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Abstract 
 
This dissertation explores the role and significance of the ancient Greek myth of 
Prometheus in Western philosophy from Antiquity to today. Paying particular 
attention to its moral and existential meanings, an analysis of this in-depth 
investigation produces an overview of the exceptional array of the myth’s 
functions and themes. It demonstrates that the most significant functions of the 
Prometheus myth are its social, epistemic, ontological and moral functions and 
that the myth’s most significant themes are fire, rebellion, creation, human 
nature and ambiguity. The dissertation argues that this analysis brings to light 
meaningful information on two sides of a reference to the Prometheus myth: it 
reveals the nature, functions, themes and connotations of the myth, while 
information about these functions and themes provides access to fundamental 
meanings, moral statements and ontological concepts of the studied author. 
Based on its findings this work claims that, as in history, first, the Prometheus 
myth will still be meaningful in philosophy today; and second, that the analysis 
of the myth’s functions and themes will provide access to essential ideas 
underlying contemporary references to the myth. To prove the validity of these 
claims this thesis examines the contemporary debate on ‘human enhancement’. 
Advocates as well as opponents of enhancement make use of the Prometheus 
myth in order to support their arguments. Employing the acquired knowledge 
about the myth’s functions and themes, the dissertation analyses the references 
encountered. The results of this analysis confirm that the Prometheus myth still 
has a significant role in a contemporary philosophical context. They improve our 
understanding of the philosophical argument, ontological framework and ethics 
of the debate’s participants; and thus demonstrate that the information about 
the Prometheus myth acquired in this thesis is a useful means to reveal 
fundamental ideas and conceptualisations underlying contemporary (and 
possibly future) references to the myth. 
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Introduction 
 
1.1. Dissertation Subject and Aims 
 
This dissertation explores the role and significance of the ancient Greek myth of 
Prometheus in Western philosophy from Antiquity to today. Without ever falling 
completely into oblivion as did many other ancient tales, this myth has 
experienced great popularity in the history of Western philosophy and still takes 
its place in contemporary discourse. At first sight a reference to the Prometheus 
myth may seem a mere illustration and the text’s tone may be light. Yet each 
time the myth occurs, this happens against a background of serious arguments 
and discussions. It carries (amongst other things) strong moral and existential 
meanings, an analysis of which can reveal significant information regarding the 
ethics and ontology of the author of the text in question. 
A lively discussion in which the myth of Prometheus plays its part today 
is the debate on human enhancement. The debate centres on the question 
whether emerging technologies such as genetic engineering could be used to 
‘enhance’ the human – eventually perhaps even create a posthuman species – 
and if we could, whether we should or not. The discussion is always ethically 
loaded and draws much attention from all sides – from scientists and 
philosophers to politics and media. One of the most important philosophical 
topics of the discussion is what it means to be human when, for instance, the 
debate concerns the difference between the human and posthuman being. Yet 
even though this means the definition of human nature is in question, the 
ontological concepts of the debate’s participants are often implicit and/or 
unclear, which in turn detracts from their arguments. Now several academics 
have concentrated their thinking on the concepts of human nature in the debate, 
but none of them has studied the role and meaning of the myth of Prometheus – 
which interestingly, is employed by both advocates and opponents of 
enhancement in support of their respective positions. Here my hypothesis is 
that such an investigation can significantly improve our understanding of the 
participants’ positions and the debate as a whole, for it can bring to light 
relevant information about the employed concepts of the human, the ethical 
value of these concepts and much more. For this reason, this thesis seeks to 
explore the Prometheus references in the contemporary enhancement debate. 
Yet how can the Prometheus myth serve as a means to clarify an 
author’s/debater’s conceptual framework? The historical occurrences of the 
Prometheus myth have been studied before. But to my knowledge nobody 
concentrated on the significance of the myth’s specific functions and themes in 
the presentation of an author’s philosophical arguments and ontological ideas. 
In order to bridge this gap, this dissertation has made the historical references 
to the Prometheus myth in Western philosophy the focus of an in-depth 
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investigation, with particular attention paid to the existential concepts used. The 
data of this investigation form the material for an analysis that produces an 
overview of the myth’s exceptional array of functions and themes and their 
significance in an understanding of an author’s philosophical position and 
ontological framework. The outcome of this analysis will in turn be put to use to 
analyse the human enhancement discourse. 
 
In sum, this thesis aims 
  
- to investigate the systematic use of the Prometheus myth in 
Western philosophy, with particular attention to ontological 
concepts; 
- to form an overview of the exceptional functions and themes of the 
Prometheus myth; 
- to demonstrate the usefulness of this information when analysing 
an author’s philosophical argument and ontological framework; 
- to analyse the Prometheus references in the contemporary debate 
on human enhancement with the acquired knowledge of the 
myth’s functions and themes at hand, in order to 1) demonstrate 
the continuing relevance of the Prometheus myth today; 2) 
improve our understanding of the philosophical argument, 
ontological framework and ethics of the debate’s participants; 3) 
demonstrate the validity and (future) relevance of the employed 
knowledge of the myth. 
 
The results of this dissertation will contribute to academic knowledge regarding 
the history of the Prometheus myth; the role of the Prometheus myth in (the 
history of) philosophy; the relation between the Prometheus myth and the 
concept of human nature (humanity, ‘the human’, etc.1); the Prometheus myth’s 
specific functions and themes; the utility of these functions and themes in an 
analysis of an author’s philosophical argument and existential concept; more 
generally the function of myth in philosophical argument and thinking; our 
understanding of the enhancement debate and in particular of the ontological 
frameworks used. 
 
                                                 
1
 I use the words ‘humanity’,  ‘humankind’, ‘mortals’, ‘humans’ and ‘the human’ interchangeably. 
When speaking of ‘the human’ my aim was to (roughly) use masculine and feminine pronouns 
alternately. However, since many of the works discussed are historical and written by men, 
masculine pronouns will be used more often than feminine ones. Of course, where ‘he’ is 
written, one can always read ‘she’ and the other way around. 
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A Definition of Myth 
 
A major subject of this thesis is the nature of myth. In chapter 4 I will have a 
close look at different definitions and explanations of myth. Until then, I will be 
working with the Oxford Dictionary definition of myth as “a traditional story, 
especially one concerning the early history of a people or explaining a natural or 
social phenomenon, and typically involving supernatural beings or events”.2 
 
1.2. The Myth of Prometheus 
 
The Figure 
 
Who is Prometheus? For a start, relevant information can already be gained 
from his name, which is usually translated as ‘forethought’, ‘forethinker’ or 
‘foresight’, depending on the etymological analysis and the way his role is 
interpreted. Most scholars argue its cognates are the Greek prefix pro-, i.e. 
‘before’, and metis, i.e. ‘cunning’, ‘intelligence’, or pro- and the verb medomai or 
manthano, i.e. ‘to learn’. It is completed by the suffix -eus, thus explaining his 
name as ‘the one who reflects/thinks in advance’, leading to translations such 
as ‘forethinker’3. However, some linguists argue it has Proto-Indo-European 
roots and is derived from the Vedic Sanskrit prefix and verb pra math, ‘to steal’, 
which would explain his name as ‘the one who steals’. They support their 
argument by the fact that the verb is also used in a Vedic myth on the theft of 
fire4. 
Similarly, Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant emphasise the 
“indeniable connection” for the Greeks between Prometheus’ name and 
“promethes, foreseeing, or prometheia, foresight; and equally between the 
name of his brother Epimetheus and epimetheia, afterthought”5. However, I 
would like to emphasise that to interpret his name as ‘foresight’ rather than 
‘forethought’ is not completely identical and not without consequences. 
Foresight suggests him having the ability to predict the future, which he does in 
Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound but not in Hesiod’s narratives. In the latter, 
Prometheus rather stands for clever thinking and contemplation, so that a 
translation of ‘forethought’ would be more appropriate.  
There are several versions of Prometheus’ character, background or 
origin. In his Theogony, Hesiod writes that he is a son of Iapetos and Klymene, 
who are Titans. The Titans are the divine generation that rule before the 
Olympian gods and the direct offspring of Gaia (Earth) and Ouranos (Sky, 
                                                 
2
 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/myth?q=myth ; last visited 29-08-2014. 
3
 C. Dougherty, Prometheus (New York: Routledge, 2006), 4. 
4
 Benjamin W. Fortson, Indo-European Language and Culture: An Introduction (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2011), 31. 
5
 Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, 
trans. Janet Lloyd (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978), 93. 
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Heaven). In Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, Gaia is Prometheus’ own mother, 
which means he is not merely a son of the Titans, but a Titan himself. In the 
works of Plato nothing is said about the generation he belongs to. There is not 
one ‘correct’ originary story, but since Prometheus always has a family 
relationship with the Titans for the purpose of this thesis I will use the phrase 
‘the Titan’ and ‘Prometheus’ interchangeably. 
 
The Myth 
 
There is not one canonical version, which makes it simply impossible to tell ‘the’ 
myth of Prometheus. Nevertheless, there is a nice summary in the Library, a 
mythological handbook written by an Athenian scholar named Apollodorus (180-
120 BC). The different aspects of the myth are conveniently united into one, 
comprehensive story, straightforwardly told in one paragraph: 
 
“Prometheus molded men from water and earth and gave them fire which he had 
hidden in a fennel stalk unknown to Zeus. When Zeus learned of it, he ordered 
Hephaestus to nail Prometheus to Mount Caucasus in Scythia. Prometheus was 
pinned there for many years. An eagle swooped down upon him daily and ate his liver, 
which grew back during the night. This is the penalty Prometheus paid for stealing fire 
until Heracles freed him”
6
. 
 
Apollodorus’ paragraph does not contain all events and personages that occur 
in the many different variations of the Prometheus myth, but it does sum up 
almost all of the myth’s most characteristic themes: creation (of the human), 
beneficence, human progress, fire/knowledge, courage, rebellion, theft, hubris, 
punishment and salvation. These themes will keep on returning in the myth’s 
lively journey throughout history. Some authors only pick one or two themes 
they consider most relevant; others try to include as many as possible in their 
story; and again others transform the story so much it is barely recognisable. 
However, a close look at the references will reveal that each version contains at 
least one of the myth’s essential elements. 
 
1.3. Mythological Characters 
 
Apart from Prometheus there are of course several gods and other mythological 
figures that have their part in the myth. Those who play a significant role I 
shortly describe below, the other figures will be described and explained at the 
relevant point in question. 
 
Epimetheus – Prometheus’ brother, whose name, as we saw, is based upon the 
word epimetheia, consisting of the prefix epi-, i.e. ‘after’, and metis, or 
                                                 
6
 Apollodorus, Gods and Heroes of the Greeks: The Library of Apollodorus (Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1976), 1.7.1. 
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medomai/manthano. Contrary to his brother, Epimetheus is thus ‘afterthinking’, 
or ‘afterseeing’, which means he is not so clever and indeed always brings 
himself and others into trouble. 
 
Olympians – the group of twelve Greek gods who rule after they have 
conquered the Titans. They are named after their place on the Mount Olympus 
and are all related in some way. The Olympian gods that play an important role 
in more than one variation of the Prometheus myth are: 
 
- Athena – the goddess of intelligence and war 
- Hephaistos – the blacksmith god 
- Herakles – a demigod, the son of Zeus who completed the famous 
Twelve Labours 
- Hermes – the god of travel and athletics and personal messenger 
of Zeus 
- Zeus – the Father or King of the Olympians and the supreme ruler 
of the universe 
 
Pandora – the first woman on earth, who carries the infamous box – actually a 
jar – with human miseries. There are several possible etymological analyses: 
her name is usually explained as a combination of pān, i.e. ‘all’ and dōron, i.e. 
‘gift’ and thus translated as the “gift of all”7 or “giver of all”8. There are, however, 
other interpretations: Boccaccio argues her name was formed out of the words 
pān, and doris, i.e. ‘bitterness’, for human life is literally all bitterness9. 
 
Titans – the powerful divine and immortal beings of an earlier generation than 
the Olympian gods. They are the offspring of Gaia (Earth) and Ouranos (Sky, 
Heaven) and rule the Universe in the Golden Age. Kronos is their chief, but his 
son Zeus defeats him and the other Titans in the Titanomachy (War of the 
Titans) and takes his place.  
 
I wish to point out that the Romans often had their own version of a 
mythological figure and his story, and virtually all of the figures had a different 
name. Zeus, for instance, was Jupiter in Latin. In principle I will use the Greek 
names and spell them in one way, which may differ from an author’s spelling. 
Yet if the author I discuss uses the Roman name I will follow him in that. 
 
                                                 
7
 Fulgentius, Fulgentius the Mythographer, trans. L. G. Whitbread (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1971), 2.6. 
8
 Dougherty, Prometheus, 41. 
9
 Giovanni Boccaccio, Genealogy of the Pagan Gods, vol. I (London: Harvard University Press, 
2011), IV, 45.2. 
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1.4. The Plan for this Study 
 
This introduction is followed by chapter 2, which presents the primary sources 
of the Prometheus myth. I chose to concentrate on writings by Hesiod, 
Aeschylus and Plato: these I consider the most important ancient texts since 
they are in fact the main sources of the later references to the myth. 
The third chapter is an historical inquiry into the use of the Prometheus 
myth within philosophy and, to a lesser extent, literature and art. I 
chronologically examine and critically analyse the references to the myth, in 
order to a) establish its meaning and role in each text or artifice; b) point out 
significant similarities, dissimilarities and patterns amongst the texts; and c) 
show how the myth develops through the ages. The overarching aim of this and 
the previous chapter is to produce a satisfying amount of information on the 
basis of which I can then continue my analysis in chapter 4. 
In chapter 4 my aim is to find an answer to the question why especially 
this myth has never lost people’s interest throughout history. I continue the 
study of the ideas, arguments and images I saw arise out of the many variations 
of the Prometheus myth in the second and third chapter. Based upon a critical 
analysis of my findings, in the first part of this chapter I determine what the most 
important functions of the Prometheus myth are: the social, epistemic, 
ontological and moral functions. The second part of the chapter is an extensive 
analysis of the myth’s characteristic themes: fire, rebellion, creation, human 
nature and ambiguity. In the appendix to this chapter I provide an overview of 
the relevant functions and themes of each work. 
The chapter’s analysis brings to light significant information on two sides of a 
reference to the Prometheus myth: it reveals the nature, functions, themes and 
connotations of the myth; while information about these functions and themes 
provides access to fundamental meanings, moral statements and existential 
concepts of the studied author. Working from my findings I explain how the 
Prometheus myth survived so many centuries and on their basis I claim that a) 
the Prometheus myth must still be meaningful in philosophy today; and b) that 
the analysis of the myth’s functions and themes must (as with the historical 
cases) provide access to essential ideas underlying contemporary thinkers’ 
references to the myth. 
In order to prove the validity of the last two claims in the fifth and last 
chapter of this thesis I examine the contemporary debate on human 
enhancement, in which advocates as well as opponents of enhancement make 
use of the Prometheus myth in order to support their arguments. Employing the 
information about the myth’s functions and themes – such as about its inherent 
ambivalence and ontological significance – from the previous chapter, I analyse 
the references encountered. The results of this analysis prove, first, that the 
Prometheus myth indeed still has a meaningful role in a contemporary 
philosophical context; and, second, that the acquired information about the 
Trijsje Franssen    Prometheus Through the Ages 
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myth’s functions and themes is useful as a means to reveal fundamental ideas, 
moral and existential concepts underlying the participants’ references. 
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2. The Ancient Myth of Prometheus 
 
As far as we know, the myth of Prometheus originates at least 2700 years ago, 
as that is roughly the time in which Hesiod’s version was composed. It is 
reasonable to assume that the myth already existed before that time, but 
unfortunately we do no longer have those older versions at our disposal.10 
Although there are more ancient authors who narrate or mention the myth – 
Aesop, Menander and Philemon for instance – in this chapter I will study 
Hesiod’s, Aeschylus’ and Plato’s versions of the story. For theirs are by far the 
most important primary sources: they provide the most extended literary 
treatments of the Prometheus myth and it is one (or a combination) of these 
classics the authors have in mind when later in history they tell about the Titan. 
 
2.1. Hesiod 
 
From the ancient authors I discuss in this chapter the poet Hesiod (7th-8th 
century BC) paints the most negative picture of the Titan: he is a trickster figure 
who, with his hubristic attitude and plots made a significant contribution to the 
misery of human existence. How he did and how much Hesiod laments this I 
will discuss below, exploring Prometheus’ role in the poet’s Works and Days 
and Theogony. 
 
2.1.1. Life’s Hardness 
 
Why is human life so tough? Why do mortals have to work so hard, endure 
sorrow, misery, and pain, and slowly decline until they die? In Works and Days, 
Hesiod narrates several myths in order to explain why. The poem is directed at 
his lazy brother Perses who “made off”11 with more than his fair share of their 
inheritance. By means of myths and stories Hesiod lectures him on how to live, 
emphasising the importance of justice and work, for instance: “[Y]ou, Perses, 
you listen to Justice, and do not cultivate Violence [hubris, TF]”; “Work, you fool 
Perses. Work the work the gods laid out for men”12. However, as the poem 
includes many general, grandiose, sometimes even bombastic statements or 
aphorisms, it seems to be addressed just as much at an external audience: 
“Violent behaviour is bad for a poor man. Even a rich man can’t afford it”; 
“Hunger is the lazy man’s constant companion”13. In other words, Hesiod is 
                                                 
10
 I do not claim that Prometheus’ name never appears in any older document, but none of the 
works or secondary literature I consulted mention any older version of the myth. 
11
 Hesiod, Works and Days and Theogony, trans. Stanley Lombardo (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1993), 54. When I am referring to Hesiod’s work the numbers will 
represent the poem’s lines instead of page numbers. 
12
 Ibid., 246–247; 447–448. 
13
 Ibid., 248–249; 345. 
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presenting a statement on how to make the best out of human life as it is, an 
example of what Robert Lamberton calls “wisdom poetry”14. And apparently 
life’s unfortunate character also requires explanation – according to Hesiod it 
used to be different. In the section “Why Life Is Hard” the poet describes how 
humans used to live like gods, “not a care in their hearts, nothing to do with 
hard work or grief, and miserable old age didn’t exist for them”15.  
 
“But Zeus got his spleen up, went and hid 
How to make a living, all because shifty Prometheus 
Tricked him. That’s why Zeus made life hard for humans. 
He hid fire. But that fine son of Iapetos stole it 
Right back out from under Zeus’ nose, hiding 
The flame in a fennel stalk”
16
. 
 
2.1.2. The Cunning Trickster 
 
Both fatal tricks Hesiod refers to are described in his Theogony.17 In this work, 
the author gives a concise account of the origin of the cosmos and the gods. 
After outlining in detail which divine generations preceded the Olympian gods in 
their rule of the universe and how the latter – Zeus, Hera, Athena, and so on – 
came into being, Hesiod relates the story of Prometheus. Prometheus was a 
son of Iapetos, who was a Titan – one of the older generations, the direct 
offspring of the Earth (Gaia) and Sky (Ouranos). Hesiod characterises 
Prometheus by his cunning and trickery: his mind is “a shimmer” and he is “the 
smartest of them all”18. He does not, however, depict Prometheus as capable of 
true predictions – ‘foresight’ – but rather of ‘forethought’, as otherwise he should 
have been able to ‘foresee’ both humanity’s and his own fate. Prometheus does 
advise his not so clever, ‘afterthinking’ brother Epimetheus not to accept any gift 
from Zeus – which his brother does nevertheless, with terrible effects. However, 
that does not mean Prometheus foresaw these effects, it could just as well have 
been nothing but caution. 
Despite his clever, ‘forethinking’, and well-meaning actions, in both 
Works and the Theogony Prometheus’ manoeuvres have disastrous 
consequences for himself as well as for the human race. In the Theogony 
Hesiod relates how he tried to deceive Zeus “when the gods and mortal men 
were negotiating at Mekone”19. Prometheus offered the “high lord of Olympos”20 
                                                 
14
 Ibid., 1. 
15
 Ibid., 132–134. 
16
 Ibid., 557–559. 
17
 It is unclear whether the poems that are assigned to Hesiod (The Theogony, Works and 
Days, and The Shield of Heracles) indeed have been written by one and the same author (see 
e.g. the introduction to Hesiod’s work (literature referred to here), written by Lamberton). 
However, as this fact does not significantly influence my interpretation and use of these 
versions of the myth I will keep on referring to Hesiod as their author. 
18
 Hesiod, Works and Days and Theogony, 513; 561. 
19
 Ibid., 537–8. 
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what seemed to be a portion of appetising ox meat and fat, whereas it merely 
consisted of bones. He had hidden the desirable meat in the ox’s stomach, 
which he kept for the humans. However, Zeus, “eternally wise”21, realised 
before making his choice that he was being cheated and in anger withheld the 
divine fire from the mortals. “But that fine son of Iapetos outwitted him and stole 
the far-seen gleam of weariness fire in a hollow fennel stalk”22 and gave it to 
humanity. Unfortunately, this further enraged Zeus, who punished both 
Prometheus and the mortals. However clever the hubristic trickster may have 
been, in the end Zeus’ “imperishable wisdom” attained victory over his. 
 
2.1.3. Humanity’s Benefactor? 
 
On the one hand, Prometheus is presented as a benefactor of humanity. He 
shows the courage to cheat Zeus by means of his cunning guile; he presents 
humans with the most appetising food; he steals fire so that they may enjoy its 
“weariless power”; and he advises his brother not to accept Zeus’ presents “in 
case trouble should come of it to mortals”23. On the other hand, although 
especially the theft of fire is meant to improve human life, it has degrading 
results for humanity. Up to Prometheus’ myth Hesiod’s Theogony has not 
narrated anything yet about a separation between humankind and the gods. 
The ‘befuddling’ of Zeus’ wits even takes place when gods and humans were 
‘negotiating’ at Mekone at what – as Prometheus serves up portions of meat – 
apparently is a banquet. Carol Dougherty reveals that Mekone was a truly 
existing city and an extremely fertile place, while simultaneously (according to 
the writings of several ancient authors) also being “the place where the gods 
established their seat and divided up their privileges at the end of the war 
against the Giants”24. The negotiation thus takes place at a location where both 
gods and mortals sojourned, at a time at which they still feast together, still live 
side by side. 
However, as the myth continues, men and gods are separated in several 
ways and hence the human position moves downscale. First, the trick with the 
ox establishes the tradition of sacrifice. The “artfully tricked out” bones explain 
“why the tribes of men on earth burn white bones to the immortals upon 
smoking altars”25. From now on, humans present sacrifices to the immortals. 
This means that a hierarchy has been established and humanity does not 
occupy the highest rank. 
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Second, the section in Works explaining “why life is hard”, fantasises how life 
would have been if Zeus would not have hidden “how to make a living” – or, 
translating the Greek word ‘βίον’, life – 
 
“Else, you might get enough done in one day to keep you fixed for a year without 
working. You might just hang your plowshare up in the smoke, and all the fieldwork 
done by your oxen and hard-working mules would soon run to ruin”
26
. 
 
In former times, the human had indeed been living a life as divine as the one 
depicted above. Works narrates that before the brothers’ actions “the human 
race had lived off the land without any trouble, no hard work, no sickness or 
pain that the Fates give to men”27. Further, the next tale in Works relates how 
humankind slowly fell downhill over “Five Ages” from a Golden generation who 
“lived like gods”28 to a terrible “Iron Age” – the one in which humanity finds itself 
now. Although Hesiod does not connect it explicitly with Prometheus’ story, the 
fact that the tale about the ages immediately follows his story does suggest that 
the wonderful state the mortals lived in ‘before’ Prometheus’ deceits had been 
the Golden Age. His tricks provide an explanation for the humans’ decline and 
why they ended up in the Iron Age. In any case, as the former myth relates, 
Zeus hid βίον “all because shifty Prometheus tricked him”. In other words, all 
the hard work that humans have to do in order to nourish themselves is due to 
Prometheus’ plots, and it is thus another – though indirect – manner in which 
the Titan’s son caused a strong distinction between humanity and the deities.  
Third, the fact that the Theogony narrates how Zeus, after Prometheus’ trick 
with the ox “wouldn’t give the power of weariless fire to the ashwood mortals 
who live on the earth”29 and how Works, too, relates that he “hid fire”, could be 
understood as meaning that before the sacrificial trick, mortals must thus have 
disposed of the same divine fire that Zeus possesses – he was able to remove 
it. Drawing an analogy between ‘hiding livelihood’ (as explained above) and 
‘hiding fire’, Vernant argues indeed that 
 
“originally celestial fire was freely available to men on the ashtrees where Zeus placed 
it; but henceforward, since fire is hidden, it must be buried deep ‘in a hollow stem’ [...] 
and then it must be continually fed for this fire only lives if it is fuelled (cf. Herodotus, III, 
16)”
30
. 
 
Contrary to the celestial fire that Zeus, “the high lord of thunder”31, can use 
whenever he pleases, the ‘stolen’ fire that humanity ends up with appears to be 
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a mere flame: it needs to be kept alive “in a hollow fennel stalk” since it will 
otherwise expire. If Vernant is right, this flaming change also separates 
humanity from the gods, as it diminishes one of the mortals’ former powers and 
thus also provides a reason to raise their esteem for the deities. However, to 
assume that ‘not to give’ is exactly the same as ‘to hide’, and that the latter 
implies that whatever was hidden must thus have been available before to the 
indirect object of the gift is too strong a claim in my view. Therefore, I consider it 
a possibility but not a fact that humanity disposed of divine fire before Zeus 
decided to hide it.32 
The final and most radical degradation of the mortals took place when 
Zeus decided to make humanity pay for Prometheus’ theft. He ordered the 
Olympian gods to create a “lovely evil to balance the good”33: Pandora, the first 
woman and a gorgeous but wicked being. “From her is the [...] deadly race and 
population of women, a great infestation among mortal men, at home with 
Wealth but not with Poverty”34. Women are a torment for several reasons. They 
are wonderful to look at, but a “sheer deception” as well; stunning, but 
“irresistible to men” at the same time35. The Theogony compares them to 
drowsy insects, for men – when married – will need to work all day, just as 
bees, “while the drones stay inside [...], stuffing their stomachs with the work of 
others”36. Even a ‘good wife’ will result in a life full of problems, as the husband 
will still have to bear the struggle and pain that this union inevitably brings 
along. Women and the institution of marriage thus also make men fall from their 
Golden state. Works illustrates the female maleficence in more detail, just as 
Pandora’s arrival among the mortals. Apart from having “an immortal goddess’ 
face and the figure like a beautiful, desirable virgin’s [sic]”, Pandora is also 
equipped with “knee-weakening anguish”, “a bitchy mind and a cheating heart”, 
and “lies and wheedling words”37. In this slightly different version of the myth 
she becomes – even more emphatically than in the Theogony – the origin of all 
harms, ills, and horrors that exist in human life: she carried the notorious ‘box’ 
that made an end to humankind’s comfortable existence. Epimetheus accepted 
her as a gift from the gods, despite his foreseeing brother’s warning and then 
 
“the woman took the lid off the big jar with her hands and scattered all the miseries that 
spell sorrow for men. Only Hope was left there in the unbreakable container, stuck 
under the lip of the jar, and could not fly out: the woman clamped the lid back on the jar 
first [...]. But ten thousand or so other horrors spread out among men. The earth is full 
of evil things, and so’s the sea. Diseases wander around just as they please, by day 
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and by night, soundlessly, since Zeus in his wisdom deprived them of voice. There’s 
just no way you can get around the mind of Zeus”
38
. 
 
2.1.4. Analysis 
 
The last sentence seems to be the main moral of the story: even Prometheus, 
despite his cunning trickery and forethought, could not escape Zeus’ almighty 
powers. Hubris will be punished, for not only was humanity sent into trouble, 
Prometheus was severely disciplined as well. For years, Zeus had the immortal 
god chained to a pillar, and an eagle devour his liver – each day again, as it 
would grow back at night. Eventually, the semi-divine hero Herakles slew the 
bird and “drove off the evil affliction from Iapetos’ son and released him from his 
misery”39. But still, this was “not without the will of Zeus” 40, aggrandising the 
glory of his son Herakles. 
However, the moral is a bit more complex than merely stating that Zeus 
is the almighty one and hubris will be punished. Very interesting is the relation 
between Prometheus, his brother and the humans and the consequences of 
their actions for them. What deserves attention, for instance, is the ambiguity of 
some of the main characters, and even the myth itself. First, Prometheus: on 
the one hand, he is intelligent, cunning and courageous and chooses to take 
humanity’s part, apparently out of pure altruism. On the other hand, he is a 
hubristic trickster who crosses boundaries and, moreover, seems to enjoy the 
very act of misleading: “Prometheus, whose mind was devious, smiled softly 
and remembered his trickery”41. In other words, his personality cannot be purely 
good. Furthermore, as explained in the former section, although he is a 
benefactor of humankind, he is just as much, as D. J. Conacher puts it, “the 
indirect cause of all man’s woes”42. His character as well as the consequences 
of his actions thus make his figure rather ambivalent. 
Pandora plays an ambivalent role too. Her wonderful, divine looks 
disguise her lying nature, her “bitchy mind” and “cheating heart”. After 
Prometheus stole fire, Zeus angrily thunders he is “going to give [humans] Evil 
in exchange for fire, their very own Evil to love and embrace”43. She makes men 
suffer – not only because of the awful jar, but also because she will “stuff her 
stomach” with the work of others – while at the same time she is needed as 
well: the Theogony relates that the man who does not marry (so that he may 
keep his harvest for himself) will die all alone and have his inheritance divided 
by “distant relatives”. Pandora is a trap but indispensable, a “sheer deception” 
but “irresistible to men”. 
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Third, there is Epimetheus, who because of his silliness and tardiness 
obviously forms the complete reverse of Prometheus. He lacks his brother’s 
predictive capacities, is ‘witless’ or even stupid. Although Epimetheus is briefly 
alluded to in the Theogony, in Works Prometheus’ brother seems to play a role 
that is just as important as the one of his cunning sibling. The latter is of course 
the one that originated all human trouble in the first place. However, 
Epimetheus is just as much the initiator of humankind’s misery, as it was him 
who accepted the vicious woman. In the duel which (this version of) the myth 
narrates, together they even seem to represent the human. As Vernant notices, 
“[T]his pair of brothers who are the complementary opposites of each other, [...] 
this union of subtle foresight and stupid shortsightedness, is characteristic of the 
human condition”44. Together they mirror the ambiguous condition in which 
humans encounter themselves: sometimes able to ‘foresee’ as much as 
Prometheus, while at other times suffering from the extreme Epimethean 
shortsightedness. 
Finally, what is said about hope is rather enigmatic: what does it mean 
that it remains stuck in the jar? On the one hand, it could signify that all that was 
left for humanity, tormented by all the horrors that spread out among them, was 
Hope – hope for improvement of whatever nature. On the other hand, it could 
mean the opposite: precisely because it “couldn’t fly out” it were just the evil 
things which scattered, and thus not even hope would be available to humanity. 
Although the latter is perhaps more logical, the former interpretation seems to 
be the right one. Throughout the myth it is emphasised several times that good 
and evil are intertwined: not just Prometheus’ and Pandora’s characters 
embody both, but also the sacrifice, marriage, and fire, which could only be 
reached through a wicked action. When Pandora has been fabricated, the 
Theogony relates that Zeus “made this lovely evil to balance the good”45. In 
other words, evil is introduced into the human world but the good has not 
disappeared completely – it was just drastically reduced. Therefore, as long as 
the good still exists, Hope should be possible for humankind. Of course we 
should not forget that hope in itself is ambivalent. As Dougherty phrases it, 
 
“it can encourage a man to work hard [...] in anticipation of a prosperous future or it can 
delude an idle man into an unrealistic expectation of a life of ease. Neither gods nor 
beasts have any need for hope, only humans who are defined by their curiosity about 
the future together with their imperfect knowledge of it”
46
.  
 
Hope, too, is thus emblematic for the human condition – a condition which, after 
its establishment by Prometheus, is characterised precisely by ambiguity. 
Sacrifice and agriculture establish the human position between gods and 
animals: working hard but sacrificing and domesticating the latter. Fire is divine 
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and enables them to cook, while on the other hand it is stolen and needs to be 
kept alive. Women are attractive and necessary, but thieving and deceptive at 
the same time. They can have a divine appearance, are human in that they 
speak and marry, but their bitchiness and voracious belly makes them bestial. 
As said, hope mirrors humans’ Promethean forethinking, as well as their 
Epimethean lack of knowledge. And so Hesiod’s myth does not merely state 
that one can’t get around the mind of Zeus, but it also presents the human as a 
courageous but tricky, pretty but lying, loving but suffering, intelligent but always 
knowledge lacking being. 
 
2.2. Aeschylus 
 
Humanity’s fate, Prometheus’ character and success, his relation to Zeus and 
even less prominent elements such as the role of hope are radically changed in 
Aeschylus’ (ca. 525-456 BC) version of the myth. Conacher even states that 
“[t]here can be little doubt that the re-creation of Prometheus from his relatively 
humble origins in the Hesiodic tradition into the great founder of the practical 
arts was almost entirely the work of Aeschylus”47 – although he does stress that 
the playwright’s ‘transformation’ of the god has been perpetuated and fortified 
by numerous poets and writers of later eras. Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound is 
probably the best known account of the myth, the one which indeed strongly 
inspired many wordsmiths of, for instance, the Romantic age. 
As the name already reveals, the Prometheus Bound covers the times in 
which Prometheus is ‘ironbound’ to the rocks. It is one of the plays of a tragic 
trilogy: the Prometheia, consisting of the Prometheus Bound (Vinctus), 
Prometheus Unbound (Luomenos) and Prometheus the Fire-bearer 
(Pyrphoros). Unfortunately, the Prometheus Bound is the only play remaining in 
its entirety. All that has been preserved of the latter two plays is a small 
collection of citations or references in the work of other ancient authors. 
Nevertheless, the silhouette of the second play can be reconstructed with 
relative certitude, its most important occurrence being that Prometheus is 
released by Herakles. When it comes to the narrative of the ‘final’ play we do 
not have much more at our disposal than speculation, as there are only three 
very short passages of classical evidence which do not confirm much more than 
the play’s existence. Therefore, in the following, I will be speaking of the 
Prometheus Bound – unless the other fragments are relevant to the text’s 
analysis – and after that I will elaborate a little more on the Prometheus 
Unbound.  
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2.2.1. Brute Force versus Cunning 
 
The play opens with a scene in which Prometheus is forcefully dragged to the 
summit of a remote Scythian mountain48 by Zeus’ minions Power (Kratos) and 
Violence (Bia). At the strong insistence of these two Hephaistos, the blacksmith 
god, reluctantly executes Zeus’ order and chains Prometheus to “this inhuman 
cliff”49. Prometheus starts lamenting his agony as soon as they have left. He 
has already foreseen that for ten thousand years he must remain chained to this 
rock and as is revealed later in the play, at some point an eagle will arrive to 
nourish himself each day with his liver. In contrast to Hesiod, Aeschylus does 
not speak of any manipulated sacrifice by means of which Prometheus would 
have wanted to deceive Zeus. On the contrary, the immortal, suffering god 
narrates how Zeus’ victory after the Clash of the Titans was in part thanks to his 
helpful advice. His mother Gaia, the Earth, “had sung time and again [...] how 
the war is won not by brute force but by cunning”50. As the Titans would not 
listen to his clever plans, Prometheus decided to help the Olympians, and so 
“[t]hanks to the strategy I devised, the black hole of Tartaros holds and hides 
archaic Kronos and all his allies too”51. His mother being Gaia in this play 
makes Prometheus’ willingness towards Zeus and his collaborators extra 
remarkable as this signifies he is not merely a son of the Titans (as in Hesiod’s 
version), but one of their members and therefore even more closely related to 
the defeated ones that are thrown into Tartaros: the abyss of punishment in the 
underworld. Yet he chooses to support the Olympians because they, unlike the 
Titans, did listen to his sharp tactics. And they win indeed, which already 
indicates early within the story the moral of the play – verbalised by 
Prometheus’ mother – that in conflict ‘cunning’ defeats ‘brute force’. It suggests 
that despite him being bound, the intelligent and knowing Titan might not be 
completely overcome by the ‘almighty’ brute after all. 
 
2.2.2. Hope, Foresight and Mortality 
 
Unfortunately, and without it being a response to anything – such as a 
deceptive trick from Prometheus – the Olympian Father conceives a plan to 
wipe out the whole human race. It is worth noticing that by leaving out the 
Mekone trickery and by having Zeus planning the extinction of humankind 
before Prometheus’ theft of fire Aeschylus takes away Hesiod’s ‘justification’ for 
the Olympian’s plot. This completely changes the reader’s impression of Zeus’ 
nature: the god’s resolution to extinguish the poor species lacks any moral 
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legitimacy – he simply decides to because “for the suffering race of mankind he 
cared nothing”52. What used to be the “eternally wise”, “high lord of Olympus” 
thus turns out to be a merciless tyrant, a barbarous despot – a significant and 
characteristic change, to which I will return below. 
Prometheus takes pity on the mortals: “no one dared stand up against 
this thing but me! I alone had the courage. I saved humanity from going 
down”53. How exactly he managed to save the humans in the face of Zeus’ 
destructive disposition is not mentioned, but apparently he succeeded one way 
or another in realising his wishes instead of the tyrant’s – which means he must 
have been rather powerful. In the same section, the brave Titan tells the chorus 
about the fire he stole from heaven for the humans and all the skills they 
acquired from it. 
Interestingly, however, Aeschylus has Prometheus start off with another 
component of his donations: hope. But no Pandora is mentioned in the entire 
play, nor is Epimetheus, let alone a jar which would have hope trapped within it. 
Here hope is a direct gift and, unlike in Hesiod’s version, it clearly has a positive 
value. Prometheus relates that he put an end to mortals foreseeing their own 
death. 
 
“Chorus: “What cure did you find for such a disease?” 
Prometheus: “Blind hopes. I sent blind hopes to settle their hearts”54. 
 
In contrast with the hope Pandora locks up in her ‘box’, it is portrayed as a true 
gain: Ocean’s daughters exclaim “[w]hat a wonderful gift you helped mankind 
with!”55. None of the characters clarify why hope is such a ‘wonderful gift’, but as 
Dougherty phrases it, “[w]hile its blindness may hamper mortal knowledge of 
the future, hope also allows man to ignore his impending death and live with 
zest”56. Instead of being completely discouraged by having the details of their 
life’s end already delineated before them from the start, humans with hope are 
more likely to have the spirit and audacity to undertake challenging enterprises, 
to try to structure and guide their own future. Hope thus enriches human life, 
and death is an evil which the human is better off not to foresee. Actually, in the 
eyes of the gods, mortality makes the human weak, or even of a lesser rank. 
When Prometheus tells Ocean’s daughters that he gave humanity fire, they cry 
out astonishedly “[f]lair-eyed fire!? Now! In the hands of these things that live 
and die!?”57. The latter designation occurs several times. Further on in the play 
the Oceanides sing that “[n]othing is sweeter than life lived as long as this may 
be; always to hope and feast, keep the heart while it throbs alive, lit up with 
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happiness”58. Immortality is obviously a good: the longer one lives, the better, 
according to the daughters – who are immortal themselves, just as Prometheus. 
They pity the Titan’s miserable situation and wonder why he even bothered to 
do the mortals good as he does not benefit from it, on the contrary: “what help 
are they? You must have seen how blind and weak, like prisoners of a dream, 
the human beings are”59. Here, death is thus depicted as a weakness and it is 
Prometheus’ immortality which keeps on feeding his rebellion against Zeus; 
which nourishes his courage and bravery, his bearing of the suffering: 
 
“Chorus: “Aren’t you afraid, throwing such talk about?” 
Prometheus: “Afraid? Why? I’m not fated to die”60. 
 
However, this immortality is also the reason he suffers so badly – or better: for 
so long – otherwise he would have given up the ghost soon. Several times 
throughout the play he laments his awful situation, and so does Io, his cow-
headed human visitor who lives a miserable life as well. She wonders why she 
did not commit suicide: 
 
“Io: “[w]hat good’s life? Why haven’t I thrown myself off this harsh rock [...] and so freed 
myself from all suffering! [...] 
Prometheus: “Then you’d be hard put to bear this agony of mine. My fate is I cannot 
die. Death would be freedom from sorrow, but now... There’s no end point to my 
misery, none until Zeus falls from power”61. 
 
By now the eagle has arrived and is feasting daily upon his liver, and so 
Prometheus wails about the pains this “bloodthirsty banqueter” causes him: 
 
“...my prison warden [...], by deathless outrage, tortures my live body – look! Only, 
myself gutted, take what agony comes, grope for an end to pain and burn, like sex, for 
death. But by the will of Zeus I’m exiled far away from death”62. 
 
Death could thus signify the end to distress, it could mean the salvation one 
longs for, and so it cannot be unconditionally qualified as something negative, 
as a disadvantage. Immortality may be the characteristic feature of the divine, 
and could imply a wonderful, infinite life; but it can just as well result in nothing 
but one’s miserable fate or the expulsion from the possibility to rest in peace. In 
summary, death is a complex question which is ambivalently evaluated.63 
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2.2.3. Founder of the Arts 
 
Other than in Hesiod’s tales, Prometheus’ gift of fire is nothing but beneficent for 
the humans and they clearly did not possess it before. It mostly has a symbolic 
meaning; Prometheus focuses on the wisdom it will bring humanity and all the 
sorts of crafts it will teach them – from writing to building houses, from 
agriculture to medicine and even the art of prophecy. It does not cause 
humankind’s degradation from a Golden to an Iron Age, on the contrary: 
Prometheus’ theft – and all that it stands for – elevates them from the infantile, 
primitive or even bestial state they were in. 
 
“Hear what wretched lives people used to lead, how babyish they were – until I gave 
them intelligence, I made them masters of their own thought. […] Men and women 
looking saw nothing, they listened and did not hear, but like shapes in a dream 
dragging out their long lives bewildered, they made hodgepodge of everything [...]. 
They swarmed like bitty ants in dugouts, in sunless caves [...]. All their work was work 
without thought, until I taught them to see what had been hard to see: where and when 
the stars rise and set. What’s more, for them I invented NUMBER: wisdom above all 
other. [...] And I was the first to put brute beasts under the yoke [...], so they could take 
the heaviest burdens off the backs of human beings”64. 
 
It is thus taken for granted that the previous absence of these capacities and 
‘technologies’ is equivalent to an ‘inferior’ stage. Furthermore, Prometheus does 
not merely uplift humans one step higher by presenting them a static gift. He 
gives them technai (singular: technē)65 – a noun which covers crafts, skills, 
art(s) and techniques – and this provides them with a means for progress. In 
contrast with his interlocutors he sees in humans the potential to create a better 
future, to improve their condition. By endowing them with knowledge, mastery of 
their thought and all these crafts and arts he gives them the ability to 
continuously develop and improve these skills. Indeed, Aeschylus thus 
transforms Prometheus into “the great founder of the practical arts” (Conacher), 
and as we will see the Titan is later often referred to as the symbol of human 
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civilisation and technological progress. “In a word: listen!”, the Titan himself 
exclaims, “[a]ll human culture comes from Prometheus”66. 
Yet humanity’s progressive capacities are not necessarily all ‘given’ by 
Prometheus. The fact, namely, that Prometheus extensively outlines everything 
that he ‘taught’, ‘showed’ and ‘invented’ does not merely emphasise his powers. 
As Eric Havelock puts it “[t]his can only mean that man on his side has been 
engaged in a prolonged enterprise of learning and instruction requiring the 
concentration of intellectual powers”67. Havelock emphasises the historical 
process that this presupposes and the fact that compared to Hesiod’s account 
of humanity, humankind as such has changed: it has become an essentially 
evolving instead of devolving species. And indeed, indirectly, it establishes the 
human as a learning being, as a being with the capacity to master techniques, 
skills, or arts, over time. Reasoning logically, a fundamental basis for the 
‘progressive abilities’ that Prometheus allegedly endows the human with, must 
thus have been there to begin with. For in order to be taught anything the 
human must have been capable to learn – whether the practices to be learned 
are given by a god or not. The human, in other words, is depicted as relatively 
autonomous and as possessing an essential progressive capacity which is even 
independent of the divine extra’s. 
Furthermore, one could interpret Prometheus not merely as the great 
founder of human culture, but as representing humanity itself. Of course, he is 
immortal, has knowledge of the future and has much more power than 
humankind: he managed to exercise strong influence on Zeus, saved the 
humans and appears to be the source of human civilisation. However, at the 
same time his condition shows strong similarities to a human one: he is in pain 
and suffers: “[b]ear with me,” he tells the chorus, “now it’s my turn for misery. 
Sorrow wanders about the world touching on each of us, and each in turn”68. 
Apparently, he sees himself as part of the world – including the human world. 
He considers himself as merely one amongst others, one out of the many 
creatures which inhabit the cosmos. ‘Sorrow’ touches him too – despite his 
divinity he suffers as an injured mortal, and shares human emotions. He ‘loves’ 
humankind, ‘feels agony’, and is frightened when he hears the daughters of 
Oceanus approaching, probably foreseeing the arrival of the eagle: “Light air 
whispers fluttering with wings! I’m afraid whatever comes!”69. He is chaotic and 
incoherent: one moment he chants courageously that Zeus will not be able to 
escape his fate, whereas at other times he suddenly bursts into desperate 
lamenting, tells the chorus that his agony will end “only when HE [Zeus -TF] 
sees fit”70 and virtually wishes to die.  
C. J. Herington concludes from such ‘contradictions’ that Prometheus  
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“appears to be deliberately represented as an unstable compound of mortal sufferer 
and immortal prophet [...]. At one moment Prometheus is totally absorbed, as any of us 
human beings would be, in the emotions and the agonies of the present, while at 
another he has the limitless and timeless vision of a God”71. 
 
I agree with Herington that Prometheus is portrayed as an unsteady being who 
combines instants of suffering and complete emotional absorption with 
moments of brilliant foresight. However, is it merely the former type of 
demeanour that should be identified as human? Herington solely classifies his 
emotional and suffering characteristics as mortal – “[i]s Prometheus a human 
sufferer or a divine seer [...]?”72. Yet I suspect it is precisely the ambiguous 
combination of suffering and foresight embodied by Prometheus that 
characterises the human condition. Moreover, as said, even death is portrayed 
as complex and ambivalent, so that the classical dichotomy between mortality 
and immortality cannot simply be aligned with that between the human and the 
divine. Yet this is precisely what Herington suggests: he explicitly contrasts the 
‘mortal sufferer’ with the ‘immortal prophet’, and thus implicitly the ‘human 
sufferer’ with the ‘divine seer’. However, Aeschylus describes the god several 
times as craving for an end to his life and so – although this death does not take 
place – he brings divinity and mortality close together. Further, although each 
individual human is mortal, as a species the human does not die. This is not 
merely due to the biological rules of evolution, but also in large part to 
humanity’s creative development and its transference of skills, technologies, 
and cultural heritage from generation to generation. In other words, humanity 
can be interpreted as immortal partially because of these typically Promethean 
capacities. Therefore, the two dichotomies mentioned above cannot be 
considered as completely equivalent, and even the Titan’s immortality provides 
a reason which supports the idea of him representing the human species. 
To review the issue in terms that are hopefully slightly more concrete 
than a fictional being’s emotions or humanity’s abstract immortality: what are 
Prometheus’ physical capacities? What hierarchal position does Prometheus 
occupy among the universe’s other existing creatures? Again, for one thing he 
is the deathless saviour of humanity. For another, he will be unable to move for 
the next 10,000 years and will thus be entirely dependent on the Olympian’s 
decisions. This makes him occupy a place between a god and an utterly 
powerless – i.e., a virtually mortal – being. It is a different situation than the 
humans’, but in a way it places Prometheus in a similar position as theirs. For 
instead of being characterised by the separation between them and the gods as 
in Hesiod’s poetry – having their inferiority emphasised, that is – in the 
Prometheus Bound humans are delineated by the difference between them and 
animals and are thus elevated instead of degraded. Previously, “[t]hey swarmed 
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like bitty ants” and had to be shown how “to put brute beasts under the yoke”. 
However, they established a line between themselves and the other creatures: 
the primitive ones or perhaps their own, former prehuman condition. A line 
drawn by the concrete techniques, their evolving potentials and the substantial 
independence this gives them. This way, the human occupies a place between 
the gods and the animals, just like Prometheus is in a state which is divine on 
the one hand, yet almost incapable of anything on the other. On a more tangible 
level, it is thus again an ambiguous combination which characterises both the 
Titan and the human creature: divine capacities on the one hand, such as 
intelligence, practical creativity and autonomy, even immortality in a way, while 
inferior – if not bestial – characteristics on the other, such as vulnerability, 
dependence and lack of capacity. 
Approaching the issue from a different perspective, several classicists 
interpret Aeschylus’ Prometheus purely as a symbol of human progress or 
rationality. By the mid-fifth century in ancient Greece, there was a strong 
scientific-rationalistic tradition coming up, considering the history of human 
cultivation from an evolutionary point of view. Since the Titan’s gifts form a 
collection which includes intelligence, mastery of thoughts, the wisdom of 
‘NUMBER’, ‘LETTERS’, and prophecy, many scholars find his speeches fit 
perfectly within the age’s development. Havelock, who extensively investigates 
the emergence of this scientific anthropology, wonders whether Prometheus is 
“equivalent to the fire he gives and [...] his instruction [is] only a concrete 
symbolization of the process of self-instruction employed by men?”73. In fact, he 
already seems to know the answer but Conacher does not agree, for this would 
be to “import into the play a humanism alien to its theme”74. Moreover, says 
Conacher, regarding the play’s topic(s) the political conflict between the gods is 
at least as important as humanity’s destiny, and so Prometheus should not be 
interpreted as nothing but “the embodiment of intelligence”75. 
Nevertheless, Prometheus could play a political role but still stand for 
humanity without being nothing but a symbol of wisdom. Interestingly, if he 
would, his gifts were the humans’ own gifts to themselves. This way, humans 
become even more autonomous and independent than if those were given by a 
divine being. Instead of merely having practical skills by means of which they 
can make progress, this would mean that humans would have the ability to 
enhance themselves with ever more progressive capacities, skills and arts – 
that is, with the sources that enable them to develop perhaps yet unimaginable 
means and skills for progress. 
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2.2.4. The Cunning and Foreseeing Rebel 
 
An important difference between Hesiod’s account and Aeschylus’ is the 
reason(s) for Prometheus’ punishment, and its validity. As mentioned before, in 
Aeschylus’ version the feast at Mekone has not taken place; instead Zeus even 
managed to win the war against the Titans thanks to Prometheus’ strategy. 
Therefore, the despot’s only ‘proper’ moral reason to punish him is the fact that 
he stole fire, which he did in order to civilise the species Zeus had wanted to 
destroy without any reasonable motivation. 
What the play emphasises just as much as the practical fact that 
Prometheus’ theft significantly enlarges humanity’s capacities is the pride, the 
boldness of Prometheus’ action, the hubris it entails in the eyes of his enemies. 
He crossed a boundary, or rather several boundaries, not only by saving 
humanity and stealing fire but also by his very attitude towards Zeus. He does 
not show any form of regret during the entire play, on the contrary: as the play 
unfolds, his statements get more and more self-confident and rebellious. But 
already from the very first scene on – and although Prometheus as yet 
maintains a stony silence – it is revealed how much the Titan’s defiance bothers 
his enemies by their insults. Power and Violence, while brutally dragging 
Prometheus over the cliffs, grumpily order Hephaistos to “[c]lamp this 
troublemaking bastard to the rock”76, “‘intellectual’ that [Prometheus] is, next to 
Zeus he’s stupid”77. They tell him he is “getting what he deserves”78 – “[y]ou 
cocky bastard”79. Hephaistos, however, feels awful about the fact that he has to 
carry out Zeus’ commands. “I haven’t the heart to chain this god, this brother!”80. 
Nevertheless, he is commissioned to “hard as [he] can, hammer the shackles 
INto him!”81. In short: according to Zeus’ allies Prometheus is an insolent 
troublemaker who betrayed all the gods, instead of a mere cheat who loses 
what is mostly a contest of wits as in Hesiod. The insults and cruelty of 
Prometheus’ punishment are due just as much to the arrogant hubris that his 
theft and attitude imply – in their view, that is. For although in practice the Greek 
concept of hubris was defined as a crime and although in tragedies it would 
almost certainly lead to the trespasser’s disaster, Aeschylus does not 
unambiguously state which of the parties is the most hubristic, nor with whose 
ruin the story will end. Yet what remains clear from the beginning is which party 
we are supposed to sympathise with. 
Aeschylus thus pictures the relation between Prometheus and the 
Olympian in a novel way, for rather than that of a trickster Prometheus fulfils the 
role of a political rebel, who even poses a certain danger to Zeus. At the end of 
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the first scene Hephaistos does his job and so the Titan is punished, but the fact 
that Hephaistos questions the ‘Father’s’ order already casts the latter’s power 
into doubt, and also the justice of Prometheus’ punishment. Throughout the play 
Zeus is portrayed as a tyrant – not least of all through the ‘new’ leader’s 
violence and the vicious disdain of his servants for their victim. Hephaistos 
warns Prometheus that “Zeus is not about to be mellow. Every ruler who’s new 
is hard”82, which explains beforehand that the often occurring reference of ‘the 
new leader’ should not be interpreted positively. Not only the Titan’s 
punishment, but also the ruler in question are challenged. Zeus has a much 
more insecure place, and Prometheus has much more power with regard to him 
than in Hesiod’s version – and not just because, being a Titan, he is older than 
the Olympian. 
That is to say that fortunately Prometheus has a weapon against the 
dictator: a secret. He knows something crucial about Zeus’ future, thanks to his 
own foreseeing abilities. Therefore, the Titan tells the chorus that the tyrant may 
be torturing him, “yet still my day will come. He’ll need me to tell Him how a new 
conspiracy [...] strips Him of His sceptre and all His privileges”83. He even 
predicts a reconciliation between him and Zeus: “[H]e’s savage, I know. He 
keeps justice in his fist. But with this hammer blow He’ll soften, He’ll calm down 
His blind stubborn rage. He’ll come to me, as a friend, I’ll love my friend 
again”84. 
Although Prometheus kept the content of his secret concealed from his 
visitors up to now, it is finally revealed in a later scene in which a heifer-headed 
human girl arrives, who is actually the beautiful princess Io. The poor, panicking 
maid had to undergo this metamorphosis because of Hera’s jealousy of Zeus’ 
feelings for her, and is now endlessly fleeing from a gadfly sent by the tyrant’s 
wife. Prometheus demonstrates his prophesising abilities by not only relating 
the preceding events that brought her in her uncomfortable position, but also 
describing the details of her forthcoming experiences. He delineates the course 
of her impending journey east and west, and tells her how many generations 
later one of her descendants will free him: the demigod Herakles, who will have 
Zeus as his father.85 
Although there are still quite some miserable millennia lying ahead of 
Prometheus as this release will happen in the far-reaching future, his cunning 
prophesies tell him that Zeus will need to have him liberated in the end. The 
reason for this is that he foresees a marriage between the Olympian ruler and a 
lady who will “bear a child greater than its Father”86. “[A]h, what a marriage... it 
will throw Him out of His throne and His tyranny [...]. None of the gods can show 
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Him the way out of these troubles. Except me. I know these things and how 
they will happen”87. As Zeus does not know the lady’s identity – the sea-
goddess Thetis88 – one day he will have to acquiesce in Prometheus’ demand 
to be freed so that the mysterious secret be revealed to him and this dethroning 
fate prevented. 
Interestingly, there are many similarities and links between Io’s and 
Prometheus’ stories, and even their destinies are intermingled. First of all, both 
Io and Prometheus suffer from Zeus’ quirks, whether love- or anger-induced, 
and both of their fates depend on the developments surrounding the tyrant’s 
potential fall. Second, Prometheus’ future saviour comes from Io’s lineage. 
Third, it is important to note that the bovine princess is the only human within 
the whole piece. It is a crucial scene as it involves the revelation of Prometheus’ 
secret and of the form of his redemption and so the fact that Io is human and 
that Prometheus chooses to disclose its content now in particular can hardly be 
a coincidence. Humankind was the reason of the entire drama between the 
gods; after much procrastination, he reveals its resolution to a human being; 
while it is thanks to a descendant of a human that the Titan will be rescued. In 
short, apart from the interwoven destinies of the two, the scene thus shows the 
complexity of the issue, its past, present and future consequences, and the 
continuous role of humanity within it. 
Speaking of the role of humanity, one wonders what the reconciliation 
predicted by Prometheus between him and Zeus may mean if one approaches 
it from the point of view in which Prometheus represents the human. Apart from 
freedom and an end to suffering, the human is then expected to experience 
forgiveness, as well as complete equivalence and peaceful reunion with the 
enemy – reminiscent of a paradisiacal situation. It completes the set of thematic 
parallels with the Fall of Adam and Eve which can be drawn with the myth on 
almost every level. Prometheus’ theft of fire and the couple’s eating from the 
tree of knowledge both aim for providing the humans with divine wisdom. Both 
actions lead to punishment, expulsion from an original state of happiness and to 
a life or condition which consists of constant suffering. Furthermore, there is 
also a parallel between the myth and the biblical story when it comes to The 
End, which has, ultimately, salvation in reserve, reconciliation, and return to the 
heavenly roots. Later, I will examine this fascinating correlation in more detail. 
For now, it emphasises the symbolic meaning of the myth. 
Whether it is likely that Zeus and Prometheus will end up as loving 
friends, will be discussed below. In any case, Io’s visit has assured Prometheus 
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of his future release. This is why, when Zeus’ messenger Hermes appears in 
order to obtain the essential information for his father, Prometheus laughs 
scornfully at his threats. None of the messenger’s menacing and blackmailing 
attempts manage to get Prometheus to reveal the secret – not even his 
reassurance that Zeus will send an ‘EAGLE’ who will feast upon Prometheus’ 
liver. Every night his organ will regenerate so that his torture can be 
continuously repeated. However, it does not change his mind as the Titan 
foresaw the details of his suffering anyway: “I knew all this and knew it all along. 
Still, I meant to be wrong. I knew what I was doing. Helping humankind I helped 
myself to misery”89. The Titan may be confrontational, antagonistic and insolent 
– accusing Hermes of having a “pompous mouth” and being a “puppet god” – 
but the messenger’s insults and derogatory tone obviously depict him, too, as a 
disdainful figure and thus anything but a sympathetic deity. Although he calls 
Prometheus insensible and hubristic, the servant himself – and his authoritarian 
boss – may be just as hubristic. When Prometheus is justifying one of his own 
insults towards Hermes, he declares “‘Tis right so to insult [ύβρίζειν, treat with 
hubris – TF] the hubristic”90. In other words, Aeschylus states again that 
Prometheus is far from the only overconfident figure. And whereas his hubris 
may lie in the proud, aggressive, or even violent utterances by means of which 
he opposes his enemies, their hubris does not merely lie in insults but also in 
the violence and aggression of their ruling. 
 
2.2.5. The End 
 
When Hermes has run out of threats, he leaves Prometheus empty-handed, 
and the play ends with the doom the messenger warned him about, but which 
the Titan had already foreseen. Zeus has a great tempest erupt – thunder, 
lightning, a shaking earth and surging waves. Prometheus knows it will hurl his 
body “utterly down the black pit of Tartaros, down the stiff whirlpool Necessity...” 
However, “[c]ome what may: He won’t put me to death”91. None of Zeus’ 
seemingly almighty powers will destroy him, as he remains an immortal god. He 
is certain that eventually the future has his salvation in disposal. As the play 
proceeds, Prometheus becomes much more self-confident and his references 
to the conflict’s alleged resolution become more defiant each time. At the end, 
the re-establishment of friendship between him and Zeus is far to seek. Shortly 
after Prometheus warns for the last time that he is the only one who is able to 
save Zeus from the disastrous consequences of his future marriage, the 
conditional value of the tyrant’s fall has completely disappeared. The course of 
events seems to have become inevitable: 
 
                                                 
89
 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 1975, 406–408. 
90
 Conacher, Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound., 71. 
91
 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 1975, 1608–1614. 
Trijsje Franssen    Prometheus Through the Ages 
32 
 
“[n]othing will save him from the sharp plunge into shame, excruciating ruin [...]. Zeus 
will learn what a difference there is: between being a power and being a slave. [...] It is 
what I wish. But also, in fact, it’s bound to happen”
92
.  
 
This poses the question which version of the future will actualise itself. For 
whereas first, Prometheus’ liberation and the two gods’ reconciliation seemed to 
be the way its course was supposed to run, at this point a different destiny 
seems to lie ahead. In the last lines Prometheus describes the raging elements; 
and as he screams, calling for his mother and father – “SKY SKy Sky sky”93 – 
one imagines him disappearing from sight, being swallowed by the rocks. 
Part of the answer to the question how the story will finish can be 
reconstructed from what has been preserved from the lost plays. As there are 
barely any references to Prometheus the Fire-bearer, in the following I will focus 
on the second play, Prometheus Unbound. The first fragment is a chant from 
Prometheus’ next of kin – the other Titans – who must have been released by 
Zeus from the Tartaros, where the latter had made them sojourn since their 
Clash. Prometheus is back at his former location, chained to the rock, for Cicero 
quotes a response to his brothers which consists of a long lamentation in which 
he bemoans the pain he has to endure because of “Zeus’ horrible pet”94 – the 
Eagle. He wishes to die but “[b]y the will of Zeus I’m exiled far away from 
death”95. The Olympian sovereign is thus still a tyrant who makes Prometheus 
suffer and so his release seems very unlikely. However, in one of the 
succeeding scenes Herakles must have arrived, for in the following fragments 
Prometheus foretells the demigod the course of his journey and works. Plutarch 
writes how “Herakles [...] raise[s] his bow against the bird, as Aeschylus says – 
Let Hunter-Apollo level straight this shaft!”96: Herakles shoots the Eagle in order 
to liberate Prometheus. The last literal quote from the Unbound is also cited by 
Plutarch, in which Prometheus thankfully says to Herakles, after the hero 
rescued him, “[t]his dearest child of the Father I hate!”97. 
Apparently, although Zeus must have decided to set Prometheus at 
liberty, at this point the Titan still hates the despot who stationed him there in 
the first place. Whether eventually this hatred will indeed turn out to be 
friendship again is a question that remains hard to be answered. For this same 
‘despot’ shows entirely new characteristics within the Unbound. Whereas he is 
always dismissed as a tyrant and selfish tormentor in the Prometheus Bound, 
sometimes in the Unbound Zeus is suddenly merciful: he ordained that 
Prometheus be freed and also released his brothers; in another fragment when 
Herakles is in trouble, Zeus takes pity on him; and as already stated in the 
former play he will eventually stop chasing Io. Since, moreover, all the main 
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figures – Prometheus, Io, and Herakles – go through an agonising process 
which nevertheless culminates in salvation, Herington concludes that the moral 
of the Unbound replies to the Bound’s tyrannical image of the Olympian god 
“with the antithesis “Zeus is a Savior!”98. However, in view of Prometheus’ 
enduring hatred, Zeus’ persistent cruelty earlier in the Unbound and the facts 
that he has a very selfish reason to free Prometheus – the fatal, future marriage 
– and that his pitying feelings are towards his son, I think his new affections do 
not suffice to turn him into a genuine saviour. Nevertheless, the grotesque and 
monstrous image of Zeus which is drawn in the Bound needs to be adjusted. 
Just as hero Prometheus encapsulates some daemonic features leading to 
thievery, defiance, and shrewd secret-keeping, tyrant Zeus possesses some 
good traits. Aeschylus’ communiqué seems to be that they cannot be analysed 
in unequivocal, black-and-white terms. The situation is a little more complicated 
than Prometheus the Good Guy versus Zeus the Bad Guy, in line with the view 
– also brought forward by other Aeschylean plays99 – that the gods in general 
are not straightforwardly the Good, let alone Perfect Ones. Deities struggle with 
one another, sometimes playing bad, sometimes playing good characters. As 
individuals they cannot be easily identified as good or evil, right or wrong, clever 
or stupid. In the Prometheus Bound Hephaistos states that he does not have 
the heart to chain Prometheus to the rock but later carries out Zeus’ order 
nevertheless; the ladies of the Chorus pity Prometheus, but the Father with his 
“orchestrated universe”100 still inspires them with much awe; the Titans were 
offered their brother’s smart advice, but brushed it off and lost the war. All 
deities have many different and contradictory facets, turning them into 
ambivalent, imperfect beings. This supports once more the idea of Prometheus 
representing the human and it shows a deeper similarity between humanity and 
divinity in general. It emphasises how much resemblance a god’s personality, 
essence, or being bears to a human one, and underlines the fundamental 
ambiguity which characterises both. 
 
2.2.6. Analysis 
 
Clearly, Aeschylus’ Prometheus is a completely different figure than the 
Hesiodic trickster, whose cheats turn out the wrong way and lead to awful 
suffering for both himself and those he was doing them for. In the Prometheia 
the Titan is principally depicted as a courageous, noble rebel, whose only true 
crime consists of his gifts to the mortals which will enable them to endlessly 
improve their life. He defies Zeus, who is (in the Prometheus Bound) 
continuously referred to as a tyrant, as a “latter-day god” who is ruling “beyond 
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the law”101 instead of “the high lord of thunder”, “whose wisdom never wears 
out”102 as in the Theogony. As Theodore Ziolkowski phrases it, Aeschylus’ 
Prometheus is not driven by “the trickster’s simple delight in deceiving Zeus but 
by a genuine love of humankind”103. And indeed, the hero chants that he is 
“hated by all those gods [...] because I love mankind more than I should”104. 
Therefore, his shrewd, opposing attitude is of a dignity which is absent in 
Hesiod’s work. Moreover, with his revolutionary actions and disposition the 
Titan is not merely rebelling against the authoritarian powers, but even levelling 
them. He first helps the current boss and then forces him to bow and listen to 
his longings for a change – “this Zeus is in no way superior to Prometheus in 
intelligence or morals”105. “Just as he had to ally himself to Prometheus and 
depend upon his knowledge in order to win his throne, so must he do to 
guarantee his lasting possession of it”106. Zeus is anything but almighty, has to 
surrender himself to fate just as anyone else, and thus becomes dependent 
upon Prometheus – something that is inconceivable within the context of the 
Theogony or Works and Days. Prometheus’ tactical guile enables him to 
conquer the feral vigour of the Father; as his mother already predicted, in the 
end, his cunning enables him to surmount a tyrant who has the naive 
impression that authoritarianism and brute force will suffice for successful 
sovereignty.  
In sum, from Hesiod to Aeschylus Prometheus developed from a tricky 
but benevolent figure – whose actions, however, mostly did not turn out well – 
into a brave, cunning rebel, ready to take on Zeus. A purely beneficent saviour 
for humanity, bringing them – in addition to fire and hope – the entire scope of 
enlightening and civilising capacities. 
Humanity also undergoes a substantive development – from author to 
author as well as within this version of the myth in particular. Coming out of a 
state of severe degradation in Hesiod, in Aeschylus humans end up in a 
position from which they can continuously proceed. Wisdom, rationality and 
courage will lead to crafts, evolution, success and victory. This is the main 
moral of the story, as applicable to real-life humankind as to the fictional god, 
who is nothing short of an archetype for the human being. Vulnerability, 
mortality, and hubris may characterise the Promethean human, suffering and 
authoritarian oppression may characterise human life. Yet perseverance, 
courage and guile will enable humans to extend their control over their own 
future, to keep on making progress. They should be aware that enlightening fire 
may also be destructive and that brave hubristic actions may be retaliated with 
punishment. But simultaneously evil things such as death, blind hopes, and 
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their subjection to destiny in reality are also all ambivalent. Death means an end 
to suffering; human ignorance with respect to their demise and the hope this 
brings forth is precisely what produces the passionate creativity and – though 
not foreseeing, definitely forethinking – plans that encourage humans to accept 
challenges and undertake exciting enterprises. The fact that they have to resign 
themselves to fate means their enemies have to as well, however powerful they 
may be. 
The Promethean human who, despite her bondage, sorrow and agony, 
has hope and belief in her future and is autonomous and confident enough to 
fight her misery and use her intelligence and creativity, will keep on evolving. In 
the end, even the brutal enemy will have to give in to the human cunning and 
courage, while Fate has a Heraklean salvation awaiting her. 
 
2.3. Plato 
 
Prometheus appears in several of Plato’s (ca. 428-347 BC) works. Particularly 
interesting are his role in the Gorgias and the Protagoras. Again, compared to 
Hesiod’s and Aeschylus’ stories, the myth as well as its protagonist undergo 
some significant changes. The storyline is entirely different, Prometheus lost his 
rebel characteristics, in both cases the myth is set in the context of a dialogue 
and the frame of reference is straightforwardly human. In the following, I will 
investigate in detail how these and several other changes come about. I will 
start by examining Prometheus’ small yet relevant part in the Gorgias, after 
which I will study the myth as it is told in the dialogue of the Protagoras. 
 
2.3.1. Gorgias 
 
In the Gorgias Socrates discusses the nature of truth with Gorgias, Polus, and 
Callicles, who are all fervent and successful (or aspirant) champions of rhetoric. 
In order to – amongst other things – convince them of the independence of the 
truth and of the value of this independence, at the end of the dialogue Socrates 
tells the rhetoricians a myth about the final judgement of the human soul. Zeus 
changed the process after he took over the rule of the universe from his father 
Kronos, for according to him this judgement of the dead was conducted badly 
under Kronos’ reign. Unjust and impious persons were sent quite regularly to 
the heavenly Isles of the Blessed, whereas they should have been sent to 
Tartaros, the pit of torment. Conversely, just and pious people often wrongly 
ended up spending their afterlife in this dungeon of retribution. One reason for 
this ill-judgement was that both the humans under trial and their judges were 
still alive while the fate of the former was determined. This way, those who had 
“wicked souls” could try to confound the judges by means of their appearance. 
For despite their injustice, the former had nevertheless “clothed themselves in 
fine bodies, good family, and wealth” and the judges, too, were “passing 
Trijsje Franssen    Prometheus Through the Ages 
36 
 
judgement clothed, their own soul cloaked by eyes and ears and their whole 
body”107. The main reason, however, that the last judgement was carried out 
badly was that humans had foreknowledge of the day of their death. This 
enabled them to prepare for their final trial far ahead of time and thus to not only 
arrange a body with the fairest possible “clothing” – from beauty and heritage to 
wealth – but also to gather a group of witnesses ready to testify to the justice of 
their lives. Therefore, this foreknowledge needed to be prevented, so Zeus told 
the other gods that “Prometheus [had] already been given instructions to 
deprive them of this faculty”108. Furthermore, both those who were tried and 
their judges had to be “stripped” – in some translations: “naked” – and dead 
when the trial took place. This way, the mortal’s soul could be directly assessed, 
bereft of its disguising and potentially deceiving outfit – whether physical, 
material, or social – while the judges, too, could not be misled anymore by the 
veil of their vision, hearing, and physicality, so that “the judging may be just”109. 
In order to achieve this, Zeus appointed three of his mortal sons – after their 
own death – to become the judges. They would decide for each human, after 
his life had ended, whether he would go to the Isles of the Blessed and “live in 
all happiness, free from evils”110; or to Tartaros, where he would undergo “the 
greatest, most painful and most fearsome sufferings”111. 
 As Socrates explains after narrating the myth, “[d]eath is in fact, as I see 
it, simply the separation from one another of two things, the soul and the 
body”112. After this separation, just as the person’s body retains roughly the 
same state as while they were alive – its stature, hair, scars – 
 
“once it is stripped of the body, everything in the soul is plain to see – both its natural 
characteristics and things which have happened to it, the things the person had in his 
soul as a result of his approach to all his activities”
113
. 
 
Now that the judge is “looking with the soul itself at the soul itself”114, the human 
soul is thus allocated the afterlife it deserves. 
The direct attention Prometheus receives in this myth – in the entire 
dialogue, actually – does not consist of more than one sentence. However, the 
part he plays should certainly not be dismissed as insignificant, especially with 
respect to the human condition. Just as in Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, the 
Titan deprives humanity of their foreknowledge of death. Yet its motivation and 
result seem to be rather different from those in Aeschylus’ version of the event. 
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First of all, in terminating the mortals’ foresight Prometheus is responding to the 
wishes of Zeus. The Olympian seems to have lost all his tyrannical 
characteristics – at least with respect to humanity – whereas in the Prometheus 
Bound, Prometheus acted against the will of the despot, and explicitly out of 
love for humanity. Second, instead of receiving the wonderful gift of “blind 
hopes” in exchange for their loss – or actually, their “disease” according to 
Ocean’s daughters – all that humans will inherit in Socrates’ myth appears to 
consist of nothing but ignorance and insecurity due to the new gap within their 
knowledge and the sudden unpredictability of their death. Moreover, they lose 
their – bit of – control. It has become senseless to try and manipulate the 
judgement about their afterlife by dressing themselves up and sorting all their 
external attributes – including the witnesses – as well as possible, since they 
will be “judged stripped of all these things”115. For Zeus the purpose of the 
matter is that his change will establish the foremost justice with respect to the 
final judgement. This is why – just as it is in Aeschylus’ play – Prometheus’ act 
is presented as unquestionably positive. 
At first sight humanity does not seem to gain much by death’s sudden 
unpredictability – at least not while being alive. However, when looking closer, 
the myth’s message is about the moral value of what is actually nothing less 
than a true transformation of the human condition, which, from now on, will be 
characterised by much more justice, truth and authenticity. First, humanity is 
less likely to take unjust actions or commit crimes. Being deprived of 
foreknowledge, humans lost much of their former influence on the last 
judgement of their soul. Their ignorance and loss of control have significantly 
raised their fear of punishment but according to Socrates, neither fear nor 
punishment – as long as they are justly executed – are necessarily bad: 
 
“What is appropriate for anyone undergoing punishment [...], is either to be made better 
and helped, or to be made an example to the rest, so that others may be frightened by 
seeing him suffer the things he suffers, and so be made better”
116
. 
 
When humans understand that the more just their life, the higher the chance 
that they will not need to join their agonising companions in Tartaros, they will 
refrain from punishable actions more than they used to. They make more 
righteous judgements and act with more justice, which, importantly, implies that 
they are also more inclined to judge each other fairly. 
 Second, particularly important to Socrates is that ignorance with respect 
to the course of their afterlife will open humans up to what we could call 
‘genuine’ truth.117 For what is true about them will no longer be the result of their 
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appearance – i.e. the extent to which they are clad in a “fine body”, a “good 
family” and “wealth”. Nor will it arise from their success – or failure – in 
persuading others of their ideas and the alleged justice of the life they live. 
Humans used to be what they seemed or were said to be, because their ‘being’ 
was entirely dependent on their appearance and their witnesses’ stories, all 
manipulable because of the expectedness of death. Now, if humans recognise 
their new situation – they are ignorant, naked, incomplete in a way – they 
understand that truth is actually just as independent from them as death. 
Humans will realise that they are unable to manipulate – let alone create – the 
truth. They will have to rely much more on themselves and their own spirit, mind 
and reasoning. And this is something of great worth, for it provides them with a 
certain access to themselves and encourages them to think independently. 
Paradoxically, the loss of foreknowledge and control over what was once 
accepted as truth thus simultaneously opens up the possibility of acquiring 
knowledge, searching and perhaps even finding the truth on their own. 
Third, it is worth emphasising that the new human state is simply good in 
itself. The practice of justice is not merely a way to flee from punishment or an 
easier method for humans to coexist. Nor is the ability to think for oneself and to 
look for truth only a matter of independence or the acquisition of knowledge. 
The righteously judging, independently thinking, and truth seeking human will 
find himself in a new, different, and essentially more authentic condition. This 
does not mean that since Zeus’ and Prometheus’ interventions all humans have 
suddenly become one hundred percent just and truthful saints. Some humans 
will perhaps never recognise the fact that truth is not about appearance and 
there will always be others who will be downright evil. However, the ones who 
do acknowledge the human condition will know that in the end their own souls 
will be distinguished from these malicious ones. The soul of an evil tyrant, when 
judged, will be found to be ugly, unhealthy, “full of scars from the perjuries and 
injustice imprinted on his soul by his every action – [...] the result of an 
upbringing devoid of truth”118. The person doing great wrongs, Socrates 
explains, does not understand “how much more wretched it is to live with a soul 
which is not healthy, but rotten, unjust, unholy, than to live with an unhealthy 
body”119. Living one’s life justly, practising virtue, and recognising one’s 
ignorance will create a healthy, authentic and beautiful soul. Moreover, it will 
even make the human happy: it is “by the acquisition of justice and self-control 
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that the happy are happy, and by the acquisition of evil that the wretched are 
wretched”120. 
In conclusion, although at first glance it may not have appeared that way, 
there is a quite positive side to the changes humanity needs to undergo in the 
myth – a story Socrates emphasises he believes to be true. Although it is a 
completely different narrative than the versions I discussed before, again it is a 
story which relates how an important human transformation took place. And 
although the god certainly does not play the main character, by means of a 
single sentence Plato nevertheless assigned Prometheus a significant role in 
the myth and, in a way, even in the whole dialogue.121 The Titan neatly obeys 
Zeus’ commands and thus is not the tricky figure or the hubristic rebel pictured 
by Hesiod and Aeschylus respectively. Yet just as in Prometheus Bound, 
human nature has changed once again and the Titan’s action makes a 
substantial contribution to the enrichment of the human’s wisdom and 
independence, while simultaneously it underlines her vulnerability and mortality. 
Prometheus helps to bring about an essential transformation, the point of which 
is that despite and paradoxically thanks to their deficiency or vulnerability, 
humans will be judged with justice, live in authenticity, value truth and also 
judge each other more fairly.  
 
2.3.2. Protagoras 
 
In the Protagoras Plato has one of his characters relate the entire myth, once 
again in a completely different way and context. The dialogue centres on a 
discussion between Socrates and the prominent sophist Protagoras about the 
question whether civic virtue (arete)122 is an inherent human quality or a skill 
that can be taught. On behalf of Hippocrates, an ambitious adolescent who 
passionately wishes to become wise, Socrates asks Protagoras what exactly 
the boy would learn if he were to become his student. The sophist’s not so 
humble answer is that every day he studies with him Hippocrates “will go home 
a better man, and the same thing will happen the day after”123. Protagoras 
explains that he teaches “sound deliberation” (euboulia) and “the art of 
citizenship” (politike technē): he knows how to make people “good citizens”124. 
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Socrates, however, is sceptic, for even Pericles, a wise statesman known to be 
particularly virtuous and a great teacher as well, never succeeded in educating 
his sons in his own goodness. This simply shows, the philosopher thinks, that 
civic virtue is not teachable. After all, of all people, Pericles is the person who 
should have been able to pass on his virtues – but his sons had to acquire their 
virtuousness by themselves. Therefore, Socrates asks Protagoras to support 
his claim and clearly show how he thinks civic virtue is teachable, upon which 
the latter decides to tell a story, for this “would be more pleasant”125 for his 
audience than if he would develop an argument. 
Protagoras tells them how once upon a time, no mortal being existed yet. 
But the Olympian gods intermingled earth and fire, and “when they were ready 
to bring them to light”126, appointed Prometheus and his brother Epimetheus the 
task to empower each race with its defining attributes and capacities. 
Epimetheus pleaded with Prometheus to let him execute this important order – 
he would let his brother examine the results when it would be finished. 
Prometheus assented and so his brother enthusiastically began to assign the 
powers and gifts. He carefully gave each creature its own specific abilities. The 
strong races would not be quick, whereas quickness was assigned to the 
weaker; some were armed or large, but the smaller ones he enabled to fly, this 
way making sure he endowed each one with enough capacities to sustain 
themselves.  
 
“But Epimetheus was not very wise, and he absentmindedly used up all the powers 
and abilities on the nonreasoning animals; he was left with the human race, completely 
unequipped. While he was floundering about, at a loss, Prometheus arrived to inspect 
the distribution and saw that while the other animals were well provided with 
everything, the human race was naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed”
127
. 
 
In urgent need to procure something that would ensure human survival, 
Prometheus stole wisdom in the practical arts128 from Athena and fire and 
technological crafts from Hephaistos and gave them to humanity. These were 
the resources with which humans could survive and develop. Of all the species 
only the humans started worshipping the gods, because they “had a share of 
the divine dispensation”, “a kind of kinship”129 with the gods. They built altars 
and houses, invented speech and clothing and found out how to nourish 
themselves. However, they still lived separately, which made them unable to 
defend themselves against wild animals. “This was because they did not yet 
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possess the art of politics, of which the art of war is a part”130. In order to solve 
this problem they tried to live together, but this resulted in them fighting each 
other, again because they lacked political wisdom. Zeus saw that the survival of 
the whole human species was jeopardised, and therefore he sent Hermes to 
bring humanity justice [dike] and shame (or reverence) [aidos] so that they 
would be able to build cities and live together peacefully. When Hermes asked 
Zeus how these arts should be distributed – to everybody or to some, as with 
the other capacities? – he responded  
 
“To all [...], and let all have a share. For cities would never come to be if only a few 
possessed these, as is the case with the other arts”
131
.  
 
Finishing the story with Zeus’ response, Protagoras declares that his point is 
thus that, contrary to the other crafts and arts – not everyone has shoemaking 
or ship-steering skills – “political excellence [...] is shared by all, or there 
wouldn’t be any cities”132. In fact, to have “political excellence” – justice, 
moderation, civic virtue, shame, decency, and so on – turns out to be the 
human’s very essence. For, as the sophist claims, it is common sense that 
everyone should call himself just. Even if a person is known to be unjust, he 
would not confess that truth to others, for “it is madness not to pretend to 
justice, since one must have some trace of it or not be human”133. Now 
Protagoras’ statements do not immediately clarify why civic virtue should be 
teachable. On the contrary, an obvious conclusion that may be drawn is the 
opposite: it is not. For one could easily reason that if all humans have a share of 
political virtue, this is thus a natural characteristic – as Protagoras himself says, 
either one has it, or one is not human. But if everyone naturally possesses this 
virtuous property, there is no need for it to be taught: it is simply there, given by 
nature, or it is not. And if nature (or Zeus, in the myth) is the one who distributes 
these characteristics, it is certainly not something that humans equip 
themselves with through teaching. 
However, the sophist narrates the myth with another, opposite, objective 
in mind. Instead of the story’s point being that humanity is naturally equipped 
with readily available virtues distributed by Zeus, the myth in its entirety should 
represent the origin of life and the birth of human culture, and show how the 
human was educated throughout this process in how to overcome her setbacks. 
Rather than proving to Socrates that particularly virtue is teachable, Protagoras 
emphasises by means of the myth that the human has come to be the special 
kind of being that has the capacity to learn – and thus to be taught virtue as 
well. 
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2.3.3. Analysis 
 
There is an interesting resemblance between Protagoras’ narrative and 
Aeschylus’ play.134 As in Prometheus Bound, the Titan is the great benefactor of 
humans who provides them with practical skills, culture, wisdom and civilisation, 
and in both stories these qualities establish a fundamental distinction between 
the human and the animal. Yet Plato also significantly modifies the myth in 
several ways. First of all, there is no mention of Pandora or any other 
punishment of humanity. In fact, the myth even barely refers to Prometheus’ 
sanction, the mere allusion being that “[l]ater, the story goes, Prometheus was 
charged with theft, all on account of Epimetheus”135. In other words, there is not 
a vulture to be seen, and it is certainly not Prometheus who is to blame. 
In line with this is the second modification: the violence and aggression 
which defined the relationship between Zeus and Prometheus in Hesiod’s and 
Aeschylus’ tales have completely disappeared. As in the Gorgias, the Olympian 
Father has been disposed of all of his former villainy and Prometheus lost all of 
his revolutionary features. In fact, the two gods are co-workers together aiming 
to benefit humanity, which is why Dougherty rightly wonders “why Prometheus 
had to steal the fire at all”136. Zeus’ actions are not atrocious or tyrannical 
anymore, on the contrary: they are essential for the humans to persevere. 
Third, some important changes have taken place with respect to the 
character of the myth’s protagonists, the nature of humanity and the relationship 
between the two. To the elements of development and improvement of the – in 
the earlier versions already existent – human being, Plato added creation: 
together, Epimetheus and his brother create the human, different from any other 
being. Yet their uniqueness does not make humans perfect. At first, what 
distinguishes them is their very incompleteness, their imperfection: other than 
all other species they are “naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed”, an 
essential characterisation reminiscent of the naked, ignorant Gorgias human. 
Later, however, thanks to Prometheus’ gift the human does not merely make 
progress, but has truly divine capacities, “a kind of kinship” with the gods. 
Again, humans have a position distinct from all other creatures, though from 
now on due to a definite and superior rather than “completely unequipped” 
nature. Yet the human is still anything but a harmonious being. As becomes 
clear from the storyline – according to Protagoras, that is – humans actually 
need to be taught political skills and virtue, or they will be unable to live in 
communities. To study human nature in more detail, one could reasonably 
interpret the myth’s three deities as together personifying the human condition. 
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For each of the gods appears to represent a specific kind of human drive, 
activity, or capacity. Epimetheus, for a start, is a very impulsive creature. 
Infamously afterthinking, the god enthusiastically starts to hand out the 
capacities he is in charge of distributing, without taking into account the amount 
of powers he has in stock, or how many species should be attended to. Instantly 
acting according to his impulses and desires, the deity symbolises the activity 
driven by the (immediate) satisfaction of a need, focusing purely on the present 
and the pleasure it should bring, without taking the consequences of the action 
into consideration. He is, in Oded Balaban’s words, in fact “the god of 
consumption”137. Prometheus, however, is a rather different kind of being. 
Employing his forethinking skills, he develops a plan in order to make up for the 
problems caused by his brother. His action is anything but pleasant, but he is 
willing to sacrifice his own comfort for the – positive – outcomes of his deed. 
The Titan represents, then, a kind of activity opposed to the one Epimetheus 
stands for – making Prometheus’ become “the god of production”138 (Balaban) 
rather than consumption. His activity has no intrinsic value nor is it carried out 
because of its immediate, satisfying results, but it is a means for the sake of an 
end, and thus executed with a particular, future objective in mind. Prometheus’ 
gifts to humanity should be understood along the same lines. The skills in the 
practical arts and fire are given as a means to humankind’s survival: “the 
wisdom it acquired was for staying alive”139. The Promethean technai – that is, 
human techniques in general – are instrumental, teleological activities, their 
worth lying in their usefulness, purpose, and benefit. Yet one should note that 
the brothers and the human drives they stand for do not as strictly oppose one 
another as they do in Works and Days. Epimetheus is “not very wise” but must 
nevertheless have some wisdom and foresight in order to be able to create 
such a wide range of species and endow them all with their specific qualities; 
while if Prometheus’ foresight were exhaustive he should have known not to 
confidently leave his brother the task the gods asked them to fulfil. In any case, 
Zeus’ values should keep humans, driven by their different impulses and aims, 
together in harmony. Shame should restrict the Epimethean desires that move 
the individual to act without any regard for its consequences for himself or his 
fellow men. Justice should constrain the Promethean, instrumental urge and 
ensure that it is not taken too far and lead to harmful and/or criminal actions. 
Zeus thus personifies morality, in particular the more political virtues which are 
there to compensate for the risks of the Epimethean and Promethean drives 
and enable human beings to cooperate and live peacefully in a community. 
This way, together the three gods represent the fundamentally 
ambiguous condition of the human, whose soul is simultaneously motivated by 
pleasure, striving for benefit, and morality. As these values or principles do not 
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uncommonly contradict each other, Protagoras thus sketches the human as a 
being that is easily in conflict not only with his fellows, but also with himself. In 
that sense, Epimetheus and Prometheus actually already represent the human 
by themselves: both are ambivalent beings with good as well as bad 
characteristics, which make them (potentially) trip over themselves. Just like 
humankind, they have a “share of the divine dispensation” but are imperfect 
nevertheless. Yet once more, the imperfection of humans does not mean that 
they cannot be taught how to live a life in balance. And thus the sophist’s 
argumentation on virtue’s teachability proceeds along these lines. According to 
Protagoras, people consider justice and the other civic virtues absolutely not as 
natural but as acquired through teaching and practice. Persons that suffer from 
evils that do come about through nature – ugliness, or weakness for instance – 
will never be met with anger or punished. Rather, they will be pitied by others – 
precisely because such things are due to birth or fate. Yet “wrong-doers” and 
offenders in the realm of political excellence are met with fury, criticised and 
punished because these virtues are not due to chance. 
 
“Reasonable punishment is not vengeance for a past wrong – for one cannot undo 
what has been done – but is undertaken with a view to the future, to deter both the 
wrong-doer and whoever sees him being punished from repeating the crime”
140
. 
 
In other words, the unjust, impious, etc. are punished so that they themselves 
as well as their observers will learn from that penalty and do more justice in the 
future. Everyone who imposes punishment cannot but have this attitude, he 
says, which implies that virtue can be taught. Remarkably, here Protagoras 
makes a statement which is strongly reminiscent of Socrates’ one about 
punishment in the Gorgias. And indeed, after some extensive arguments, at the 
end of the dialogue the debaters’ ideas have come much closer to each 
other.141 Slowly, the question discussed has evolved from the teachability of 
civic virtue to the nature of virtue in general. By means of a rather complex 
argument, Socrates comes to the conclusion that what he calls “the art of 
measurement” would enable people to make the morally right decision. Those 
who control this technique will not be overcome by irrational drives, immediate 
pleasures or misleading appearances. They will be able to weigh the goods of 
the present, near and far future against one another, so that to make the right 
choice becomes solely a matter of calculation, weighing, or measurement, that 
is, knowledge. And so in the end Socrates and Protagoras agree – though the 
latter rather reluctantly – on the thesis that all virtues are knowledge. However, 
the question as to what this means exactly – what is the nature of knowledge? – 
and whether virtue is then teachable or not, are still pretty cloudy, according to 
both. In fact, the debaters have reversed their original stances. For now that 
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virtue is defined as knowledge, Socrates is arguably thinking it is teachable, and 
Protagoras – despite his hesitant giving in to his opponent’s arguments – has 
come to deny it, whereas at the start of the debate their positions were the other 
way around. Noting their confusion, Socrates says that he is “most eager to 
clear it all up”142. He would like to continue their conversation later on, in order 
to find an answer to these questions, 
 
“so that Epimetheus might not frustrate us a second time in this enquiry, as he 
neglected us in the distribution of powers and abilities in your story. I liked the 
Prometheus character in your story better than Epimetheus. Since I take promethean 
forethought over my life as a whole, I pay attention to these things, and if you are 
willing, as you said at the beginning, I would be pleased to investigate them along with 
you”
143
. 
 
The last quote nicely rounds off the dialogue with another allusion to the myth. 
What exactly does Socrates wish to say here? Does he fully subscribe to the 
symbolic function Protagoras ascribed to the gods? The philosopher states he 
is eager to find out what virtue is and whether it can be taught, so that 
Epimetheus does not trip them “a second time” in their investigation. How the 
god did the “first time”, during the discussion, may seem rather unclear. 
Epimetheus surely overlooked humanity in his distribution of capabilities, which 
could have frustrated the two debaters in several ways. It could just be a remark 
according to Socratian irony, meaning that actually Protagoras himself annoyed 
him with his story because of the silly figure in it that forgot to assign humanity 
proper faculties. However, a more likely interpretation would be that it should 
point to the fact that the two thinkers, being human, did not have the capacity to 
properly finish their investigation due to a certain lack of powers. In all 
probability, Socrates is referring to Epimetheus’ impulsive nature and lack of 
foresight, which disabled the god to foresee the end of the powers he had to 
distribute. Similarly, the two thinkers ended up focussing too easily on the 
present, in the heat of the discussion getting pulled away by the pleasure of the 
moment. They did not take the future into account, which could have brought 
much more pleasure and good – an answer to their questions, that is. Naturally, 
Socrates prefers the figure of Prometheus to his brother, as his instrumental, 
calculative and future-orientated approach nicely connects to the art of 
measurement from the philosopher’s argument. To possess the art of 
Promethean forethinking implies one will be less easily misled by appearance. 
One will be better able to measure, weigh and judge the different pleasures and 
pains and make the right choice and decide which action should be performed. 
Since Socrates says “I take promethean forethought over my life as a whole”, 
apparently he himself already masters the craft and so the authenticity of his 
own disorientation at the end of the debate should be taken with the greatest 
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suspicion. The philosopher’s allusion to the myth should then be understood as 
him pointing out Protagoras’ Epimethean shortcomings rather than his own. 
Reinvestigating their questions would be a means for Socrates to teach the 
sophist the virtue of Promethean forethought – of great worth not only with 
respect to their discussion but to life in general. For Socrates, the god thus 
represents the art or knowledge that should provide humans with the means to 
take control of their life and live in virtuous harmony with their companions.  
What must have become clear is that there are both significant 
differences and similarities between Plato’s reshaped Prometheus myth and the 
other ancient tales, including his own Gorgias story. In short, the Protagoras 
Titan remains an important benefactor of humanity as in all versions; symbol of 
forethought, craft, rationality and wisdom. He is an archetype of the human as in 
Prometheus Bound, though together with other protagonists, without his rebel 
characteristics and less heroic. As in all other tales, thanks to (a considerable 
contribution from) Prometheus humans undergo an important transformation – 
other than in Works and Days a serious improvement – which makes them a 
unique species. It is an improvement which paradoxically involves imperfection: 
vulnerability and ignorance. An ambiguous form of imperfection that, as in 
Prometheus Bound as well as Gorgias, is nevertheless of great worth and as in 
Gorgias in particular of moral worth, centring on social virtues, justice and the 
moral value of truth. In conclusion, there are some obvious parallels between 
Plato’s stories and the earlier ones. But through the sympathetic relation 
between Zeus and Prometheus, the latter’s and his brother’s hand in the 
creation of humanity, the complex nature of our species and the emphasis on 
(the role of) virtue, the philosopher makes meaningful changes and adds 
substantial elements to the earlier tales. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite all the significant differences between their narratives, somehow 
Hesiod, Aeschylus and Plato together created ‘the’ ancient myth of Prometheus, 
which provides later storytellers with a broad source of often contradictory but 
adaptable story elements. The myth contains a set of core story components 
and a set of core themes. At this point I can only provide a rough list but in 
short, the core components are the Titan’s theft of fire, his gift(s) to humanity, 
his punishment, his liberation and his creation of the human. The core themes 
are fire/knowledge, rebellion/hubris, creativity, human nature and ambiguity.144 
Yet Hesiod, Aeschylus and Plato themselves showed that none of these 
components or themes are obligatory in further narration and that expansion is 
always permitted. From the start, the Prometheus myth has thus had an 
extraordinary flexibility, which may be the reason why in the following centuries 
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many philosophers, artists and writers grab hold of this tale to tell their own. 
Who does, how and when, I will discuss in the next chapter. 
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3. Prometheus’ Journey through History 
 
In this chapter I give an historical outline of the use of the Prometheus myth 
within Western philosophy and, to a lesser extent, in literature and art. I 
chronologically examine and critically analyse the many variations of/references 
to the myth, in order to a) establish its meaning and role in each text or artifice; 
b) point out significant similarities, dissimilarities and patterns amongst the 
texts; and c) show how the myth develops through the ages. I do not wish to 
present an exhaustive overview, but by studying a serious number of references 
the overarching aim of this inquiry is to gain a reliable and satisfying amount of 
information on the basis of which in the next chapter I can find an answer to the 
question why, century after century, authors and artists always kept on returning 
to this tale. 
 
3.1. From Antiquity to Christianity  
 
Apart from Hesiod, Aeschylus and Plato, many others had their say about 
Prometheus and so several additions are made to the myth in Antiquity. A 
compound of core story elements is formed and when Christianity emerges the 
myth fuses partially with the biblical tales. 
 
3.1.1. Crafts, Customs and Practices 
 
Someone who made an interesting addition to the myth, is the Roman 
philosopher Pliny the Elder (23-79 AD). In his section about gold and rings, 
Pliny narrates how Prometheus, after he was released from his chains, was told 
by Zeus to wear a ring of iron. This was intended “to signify a chain thereby, 
and not an ornament”145, and to remind the god after his liberation of his sinful 
actions in the past. Yet Prometheus “enclosed a fragment of [gold] in iron, and 
wore it upon his finger; such being the first ring and the first jewel known”146. 
This is “how the use of precious stones first originated, and from what 
beginnings this admiration of them has now increased to such a universal 
passion”147. 
Judging by Pliny’s writings, the Titan’s status appears to be rather high. 
The terms Pliny employs when referring to the myth – all stories about 
Prometheus are “utterly fabulous”148 – and to the related ring-wearing – 
“admiration”, “passion” – suggest a strikingly positive evaluation of the figure, 
whose negative chains have somehow transformed into worshipped 
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accessories. A similar statement about the rings is made in the Poetica 
Astronomica (2nd century AD), in which the author Hyginus relates quite 
extensively about the god and reveals several practices as having originated in 
his story.149 It was due to Prometheus’ knowledge – “who with his wonderful 
wisdom is thought to have made men”150 – that humans, when sacrificing, 
started to offer only part of the animal instead of the entire beast, as they did 
before. This way, they could keep its flesh for their own consumption and did 
not have to give up the whole animal to the gods. Next, Hyginus narrates the 
tale (as did Hesiod) in which Prometheus misleads Zeus by offering him a 
sacrifice consisting of covered up bones. Angered by this, the latter takes fire 
from humankind, which Prometheus brings back in a fennel stalk. 
 
“[H]e came joyfully, seeming to fly, not to run, tossing the stalk so that the air shut in 
with its vapours should not put out the flame in so narrow a space. Up to this time, 
then, men who bring good news usually come with speed. In the rivalry of the games 
they also make it a practice for the runners to run, shaking torches after the manner of 
Prometheus”
151
. 
 
Zeus sends Pandora to the mortals, and Prometheus is chained to the 
Caucasus, tortured by the eagle. However, the Father of the Olympians 
releases Prometheus when he warns the former for the dangers of his plans to 
marry Thetis, since Prometheus knows – as is also revealed in the Prometheus 
Bound – that her son will be stronger than his father. The Titan will nevertheless 
have to remain wearing stone and iron on his fingers as commemoration, which 
– just as Pliny related – was from then on followed by humans. Moreover, 
  
“[s]ome also have said that he wore a wreath, as if to claim that he as victor had sinned 
without punishment. And so men began the practice of wearing wreaths at times of 
great rejoicing and victory. You may observe this in sports and banquets”
152
. 
 
Hyginus continues the story by narrating that Herakles killed the eagle as a way 
to thank Prometheus for showing him the way to get the apples from the 
Hesperides. And “since it was slain, men began, when victims were sacrificed, 
to offer livers on the altars of the gods to satisfy them in place of the liver of 
Prometheus”153. 
The roots of several of the ancients’ customs and cultural practices are 
thus traced back to this god and his myth: torch racing, the habit of wearing 
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rings as well as wreaths, sacrificing practices and more. From the tricky figure in 
Hesiod’s version of the myth, Prometheus thus evolved into a highly 
appreciated, cultural hero. However, James George Frazer says that 
Prometheus “appears not to have been worshipped by the Greeks; Lucian says 
that nowhere were temples of Prometheus to be seen”154. Yet this Assyrian 
author, Lucian of Samosata (c. 125-180 AD) treated the myth in a rather 
humorous way, and so one cannot simply assume that his statement should be 
taken seriously. Lucian’s Prometheus is a satirical dialogue in which 
Prometheus addresses Hermes and Hephaistos with the aim “to dissipate the 
charges”155 made upon him by Zeus and his allies. Starting by treating the 
accusation of sacrificial trickery, he explains that he is blushing for Zeus’ 
decision to crucify him “just because he found a small bone in his portion”156 – 
Prometheus had just been joking. As far as it concerns his creation of 
humankind, he does not understand Zeus’ response either – “[s]urely he doesn’t 
fear that they will plot an insurrection against him and make war on the gods as 
the Giants did?”157. The genesis of the mortals has actually been rather 
advantageous than negative to the Olympians: before their existence, the Earth 
had been a mess, and there were no altars or temples where the gods were 
being worshipped. Yet now there are temples, he says, – “to Zeus, to Apollo, to 
Hera, and to you, Hermes, in sight everywhere, but nowhere any to 
Prometheus”158. Obviously, he did not create humanity for his own interests. On 
the contrary, it was done for the gods’ pleasure, for 
 
“if man had not been created [...], it would be our lot to possess wealth, so to speak, 
which no one else would admire [...], and we should not realise how happy we were if 
we did not see others who did not have what we have. What is great, you know, can 
only seem great if it is gauged by something small”
159
. 
 
In Prometheus’ view, the gods’ agitation with respect to his theft of fire does not 
make any sense either, for they themselves did not lose any fire when he 
brought some of it to humanity. Moreover, they do not even need fire – whereas 
mortals do – and so “it is downright stinginess”160. 
By and large it is Zeus and the other gods who are ridiculed by 
Prometheus and not the other way around. However, apart from depicting 
Prometheus as a very comical creature Lucian’s dialogue also presents him as 
a very clever one, who has a much greater capacity of intelligent arguing than 
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his interlocutors. Moreover, since the dialogue ends with the prospect of 
Prometheus’ liberation and tougher times for Zeus, we are left with the 
impression that the former is the victor and the latter the defeated. 
Lucian had in fact a very satirical attitude to religion. Principally to both 
the ancient Greek and the new, Judeo-Christian one, but most of all he 
delighted in deriding the beliefs and superstitions of Antiquity’s traditional 
pantheism, and in particular its capital god. Zeus is ridiculed not just in this text, 
but also in many other of Lucian’s works, such as in the Pro Imaginibus, Timon, 
and Zeus Tragoedus. In the last work, the author presents the ‘Great Almighty’ 
as a helpless butterfingers. And in doing this by ridiculing a highly revered 
statuary of the god, he kills two birds with one stone: he manages to criticise not 
only the classical religion itself but simultaneously the senseless, rusty customs 
supporting it. 
Perhaps Lucian’s Prometheus should thus be taken with a pinch of salt, 
but through its irony still shines admiration for an extensively equipped hero. 
The characteristics that Lucian valued most of all must have been Prometheus’ 
rebellion and creativity, as becomes even more apparent in the short, ‘warm-up’ 
speech Prometheus Es in Verbis (PEV). Here, the author addresses an 
interlocutor who has told him to be – as the speech’s title reveals – ‘a literary 
Prometheus’. In the first instance, Lucian appreciates the identification: “If your 
meaning is, my good sir, that my works, like his, are of clay, I accept the 
comparison and hail my prototype”161. Just as Prometheus, Lucian aims to take 
some raw material – in his case the stiff, rigid substance of the established 
traditions and beliefs – and manipulate, transform, and remodel it by means of 
artistic and playful creativity.162 However, later he refuses to accept the 
association, for he views his own clay as “poor common stuff, trampled by 
common feet till it is little better than mud”163. Then again, as in Athens the 
ceramic potters used to be called Prometheuses, Lucian notes that the 
resemblance may be accepted after all for “my productions are as brittle as their 
pottery; fling a stone, and you may smash them all to pieces”164. Lucian’s work 
is muddy, common, and filthy. Moreover, it lacks the vitality from Prometheus’ 
creations, for instead of warming up his clay or even bringing it to life, he dried it 
out so that it became fragile and vulnerable. Even when he is comforted by 
someone telling him that it is his “innovating originality”165 that constitutes the 
likeness between him and the Titan, he still refuses to accept this in a positive 
way, for mere originality or novelty does in no way guarantee quality, harmony, 
or beauty. Lucian fears that the audience his work appeals to is in fact only 
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interested because of its novelty and bizarreness, without appreciating its 
aesthetic and intellectual worth. 
However, in a last moment of comparison with Prometheus Lucian 
appears to have recovered some of his self-confidence. Quickly listing the 
Titan’s infamous wrongdoings, he wonders “have I [...] cheated my hearers by 
serving them up bones wrapped in fat, comic laughter in philosophic 
solemnity?”166. The author himself does obviously not take this particular 
analogy too seriously or negatively. Actually, in the end he seems to return to 
enjoying his reputation of originality, for he finishes his speech by strongly 
denying that he would, just as Prometheus, be a thief: 
 
“I defy you there; that is the one fault you cannot find with me: from whom should I 
have stolen? if any one has dealt before me in such forced unions and hybrids, I have 
never made his acquaintance”
167
. 
 
The reader or auditor is thus left with a very ambiguous assessment of the 
Promethean analogy. Initially, Lucian strongly appreciates the correlation. For, 
like the Titan, he aims to revise the status quo by means of his clay innovations. 
Just as Prometheus, the author wants to rebel against the Olympian authority. 
The Titan symbolises the creative and recalcitrant artist: as he remarks cynically 
in Lucian’s work: “see what the penalty is for making creatures out of mud and 
imparting motion to that which was formerly motionless”168. The god represents 
him who dares to animate what had previously been immobile. His creations – 
the human beings he fashioned – embody this flexibility and malleability. These 
are characteristics which stand in stark contrast with the inelasticity of those in 
power – whether that power is wielded by means of divine thunderbolts and 
eagles, or ancient customs and superstitions. Of course, Lucian firmly wishes to 
identify himself with this artist. Simultaneously, however, he lacks confidence in 
his own products. Even if his writings do deserve the label of ‘originality’, that 
does not prevent them from being grotesque crossbreeds, which lead to the 
sheer entertainment of a cheap, spectacle-hungry crowd. Let alone that his 
work will ever be as original as the divine creation-out-of-nothing: novel or not, it 
will always continue to be a combination of revised, but familiar models. Be that 
as it may, in the end Lucian does seem to resign to his fate: his objective 
remains to playfully revolt against the constituted order of things, hoping it will 
be appreciated not only by the mob but also the sophisticated intellectuals.  
How the situation was in general concerning the ‘amount’ of worship 
dedicated to Prometheus, and thus whether Frazer was right in his suggestion 
that there was no true reverence of the god, is a question that remains to be 
answered. As we saw earlier, according to Pliny and Hyginus people started 
wearing wreaths and rings out of Promethean inspiration and held torch races in 
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honour of the god – something which cannot but have emanated from some 
feeling of awe towards the Titan. The Greek traveller and geographer 
Pausanias (2nd century AD) also speaks extensively about the practices and 
traditions related to Prometheus in his Description of Greece. He describes in 
detail how the races in Athens take place: 
 
“In the Academy is an altar to Prometheus, and from it they run to the city carrying 
burning torches. The contest is while running to keep the torch still alight; if the torch of 
the first runner goes out, he has no longer any claim to victory, but the second runner 
has. If his torch also goes out, then the third man is the victor. If all the torches go out, 
no one is left to be winner”
169
. 
 
A little further in the same work, Pausanias relates that the inhabitants of the 
chief cities of both Argos and Opous claimed to have the Promethean grave on 
their territory, apparently revering him there as a hero. Further, Pausanias 
brings to the reader’s attention that the very site where humanity’s creation had 
taken place was localised and honoured as well. The author narrates that there 
is a ravine at Panopeus, central Greece, and there lie stones which  
 
“have the color of clay [...] and they smell very like the skin of a man. They say that 
these are remains of the clay out of which the whole race of mankind was fashioned by 
Prometheus”
170
. 
 
Most modern scholars confirm that there were not that many statues and 
temples dedicated to the god. Yet each of them also underlines that in Athens 
Prometheus enjoyed a significant cult – which according to Conacher and 
Dougherty already emerged in the fifth-century BC. The torch races Pausanias 
describes were held at five different festivals, all in honour of the deities 
associated with fire, light, cunning intelligence, and arts – admittedly, not always 
only in honour of Prometheus, but also Hephaistos and the goddess Athena. 
One of these festivals was actually called the Prometheia, in which particularly 
the Titan’s gift of fire was celebrated, for this was a very important element in 
Greek culture. It provided the people with warmth and light and symbolised 
knowledge, technology, civilisation and more – which does not mean the 
ancient Greeks were not also well aware of fire’s dangerous and destructive 
potential.  
Wreaths, rings and sacrifices; multiple cities squabbling over who was in 
possession of the genuine tomb; localisation of the clay that had served as the 
original material out of which the human race was born; but above all the torch 
races – there was a number of practices and adorations, all in honour of 
Prometheus and his courage, creativity, intelligence and gift of fire. He may not 
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have had that many temples dedicated to him, but in his own way, the Titan 
must have nevertheless been worshipped by the ancient peoples – in particular 
by the Athenians. 
 
3.1.2. The Creation of the Human 
 
Remarkably, the last three authors above all integrate the Platonic element of 
Prometheus’ creation of the human into the myth. As Olga Raggio observes, 
this element “did not inspire any great literary or artistic creation among the 
Greeks”171 but became very popular among the Romans during the reign of 
Caesar Augustus (27 BC-14 AD). This can be deduced from the work of poets 
such as Ovid, Horace and Propertius. In his Metamorphoses, Ovid (43 BC-17 
AD) writes how the human was either made by the “great Creator” or whether it 
was  
 
“[new-made] earth that Prometheus moulded, mixed with water, 
In likeness of the gods that govern the world – 
And while the other creatures on all fours 
Look downwards, man was made to hold his head 
Erect in majesty and see the sky, 
And raise his eyes to the bright stars above. 
Thus earth, once crude and featureless, now changed 
Put on the unknown form of humankind”
172
. 
 
Ovid speaks of a creation based on fresh earth, humans made in the divine 
image, and a majestic – even world-metamorphosing – result. Yet the picture 
drawn by the other Augustan poets is not necessarily as positive as his. In his 
Odes, Horace (65-8 BC) does call Prometheus “resourceful” or “ingenious” 
(callidum). He also narrates that while creating humankind the god did “add to 
our primal substance particles drawn from wherever”173 or, as another 
translation has it: “a particle cut from each of the animals”174. The Titan thus 
appears to have done something quite praiseworthy by endowing us with an 
impressive range of (animal) qualities. However, – and even though he is said 
to have had no choice – apart from all the enriching capabilities and ambitions 
Prometheus also ‘equipped’ the human with negative characteristics, such as 
anger, sinfulness and hubris – he “put in our stomachs the urge of the ravening 
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lion”175. This caused the human often to be governed by anger, sinfulness and 
hubris. Our many capacities thus also brought dangers along, for as Horace 
concludes “[n]othing is too steep for man: we foolishly seek heaven itself, our 
sin will not let Jove lay down his punitive thunderbolts”176. 
Another contemporary, the love poet Sextus Propertius (43-16 BC) even 
seems to think that the god has simply failed his task. He straightforwardly 
exclaims “[w]hat a botch Prometheus made when he fashioned men out of clay 
and left so little space for the governing mind”177. That mind should control our 
actions, the poem continues, but, whether rich or poor, it is unable to, for 
 
“the slightest wind is enough to blow us far off course and out to sea to founder or find 
some war to begin or, worse, renew. Whatever wealth you’ve piled up, you cannot take 
it with you. When you cross that ferry into the world below, you go aboard as naked as 
when you were born, equal, victor and vanquished, rich man and pauper together”
178
. 
 
Propertius opened the elegy with the statement that the god of peace is Love. 
And by speaking passionately about his “battles” between the sheets, he 
suggests it is this kind of war that should be fought instead. Actually, even 
though the state of Love is a state of mind that is not any more controlled or 
“governing” than its alternative, from this point of view Prometheus’ moulding 
mistakes may have been not so bad after all. For Propertius himself deeply 
enjoys his young, free, dancing and drinking life. He explicitly says it is his 
delight to “bind” his mind to the ‘Unbinder’ (Lyaeus), which is an epithet for 
Dionysius, his unchecked parties and his wine. In this context of love poetry the 
poet’s glee could reasonably be interpreted to include the – paradoxically – 
unbinding “bondage of Love”179: he does not only delight in his mind being tied 
to wine or the ‘unbound’, but also to the goddess Venus and what she stands 
for. Therefore, whether the – again paradoxically – un-forethinking actions of 
Prometheus in creating a licentious type of being should be truly interpreted as 
negative, is certainly doubtful. Nevertheless, when “my hair begins to go grey 
and love is behind me”, then it “will be time enough for my mind to turn to nature 
to consider the ways of the gods who built this intricate house we too often take 
for granted”180. But Propertius implies that up to then he will take happy and full 
advantage of the – thanks to Prometheus – ‘ungoverned’ nature of his mind, 
and his Love-regulated life. 
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3.1.3. Early Christianity 
 
The story of Prometheus’ creation of humankind had thus firmly established 
itself in the Roman culture and was being narrated and evaluated in different, 
creative, and often ambiguous ways. In the meantime, Christianity was coming 
up and in the first Christian centuries the myth was slowly absorbed by the 
biblical stories. Apart from many differences, there are also several parallels 
between the narratives and their figures. The most obvious one is Prometheus’ 
creation of humanity and the Genesis itself, as both stories’ protagonists are 
fashioning humans out of clay. Some Bible illustrations are actually showing 
evident similarities with the ancient iconographical tradition of the myth. For 
instance, the way the Lord bends over Adam in the biblical illustration below, is 
certainly reminiscent of the depiction of Prometheus’ moulding activities on the 
sarcophagus next to it: 
 
1.       2.  
 
 
       
 
 
Figure 1) God enlivening Adam; Moutier– Grandval Bible (840 AD), the British Library 
(MS Addl. 10546).  
Figure 2) Prometheus creating the human; detail of sarcophagus (third century AD), 
Museo Nazionale, Naples.
181
 
 
Both creators are about to bring the first human to life while another divine or 
angelical figure is watching. Raggio explains that “[i]n the Graeco-Roman world 
of the first Christian centuries the myth of Prometheus plays the role of a sort of 
“Genesis secundum Gentiles”182 – a kind of folktale of creation. Tertullian (160-
225 AD), one of the first Christian authors, tried to convince the people that the 
Titan was not the real creator. He exclaims about the Christian Lord that “[h]e 
alone is God, Who made the universe, Who fashioned man of mud – (for He is 
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your true Prometheus!)”183. Several other Early Church Fathers advance similar 
ideas about the ancient gods, inspired – just as Tertullian – by earlier allegorical 
and euhemerist explanations of the myths. With respect to the first explanatory 
form they drew on ideas of, for example, Plutarch (46-120 AD), who speaks of 
the Titan as the personification of human rationality: “Prometheus, or, in other 
words, the power to think and reason”184. That is, Prometheus is an interesting 
allegory, yet nothing more. With respect to the second manner of explanation, 
the ecclesiasts were encouraged by Euhemerus’ (c. 330-260 BC) rationalising 
way of analysing the myths. This Greek philosopher had, centuries before, 
introduced historicising methods of exegesis into mythography by explaining the 
gods – actively worshipped by his fellow Greeks – as originally having been 
living humans. According to him, the mythological divinities had been merely 
mortal kings, heroes, champions, or benefactors in some other way, who had 
earned serious respect during their lives and had therefore, somehow, been 
deified by later generations. 
Both forms of mythological interpretation were enthusiastically espoused 
by the Early Church Fathers in an attempt to incapacitate pagan religion. The 
‘merely human’ interpretation was, moreover, also stimulated by the 
anthropomorphic character of the ancient deities. Anger, jealousy, adultery – 
the gods were depicted just as frail and sinful as humans, if not worse. 
Particularly relying on the euhemerist argument, the Fathers thus often 
explained the classical tales as perhaps once truly happened historical events 
that had, however, – and whether positive or not – been obscured and 
deformed throughout the years because of exaggerating storytelling and 
retelling. One of these Patristic authors, for instance, was Lactantius.185 In The 
Divine Institutes (c. 303-311 AD), he states that poets such as Plato and ‘the 
Sibyl’ had not been wrong when relating how the human was formed out of 
earth and in divine likeness. However, “they said that man was made by 
Prometheus from clay. They were not mistaken in the matter itself, but in the 
name of the artificer”186. Actually, they were also incorrect with respect to 
Prometheus’ divinity: he must have been simply the first sculptor:  
 
“[Prometheus] first originated the art of making statues and images [...]. And thus the 
truth was corrupted by falsehood; and that which was said to have been made by God 
began also to be ascribed to man, who imitated the divine work. But the making of the 
true and living man from clay is the work of God”
187
. 
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Just as the other ancient gods, Prometheus had thus been nothing but an 
idealised man – an exceptional human being who, through the legends of 
inspired poets and authors, had been aggrandised and ultimately deified.  
Unlike Lactantius, the mythographer Fulgentius Planciades (late 5th – 
early 6th century) presents an allegorical explanation of the myth, which as we 
will see below, was very influential. He narrates in his Mythologies that the Titan 
– a symbol of divine foresight – stole heavenly fire from Phoebus’ chariot wheel, 
with the help of Minerva – an allegory of divine wisdom – in order to animate the 
human with a divinely inspired soul. Fulgentius says to follow the ancient 
philosophers, who understand Prometheus’ liver as the human heart where 
“wisdom dwells”, and “explain the vulture as an allegory of the world”188. Our 
heart is thus being consumed by the concerns of the world and this way it 
nourishes Divine Providence, which “cannot have an end to itself” and thus 
cannot do without the wisdom of our heart.  
The famous Archbishop Isidore of Seville (c. 560-636) turns his attention 
again to the euhemeristic method. Yet instead of merely rejecting the pagan 
ideas as fables and superstitions, he seriously aims to demonstrate his claims, 
and does so by supporting these with historical facts, etymological analyses and 
other details. Isidore sums up a list of these once-human-gods, who had been 
royalties, founders of cities, or otherwise notable men and women. Some had 
been inventors of arts – Aesculapius had discovered medicine, for instance, and 
Vulcan developed forging. Because of these persons’ impressive powers, 
activities, or inventions “after they had died, the people who had been fond of 
them made likenesses, so that they might have some solace from 
contemplating these images”189. This is where Prometheus comes into play, 
since in the following section the archbishop relates that it was he who had 
actually been the first person to teach people how to make these: 
 
“The pagans assert that Prometheus first made a likeness of humans from clay and 
that from him the art of making likenesses and statues was born. Whence also the 
poets supposed that human beings were first created by him – figuratively, because of 
these effigies”
190
. 
 
Isidore suggests that it was due to the lyrical reformation of facts about the 
historical – the human – inventor of the art of sculpture, that Prometheus was 
promoted to divinity and to the creator of humankind. His suggestion is similar 
to the statements of his ideological forebears, but – quite importantly – missing 
their polemical tone.191 Moreover, in the Chronicon, Isidore presents a long but 
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detailed list of important (once living) persons, and he places the pagan god 
amongst other great, Judeo-Christian figures, such as Abraham, Isaac, and 
Jacob. 
Interestingly, because of Isidore’s more practical, historical, descriptive 
and objective treatment of the ancient gods – and because of the author’s 
immense value as source of information – euhemerism lost its negative function 
as a tool to fight paganism. As Jean Seznec formulates it, the result of the work 
by the “great encyclopedist” was 
 
“to restore dignity and independence to the personages of Fable: as benefactors of 
humanity they had every right to be held in grateful remembrance. [...] By gaining a 
foothold in history, the gods had acquired new prestige”
192
. 
 
Many centuries later many authors were still greatly indebted to Isidore when 
writing on ancient history. One of his most important followers is Peter 
Comestor, who was chancellor of the Notre Dame in Paris in the 12th century. 
He wrote the Historia Scholastica (ca. 1170) – the “mediaeval popular Bible”, as 
it is often called because of its authority. It is a sacred history that practically 
involves all biblical information but, in passing, also presents quite some 
mythological material and thus also includes a small section on Prometheus 
and other pagan heroes or gods. The sections in question may not be that 
extensive, but significant is that Comestor presents the biblical and mythological 
information textually parallel to one another and thereby also establishes a 
parallel between the characters of the different narratives – if not, says Seznec, 
“strict equality”: 
 
“All these mighty spirits [i.e. pagan figures – TF] are worthy of veneration, exactly as 
are the patriarchs, and for the same reasons: they have been the guides and teachers 
of humanity, and together stand as the common ancestors of civilisation”
193
. 
 
In part because of the Historia’s popularity, the analogous evaluation of pagan 
and biblical wisdom became the common attitude in the Middle Ages. The text 
was enthusiastically copied, translated, used and adapted for centuries, and so 
Prometheus also keeps on emerging in other historical and genealogical works. 
Around the same time a treatise on mythology appears, written by a still 
unidentified Mythographus Tertius 194– possibly the well-known English scholar 
Alexander Neckam (1157-1217). This treatise forms a compendium of virtually 
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all the available information on mythology at the time, thus including both 
allegorical and euhemerist explanations. In its part on Prometheus, the Titan is 
initially explained in line with Fulgentius, as “the foresight of God”195, who 
animated his creation – the human – with divine fire, which he stole aided by 
Minerva, goddess of “heavenly wisdom”196. However, the section presents more 
than one possible exegesis. For instance, the vulture gnawing at Prometheus’ 
liver could be understood in Fulgentius’ way – that is, as the world’s worries 
bothering the human heart. Yet the Titan could also have been the first sculptor, 
in which case the vulture would be representing “envious men” who “bit him with 
the tooth of detraction”197. The next paragraph again describes a different 
interpretation, according to which Prometheus was a very intelligent man, who 
studied (and later taught) astrology from the Caucasus Mountains. Thus “an 
eagle is said to devour his heart because solicitude, by which he understood all 
the eclipses and motions of the constellations, is unrelenting”198. 
Whether the vulture should in the end be comprehended as the world’s 
worries, envious men, or the unrelenting solicitude of devoted study is a 
question that is not clearly answered. Yet it remains very interesting that this 
work presents an overview of explanations that are entirely different in nature. 
Another fascinating characteristic is the regular emergence of a personal and 
moral tone – something which is rarely found in former mythographies. 
Frequently, the author includes his comments and opinions in the text. 
Unfortunately, in the paragraphs on Prometheus, his view is difficult to 
distinguish from those of the classical writers he refers to. The author asserts, 
for instance, that “Prometheus rightly kindled his torch from the sun because, 
according to the natural scientists, [...] we receive life from the sun”199. Whether 
this should be understood as a positive evaluation of the Titan’s thieving action 
from the side of the mythographer is hard to determine, as this ‘judgement’ is 
made within the context of Fulgentius’ – rather positive – version of the myth. A 
few sentences further, in the paragraph on another authors’ exegesis, it is 
explained that the fire brought by the Titan 
 
“benefited mortal man while they used it well. Later, through the wicked use of 
mankind, it was turned to their destruction. [...] Thus it is that when fire was stolen, 
diseases are said to have been sent down upon mankind by the angry deities”
200
. 
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Suddenly, fire was not that beneficial anymore. Perhaps both quotations are 
cases of pure paraphrasing of the ancient authors, perhaps they are not. 
Possibly, the mythographer aims to send a broad, ambiguous message, 
encouraging the human to acquire knowledge by praising fire as the metaphor 
of wisdom, soul, and life; while simultaneously, by emphasising the angry gods’ 
punishments, warning humanity about the miserable consequences of its 
“wicked” misuse. His own view remains difficult to establish; yet most important 
is that in any case the entire work shows quite an inclination to moralise – a 
new inclination, which becomes stronger in the centuries that follow. 
 
3.2. From Early Middle Ages to Renaissance 
 
In the 13th and 14th century Prometheus gradually recovers his classical, 
favourable image and his value as sage, as sapiens who created the human 
being and animated him. This becomes apparent, for instance, in the popular 
literature on Ovid, such as the Ovide Moralisé (end 13th-beginning 14th 
century): 
 
“Li filz Japeti, sans doutance 
Prometheüs, qui mout savoit 
De terre et d’iaue, fet avoit 
Une ymagete a la semblance 
Des dieus, qui toute ont la puissance 
de toutes choses ordener. 
La glose dist que, pour donner 
A l’ymage esperit de vie, 
Ot du chars du Solail ravie 
Une luisante faille enflammee, 
Dont il ot l’image animee”
201
. 
 
Similar interpretations are found in Giovanni del Virgilio’s discussion of the 
Metamorphoses. Both works aim to legitimise Ovid’s pagan poetry by 
moralising and theologising it, both explain his myths as foreshadowings of 
ethical, Christian truths. This results in positive, allegorical presentations of 
Prometheus as the sage who made “[u]ne ymagete a la semblance/Des dieus”, 
provided the creature with wisdom, and as such prefigured the true, Christian 
God. One manuscript of the Ovide Moralisé (first half of the 14th century) 
perfectly demonstrates this fusion of the mythological and biblical narrative as it 
even contains an illustration that shows both God and Prometheus, together in 
the act of genesis:  
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Figure 3) Creation and animation by God and Prometheus. Ovide Moralisé, Lyons, 
Bibliothèque de la Ville MS. 742.
202
 
 
God is creating Chaos, while Prometheus animates the human with the flame of 
his torch, all this against the background of Creation: animals, trees, and 
houses. 
 
3.2.1. Boccaccio 
 
After quite some consideration – and reluctantly, as he considers himself unable 
to accomplish such a task – halfway through the 14th century Giovanni 
Boccaccio accepts the truly Renaissance request of Cyprus’ King Hugo IV to 
write an encyclopaedia of myth. The outcome is the influential mythological 
handbook the Genealogy of the Pagan Gods (1373). Continuing and building on 
the trend of his predecessors’ literature, in this extensive work Boccaccio brings 
the allegorical, euhemerist, and moral tendencies together. However, unlike the 
earlier mythographies, this handbook returns to the classical manuscripts, 
focusing just as much on the ancient texts themselves as on their later, Patristic 
exegesis. And unlike the just mentioned analysts of Ovid’s work, Boccaccio 
does not narrate and moralise myths mainly in order to reveal their theological 
significances and truths. Rather, he writes the mythological encyclopaedia 
because he is convinced of the necessity and unavoidability of myths. They 
contain an inexhaustible amount of literal, historical, allegorical, political, and 
ethical meanings, ancient fantasies and cultural memories which the 
mythographer can revive by means of the animating powers of his research, 
interpretations, and poetry. According to Giuseppe Mazzotta, the Genealogy is 
a “meta-discourse [...] on myth”, which “describes for Boccaccio the total history 
of man’s creative imagination from the beginning to the present”203. 
In his chapter on Prometheus Boccaccio presents two versions of the 
myth and its protagonist. After having quoted a number of ancient authors – 
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Ovid, Aeschylus, Hesiod, Fulgentius and many more – the author warns the 
King that it will be difficult “to peel off the outer layer of these fictions”.204 Most 
important is to find out who Prometheus – child of Iapetos – was, and “[i]n fact, 
he was twofold, just as the man he produced is twofold”205. The first 
Prometheus is God himself: in line with Tertullian’s Patristic interpretation, the 
Titan represents the true, almighty God-Creator, the “deus verus et 
omnipotens”206. “The natural man [homo naturalis] was first created by God 
from the clay of the earth; both Ovid and Claudian know about him, although not 
in the religious sense in which Christians understand it”207. Boccaccio combines 
the Christian and mythological narratives. Both tell the story of the creation of 
the human, who was endowed with a “rational spirit” as well as “sensible and 
animating powers”.208 The ancients simply visualised the Creator – who the 
Christians now know is God – differently. If the created humans, says 
Boccaccio, would not have sinned, their corporeal powers “would have been 
eternal just as is the rational spirit, the nature of which is divine”209. In other 
words, due to their sinning, humans became these dualistic organisms. We 
became creatures consisting, first, of physical spirits that could have been 
perfect but are defective now; and second, of rational ones which prove our 
(apparently) divine kinship – although these spirits, too, are far from flawless. 
For “indeed, those who are produced by nature arrive coarse and ignorant, nay, 
unless they are instructed, filthy, savage, and beastly”210. Here, the second 
Prometheus comes into play. This is the historical philosopher who, as other 
authors relate, studied the stars and lightning from the summit of the Caucasus, 
and taught the Assyrians astrology: “those whom he found boorish, 
uncultivated, and living like beasts he left as civilized men”211. 
The historical Prometheus is not a mere euhemerist figure, but also has an 
allegorical, moral meaning: the myth becomes a tale about the civilising power 
of wisdom, in which the ancient god emancipates humankind from its natural, 
beastly condition and becomes a hero of culture. For in contrast with the homo 
naturalis, Prometheus was a homo doctus, 
 
“a learned man, and taking them [the homines naturales – TF] as if they were made of 
stone and he were creating them anew, he taught them and educated them and, by his 
demonstrations, turned them from natural men to civil, so distinguished in their 
knowledge of customs and in their virtues that it is very clear that nature produced 
some and teaching had reformed others”
212
. 
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When the human sinned, he became this merely natural – that is, imperfect – 
product. But Boccaccio’s point is that through wisdom – that is, philosophy and 
science – one can be transformed and moulded into a homo civilis. In that 
sense, the myth has a political dimension as well: a civilised human is a being 
who possesses virtues and a sense of ethics, and who is capable of communal 
living. 
Boccaccio continues by relating that with the help of Minerva, this second 
Prometheus rose to the sky “that is, [...] the place of perfection”, where 
everything was enlivened by fire, “that is, by the clarity of truth”213. There, he 
stole fire in order to animate – to “complete” – the human with this symbol of 
life, wisdom and truth. The Genealogy’s author emphasises that the myth 
describing the fire as being stolen is anything but ill-suited, 
 
“for we do not obtain the clarity of truth in theatres or town squares or in open spaces 
but secluded in solitude, and it is in silence that we pursue our inquiries and investigate 
the natures of things with much deep thought. And because such things are done in 
secret, as if we seem to be stealing them, and to explain whence wisdom comes to 
mortals, the fable says that it is from the wheel of the sun, that is, from the lap of God, 
whence comes all wisdom, for He is the true sun “who illuminates every man coming 
into this earth””
214
. 
 
Prometheus’ stolen fire thus represents the ray of truly divine wisdom, which the 
by nature ignorant human may – and should – attain if he dedicates himself to 
the acquirement of knowledge in the solitude of silent meditation. Again, the 
Bible and the myth are connected, or even integrated: the phrase about God 
being the true sun includes a quote from John 1:9. By means of the above 
paragraph, the author illustrates how both the Christian story and the pagan 
fable emphasise the divinity of knowledge and its absolute necessity for the 
illumination, enlivenment, and completion of the “twofold” human being, for 
  
“the bodily mass infected by a terrestrial cloud weakens the powers of the mind so 
much that unless they are aided and inspired by knowledge, they become so 
benumbed that men seem more like brutish than rational animals”
215
. 
 
Boccaccio narrates how the poets say that Prometheus’ actions had to be paid 
for: the angered gods left him bound to the Caucasus cliffs. 
 
“There they say his vitals were torn by an eagle, that is, troubled by sublime and deep 
thoughts, and then, after being worn out by the long labor of profound thought, they are 
restored when after various ambiguities the once allusive truth about something is 
discovered”
216
. 
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In the poets’ eyes, the liver consuming eagle thus represents the trouble, 
torture, and anxiety one needs to go through in order to achieve spiritual 
salvation. One has to work hard in order to find the clarifying truth. 
Then Boccaccio relates how the authors he studied also told that the furious 
divinities sent humans poverty, fever, and women. 
 
“By poverty I understand corporeal labors, which weaken us and for which we are born 
by the crime of him to whom it was said: “With the sweat of your face you eat your 
bread.” [...] By fevers I think they mean the ardors of desire, which give us continual 
anguish and vexation. Woman, however, was created as consolation, but by her 
disobedience became cause of torment”
217
. 
 
Another time, allegorical meanings are read into the myth, and once more, one 
of these is literally supported with a quote from the Bible, in which God 
addresses Adam after the Fall218. Essentially, all three messages are found in 
both the pagan and theological narrative: crime will be punished, work is 
indispensable, and lust is dangerous. The main point is once again that humans 
will have to make a strong effort in order to make up for their sin. They will have 
to compensate their physical and spiritual imperfections through corporeal and 
psychological labour – through philosophy and civilisation. 
The threats of women are particularly underlined by means of several 
lengthy citations from Boccaccio’s highly esteemed mentor Francesco Petrarch, 
who said in On the Solitary Life (1346) that “no poison is as destructive for 
those pursuing this life as feminine companionship”.219 The next section is on 
Pandora and although no box or jar is mentioned, eventually – again reinforced 
with a biblical parable220 – she does end up once more as symbol of human 
misery. Yet not all women in the context of the myth represent misery and the 
dangers of desire. Boccaccio also writes a section on Prometheus’ children, Isis 
and Deucalion, who both possessed impressive abilities that are comparable to 
their father’s: Isis the capacities to teach and cultivate, Deucalion the ones to 
create. 
In summary: despite his earlier warnings to the King, through his 
extensive discussion of the Prometheus myth, Boccaccio actually managed to 
peel off quite some fictional layers. The poet made a great effort to bring its 
subterranean meanings to light, while thereby reconciling the mythological and 
theological narratives. The story’s first, significant sense lies in the fact that 
Prometheus represents no one but the Creator, the Christian God himself. 
Second, the Titan had literally been an historical wise man, a philosopher, who 
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taught people science, who educated and civilised them. Boccaccio shows that 
allegorically, the tale states the supernatural quality of wisdom and rationality, 
and the importance of the development of the human’s rational potentials. 
Prometheus’ myth emphasises the necessity of this cultivation. A process 
enabling an initially natural and savage creature to become civil, capable of 
virtue and science, and of engagement in social life – that is, enabling that 
organism to become truly human. Further, the poet explains how the narrative 
underscores the solitary, labour demanding, frightening, and even tortuous 
characteristics of that process, and stresses the dangers of the human’s 
corporeal shortcomings and vulnerability to lust. 
Noteworthy is the strongly dichotomous image of humankind underlying 
Boccaccio’s excavated meanings: a “twofold” creature that consists, first, of a 
sinful, imperfect body and, second, of a potentially – that is, if aided by 
knowledge – rational mind. The latter highlights the divine kinship of that same, 
sinful being, providing a rather positive counterweight to the human’s more 
negative characteristics. It is interesting that, just as the story’s allegories, this 
image is a perfect blend of the pagan and Christian pictures of humanity. 
However, the myth’s allegorical value does not finish here. In the book’s 
preface, Boccaccio describes the mythographer’s work itself as a Promethean 
task. He assures the King that he will satisfy his wish for a genealogy, but still 
explaining his reluctant attitude he says 
 
“Nonetheless, I dread undertaking such a large task, and if another Prometheus or 
even Prometheus himself, who in a bygone era the poets said could form man from 
mud, were to rise up and present himself, I scarcely believe that he, much more than I, 
would have the skills for this work”
221
. 
 
The beauty of this quotation lies in its – I’d like to say Promethean – ambiguity. 
For, on the one hand, it has a desperate, negative flavour, with Boccaccio 
underlining the fundamentally unaccomplishable character of the task he is 
asked to perform – a satisfactory result would demand divine capabilities. On 
the other hand, these same lines draw an analogy between Prometheus and 
the poet. By means of other – and surely rather indirect – words, in a way 
Boccaccio calls himself “a literary Prometheus”, just as Lucian was named by 
others. According to Susanna Barsella Boccaccio should be considered an 
early-humanist author, as his innovative views already contained the essence of 
Humanism: a strong attempt to unite Christian and classical thoughts, and an 
image of the poet as a “moral philosopher”, whose function it is “to educate men 
to natural and moral knowledge so that they may live in a secular, political, 
context according to the principles of justice and piety”222. In the last book of the 
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Genealogy, Boccaccio indeed emphasises the poet’s valuable function once 
more. He tells the King that he has reached the end of this task: 
 
“In obedience to your command, I have according to my ability added interpretations to 
the myths, both derived from the ancients and from my own slender intellect. I have 
also performed what I considered in some directions a most urgent duty, and shown 
that the poets [...] are [...] not absurd nor mere story-tellers – nay, they are marked with 
secular learning, genius, character, and high distinction”.
223
 
 
Clearly, Prometheus perfectly embodies Boccaccio’s concept of the poet with 
his socialising, illuminating, educative and humanising function. Thanks to the 
truth, knowledge, and meanings he can teach, the Promethean poet is thus not 
just a creative moulder of verbal clay, but by means of his artistic productions 
he may even transform an originally brutish organism into a civil, human being – 
and Boccaccio hopes to join this group of geniuses.  
 
3.2.2. Ficino 
 
In the 15th century, Humanism is getting more and more popular and so is 
(Neo-)Platonism and the work of its ‘father’ Plotinus (ca. 204-270 AD). 
Influenced by the humanistic tendencies and fascinated by the ancient authors, 
the philosopher Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) commits himself to revitalising 
Plato’s ideas. At the time, Aristotle has long been the favourite of scholars and 
clergy, but Ficino turns to Plato and translates virtually all of his writings in Latin. 
This way, he makes the philosopher’s works available to the public. He 
promotes the examination of his writings at the Platonic Academy of Florence 
(established in 1462) and Plato’s work as well as Ficino’s interpretations 
become very popular and influential. It continues the Patristic tendency, aiming 
to unite pagan and Christian ideas. However, whereas earlier authors usually 
tried to keep (and apply) the Platonic concepts separate from their philosophical 
framework as such, according to Josephine Burroughs “Ficino deliberately set 
out to combine the Platonic doctrine as a whole with the Christian doctrine”224. 
Ficino got so inspired by Plato’s ideas and theology that, in his early 20s, he 
even had a religious crisis. Later on, he converted back to Christianity, but not 
without conceiving of it in a different way, that is: within a Platonic paradigm. 
The result is a new system, which centres on humanity’s one and 
universal aim: the achievement of the summum bonum, the highest good. Both 
philosophy and religion are required for Ficino’s scheme – philosophy providing 
knowledge and universal principles; religion the right conception and 
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justification of that highest good. They complement each other, and being both 
“manifestations of spiritual life”225, they strive to attain this same aim. Clearly, 
underneath this system lies the strongly humanistic idea of the uniqueness of 
the human and his universal desire – and, not unimportantly, his ability – to 
pursue and attain the highest good. Yet beside that Humanism and Platonism, 
Ficino remains very open to the Aristotelian school, which focused on a more 
practical, natural, or physical, philosophy. In fact, as he explains in his Five 
Questions Concerning the Mind (1476-7), the human’s universal desire for that 
ultimate, perfect end is a natural motion, the appetitus naturalis. Thus, in a way, 
he combines Aristotelian and Platonic ideas in that very concept. The principle 
of the universe – or better: of Being – is such that every species has its own 
essential, natural, tendency to move towards a specific, common good, which is 
both its source and end. In humanity’s case that is “boundless truth and 
goodness”, “the cause of causes”226 – in other words: God – in which it will find 
the rest that its moving soul eventually strives towards. Each species has a 
highest, ideal member, primum in aliquo genere, who stands at the top of a 
hierarchy. It is according to that hierarchy that its individual members are 
organised, and upon which the less perfect order and goodness of less perfect 
creatures, depend – but to which, as they are nevertheless still partially good, 
ordered, and in motion, these beings and their single, particular ends, also 
contribute. God, embodying Being, Goodness, and Truth as such, is the 
transcendent primum of humanity. And in the end, as the cause of all Being, He 
is the primum of each created thing. This image of God is reminiscent of the 
Platonic Ideas. The human soul has a unique metaphysical position: it stands at 
the centre of the hierarchy that includes all creations. The soul has the ability to 
move up- and downwards, high and low; to move towards goodness and 
wisdom through its intellect, or towards pleasure and enjoyment through “the 
will” – that is, desire. Again, this demonstrates a dichotomous image of the 
human. On the one hand, the soul has a rational tendency, eager for learning, 
enquiry, and reason, that is: the mind, or contemplation – which it shares with 
God – and the power of discourse and deliberation. On the other hand, it has an 
irrational, physical tendency, guided by instinct and thus focusing on its body 
and senses – “the powers which we and brutes have in common with the 
plants”227, that is: nutrition, reproduction, and sensation. Because of its reason, 
the human essence is more perfect than the nature of any other species. 
Humans are capable of grasping what Ficino calls “the whole of being”228. They 
must indeed have some divine kinship, for “if intellect thus touches upon the 
highest form of perfection, it does so undoubtedly because of a certain highest 
affinity between that highest form and itself”229. Yet the mind remains 
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vulnerable, for it can “be diverted from its speculative intention when it occupies 
itself excessively with the care and cultivation of the body”230. Both tendencies 
are natural, and inherent to the human essence: 
 
“thus we see that by a natural instinct every soul strives in a continuous effort both to 
know all truths by the intellect and to enjoy all good things by the will”
231
. 
 
The paradox of this situation is that since the human reason is characterised by 
freedom of choice, the soul is unable to be satisfied: it will either let itself be 
misled by the senses, which means it will not succeed in attaining the highest 
good; or it will oppose the senses, in which case its ‘inferior’ parts will remain 
unfulfilled and render life ‘laborious’. The result is that  
 
“reason is always uncertain, vacillating and distressed; and since it is nowhere at rest 
while thus affected, it certainly never gains possession of its desired end or permits 
sense to take possession of its proper end which is already present”
232
. 
 
In short, the human’s very nature disables her to attain happiness and rest – 
that is, infinite being, truth, and goodness. 
  Now here Prometheus enters the stage, and, as Raggio says, “for the 
first time after Plotinus, the myth is invested with the dignity of a philosophical 
symbol, mystical and deeply pessimistic”233. As said, according to Ficino, it is 
because of reason that the human is the most perfect of every creature on 
earth; however, due to that same reason, it is at the same time the least perfect 
being, because of the unattainable character of the final, absolute perfection 
she strives for. For Ficino, Prometheus’ unfortunate story nicely represents the 
human soul’s complicated quest for superior truth – indeed, moving itself 
towards some Platonic Intellectual Realm. With the help of Pallas, the Titan 
managed to get hold of divine fire, “that is, reason”, but 
 
“[b]ecause of this very possession, on the highest peak of the mountain, that is, at the 
very height of contemplation, he is rightly judged most miserable of all, for he is made 
wretched by the continuous gnawing of the most ravenous of vultures, that is, by the 
torment of inquiry. This will be the case, until the time comes when he is carried back to 
that same place from which he received the fire, so that, just as he is now urged on to 
seek the whole by that one beam of celestial light, he will then be entirely filled with the 
whole light”
234
. 
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Like Boccaccio’s eagle, in this dark comparison Prometheus’ vulture stands for 
the agony that human reason brings along. After stealing a ray of the heavenly 
light of contemplation the human soul is torn apart by that very power, “the 
torment of enquiry”. Aware of its intellectual capacities and its desire towards 
the end it was given, yet unable to reach its goal because of its dual nature, the 
soul encounters itself as if chained to a rock, incapable to move. Just as 
Prometheus, it will only be released when it returns to heaven, and finally that 
one flame of knowledge can expand so that it be “entirely filled with the whole 
light”. In other words, the mystical state of perfection, wisdom and happiness to 
which the human’s entire life is devoted can only be achieved in the afterlife, 
when the body – and thereby, the soul’s inclination towards it – does not 
present its problems anymore. Human life is nothing but misery. Only death can 
relieve our harmful situation. 
Unsurprisingly, Ficino also draws a biblical parallel:  
 
“The more easily the first man was able to receive happiness when in the beginning he 
was entirely devoted to God, the more easily he has lost ease itself when thereafter he 
turned against God”
235
. 
 
Prometheus and Adam both committed a sin of knowledge and had to endure 
the torture of its consequences – and so still today, the human has to “[o] 
sorrow! – live and suffer contrary to the order of nature”236. However, in the end, 
the human soul will be released from its agony, for as difficult as it is when the 
soul is still in physically trapped, as “easily it obtains it [its aim, happiness – TF] 
when it is either free from the body or in a temperate immortal celestial body”237. 
Eventually, we will enter some paradisiacal place, where “nothing evil can be 
imagined” and we will find 
 
“eternal life and the brightest light of knowledge, rest without change, a positive 
condition free from privation, tranquil and secure possession of all good, and 
everywhere perfect joy”
238
. 
 
Prometheus’ more artistic and creative skills are not mentioned in the Five 
Questions. Yet Ficino does pay these abilities attention in his Summary of 
Protagoras – Plato’s Protagoras, that is. He explains that “Prometheus, who 
represents the highest level of daemons, might equip men” and that 
“Prometheus [...], ruler of the rational soul, transferred the activity of art [...] to 
man”239. Of course, he also speaks of Epimetheus, “who represents the host of 
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the lower daemons”, which “support corporeal and irrational nature”240. In this 
context, the dual nature of the human condition – his incorporeal and corporeal, 
rational and irrational nature – is thus embodied by the two brothers together, 
and the resulting image seems less pessimistic than the one in the Five 
Questions, because 
 
“the more Epimetheus and the lower nature support the irrational in matters pertaining 
to the body, the more Prometheus and the higher providence seem to give counsel to 
men in matters pertaining to the soul. For when he bestowed the principle of art, he 
revealed the skilful maker of all that nature has granted to the beasts”
241
. 
 
Yet despite the fact that Prometheus embodies some Divine Providence, the 
text is not optimistic either. For, although Plato himself does not explicitly 
mention Prometheus’ punishment in this dialogue, Ficino adds later on that 
“through the very gift of reason [...] we lead a life on earth that is more wretched 
than that of the beasts, since it is more disturbed and more tearful”242 – an 
addition that finds it origin rather in his own theories than in Plato’s. 
In several other works Ficino respectfully draws attention to Prometheus 
and his intellectual and creative arts. He describes him “as the sun cherishing 
the rational spirit”243 in the Philebus Commentary; and together with Saturn and 
Jove as part of “the triple intelligence” in his commentary on Plato’s Statesman. 
The Titan appears once more, but remarkably this time against a completely 
different background. In 1489, Ficino writes a short letter – The Pursuit of Long 
Life – to his fellow philosopher and friend Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. He 
tells Pico he is reading a difficult – because poorly written – book called On 
Delaying Old Age, and explains that “this difficult text on delaying old age is 
delaying your visit to me”244. He seems to regret this impediment, but God is 
urging him to read the text before they meet. Although, he says, “my own 
concern, however, is not so much with delaying old age as with holding on to 
it”245. Interestingly, the letter continues in the following way: 
 
“In the meantime, while we seem to be apart and to be dealing with different things, we 
are doing the same thing: we are imitating Prometheus. We are making man, you the 
soul and I the body. You are bringing the soul from the divine world; I am taking the 
body from the heavens. The universe has already been marvellously displayed by you 
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in a sevenfold mirror. How beautifully, by our joint effort, we are now putting together 
our man, the observer of the universe!”
246
 
 
Now, how should this analogy be understood? Just as Boccaccio, Ficino 
appears to conceptualise his and Pico’s writings – the “sevenfold mirror” refers 
to Pico’s recently published Heptaplus, a work on the seven days of creation – 
as a Promethean task. However, unlike Boccaccio, Ficino does not mention the 
Titan’s role as educator: it is all about his creative powers. Further, what is 
striking is that Ficino’s comparison is of a much less humble nature than 
Boccaccio’s. Together, by means of their texts, those we could call the new 
‘literary Prometheuses’ would be capable of – or actually are already – creating 
and animating the human being. The task seems to be anything but 
unachievable: apparently, Ficino and Pico do possess the supernatural 
capacities necessary to accomplish the job that Boccaccio feared he himself 
could not.247 
Yet the section may need to be interpreted in an entirely different way – it 
should probably not be understood in all earnestness. First of all, Ficino is 
known for his sense of humour. Second, the tone of the letter as a whole is 
quite ironic indeed – think of the linguistic play in the quote above, how the book 
“on delaying old age is delaying your visit to me”. Third, if one takes into 
account that Pico was quite handsome, whereas Ficino himself had a hunched 
back, an imaginary situation in which precisely the former would create the soul 
and the latter the body seems to be loaded with quite some self-mockery, and 
so all in all I would say that it is highly likely that the text should be taken with a 
grain of salt. Perhaps the analogy is even a wink to the poorly written book: 
through their work, Ficino and Pico may be retarding their own ‘old age’ as they 
are developing their essentially immortal soul, and ascending towards that 
“everlasting” state by means of Promethean contemplation and philosophy. 
Actually, from a more practical point of view, they are literally establishing some 
form of immortality through the material, time-resistant nature of their writings. 
 
3.2.3. Pico della Mirandola 
 
Apart from being a fellow philosopher and great friend of Ficino, Pico della 
Mirandola (1463-1494) is another essential member of the Florentine Academy 
and just as enthusiastic about Plato as he was. Just as Ficino, Pico thinks 
Christianity and the ideas of Antiquity should be united, as should Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s theories. He believes that there are moral and religious truths to be 
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found within the wisdom of ancient thinkers and that allegorical exegesis can 
disclose the natural and theological revelations that lay underneath the 
Classics’ mysteries. And like Ficino, Pico deifies the human. Yet despite the two 
philosophers’ similarities, their theories do diverge significantly.248 The main 
difference lies in the way they characterise and value human life on earth. 
Whereas both of them have strong faith in the power of human knowledge, 
Pico’s idea of the human and her capacities is far more positive than Ficino’s. 
Pico is convinced that the felicity of the human is to be found on earth, and that 
here, already, she can exert her divine powers. In the words of Raymond 
Trousson, “[c]’est là ce qui sépare Ficin de Pic de la Mirandole”: for Pico’s 
human “la noblesse réside précisément dans la recherche terrestre de la 
vérité”249. What for his friend epitomises humanity’s misery is precisely what 
provides his glory in Pico’s theory: the earthly quest for truth. 
In his oration On the Dignity of Man (1486) Pico discusses what he calls 
“the outstandingness of human nature”250. Even though the human reason or 
their ‘central’ position are admirable characteristics, in his eyes these are not so 
much what make humans so exceptional, but rather the freedom of the human 
will and, consequently, their immense amount of possibilities. To demonstrate 
this “outstandingness”, he tells the story of Creation, which interestingly, has a 
strong Promethean flavour. When God built the world, Pico relates, he made 
heaven, animated the planets and created animals. “But, with the work finished, 
the Artisan desired that there be someone to reckon up the reason of such a big 
work, to love its beauty, and to wonder at its greatness”251, and thus God 
decided to create humanity. Yet when he came to the human’s formation, there 
were no features or characteristics left: “[e]verything was filled up; all things had 
been laid out in the highest, the lowest, and the middle orders”252. Therefore, 
God made the human without any specific nature. He tells Adam he has given 
him 
 
“no fixed seat, no form of thy very own [...]. A limited nature in other creatures is 
confined within the laws written down by Us. In conformity with thy free judgement [...], 
thou art confined by no bounds; and thou wilt fix limits of nature for thyself. [...] Thou 
canst grow downward into the lower natures which are brutes. Thou canst again grow 
upward from thy soul’s reason into the higher natures which are divine”253. 
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The resemblance to Protagoras’ version of the Promethean myth is 
extraordinary. For a start, there is the implicit reference to Epimetheus’ 
premature finishing up of the abilities to be distributed; further, the sections of 
the above quote are strongly reminiscent of Protagoras’ phrases describing the 
human race as “completely unequipped” or “naked, unshod, unbedded, and 
unarmed”. A few paragraphs later, Pico refers explicitly to the myth and asks  
 
“Who does not wonder at this chameleon which we are? It was not unfittingly that 
Asclepius the Athenian said that man was symbolised by Prometheus in the secret 
rites, by reason of our nature sloughing its skin and transforming itself”
254
. 
 
Asclepius was right, Prometheus is a beautiful archetype for the human: we are 
endowed with a creative godlike capacity to decide for ourselves what to be, to 
mould ourselves into whatever we wish. Pico explains that the human is a 
‘microcosm’ – we unite the different zones of the universe in our unique nature. 
That universe consists of three worlds: the intellectual or angelical world; the 
one of the heavenly bodies; and the one of the earthly, the physical bodies. As 
micro-embodiment of this cosmos, of the intellect, the divine, the material and 
the body, the human is given an innumerable amount of potencies on the basis 
of which she will shape herself. Pico thus brings the human significantly closer 
to God than Ficino. The essence of the comparison with Prometheus does not 
so much lie in creativity as a practical skill, but it is rather a unique ontological 
gift. Humans literally have the celestial type of power to apply their capabilities 
to themselves as such, as being, as creature. This is outstanding indeed, yet 
Pico points out this does not mean that humans are perfect. Importantly, their 
moral nature is an essential element of their self-creation and transformation. 
They can always “grow downward” and become a brutes, when they, for 
instance, choose to exclusively follow the physical realm. In Charles Glenn 
Wallis’ words “God has granted to man every kind of seed. They grow as man 
cultivates them”255 – and so the human can grow whatever way. 
 
3.2.4. Bovelles, Erasmus and Alciati 
 
Slowly, Renaissance thinking places the ability to give form more and more in 
the hands of the individual human being. In Le Livre du Sage (1509), Charles 
de Bovelles (1479-1566) assigns Prometheus a similar role as his exemplary 
                                                 
254
 Ibid., 5. Note that an alternative translation says that man “was symbolised by Proteus in the 
mysteries”. (Pico della Mirandola, “On the Dignity of Man,” in The Renaissance Philosophy of 
Man, ed. Ernst Cassirer and et. al. (London: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 225; my 
emphasis.) Proteus is a son of Poseidon, who, like Prometheus, has significant prophetic, 
intellectual and creative capabilities and is also a trickster figure. Which translation should be 
the right one is remains unclear. In fact, due to their similarities some authors conclude that the 
two gods were actually the same figure (see e.g. Jacob Bryant’s A New System, or, An Analysis 
of Ancient Mythology (1774-1776)). 
255
 Pico della Mirandola, On the Dignity of Man, 1985, xv. 
Trijsje Franssen    Prometheus Through the Ages 
75 
 
Florentine predecessors did: the Titan represents the human who – contrary to 
any other living being – determines his own shape. Humans certainly have 
great potentials when it comes to wisdom and civilisation, but they are not born 
a sage, they have to become one. Each human has to face a specific process in 
order to evolve into a ‘true’ human – the sapiens – for “seul cependent le sage 
est vraiment homme”256. Moving through several stages of being – essere, 
vivere, sentire, intelligere (being, living, feeling, knowing) – they develop from a 
mere “natural human” into a wise, a perfect human. This sage “begs” for 
darkness in order to obtain light; for nature to obtain intelligence; for “the part” to 
obtain “the whole”; and for seed, so that it may be brought to full fruition: 
 
“En ce domaine en effet, il imite le célèbre Prométhée [...]. De même, le sage 
abandonnant le monde sensible par la force de la contemplation et pénétrant dans le 
royaume du ciel, après y avoir recueilli au giron immortel de son esprit le feu très clair 
de la sagesse, le porte au monde d’en bas et cette flamme pure et très vivante vivifie, 
réchauffe et anime l’homme naturel et terrestre qui est en lui”
257
. 
 
This wise human is embodied by that “famous Prometheus” who, “abandoning 
the sensible world”, managed to catch the fire of knowledge from the divine 
realm. When introducing the “very bright flame of wisdom” within his immortal 
soul, the sage – just as the ancient god – “enlivens, reheats, and animates” the 
mere, terrestrial creature he was before. He is artful, and remoulds (reproduit) 
the divine creation: 
 
“Rien n’est le propre de l’homme mais tout ce qui est le propre des autres êtres lui 
appartient. Tout ce qui est la particularité de tel ou tel, de celui-ci et de celui-là, 
individuellement, appartient à l’unité de l’homme. Celui-ci en effet porte en lui la nature 
de toutes choses, voit tout, reproduit la nature entière”
258
. 
 
Like Pico’s human, the sapiens has the freedom to form himself. He “carries 
within him the nature of all things” and gains perfection as he acquires 
knowledge, self-consciousness, self-mastery, and independence. The absence 
of a particular nature enables humanity to embrace the universe and to know, 
appropriate and eventually “reproduce nature in its entirety”. Moreover, it is a 
circular process, for as the human follows his path, and, guided by reason, 
arrives at his destination, “mother nature” is led back to herself. As he moves 
from matter to mind, from substance to subject, from mere existence – even via 
angelic knowledge – to true, divine, and universal “connaissance de soi”259, not 
only the human but Being as such becomes conscious of itself. 
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Just as his theoretical forebears, Bovelles tries to combine different 
ancient theories: the human development follows a rather Aristotelian scheme – 
from the potential to the actual – while its supreme end tastes of Platonic 
idealism. Both the process of becoming sage and the final state of wisdom are 
reminiscent of Ficino’s dynamic system and his highest good. The Titan himself 
is very similar to Boccaccio’s second Prometheus and his civilising capabilities. 
As in the end he finds a state of unity with himself – Being, the angels, God and 
the world – Bovelles’ human is very reminiscent of Pico’s image of the human 
as microcosm – Bovelles says that “[l]e sage est un homme qui mérite d’être 
célébré comme un petit monde”260. However, a significant difference between 
Bovelles’ human and his predecessors’, is that his one is much more of an 
individual, and so is her process: it is a journey of self-creation in which “le 
penseur solitaire”261 has to lift her spirit up to this higher level only by means of 
her contemplation – and all by herself. Another, remarkable change in Bovelles’ 
theory is that he secularises the essentially religious concepts of his forebears: 
the human’s ascension is an exclusively human, self-achieved, and 
independent process that has no need of divine intervention or help. As Eugene 
Rice phrases it, “[t]he wise, divine, and Promethean man is the natural end and 
consummation of the natural man and his own creation”262.  
In the meantime other thinkers still make serious attempts to harmonise 
the – by now more independent, perhaps even secular – urge for wisdom with 
the Christian faith. The time’s tremendous love for science had evoked a 
counter-reaction: it had nourished the opposite idea that the human should 
refrain entirely from boldly diving into the laws of nature and the divine secrets, 
and should leave the ‘high’ wisdom to God. Yet in his Antibarbari (ca. 1495), the 
humanist philosopher (theologian, priest, and teacher) Desiderius Erasmus 
Roterodamus (1466 – 1536) argues against this idea. Knowledge is good and 
needed, since it can release us from our ignorance and stupidity. It should not 
be forbidden at all, we should just take care that it be combined with ‘charity’ 
and modesty, so that we do not end up bragging about our achievements. And 
one should work for it: 
 
“Wisdom is indeed to be sought from God, I agree, and sought in what way? [...] [D]o 
you think that what you need for the mind is to be received gratis? is wisdom to be 
poured in while one is asleep? [...] If it be right to bring in the fables of the poets at this 
point, we ought to imitate Prometheus, who when he wanted life for his clay image 
dared to seek it from the stars, but only when he had already applied every means 
available to human skill”
263
. 
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His remarks may have a strong ironic flavour, but between the lines Erasmus 
seriously reinforces us to follow, perhaps even emulate Prometheus’ ambitions. 
We should not expect to suddenly wake up wise without having struck a blow, 
but just as the ancient god we must be willing to make an effort, cross 
boundaries and actively engage in learning in order to get rid of our ignorance. 
The most famous Emblemata (1531) by Andrea Alciati (1492 – 1550), 
literally paints a rather different picture of the Titan than the two authors just 
discussed. As Raggio points out, “[a]s soon as we turn to more popular sources, 
Prometheus, the pious philosopher, is replaced by Prometheus, the arrogant 
astrologer”264. Alciati’s emblem book includes a depiction of Prometheus (see 
Figure 4265), lying suffering and enchained against a rock, while his liver is 
engorged by the eagle. The motto above reads quae supra nos, ea nihil ad nos 
– “we should not be concerned with things above us” – ironically – a Socratic 
phrase.266 In the 1550 version of the book, the emblem is placed in the section 
‘Astrologia’, together with, amongst other things, an emblem of Icarus. Being 
too bold, the boy Icarus flew too close to the sun. The wax of his wings melted, 
so that he fell into the sea and drowned. Apparently, both of them do indeed fit 
under the heading of “arrogant astrologers”. The verse accompanying 
Prometheus’ picture says that the Titan, now that his liver is being torn apart by 
the bird, 
 
“could well wish he had not made man. Hating moulders of clay, he curses the torch lit 
from the stolen fire. – The hearts of the learned are gnawed by various cares, the 
learned who strive to know the vicissitudes of heaven and the gods”
267
. 
 
Interestingly, the text strongly reminds us of the earlier references to the torture 
of knowledge. Boccaccio’s and Ficino’s Titans are also gnawed by the troubling 
attempt to achieve divine wisdom. Yet contrary to these two Alciati strongly 
condemns the strivings for knowledge. It is hubris. The arrogant “learned” are 
not only suffering, let alone to be pitied. The moral lesson to be learned from the 
emblems is that figures as Prometheus and Icarus are wrong, and probably 
even deserve their penalties. For pride should be punished and what is above 
us should be left untouched. 
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Figure 4. 
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3.3. From Renaissance to the Scientific Revolution 
 
What Raggio calls “more popular sources”, such as the emblems, thus put the 
human urge for divine wisdom in a pejorative context – and with that, the 
Promethean myth. However, simultaneously a solid belief in human powers – 
and particularly in the value (or perhaps even necessity) of the execution of 
these powers – does remain very much alive within the time’s theoretical or 
philosophical context. 
 
3.3.1. Bacon 
 
A famous philosopher – as well as scientist, statesman, and jurist – who, on the 
eve of the Enlightenment, cultivated the Renaissance focus on humankind’s 
intellectual and scientific capacities, is Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626). He further 
developed the humanist views into what many consider to be the basis of 
modern thinking. The difference and modernity of his ideas lie in his way of 
placing the already vividly present ideals of human freedom, rationality and 
progress within a new, pragmatic and experimental paradigm, which – as 
phrased by Charles Whitney – sees “knowledge as power over nature, 
knowledge for the benefit and use of life”268. In the Instauratio Magna (1620), 
Bacon calls for a radical regeneration, an ‘instauration’ of humanity, which 
should lead to major scientific innovations, discoveries, transformation and 
progress – for that is essentially what human existence is all about. His call for 
knowledge-as-power is almost completely secularised, as, instead of a search 
for divine wisdom, it has become a quest for practical and most of all useful 
knowledge. In the Novum Organum (1620) he formulates his idea of a proper 
scientific method: 
 
“[m]y course and method [...], is this – not to extract works from works or experiments 
from experiments [...], but from works and experiments to extract causes and axioms, 
and again from those causes and axioms new works and experiments, as a legitimate 
interpreter of nature”269. 
 
He continuously emphasises his independence from the past and demands a 
radical break with tradition. The routines in discourse and the modes of 
production in arts and sciences limit our possibilities, which is why we need to 
emancipate ourselves from those timeworn systems. 
 However, in order to define and articulate his concepts of reform, 
instauration, and innovation, at the same time it is obvious that Bacon cannot 
but build on classical, religious, and traditional ideas and significances. One of 
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Bacon’s more literary works, De Sapientia Veterum (Wisdom of the Ancients, 
1619), demonstrates this paradoxical situation quite well. The philosopher 
analyses a set of classical myths one by one, thereby using them to give shape 
to his own thoughts. Interestingly, Chapter XXVI, ‘Prometheus, or the State of 
Man’ extensively treats the story of the Titan. According to Bacon, the story 
does not only prove humans’ rational capabilities, but also their position at the 
centre of the world, and their mastery over nature. He starts by relating that 
according to the ancients, Prometheus created the human of clay “mixed with 
certain parcels taken from diverse animals”270. In order to be not only its creator, 
but also its “propagator”, he stole fire from heaven and gave it to the new race. 
Presenting a less familiar version of the myth, Bacon adds that Prometheus’ 
efforts were not appreciated by humankind. On the contrary: the humans were 
ungrateful and accused him to Jupiter. The father of the gods was very pleased 
with their accusation, and thus did not only allow them the use of fire, but also 
granted them “perpetual youth”271. Yet foolish humankind placed this fabulous 
present on the back of a silly donkey. The animal was very thirsty and turned to 
a fountain. He accepted the condition of the serpent which guarded the 
fountain, that he may drink only if the latter would receive the burden on the 
donkey’s back. This way, humanity’s eternal youth was lost to serpents. 
In the meantime, Prometheus reconciled with the humans. However, he 
was still quite angry at Jupiter and thus prepared him a misleading portion of 
what seemed to be ox meat, but consisted of nothing but bones.272 Having 
discovered the trick, Jupiter ordered the Olympian gods to create Pandora and 
her box full of misery. Thanks to his foresight, Prometheus refused to accept the 
‘gift’. Unfortunately his brother Epimetheus did not foresee the trouble, released 
the box’s miseries when opening it and only managed to retain hope. Jupiter 
charged Prometheus for his various crimes – even accused him of attempting to 
rape Minerva – and chained him to the Caucasus mountain, so that he may be 
perpetually tortured by the eagle. Yet, says Bacon, it is said that he was 
liberated by Herakles, who sailed the ocean in a cup that was given to him by 
the sun. 
Finally, the philosopher tells about the real-life torch games that were 
held in honour of the Titan. Lighted torches were passed on from one racing 
participant to the other: “whoso suffered to go out yielded the place and victory 
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to those that followed [...], so that whosoever came first to the mark with his 
torch burning got the price”273. 
After his precise descriptions of the myth’s episodes, in the rest of the 
chapter Bacon provides a pervasive, allegorical analysis of each passage, for 
“[t]his fable demonstrates and presseth many true and grave speculations”274. 
The philosopher starts by stating that Prometheus obviously represents 
Providence. Out of the entirety of nature, the ancients selected only the creation 
of the human as the particular work of Providence. The reason why they did, 
Bacon explains, is that the human has a mind and comprehension. And as it is 
unthinkable that this rationality and understanding should originate in an 
irrational basis, one must assume as well that these be designed and implanted 
in the human mind by a higher Providence. Yet humanity’s rational mind is not 
the only reason why the ancients picked out our species as the providential 
location, for 
 
“man is, as it were, the centre of the world, in respect of final causes, so that if man 
were not in nature, all things would seem to stray and wander without purpose, and like 
scattered branches, as they say, without inclination to their end. For all things attend on 
man, and he makes use of and gathers fruit from all creatures; […] all things seem to 
work, not for themselves, but for man”
275
. 
 
The fact that when the human being – that creature around which the whole 
world is built – was created, the clay was mixed with particles from many 
different animals, was not a trivial detail either. For the human is indeed a 
“microcosm” – a term which reminds us of Pico and Bovelles. It is obvious, says 
Bacon, that in contrast other creatures’ figures “the body of man [...] is endued 
and furnished with most admirable virtues and faculties”276. Without explicitly 
mentioning the ancient author, Bacon employs Platonic terms when describing 
the human as “naked” and “unarmed” and continues explaining that 
Prometheus stole fire in order to make up for these shortcomings. Therefore, 
 
“if the soul be the form of forms, […] fire deserves well to be called the succour of 
succours […], which infinite ways affords aid and assistance to all labours and 
mechanical arts, and to the sciences themselves”277. 
 
The fact that the Titan’s theft was brought about by means of a set of twigs is 
also significant: as twigs are used for striking and blowing, they symbolise the 
way the fire is generated, namely by violently colliding objects. It thereby 
emphasises the power of fire to set things in motion, stealing, as it were, its 
flames from the sun. 
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The episode which relates about the ingratitude of humankind for 
Prometheus’ gifts may seem rather peculiar, but Bacon explains it is not: its 
allegorical meaning is “that men’s outcries upon the defects of nature and art 
proceed from an excellent disposition of the mind and turn to their good”278. 
Those who infinitely praise themselves and their wisdom appear to equalise 
their own nature and capacities with divine ones, thereby showing little esteem 
for God and his perfection. Moreover, having contented themselves with their 
own powers and knowledge, they cease exploring. Therefore, those who 
complain against nature “are indeed of more true and moderate judgements; for 
they are ever in action, seeking always to find out new inventions”279. We 
should acknowledge how little we know, and how truth and falsehood are 
intermingled. We should be grateful to the gods for our imperfections, as these 
will enable us to acquire new blessings and greater goods. 
 With respect to the gift of perpetual youth, according to Bacon its moral is 
that “the divine bounty is not wanting unto man in the obtaining of such gifts, but 
men are wanting to themselves”280. It was humankind who placed this valuable 
gift on a donkey’s back – a stupid, slow-paced creature which, says Bacon, 
symbolises experience. Reason and experience have not yet been properly 
united – philosophical abstractions and ponderous practice remain separate. 
Yet, says Bacon, we may nevertheless be hopeful. For he is convinced that if 
humans keep on following the empirical path, guided by methodology, and 
without letting themselves be distracted by certain avaricious thirsts, they “may 
prove no unfit porter to bear this new addition of divine munificence”281. 
Next, the myth attends to the human condition and major aspects of his 
life, personified by the tale’s main characters. For a start, there is the figure of 
Pandora, who embodies 
 
“pleasure and voluptuousness, which (when the civil life is pampered with too much art 
and culture and superfluity) is engendered, as it were, by the efficacy of fire […]. From 
this do infinite miseries, together with too late repentance proceed, and overflow the 
minds, bodies, and fortunes of men”
282
. 
  
Humans should not spoil themselves with too much pleasure, for not only 
individual trouble but fighting, wars and despotism find their source in there. 
Further, the brothers Epimetheus and Prometheus represent two types of 
human. The first stands for the un-foreseeing, careless one, who merely 
focuses on the present and its diversions and therefore ends up living his life 
“almost in perpetual affliction”283, but nevertheless does entertain himself. 
Those of the second type are cautious, and do think further ahead. This way, 
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they manage to evade many miseries, yet, due to their prudence, 
simultaneously they also “deprive themselves and defraud their genius of many 
lawful pleasures and diverse recreations”284. As many before him, Bacon relates 
how rational, enquiring humans torture themselves with worries, concerns, and 
anxieties. 
 
“For, being chained to the pillar of necessity, they are afflicted with innumerable 
cogitations [...], and those griping, and, as it were, gnawing and devouring the liver”
285
. 
 
Consequently, few people of either condition succeed in both deriving the 
benefits of Providence and avoiding misery. They are, indeed, unable to 
achieve that aim without the help of Herakles, “that is, fortitude and constancy 
of mind, which is prepared for every event, and armed in all fortunes, foreseeing 
without fear, enjoying without loathing, and suffering without impatience”286. 
Even Prometheus did not possess this virtue – for, says Bacon, no being can 
handle such agony by its own nature. Therefore, he needed the help of 
Herakles, the message being that knowledge, psychological fortitude and 
courage will teach us how to deal with our flaws and vulnerabilities. 
 Finally, Bacon explains the significance of the torch races. The lighted 
flares represent practical science and art, the message being that “the 
perfection of sciences is to be expected from succession, not from the 
nimbleness and promptness of only one author”287. Just as the torches used to 
be passed from one person to another, those speeding today with the fire of 
knowledge should also make sure that they transfer their wisdom, 
 
“seeing it may be as well extinguished in running too fast as by going too slow. […] It 
were therefore to be wished that these games in honour of Prometheus or human 
nature were again restored, and that matters should receive success by combat and 
emulation, and not hang upon any one man’s sparkling and shaking torch”
288
. 
 
The father of modernity aimed at a radical break with the past. Of course there 
are still obvious connections with earlier theories – sometimes Renaissance, 
sometimes mediaeval ideas – but simultaneously, he does indeed also make 
some radical and rather new statements. For a start, whereas Bacon, just as 
Ficino, Pico, and Bovelles, also places the human at the world’s centre, he does 
this in a much more optimistic framework than the former theorists. Unlike in 
Ficino’s and Pico’s work, the possibility of the human growing downward to 
become a “brute” is not mentioned. We do have imperfections, but from there 
we proceed, we do not fall off – as long as we make an effort, of course. 
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Further, just as Pico, Bacon states that the universe is there to be appreciated 
by humans – it would be senseless without them. Yet it is remarkable that 
Bacon’s description of this situation pictures a much less divine setting and 
shows much less references to God than those of his predecessors. Although 
he explicitly claims that our mind must have been provided by the Lord, he does 
not extensively relate – as Pico did – how humankind was created according to 
the Lord’s wishes, so that there be someone to admire his work. These may 
have been God’s desires, but apparently that aspect is not that important right 
here, right now. Moreover, as Bacon confesses at the end, he does rather not 
interpret the myth by drawing analogies with Christian themes. Of course, that 
does not mean that we should not show deep respect for the Lord; and we 
should take care not to violate divine wisdom. Yet the main point in his 
argument is that the world is built around us humans – we are unique. We find 
ourselves here on earth, and accordingly, the wisdom we strive for is not so 
much divine, but it is rather the practical, empirical and empowering knowledge 
that we should acquire, pass on and take to our advantage. 
Our uniqueness does, nevertheless, not imply that we do not have our 
shortcomings: we are “naked” and “unarmed”. Therefore, we should follow the 
myth’s advice to arm ourselves with fire – not so much a symbol of the Ultimate 
Truth or Supreme Wisdom, but rather of the mechanical and scientific 
instrument. Fire is there to help us to make progress in the empirical sciences, 
technologies and arts. Similarly, we should pay attention to the tale’s 
recommendation to be grateful for our imperfections, as those will only stimulate 
us to continue our analyses and persevere in our investigations. Despite his 
emphasis on the human’s central position, Bacon thus also extensively treats 
human imperfections. These are not only the above ones related to knowledge 
or rationality, but also flaws such as hypocrisy, lack of piety or foresight, 
excessive self-pampering or, on the contrary, superfluous – and again, gnawing 
– worrying. Yet the philosopher maintains his faith in humanity’s capacities: as 
long as we recognise and appreciate our imperfections and we believe in the 
possibility to improve our frail nature through practical knowledge, Heraklean 
courage and constancy of mind, we should be able to make progress. Our flaws 
are, in the end, even preconditions for this advancement, the crucial 
requirement being that we are willing to share and transfer our knowledge – to 
literally advance the flames of our learnings. 
 Bacon thus holds particularly new ideas of knowledge and science, of the 
human and her destiny, and of the relation between the two fields. Science has 
become something practical, empirical, and material, and we should not spend 
too much time on art and culture. Moreover, wisdom is acquired in a social, 
collaborative setting, rather than by a solitary sage such as envisioned by 
Bovelles. In accordance with that, Prometheus has thus ceased being the 
Renaissance figure and become a pragmatic researcher who engages in 
systematic examination. Knowledge is supposed to be based upon a proper 
combination of reason and experience – even if of an inferior, donkey-like 
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nature, for “rightly is truth called the daughter of time, not of authority”289. There 
is always room for innovation and improvement – if only we persevere in our 
research and learn from our experience, Bacon believes even perpetual youth 
is among our possibilities. It should be useful and grant humanity power over 
nature, rather than resulting in divine abstractions:  
 
“I do not trouble myself with any such speculative and withal unprofitable matters. My 
purpose, on the contrary, is to try whether I cannot in very fact lay more firmly the 
foundations and extend more widely the limits of the power and greatness of man”290. 
 
What the human potential might lead to and what form science could take when 
exercised the way he conceptualised it, becomes clear in Bacon’s utopian story 
New Atlantis (1627).291 The novel tells the tale of the crew of a European ship 
that, lost in the South Sea and on the verge of perishing, discovers just in time 
an unknown island and sails towards its fair harbour. The island and its city 
Bensalem are very pretty and highly developed, and its people are incredibly 
friendly, generous and pious – they are Christian as well. The sailors are 
overwhelmed by the miraculous place and its enlightened inhabitants: 
 
“It seemed to us, that we had before us a picture of our salvation in Heaven; for we that 
were a while since in the jaws of death, were now brought into a place, where we found 
nothing but consolations”
292
. 
 
Several days in a row a priest visits the crew and tells them how through regular 
and pervasive navigation the island’s people aim to get to know other countries, 
and there acquire knowledge “especially of the sciences, arts, manufactures, 
and inventions”293. After a week, the sailors are taken to a fascinating place 
called Salomon’s House. They are led from room to room, from one incredible 
instrument, practice and experimentation to another. Here, the island’s people 
produce “new artificial metals”, create new plants and develop ways to achieve 
the “prolongation of life”294. They bring new animals into being, “whereof some 
are advanced (in effect) to be perfect creatures”295. Extremely nourishing food 
and drinks are produced, some of it making “the very flesh of men’s bodies 
sensibly more hard and tough and their strength far greater than otherwise it 
would be”296. Even some kind of robot is fashioned: “We imitate also motions of 
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living creatures, by images, of men, beasts, birds, fishes, and serpents”297. The 
Father of the House explains to them that the “end of our foundation is the 
knowledge of causes, and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the 
bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible”298. Further, with 
respect to their investigations and experiments, it is essential to “cast about how 
to draw out of them things of use and practise for man’s life”299. And obviously, 
they are very successful. 
The civilisation depicted in the novel shows the perfect society as Bacon 
visualises it: one based upon, or built around science – Salomon’s House is 
literally called “the lanthorn of this kingdom”300. The form of science that is 
practised at this place has the empirical and experiential characteristics whose 
importance Bacon emphasises in his other works. Furthermore, they say they 
study the “creatures of God”301, but no religious ceremony is incorporated. 
Moreover, their type of wisdom is passed on as if it were a Promethean torch. 
Bensalem’s people travel across the world to pick up knowledge from other 
cultures, bring it back home and cultivate it further. Moreover, it all takes place 
in a social environment, although independent from the State. In short, the 
people’s main objective is to conquer nature, and to effect “all things possible”, 
thereby making sure that the inventions and creations can be brought to benefit. 
They aim for a type of utility that even includes the ascension of the human race 
as such, the “prolongation of life”, or the creation of an artificial doppelgänger. In 
short, the utopian picture sketched in New Atlantis delineates nothing but the 
various forms of celestial heights that humanity may reach if science is 
performed as envisioned by Bacon. 
 
3.3.2. Hobbes 
 
After Bacon, for more than a century, the interest in the myth of Prometheus 
diminishes noticeably. It appears much less frequently, and if it does, originality 
in the interpretations is virtually absent. The euhemerist tradition is revived and 
many authors identify mythological figures with biblical ones. The Dutch 
theologian Gerardus Vossius (1577-1649), for example, explains that the one 
who the Greeks thought to be Prometheus had actually been Noah; others 
compare the Titan to Moses, and Pandora’s box represents the Sin of 
Knowledge (Robert Burton; 1577-1640). What according to Trousson is “le 
seule utilisation intéressante du mythe”302 of the times, is Thomas Hobbes’ 
(1588 – 1679) use of it. Disgusted by the Puritans’ revolt against the monarchy 
in the century’s Civil War period in England, the philosopher’s objective is to 
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develop a theory that will re-establish the sovereign’s authority. In De Cive 
(1642), he explains that only those few individuals who are most able should 
govern – the Monarchs, that is – “and the People, least of all”303. 
 
“It seems the ancients, who made the fable of Prometheus, pointed at this. They say 
that Prometheus, having stolen fire from the sun, formed a man out of clay, and for this 
deed he was tortured by Jupiter with a perpetual gnawing at his liver. Which is, that by 
human invention, which is signified by Prometheus, laws and justice were by imitation 
taken from monarchy; by virtue thereof, as by fire removed from its orb, the multitude, 
as the dirt and dregs of men, was as it were quickened and formed into a civil person; 
which is termed aristocracy or democracy”
304
. 
 
Prometheus thus symbolises “human invention”: a natural human capability, a 
desire to create. Yet this urge is neither noble nor heroic, but proud and defiant. 
Hobbes’ presentation of the story centres on the Titan’s challenge of the 
Olympian authority. It underlines the terrible actions to which the human desire 
to invent may lead: the recalcitrant “imitation” of the lawful powers of the 
sovereign. In his times, Hobbes bears witness of this Promethean urge resulting 
in the revolt of the Puritans, who are also opposing God’s will while striving for 
the “dirt” of the empowered mass. Remarkably, he refrains from reading the 
myth from Prometheus’ perspective, and pay attention to the possibly legitimate 
character of his activities and the illegitimate actions of the gods. As George 
Shulman puts it: “[b]y making Jupiter the completely justified embodiment of 
human interests and public good, Hobbes makes Prometheus’s crime 
gratuitous, infantile, and self-destructive”305. The Titan personifies rebellion 
against established authority, and thereby also against God – something 
strongly rejected by the philosopher. 
A decade later, Hobbes’ Leviathan appears (1651). In the meantime, the 
Parliamentary victory has taken place and the philosopher has to adapt his 
political theory. Rather than trying to inhibit a revolt against a settled Monarch 
he himself aims to, one could say, ‘invent’ something: namely, a proper solution 
to the disorganisation of what he considers to be any society’s natural, pre-
political basis. That is, a remedy to the chaotic and most of all, anxious state 
people find themselves in when there is no form of order whatsoever – not yet. 
Hobbes’ theory is not any more about defending the settled Monarch (against 
the Puritans), but creating a form of government from scratch, which will prevent 
future rebellion. Accordingly, he changes his view of Prometheus as well: 
 
“it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoreth to secure himselfe against the 
evill he feares, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetuall solicitude of 
the time to come; So that every man, especially those that are over provident, are in an 
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estate like to that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus, (which interpreted, is, The 
prudent man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where, an 
Eagle feeding on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was repayred in the night: 
So that man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all 
the day long, gnawed on by feare of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has not 
repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep”
306
. 
 
Instead of the insurgent against an established authority, the Titan has come to 
represent the anxious and unstable and – most importantly – ontological 
condition of the human before the political needs of sovereign order have been 
fulfilled. Ignorant of what causes the good and bad happenings of his life, the 
human finds himself in a state of “perpetuall solicitude”. This is how, says 
Hobbes, religions arise: as humanity is in need of explanations, clarifications 
and order. Trying to foresee the future, humans are overtaken by angst and 
distress, due to the lack of rules and standards, to the absence of a Jupiter. 
Their worries are gnawing on them as the Eagle on Prometheus’ organ – an 
allegorical interpretation made many times before. Interestingly, Hobbes 
removes the earlier pejorative flavour of the Titan and his desire. Now he is 
characterised as “The prudent man” and the natural urge to invent seems to be 
appreciated or even necessary. Only, of course, as long as it results in the 
appropriate kind of solution to this natural state of agony: the construction of a 
proper government, of a positive Leviathan authority – and thus its 
corresponding, civilised people. As finding this solution is Hobbes’ very goal, 
according to Shulman 
 
“Hobbes himself, as the teacher of a new science tacitly has replaced the rebellious 
Prometheus. For now it is Hobbes who steals fire from the gods on behalf of mankind, 
whom his science will teach to invent precisely the “civil person” or “artificial man” 
whose creation he once condemned as pride”
307
. 
 
Contrary to all the century’s biblical analogies and corrections of the myth, in the 
philosopher’s Leviathan interpretation Prometheus has again come to represent 
the human – perhaps thus even Hobbes himself. Yet the Titan is not the 
Renaissance hero of rationality and wisdom, but a practical figure. Not so much 
practical in the Baconian sense of an empirical scientist, an interpretation which 
is still mostly knowledge-centred, but in a new, namely socio-political sense. 
Hobbes has placed the myth within the context of society – a reading we did not 
encounter before. Further, a noteworthy aspect is that religion no longer plays a 
role in the Leviathan – whereas in De Cive it still does. The necessary authority 
will be self-made – no need for God when it comes to this. The human is 
capable of creating it independently. Hobbes makes the radically new choice to 
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separate religion and politics, the Church and the State – for the latter requests 
an exclusively human, that is, terrestrial ground: a base consisting of 
Promethean creation. 
 
3.4. The Enlightenment 
 
Although one might expect that in the Enlightenment age one would grab hold 
of and elevate the god of fire as symbol of human reason, knowledge, and 
progress, what happens is the reverse. In philosophy, barely anyone refers to 
the Titan, which was probably due to the fact that mythology as such was 
anything but in fashion. According to Trousson “les Lumières se contentent de 
froids symboles ou même délaissent toute valeur symbolique; le génie du siècle 
est trop critique et trop rationnel pour s’attacher à Prométhée”308. When the 
myth was mentioned, it was often in theatrical plays, satires or comedies, and 
the focus was usually rather on Pandora and her box than Prometheus. If 
Prometheus does play a more important role, he is – just as Pandora – symbol 
of the community’s downturn. He embodies the bad consequences the times’ 
so-called ‘progress’ and ‘rationalisation’ have: the human detaches himself from 
God, and is drawn from his moral duties by his curiosities, overconfidence, and 
so-called ‘achievements’.  
 
3.4.1. Rousseau 
 
The famous philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 1778) accuses 
humans of having created their own state of misery by developing 
contemporary society. Yet he does not attribute this to the humans’ 
disengagement from God, but to their disengagement from themselves as 
human beings. Rousseau speaks of an historical, rather than a religious 
downfall, for by nature, the human is innocent, good and happy. However, in his 
Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts (1750), he argues that the present 
civilisation has destroyed that natural purity. The deceiving appearances of 
today’s alleged progress would make a foreigner be completely misled about 
the citizens’ morals. For in fact, “our souls have become corrupted in proportion 
as our Sciences and our Arts have advanced toward perfection”309. Society’s 
decadence is thus brought about by science and art: “Astronomy was born of 
superstition; Eloquence of ambition, hatred, flattery, lying; Geometry of greed; 
Physics of a vain curiosity; all of them, even Ethics, of human pride”310. 
Interestingly, the frontispiece of the Discourse depicts Prometheus, who 
with the fire of his torch animates the immaculate human he seems to have just 
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created. In the human’s shadows stands a satyr, reaching for the fire. Rousseau 
explains that  
 
“It is easy to see the allegory [...]. “The satyr,” says an ancient fable, “wanted to kiss 
and embrace fire the first time he saw it but Prometheus cried out to him: ‘Satyr, you 
will weep the loss of the beard on your chin, for it burns when you touch it.’” This is the 
subject of the frontispiece”
311
. 
 
Later, he clarifies the meaning of the myth even further, saying that 
 
“Prometheus’s torch is the torch of the Sciences made to quicken great geniuses; that 
the Satyr who, seeing fire for the first time, runs toward it, and wants to embrace it, 
represents the vulgar who, seduced by the brilliance of Letters, indiscreetly give 
themselves over to study; that the Prometheus who cries out and warns them of the 
danger is the Citizen of Geneva”
312
. 
 
The Titan remains a symbol of knowledge, science, and creativity, but again, as 
with the religious critics, his fire is placed in a very bad light. The splendour of 
wisdom’s illumination is betraying and seduced by the apparent power and 
control it should produce, the human will burn herself. As the one who founded 
science, Prometheus is an enemy of the serenity of the ignorant, innocent and 
virtuous primitive human.313 And rather than some supernatural evil, the Titan 
personifies the evil the human does to herself, and for which she herself – her 
pride, vanity, and craving for luxury – is entirely responsible. There will be no 
help from above. The only positive thing about that responsibility is that 
salvation, too, is in human hands. Consequently, Rousseau pleads for and 
believes in a return to humankind’s original goodness. Not through some – 
unfortunately impossible – historical rebound, but by developing a life 
analogous to that natural, uncivilised, and happy life we used to lead. 
 
3.4.2. Kant 
 
One of the very few times the Titan is mentioned in a positive context, is when 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) compliments Benjamin Franklin, who had recently 
been experimenting with electricity and calls him the ‘modern Prometheus’. 
Here, the Titan does seem to represent the paradigmatic modern human, who 
combines scientific rationality with creativity: the independent human who 
aspires to take control over nature, history and the future; who has the courage 
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to take the freedom to try and overcome his limits, striving to literally “emerge 
from his self-incurred immaturity”314. 
 
3.5. The Romantic Era 
 
Whereas for the most part the Enlightenment’s spokesmen thus did not quite 
worship Prometheus, in the Romantic era the Titan will again inspire many 
artists. The fact that Aeschylus’ work is translated into English partly explains 
his popularity. And essential is the political character of the Prometheus Bound: 
disappointed by the sad results of the French Revolution, the Romantics need 
other icons than the Enlightenment ones to represent their ideas and feelings, 
and Prometheus’ creative and rebellious qualities make him very suitable. 
 
3.5.1. Goethe 
 
First, however, in the last decades of the 18th century the Sturm und Drang 
movement comes up, which in response to the time’s extreme fixation on 
rationality has its focus on entirely different themes: emotion, creativity, and 
independence. A crucial figure in this proto-Romantic period is Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe (1749 – 1832). The illustrious and very successful author 
of The Sorrows of Young Werther (1774) has the figure of Prometheus appear 
regularly in his work: he composed a play dedicated to him, a poem, an epic on 
Pandora (1807-1808), and more. Even Faust (1808) might be seen as 
presenting a Promethean theme: the protagonist of this story is willing to sell his 
soul to the devil in exchange for knowledge. 
Around 1773, Goethe writes a drama called Prometheus, which is, however, 
never finished and only published in 1830. In the play, Prometheus has 
audacious discussions with Mercury and makes tough statements in 
conversations with others, thereby each time emphasising his disdain for Jupiter 
and his independence from him. He dismisses all deities’ powers and 
celebrates his own. The Olympians are neither eternal nor almighty and do not 
deserve any more respect or reverence than anyone else – on the contrary. 
Despite the fact that in this story it is Jupiter who is his father, Prometheus 
states full of determination that he does not belong to them: “Göttern? Ich bin 
kein Gott/Und bilde mir so viel ein als einer”315. Instead, he associates with 
humans, whom he sculpted all by himself, through hard and “daily work”.316 He 
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also teaches them how to build houses, to tend their flock and to defend their 
interests. He even teaches Pandora – here, his “daughter” – about fundamental 
and emotional issues, such as love and death. Jupiter shrugs his shoulders 
about Prometheus’ attitude and actions, for he is still convinced of his own 
supremacy. His son, however, once again denies his father’s power and 
declares that the Earth is his instead. Further, Prometheus challenges the 
allegedly exclusive infinity of the Olympians and exclaims “[w]ir alle sind 
ewig!”317. He explains that he does not remember his birth, nor can he foresee 
his end and therefore his existence is eternal – and so is humankind’s.  
The play covers many issues and its protagonist plays many parts, 
amongst which are those of educator and founder of civilisation. But the most 
important of his personifications are those of creativity and rebellion. These are 
the main themes that are found as well – in a finalised and more compact form 
– in the poem that Goethe writes a year later: Prometheus (1774), a true ode. 
Instead of the rational, society-corrupting, or blasphemous characteristics 
ascribed to the Titan in the Enlightenment, the hymn glorifies his artistic and 
revolutionary spirit. It is a bold speech, in which Prometheus, again, heavily 
assails the Olympian King. The ode is framed as a dialogue, yet his 
interlocutor’s part is absent. Prometheus starts off by telling Zeus318 to “cover 
his heavens” (“Bedecke dein Himmel”) and leave his Earth (“meine Erde”) to 
him – that is, the world he shares with humanity, a fundamentally different realm 
than the divine one. Once more, Prometheus repudiates his father’s might, for 
he did not have any hand in what the hero achieved, created or experienced. 
He does not owe Zeus anything – who protected him from the Titans, he asks 
emotionally, from death or slavery? 
 
“Ich dich ehren? Wofür? 
Hast du die Schmerzen gelindert 
Je des Beladenen? 
Hast du die Thränen gestillet 
Je des Geängsteten? 
Hat nicht mich zum Manne geschmiedet 
Die allmächtige Zeit 
Und das ewige Schicksal, 
Meine Herrn und deine?”
319
 
 
Whatever Prometheus accomplished, he accomplished all by himself. He is 
thrown upon his own resources, but determined in his resistance: what on earth 
– literally on Earth – should he honour Zeus for? Nor does humankind have any 
reason to worship him; the uncaring ‘Father’ never made the least effort to 
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relieve them from their miseries. There is no substance to his alleged authority. 
As a matter of fact, the truly almighty and eternal powers are Time and Fate, to 
which all – Prometheus, humans and the Olympians too – are subjected. And in 
contrast to the latter, Prometheus does care about the humans’ fate, and has 
fashioned their lives according to his own: 
 
“Hier sitz’ ich, forme Menschen 
Nach meinem Bilde, 
Ein Geschlecht, das mir gleich sey, 
Zu leiden, zu weinen, 
Zu genießen und zu freuen sich, 
Und dein nicht zu achten, 
Wie ich!”
320
 
  
The people he created, he made in his own image, “invoking his own mixed 
experiences to illuminate the inherent duality of the human experience”321. They 
will have the same diversity of sensations as he does: they will suffer and weep, 
but also feel pleasure and delight. 
It is not entirely clear who or what Prometheus represents exactly. He no longer 
symbolises the community’s religious downturn, or the Rousseauian prototype 
of ‘civilised’ sin and misery. Nor is he merely the rebel, or recalcitrant son – 
Goethe’s portrayal of his figure suggests something more profound. Moreover, 
Prometheus has a very hostile attitude towards the gods, and in the play he 
literally states he is not a god, so despite his creation of humanity it is also 
rather unlikely he forms some substitution of the Christian God. His “daily work”, 
as Carl Kerényi points out, should not be understood as Creation in a Biblical 
sense, for it is “limited exclusively to what he can create on earth”.322 Yet neither 
is Prometheus merely identical to the human being. He was “forged as a 
Man”323 (“zum Manne geschmiedet”) by Time and Fate, but at the same time it 
was him who moulded humanity. He identifies with the humans, but 
nevertheless still resides in another place, positioned between their sphere and 
the divine. As Kerényi concludes: 
 
“Goethe’s Prometheus is no God, no Titan, no man, but the immortal prototype of man 
as the original rebel and affirmer of his fate: the original inhabitant of the earth, seen as 
an antigod, as Lord of the Earth”
324
. 
 
What makes Prometheus into the prototype of the human and the Lord of the 
Earth is creativity as such and the revolutionary autonomy that creating per se 
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entails. The above lines form an ode to the headstrong human and the 
inherently divine quality of his creative powers – placing the human in that 
sense, just as Prometheus, between the two spheres. It is a hymn to the 
individual who, leaving all his former credulity behind, makes the rebellious 
move to take life in his own hands – despite the heaviness of the human lot. 
Actually, Prometheus specifically embodies the artistic genius celebrated in the 
Sturm und Drang time. He provides the means to express artistic identity. In 
fact, one person’s in particular. For the poem’s content – Prometheus’ non-stop 
celebration of himself, his creativity and independence; its form – the 
continuous repetition of first person pronouns (‘I’, ‘me’, ‘my’, and ‘mine’), which 
make up 23 of the poem’s 225 words; and the way it ends – “Wie ich!” make 
one suspect that Prometheus symbolises Goethe and the unconstrained, artistic 
endowment through which he can virtually create himself. And indeed, an 
interesting section from his autobiography Dichtung und Wahrheit (1811-1833), 
supports these presumptions. Goethe writes that when he was looking for the 
basis of his independence, he found that the firm foundation lies in his 
“productives Talent”. 
 
“Wie ich nun über diese Naturgabe nachdachte und fand, dass sie mir ganz eigen 
angehöre und durch nichts Fremdes weder begünstigt noch gehindert werden könne, 
so mochte ich gern hierauf mein ganzes Daseyn in Gedanken gründen. Diese 
Vorstellung verwandelte sich in ein Bild, die alte mythologische Figur des Prometheus 
fiel mir auf, der, abgesondert von den Göttern, von seiner Werkstätte aus eine Welt 
bevolkerte. Ich fühlte recht gut, daß sich etwas Bedeutendes nur produciren lasse, 
wenn man sich isolire”
325
. 
 
Goethe knows that he – or the artist in general326 – is entirely left to his own 
devices, but he discovered that this is also his very strength. He may not be 
able to count on any help from above, but – and this is essential – nor is he 
hampered by anything unknown. Therefore, he can establish his entire Being on 
his individual “natural gift”. In fact, thinks Goethe, one will only produce 
“something meaningful” when it is the result of the solitary execution of his 
talent. This makes him identify with Prometheus, who populated an entire world 
in isolation. The latter’s rebellion against Zeus is thus not so much a 
sacrilegious opposition against Christianity, or an urge for secularism. The 
revolutionary hero represents the artist’s independence from anything outside 
himself. He is the genius who is able to create everything by himself and who 
has the gift to animate his creations with his internal powers, capable “à 
façonner son oeuvre d’après une forme intérieure”327. In the play, after 
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sarcastically wondering whether the gods are eternal and almighty, Prometheus 
asks a set of rhetorical questions, underlining the things they cannot do: 
 
“Unendlich? – Allmächtig? – 
Was könnt Ihr? 
Könnt Ihr den weiten Raum 
Des Himmels und der Erde 
Mir ballen in meine Faust? 
Vermögt Ihr zu scheiden 
Mich von mir selbst? 
Vermögt Ihr mich auszudehnen, 
Zu erweitern zu einer Welt?”
328
. 
 
However, he – Goethe, the poet – can: in contrast to the gods, he does have 
the capacity to resume the entire world – heaven and earth – in his “fist”, that is, 
in one poem. He is able to “separate him from himself” by putting his spirit on 
paper, this way “stretching” himself, “expanding” his soul to cosmic sizes. 
Ironically, as embodiment of the poet, even Prometheus himself has had to 
tolerate the consequences of this artistic autonomy. “Die Fabel des Prometheus 
ward in mir lebendig. Das alte Titanengewand schnitt ich mir nach meinem 
Wuchse zu”329. Prometheus is Goethe’s idol, but then of course only once 
moulded according to the poet’s personal wishes and shape. 
 
3.5.2. Lord Byron 
 
The innovative, refreshing nature of Goethe’s oeuvre makes him into one of the 
most important people to fashion the Romantic era and its typical expressions 
of creativity, emotion, independence, et cetera. Moreover, as Trousson phrases 
it, Goethe brings Prometheus with “a giant step forward” to the “heart of a new 
age”330, for the Titan inspires many other Romantics. However, whereas Goethe 
still assigned a significant role to Prometheus as Creator of Man, several 
Romantic poets let go of that part. They do keep him as personifying the 
Creative Artist, but further move their focus to the Rebel. As they observe the 
French Revolution – and thereby their hopeful expectations for regime change 
and freedom – progressively degenerate into terror, tyranny, and violence, 
Prometheus is an excellent model for courageous rebellion and the agony 
resulting from it. The Titan offers “a way to think about the complexities of a 
tumultuous political world”331. 
Lord Byron (1788 –1824) is one of his admirers and writes that “[t]he 
Prometheus [Bound, TF], if not exactly in my plan, has always been so much in 
                                                 
328
 Goethe, “Prometheus, Dramatisches Fragment,” 482. 
329
 Goethe, Aus Meinem Leben: Dichtung Und Wahrheit, III:477. 
330
 Trousson, Le Thème de Prométhée dans la littérature européenne..., 267. 
331
 Dougherty, Prometheus, 96. 
Trijsje Franssen    Prometheus Through the Ages 
96 
 
my head, that I can easily conceive its influence over all or any thing that I have 
written”332. His works count at least seventeen references to the Titan. Manfred, 
for instance, celebrates the human mind, which the protagonist proudly calls 
“the Promethean spark,/The lightning of my being”333. Next, like Goethe, Byron 
identifies Prometheus with the poet as the uncomprehended, solitary genius. 
The poet aims to “be the new Prometheus of new men”334 and takes risks to 
acquire creative powers. However, as Prometheus suffered in loneliness, so 
does the artist, whose beloved labour is not appreciated. Further, in the Ode to 
Napoleon Buonaparte Prometheus’ martyrdom is compared to the Emperor’s 
miserable defeat.335 
One of Byron’s poems is entirely dedicated to his idol. Prometheus 
(1816) is an ode to humans and their suffering, against the background of the 
time’s miserable political scene. Again, it shows how beneficial work is repaid 
with pain: 
 
“Titian! [sic] to whose immortal eyes 
The sufferings of mortality, 
Seen in their sad reality, 
Were not as things that gods despise; 
What was thy pity’s recompense? 
A silent suffering, and intense”
336
. 
 
Yet despite all this torture, the martyr refuses to admit defeat and Byron glorifies 
his endurance of the ruthless powers of Zeus. In fact, “the Thunderer” is not as 
almighty as he may seem. Prometheus suffers and is immobile, but he suffers 
quietly and this frustrates his oppressor. Moreover, because Prometheus is 
unwilling to reveal what he foresaw – Zeus’ future collapse – his torments are 
thrown back on the allegedly Almighty. As Byron writes: “in thy [Prometheus’] 
Silence was his Sentence”337. Zeus is overcome by “evil dread”338 because he 
will not learn the details of his demise. His anxiety is so strong, “[t]hat in his 
hand the lightnings trembled”339. In a way, rather than Prometheus, it is he who 
is the victim, who is punished by the Titan’s refusal to reveal what tyranny 
awaits his foe.  
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For Byron, Zeus represents the totalitarian policies of the contemporary rulers 
and Prometheus the mental, emotional and revolutionary forces of the human. It 
is the Titan’s “impenetrable Spirit”340 that make him 
 
“[...] a symbol and a sign 
To Mortals of their fate and force; 
Like thee, Man is in part divine, 
A troubled stream from a pure source; 
And Man in portions can foresee 
His own funereal destiny”
341
. 
 
Like Prometheus’ fate, the humans’ may be wretched and “funereal”, but they 
also share the Titan’s divine qualities, they have the ability to “foresee” and their 
“Spirit may oppose” to their “sad unallied existence”; 
 
“And a firm will, and a deep sense, 
Which even in torture can descry 
Its own concentered recompense, 
Triumphant where it dares defy, 
And making Death a Victory”
342
. 
 
Prometheus embodies the essential agony of human existence, but just as 
much the force of the human mind and will – “the Promethean spark” we saw 
earlier – by means of which humans can rebel against whatever tyrannical 
power is the source of that agony. Byron strongly believes in humanity’s power 
of endurance and encourages the people of his time to resist the despots. For 
even in torture humans can find their repayment: if they follow Prometheus’ 
example and endure their suffering, they refuse to satisfy the cruel and unjust 
desires of their oppressor and thus the triumph will be theirs. “Prometheus 
teaches us not to want life, and thus to want less than our opponent(s)”343: he 
teaches us to make “Death a Victory”.  
 
3.5.3. Percy Bysshe Shelley 
 
In 1820 a good friend of Byron, Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792 – 1822) publishes 
the Prometheus Unbound (1820), a long dramatic poem with, just as Byron’s, a 
strong political undertone. Prometheus is again a revolutionary hero, helping 
humanity to overcome tyrannical forces. Yet Shelley takes it a large step further: 
the Titan ends up truly liberating humanity from all forms of oppression, 
resulting in a utopian state of love, harmony and happiness. Shelley decides to 
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revive Aeschylus’ lost play – but his version of it, written according to different 
lines. For instance, as he reveals in his preface, he refuses to reconcile “the 
Champion with the Oppressor of mankind”344.  
The story initiates thousands of years after Jupiter had Prometheus 
chained to the rock. The Titan is still there, the Oceanides Panthea and Ione are 
seated at his feet. He is still suffering, still defying his oppressor: “me, who am 
thy foe, eyeless in hate [...]. No change, no pause, no hope! Yet I endure”345. 
Humans, too, are still Jupiter’s “slaves”, engaging in useless worshipping, while 
filled “[w]ith fear and self-contempt and barren hope”346. Therefore, in the past, 
Prometheus called down a gruesome curse upon the omnipotent tyrant, but he 
suddenly realises not to want to respond to the god’s atrocity along that same 
principle of vengeance and violence, which would only make him “a potential 
perpetuator of the destructive life-to-death cycles fostered by Jupiter”347. 
Prometheus disclaims his earlier hatred and now only pities Jupiter. He 
seriously regrets and recalls his curse and wishes “no living thing to suffer 
pain”348 – apparently, not even his torturer. In order to attain his aims – 
overthrowing Jupiter, humanity’s salvation and his own reunion with his wife 
Asia – Prometheus decides to orient himself according to a wholly different 
principle: the principle of love. This does not mean he will give in, or submit 
himself to the tyrant’s horrendous powers – he just chooses to operate from an 
entirely new basis of opposition. 
In the second act, we follow Asia, who on her way to Prometheus meets 
the Demogorgon349 – a rather mysterious but good deity. She interrogates him 
about who made the Earth and good and evil. He replies several times that it 
was ‘God’ – though not once mentioning Jupiter by name. Asia relates how 
gods and humans used to live in a happy, early era where there was nothing 
but “Light and Love”350. Then, however, Jupiter came to power and as soon as 
he started ruling famine, disease, strife and death fell upon the human beings. 
Prometheus came to their aid. He sent love, and 
 
“gave man speech, and speech created thought, 
Which is the measure of the universe;  
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And Science struck the thrones of earth and heaven”
351
. 
 
The Titan brought music, taught astronomy, politics and much more. Of course, 
he was severely punished for his actions, but humans still worship him. Slowly it 
becomes clear that in the end, it is love which is the all-embracing force that 
rules the universe, the “deep truth”, as Demogorgon says. Earth and Heaven 
will be unified and so will Asia and Prometheus. And indeed, in act three Jupiter 
falls down Demogorgon’s abyss and disappears into nothingness. Then 
Herakles arrives at the Caucasus, and unbinds Prometheus. Finally, the Titan 
and Asia are brought back together – “thus introducing Shelley’s vision of a 
return to the Golden Age”352. They “will search, with looks and words of 
love,/For hidden thoughts, each lovelier than the last”. They will “Weave 
harmonies divine, yet ever new”, and feed “all/That tempers or improves man’s 
life, now free”353. They will be “visited” by “[t]he gathered rays [...] /Of Painting, 
Sculpture, and wrapt Poesy,/And arts, tho’ unimagined, yet to be”354. 
Prometheus will enrich humanity with all these creative capacities and apart 
from that the human will grow “wise and kind/And, veil by veil, evil and error 
fall”355. 
In the next scene of the act we witness the fabulous results of these 
plans and predictions. The Spirit of the Earth describes in detail the 
transformation of humanity – for a true transformation it is – that has now taken 
place. “[T]hrones were kingless”, man’s “foul masks”, “self-loved ignorance”356 
and feminine villainy have disappeared: “with little change of shape or hue; /All 
things had put their evil nature off”357. Similarly, the fourth and final act is one 
grand hymn to love, beauty, happiness, freedom, virtue, and wisdom – and 
most of all to their cosmic proportions. A chorus of spirits assures that their task 
is accomplished, and they will build 
 
“A world for the Spirit of Wisdom to wield; 
We will take our plan 
From the new world of man, 
And our work shall be called the Promethean”
358
. 
 
The lyrical description of the new, paradisiacal world continues for many lines. 
“Unimaginable shapes”, are perceived and the “monstrous works” and 
“monarch beasts”359 exist no more. The human has been improved in countless 
ways. He “who was a many sided mirror,/Which could distort to many a shape 
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of error”, has become “one harmonious soul of many a soul/Whose nature is its 
own divine controul”360. At the end, the Demogorgon emerges and concludes 
the tale in a profoundly optimistic way, with an ultimate praise to Prometheus’ 
admirable endurance and his amorous attitude. Hope, love, forgiveness and 
compassion – the Good has triumphed. 
As Shelley states in his preface, the ancient Greek playwrights each 
formed the mythological stories according to their own shape. “They by no 
means conceived themselves bound to adhere to the common interpretation 
[...]. I have presumed to employ a similar licence”361. And so he does: he may 
have taken Aeschylus’ play as his basis, but consciously releases all his 
creativity upon that source of inspiration, to mould his very own version.  
 
“The imagery which I have employed will be found, in many instances, to have been 
drawn from the operations of the human mind, or from those external actions by which 
they are expressed”
362
. 
 
There are many ways in which Shelley employs the inventive “license” of the 
ancients. For a start, compared to Aeschylus’ play in Shelley’s poem 
Prometheus’ own share in his rescue has become much larger – the withdrawal 
of his malediction has become more important than Herakles’ actual unbinding. 
As Dougherty observes, Shelley dedicates nothing but four lines to the latter’s 
action – it is rather Prometheus himself who is the cause of his liberation. Next, 
as mentioned, hero and tyrant may not be reconciled – the latter, symbol of evil, 
must be completely overthrown by the figure who Shelley characterises as “of 
the highest perfection of moral and intellectual nature, impelled by the purest 
and the truest motives to the best and noblest ends”363. Furthermore, 
Prometheus’ victory is established through non-classical means: pity, 
forgiveness, and love, instead of rebellious defiance. As usual, the Titan calls 
for a revolution, but he comes up with an entirely new itinerary to victory. The 
human battle against evil and misery is not won through recalcitrant and violent 
resistance, but by banning hatred, fighting and vengeance. For, Shelley tells us 
in Queen Mab (1813), it is not human nature to be evil: “Nature? —no !/Kings, 
priests, and statesmen, blast the human flower”364. In fact, “every heart contains 
perfection’s germ”365. 
Shelley’s myth carries a serious political message.366 While Prometheus 
deplores the death of peace, implicitly the poet even expresses his substantial 
disappointment with respect to the French Revolution: 
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“The nations thronged around, and cried aloud, 
As with one voice, Truth, Liberty, and Love! 
Suddenly fierce confusion fell from heaven 
Among them; there was strife, deceit, and fear; 
Tyrants rushed in, and did divide the spoil”
367
. 
 
Prometheus urges that a life be established which is ruled by equivalence and 
harmony instead of an authoritarian force. Relying on the figure of the Titan, 
Shelley encourages humans to take their responsibility and start a new, 
peaceful revolution. They should break the vicious circle of violence and 
retribution, and by virtue of their love and creative intellect exchange that for a 
world in which the human is free and equal, “the king/ Over himself; just, gentle, 
wise: but man”368. In Shelley’s words the thrones should be “kingless”, whether 
that ‘king’ be a monarch, tyrant, or even a clergyman. For the Church has also 
developed a kind of tyranny because of the system’s urges for power, its forms 
of oppression, petrified traditions, customs and superstitions. Several times 
Christianity is strongly criticised throughout the poem. Towards the end of the 
first act, for instance, the Titan sadly exclaims that Jesus did not succeed in his 
mission. “O, horrible! /Thy name I will not speak,/It hath become a curse”369. 
Although the Saviour’s ethics and intentions were the best of all, Christian 
society has become a failure and his name is indeed not mentioned once 
throughout the entire poem. Fortunately, humanity has the capacity to fulfil the 
task of transforming the socio-politico-religious realm. Prometheus is the 
humans’ perfect model. His aim, for them to follow, is to strictly hold on to 
Christ’s moral teachings but apply them in a wholly different manner and fight 
against the status quo – including their own ignorance and mistakes. 
Shelley thus sketches an optimistic picture of the future – much more 
than, for instance, Byron –, in which the human will take matters into her own 
hands and overturn her misery by means of hope and love. As in earlier stories, 
Prometheus embodies the human being, or actually, as he phrases it himself, 
both “[t]he saviour and the strength of suffering man”370. Again, he gave 
humankind speech, thought and wisdom, and taught them science. Knowledge 
and the human mind are thus important, but they are not the main focus of 
Shelley’s tale. Just as Goethe and Byron, he celebrates humanity’s creative 
imagination. The author’s own “imagery [...], drawn from the operations of the 
human mind” is a perfect example of this creativity, which in this case takes on 
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utopian colourings. Once Prometheus and Asia are united, humans acquire the 
capacity to produce ‘divine harmonies’ and ‘unimagined arts’. They even have 
the power to transform their own living and in that sense there is an “essential 
unity of art and life”371. Like the other two authors, Shelley pays particular 
attention to the poet, who, one of the spirits tells, 
 
“Of shapes that haunt thought’s wildernesses.  
[...] from these create he can 
Forms more real than living man, 
Nurslings of immortality!”
372
. 
 
Humans have an immense creative talent and are apparently even able to 
produce immortal entities, as long as they let themselves be driven by love and 
imagination. However, Shelley also underlines that the relationship between 
humans and their work does not only go in one direction. 
 
“Every man’s mind is [...] modified by all the objects of Nature and art [...]. Poets, not 
otherwise than philosophers, painters, sculptors and musicians, are, in one sense, the 
creators, and, in another, the creations, of their age”
373
. 
 
The relation human-creation is reciprocal, for the creator builds on ideas of 
others, is influenced by his contemporaries and his era and it that sense, a 
creation himself. Yet this given does not make the creator/creation helpless. 
The artist – and in particular the poet – even has a political force. In fact, the 
author assures us in A Defence of Poetry (1821) that “poets are the 
unacknowledged legislators of the world”374 – and Prometheus is the ideal 
symbol of this imaginative power.375  
In Prometheus Unbound, Shelley rejects all forms of authority, advocates 
equality, celebrates the intellectual and creative human powers and encourages 
us to use these. Full of positive hope and belief, he calls for a peaceful 
revolution, so that we can let the “purest and the truest motives” rule and we 
can say that we took our “plan/From the new world of man” and our work may 
be called “the Promethean”. 
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3.5.4. Mary Shelley 
 
For many Romantic artists Prometheus provides the perfect combination of 
rebellion (or opposition), and imagination, originality, and creativity. Another 
author who sincerely occupies herself with the myth and these motives is Mary 
Wollstonecraft Shelley. She spends the summer of 1816 on the shores of Lake 
Geneva, in the company of Byron and her husband (1792 – 1822). It becomes a 
rainy summer, and they have to spend many days inside. They have many long 
conversations376 and Byron proposes that everyone present would write a ghost 
story, which leads Mary Shelley to start her famous tale. Frankenstein, or The 
Modern Prometheus (1818) certainly concentrates on the Romantic creativity 
theme and again, as in the works of the two others discussed above, 
Prometheus plays an important – though completely implicit – role. However, 
Mary Shelley’s approach, her treatment of the themes, and the questions asked 
are significantly different. Whereas neither Byron nor her husband paid much 
attention to that aspect of Promethean creativity, Mary Shelley shifts her focus 
to the creation of the human. In the preface of her novel, she explains that her 
idea took shape after listening to the men’s discussions on, amongst other 
things, the “nature of the principle of life”377. They wondered whether “a corpse 
would be re-animated” or “perhaps the component parts of a creature might be 
manufactured, brought together, and endued with vital warmth”378. Science had 
made significant progress and so the times in which they lived were not just 
characterised by political issues and a fascination for arts, but also by a very 
optimistic view on scientific potential. 
In an attempt to explore science’s (almost) unimaginable possibilities, 
Mary Shelley builds her tale around one central act: the creation of life by an 
immensely ambitious scientist named Victor Frankenstein. The story raises 
questions about human fears, desires, needs and social relations. Yet most of 
all, it raises the question of human nature and the 
 
“enduring Promethean questions about the dangers of unbridled scientific research and 
the limitations of the creative process – what are the moral issues involved when 
mankind metaphorically steals fire and usurps the divine power of creation?”
379
. 
 
Unlike Percy Shelley or Goethe, Mary Shelley lays her hands on the Titan in 
order to investigate the boundaries of humanity’s creative and scientific 
powers.380 
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The narrative and its protagonists are of a rather complex nature, which 
is why the Prometheus myth, due to its ambivalent character, provides such a 
convenient tool to address the intricate matters the story contains. One of the 
first questions one would like to have answered is the one of personification – 
who is the Promethean figure? 
Frankenstein starts his narrative by telling how he has always been “imbued 
with a fervent longing to penetrate the secrets of nature”381. Enthusiastically 
studying many scientists by himself, 
 
“I entered with the greatest diligence into the search of the philosopher’s stone and the 
elixir of life. [...] What glory would attend the discovery, if I could banish disease from 
the human frame, and render man invulnerable to any but a violent death!”
382
. 
 
Following his dreams, he made a great effort to accomplish that desire. And at 
some point he actually discovered how to “bestow animation upon lifeless 
matter”, aware that he may even “in process of time [...] renew life where death 
had apparently devoted the body to corruption”383. He spent many nights 
working body and soul in his laboratory, until one night he had created a living 
being. Unfortunately, as soon as it opened its eyes, Frankenstein was so 
shocked and disgusted by the savage looks of the massive creature, that he 
fled his home that very same night. The nameless monster (‘fiend’, ‘daemon’, or 
‘wretch’) vanished as well and soon Frankenstein learned that his younger 
brother had been killed by the wretch. Finally, on a glacial field, he encountered 
the monster, who made the scientist hear his side of the story. 
Up to here, the Promethean figure clearly seems to be Frankenstein: with 
nothing but positive intentions and aiming to do humanity good, he devotes 
himself to creation. Further, this is simultaneously an act of rebellion against the 
status quo. He never mentions him, but in a way Frankenstein even rebels 
against God. Implicitly he judges the being that God created to be flawed; he 
“metaphorically steals fire” from heaven, and thus appropriates the ability to 
create life – up to then an exclusively divine capacity. Because of this ability, 
Frankenstein could also be identified with God. I shall return to this below. 
In a phrase which demonstrates two Promethean characteristics, namely 
both the ambitious creativity of Frankenstein’s act and its rebellious – and 
therefore frightening – quality, Frankenstein narrates how “[w]ith an anxiety that 
almost amounted to agony, I collected the instruments of life around me, that I 
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might infuse a spark of being into the lifeless thing that lay at my feet”384. 
Further, the symbol of fire is repeated several times. Frankenstein speaks of “a 
spark of being”, and once more putting his dreams into words, he states that 
“[l]ife and death appeared to me ideal bounds, which I should first break 
through, and pour a torrent of light into our dark world”385. However, it is clearly 
not just the positive side of the myth that applies. As several ancient authors 
(e.g. Ovid, Horace, and Catullus) emphasised: Prometheus failed in his work 
and he was blamed for humanity’s imperfect, even ‘animal’ nature. Similarly, the 
hubristic Frankenstein creates a flawed, beastly being and fails. Moreover, as 
we will see, when Frankenstein allegedly achieves his aim, he is severely 
punished; and, just as the Titan, not only does he but also those he meant to 
benefit suffer misery and death. 
Yet at a closer look, Frankenstein is not the only character that reminds 
us of the Promethean myth. When Frankenstein and the monster meet, the 
latter recounts his experiences during the months they did not see each other. 
He tells in detail about his disorientation, his feelings of loneliness and his 
frustration of not understanding anything – “I was a poor, helpless, miserable 
wretch; I knew, and could distinguish, nothing […]; all was confused”386. Yet he 
invents fire, learns how to cook, speak and read and slowly evolves from an 
ignorant beast to an educated, somehow socialised and human-like being. He 
starts as a creature who is virtually devoid of any capacity whatsoever; 
reminiscent of Epimetheus’ “completely unequipped” species (as in the 
Protagoras); and also of the state of the humans as described by Aeschylus’ 
Titan before he presented them his gifts. Like those lost creatures who 
“swarmed like bitty ants”, the monster, too, wanders randomly through the 
fields; like them in a “babyish” and “wretched” state: ignorant, unable to ‘master’ 
his thoughts, and without any place to stay. Yet he does have senses and 
feelings from the start. And little by little, “I began to distinguish my sensations 
from each other”387 – as Aeschylus’ humans, he learns how to “see” and “hear”. 
 
“[M]y mind received every day additional ideas. My eyes became accustomed to the 
light, and to perceive objects in their right forms”
388
. 
 
On the one hand, the monster teaches himself how to make fire and suffers 
badly – qualities that are reminiscent of Prometheus himself. On the other hand, 
he discovers how to construct a hideaway, just as the people from the 
Prometheus Bound; and – as in the Protagoras – he learns, when watching the 
family, about the advantages of living with others, “in bonds of friendship”. The 
development of a beastly creature to a practically civilised being is strongly 
                                                 
384
 Ibid., 58. 
385
 Ibid., 55. My emphasis. 
386
 Ibid., 105–106. 
387
 Ibid., 106. 
388
 Ibid. 
Trijsje Franssen    Prometheus Through the Ages 
106 
 
reminiscent of the process through which humankind, enabled by Prometheus’ 
efforts, evolves. 
While observing them from his hideaway, the monster came to feel 
tender affection for the family members. However, when he decided to meet 
them, they were terrified by his appalling appearance and violently rejected him. 
The monster was deeply hurt, and interrupts his tale to exclaim to Frankenstein 
 
“Cursed, cursed creator! Why did I live? Why, in that instant, did I not extinguish the 
spark of existence which you had so wantonly bestowed?”
389
. 
 
After being dismissed by the only people to whom he felt attached, in bitter 
agony he left his place. When he arrived at Geneva, at some point he saw a 
boy and caught him, hoping that if he could “educate him as my companion and 
friend, I should not be so desolate in this peopled earth”390. The boy, however, 
was horrified and when the fiend learned it was his creator’s brother, he 
suffocated him. Desperate for a friend, at the glacier he came up with the idea 
that Frankenstein create him a female companion, “one as deformed and 
horrible as myself” for she “would not deny herself to me”391. 
 Frankenstein reluctantly consented. However, when his second creature 
was almost finished, he realised that she could turn out to be much more evil 
than her companion. Or worse, they may even reproduce themselves, “at the 
price, perhaps, of the existence of the whole human race”392. Overcome by this 
horrendous thought, he decided to tear the body to pieces and fled. But the 
daemon took his revenge and murdered more of those dearest to Frankenstein: 
he killed his best friend and strangled his bride. He knew when and where his 
creator would spend his wedding night – as in the Prometheus Bound, a secret 
about a marriage, which could (and practically does) overthrow his master. That 
master has by now acquired ‘Zeusian’ characteristics: he has become the 
monster’s “tyrant and tormentor”393, who sentenced him to an existence of 
nothing but suffering. 
For many weeks Frankenstein pursued the wretch, until they ended up in 
the Arctic. When realising that Frankenstein was about to be brought into safety 
by some captain, the monster killed his creator. The novel finishes with Captain 
Walton relating how the fiend nevertheless emerges one final time to grieve for 
his maker. Severely embittered, he recalls how he once sought virtue and 
happiness, dreamt of meeting people that could give him love, and was 
motivated by “high thoughts of honour and devotion”394. But all his hopes turned 
out to be false. 
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“No guilt, no mischief, no malignity, no misery, can be found comparable to mine. 
When I run over the frightful catalogue of my sins, I cannot believe that I am the same 
creature whose thoughts were once filled with sublime and transcendent visions of the 
beauty and the majesty of goodness”
395
. 
 
The monster still strongly deplores the injustice with which he was treated, but 
literally acknowledges that he is a wretch and tells Walton that “your abhorrence 
cannot equal that with which I regard myself”396. The captain does not need to 
obey Frankenstein’s dying request to kill the daemon, for, disgusted by his own 
being, the monster will do that himself. 
Both creator and creature display characteristics of Prometheus and/or 
other essential elements from the myth. Frankenstein embodies the Titan as the 
creator and saviour of humankind and as a rebel. But then the monster creates 
fire and unfolds a marital secret, while his evolution symbolises humanity’s 
progress as told in the Promethean story. “And yet – and this is Mary Shelley’s 
macabre twist on the myth – neither one is entirely successful”397. 
Frankenstein’s good ambitions crumble into misery, and the sensitive, wilful 
creature who assembles all his powers to become truly human, finishes as 
monstrous as his looks suggest – and each of them suffers badly. Both are thus 
to be identified with the Titan – whether as god or representative of humanity – 
and together they cover the ambiguities of the figure, who is as much a creator 
and benefactor of humankind, as a personification of its agony. Moreover, each 
of them embodies Prometheus’ ambivalence on his own: Frankenstein is heroic 
but rebellious and responsible for intense agony for himself as well as others; 
the monster is criminal but human at the same time. And that is not all; things 
become even more complicated when their personas start to merge. Whereas 
Goethe, Byron, and her husband present Prometheus as a noble and ethically 
perfect idol who deserves nothing but praise, Mary Shelley ascribes similar 
qualities to both characters – the good as well as the bad. It is this moral 
ambiguity in particular that differentiates her story and Promethean figure from 
those of her contemporaries. Frankenstein is not a pure hero – he is the 
controller, the tyrant of his creature, who in his isolation, vulnerability, and 
ignorance, suffers due to his creator’s cold rejection. The monster begins as an 
innocent infant, with nothing but peaceful intentions – looking to understand the 
world and yearning to be socially accepted and loved. But as the story 
proceeds, the initially innocent creature becomes the tyrant, who tortures his 
master through death and destruction and turns him into a slave. Yet despite 
the fact that he murders his master and appears to triumph somehow, the 
monster never loses his own slavishness. On the contrary, in the end, he still 
needs to submit to a power stronger than he – the brutal misery of his existence 
– and thus he sees no other option than his own annihilation. “Farewell, 
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Frankenstein! If thou wert yet alive, and yet cherished a desire of revenge 
against me, it would be better satiated in my life than in my destruction”398. 
Mary Shelley’s use of the myth comprises a wide range of ideas, 
metaphors, allegories, possible interpretations and explanations. A major point 
is that it “is a complex critique of the Romantic notion of creativity. [...] [T]he 
creative force, as symbolized through Prometheus, is dangerous and 
unpredictable”399. Although Frankenstein’s creative plan starts as an 
enthusiastic, ambitious and purely benevolent project, the scientist soon starts 
to show extremely obsessive, controlling, and – when working day and night in 
his laboratory, spending barely any time with friends and family – even 
antisocial qualities. No wonder, perhaps, that his creation turns out to be 
revolting. Whereas many other Romantics employed the Promethean figure to 
celebrate the unconstrained creative powers of the (solitary) artist, Mary Shelley 
challenges that unboundedness. She draws attention to the limits of creativity, 
the (moral) responsibilities it brings along and its ambiguous – and therefore 
problematic and possibly even dangerous – character: the obsession, tyrannical 
urges, and unforeseen consequences that may emerge from creative passions. 
  The creativity Mary Shelley addresses also encompasses scientific 
ambitions, for an important form of such creative passions is a scientist’s 
intense devotion to knowledge. The imagination of Byron and her husband with 
respect to science was fuelled by the Romantic dream to create life, about 
which they speculated excitedly. In contrast to their enthusiastic imagery, Mary 
Shelley’s investigation discloses the dark side of such scientific drives. The 
story is not written as pure fantasy literature, but founded upon what she 
regarded as the latest science of the day. Many years of scientific progress had 
established people’s faith in science. Although in his preface to his wife’s novel 
Percy Shelley emphasises that he does not have “the remotest degree of 
serious faith to such an imagination”, he writes nevertheless that “[t]he event on 
which this fiction is founded has been supposed, by Dr. Darwin, and some of 
the physiological writers of Germany, as not of impossible occurrence”400. It was 
probably its connection with (scientific) reality that led to the fierce reactions to 
the book when it was published. The Edinburgh Magazine review states that it 
was written in the “highest style of caricature and exaggeration”; they “received 
a shock [...] so as to produce a painful and bewildered state of mind”401. 
However, simultaneously it generated strong emotions of admiration: Sir Walter 
Scott complimented it as “an extraordinary tale, in which the author seems to us 
to disclose uncommon powers of poetic imagination”402.  
                                                 
398
 Shelley, Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus, 225. 
399
 Dougherty, Prometheus, 113. 
400
 Shelley, Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus, 11. My emphasis. 
401
 Anonymous, “Review Frankenstein or the Modern Prometheus,” The Edinburgh Magazine 
and Literary Miscellany, March 1818, 249; 253. 
402
 Sir Walter Scott, “Review Frankenstein or the Modern Prometheus,” Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Magazine, March 20, 1818, 614. 
Trijsje Franssen    Prometheus Through the Ages 
109 
 
It is likely that the reader’s shock was caused by the apparently unlimited 
possibilities of science. According to Theodore Ziolkowski, Mary Shelley’s book 
should thus be read as expressing “society’s concern at what it perceived to be 
the mindless pursuit of knowledge with no thought for its social implications”403. 
She does, however, not reject the quest for knowledge as such. The story 
underlines that scientific work is ethically neutral in itself and has exciting 
potentials that may have genuinely good results, but is simultaneously in 
serious danger of being perverted by society. Responding with horror to each of 
the monster’s well-intended actions, it is society that turns him into an evil 
being. If Frankenstein would have reacted differently to the monster, taken his 
responsibilities and received him with love and help, he may have become 
anything but a monster, but a good being instead.404 Frankenstein has learned 
his lesson and makes a great effort to teach Walton about the perils of scientific 
ambitions:  
 
“You seek for knowledge and wisdom, as I once did; and I ardently hope that the 
gratification of your wishes may not be a serpent to sting you, as mine has been”
405
. 
 
Mary Shelley points at the conflict between ‘objective’ or ‘pure’ science and its 
often ignored ethical implications, social consequences and possible misuse. 
She warns of a science practiced without concern for moral responsibilities. In 
fact, according to Ziolkowski Mary Shelley “produced for the first time that 
ambivalence toward scientific knowledge that we have come to regard as 
characteristically modern”406. 
 Apart from a critique of creativity and irresponsible scientific practices, 
the story’s focus on creation also invokes images of the Genesis; the negative 
theme of dangerous knowledge being reminiscent of the Sin of Knowledge. 
Several parallels are drawn indeed between the book’s tale, Prometheus’ myth 
and the Biblical legend. After having read Milton’s Paradise Lost the monster 
himself is struck by the similarities to his own situation: “Like Adam, I was 
created apparently united by no link to any other being in existence”407.  
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Frankenstein is compared to God, and just as the latter’s creature, the monster 
starts off fully grown and sometimes “allowed [his] thoughts [...] to ramble in the 
fields of Paradise”408. Like Adam – and Prometheus – he was soon forsaken by 
his master, but unlike him this turned the creature into a satanic being; as he 
phrased it himself, “the fallen angel becomes a malignant devil. Yet even that 
enemy of God and man had friends and associates in his desolation; I am 
alone”409. Unlike Adam’s maker, the monster’s one refused to provide him with 
company; “no Eve soothed my sorrows”410. 
Though never explicitly naming God, Frankenstein himself also employs Biblical 
images while telling his story – how hard he worked to “animate the lifeless 
clay”411. Yet there is not just the analogy between him and God. Shortly before 
their marriage, Frankenstein remembers with anxiety how the monster 
threatened to find him and Elizabeth on their wedding night. He is reading a 
sweet letter from his fiancée and overcome by “paradisiacal dreams of love and 
joy; but the apple was already eaten, and the angel’s arm bared to drive me 
from all hope”412. Frankenstein knows that his dreams are in serious danger of 
not being realised, due to his own pursuit of knowledge, which, as he tells 
Walton, in the end indeed turns out to be “a serpent to sting” him. In fact, not 
only did he eat from the Tree of Knowledge, but also from the Tree of Life. Like 
the monster, Frankenstein compares himself to Adam, though not so much as 
God’s creation, but as somebody who has committed a disastrous sin. As 
Prometheus and Adam, he searches for forbidden knowledge and is punished 
for his quest. In a way, Frankenstein himself could – just as Prometheus, Adam, 
and the monster – also be said to be rejected by his master: God. He is very 
much aware of the sacrilege he committed and regrets it with all his heart. Yet 
at the same time his sad disillusion can be read as a critique of God: it was the 
latter who made the human to be flawed, vulnerable and mortal. Frankenstein 
merely wished to make the world a better place – why shouldn’t he be allowed 
to do so, and make up for the Almighty’s failures? However, just as God and 
Prometheus, he himself also ends up producing an imperfect creature. 
 Despite their many differences, the three tales and their four main 
characters – Prometheus, Adam, Frankenstein and the monster – are 
connected in several ways. All four are fallen angels in their own way: each of 
them is gifted and has ‘angelic’ aspirations, yet none of them succeeds and all 
sink very low. They acquire knowledge, but this has for all of them bad 
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consequences.413 An important difference between Adam on the one hand, and 
Prometheus’ humankind and the monster on the other, is that Adam is equipped 
with many more capacities from his moment of creation. Like an infant, 
Protagoras’ “naked” human and the monster had to start from zero, whereas 
Adam – though also naked and disoriented when born – did not have to learn: 
“[W]ho I was, or where, or from what cause /Knew not: to speak I tried, and 
forthwith spake”414. In contrast, the monster only “muttered some inarticulate 
sounds”415 and could barely think. And unlike both the biblical and mythological 
human, he had to teach himself everything, the only basis being pure 
observation of the family. The fact that he learns everything in a situation of 
sealed isolation is fundamental. It leads us to another interesting Promethean 
theme brought out by the narrative: human nature. Basically claiming that he 
himself is the author of the novel,416 Percy Shelley states in his preface that “I 
have not considered myself as merely weaving a series of supernatural 
terrors”417. Although the story’s “event” is surely 
 
“impossible as a physical fact, [it] affords a point of view to the imagination for the 
delineating of human passions more comprehensive and commanding than any which 
the ordinary relations of existing events can yield. / I have thus endeavoured to 
preserve the truth of the elementary principles of human nature, while I have not 
scrupled to innovate upon their combinations”
418
. 
 
As mentioned, the story should be read to have a serious link with reality; and 
apparently not only with respect to the possibilities of science, but also with 
respect to humans and their possibilities. Byron, Shelley and his wife 
contemplated about the “nature of the principle of life”. The fact that the full-
grown, lonely monster is illiterate and understands virtually nothing, shows that 
Mary Shelley believed that a human deprived of social circumstances – 
Protagorean “bonds of friendship” – would be rather inarticulate. The human 
being needs a form of socialisation to be able to learn to speak, read, etc. 
However, despite his lack of a ‘normal’, socialising situation, the monster 
manages to acquire these capacities. From this, says Christopher Small, 
emerges an image of the human who “born or made, has innate potentialities 
that allow him to make use of them far beyond mechanically rational 
expectation”419. Social contact is needed to put them to work, but by nature the 
human being has an impressive range of potential capabilities. And these do 
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not just include the intellectual capacities to speak, read and think, but also 
emotional ones – the ability to feel. Shortly after the monster started his walk 
through the fields and before he has cultivated any of his intellectual 
capabilities, he enjoys the light of the moon; is pleased by the light and heat of 
fire; and listens to the “pleasant sound” that “proceeded from the throats of the 
little winged animals”420. He already experiences emotions before he is able to 
put them to words. His sensations, moreover, demonstrate his (principally) 
virtuous nature. The monster sympathises with the family members and wishes 
them nothing but the very best. He even saves a girl’s life while wandering 
through the woods. Just after he met him on the glacier, he tells Frankenstein “I 
was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend. Make me happy, and I shall 
again be virtuous”421. Mary Shelley seems to withhold a quite Rousseauian idea 
of human nature: we start off “naked”, innocent and ignorant, and possess 
innate intellectual, emotional and virtuous capacities. But knowledge and 
society may be dangerous and corrupting and essential is that happiness and 
virtue are intertwined. What not only the monster, but also Frankenstein himself 
shows, is that good intentions and potentials can nevertheless produce evil and 
that bad social circumstances may lead to misery, violence, and vice. 
In conclusion, Mary Shelley aims to highlight the complex nature of the – 
all interconnected – issues of creativity, science, society and human nature, 
which is why the myth provides such a suitable instrument to address the 
paradoxes these matters evoke. The intricate and ambiguous issues – all 
coloured by implicit Promethean symbolism – treated in the novel raise many 
moral and practical concerns, or rather: questions. Mary Shelley breaks through 
the neat categories in which these issues as well as the Promethean allegories 
were often pigeonholed in her age. The Promethean torch may lead to 
enlightenment or darkness; creativity – perhaps even the power to create life – 
may produce beauty or imperfection; courageous rebellion may lead to victory 
and salvation or suffering and defeat; (the quest for) knowledge or education 
may lead to progress or failure; good intentions may result in respectful mastery 
or enslaving tyranny. Actually, the point is that none of these matters are a 
question of either/or, but it is most likely that all these activities, intentions, 
hopes and desires will produce both – the good as well as the bad.422 Real life 
is a lot more complicated than it is pictured by many of Mary Shelley’s fellow 
Romantics; it is characterised by innumerable puzzles and questions that she 
may not solve, but does dare to address. What will happen if we blindly follow 
our desires and appropriate all divine creative powers for ourselves? It is not 
necessarily the more creation the better; scientific research does not 
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automatically produce nothing but good. Should we, in our enthusiasm, simply 
allow every plan of creation, every scientific innovation, to be executed in 
complete freedom? Should we not first carefully consider the social 
circumstances, reflect on the possible consequences, and take our moral 
responsibilities – whatever the outcome? Should we not at least ask ourselves 
whether there are not any boundaries to respect? These are questions that still 
demand our attention today – it is not for nothing that Frankenstein’s name still 
regularly occurs in discussions on scientific progress. Mary Shelley’s 
Prometheus is still a Modern Prometheus. 
 
3.6. The Masters of Suspicion  
 
After Mary Shelley’s novel, the figure of Prometheus will maintain a high 
popularity. Marx, Nietzsche and Freud – labelled the ‘The Masters of Suspicion’ 
by the philosopher Paul Ricoeur – will each refashion the myth to explore their 
contemporary concerns. In McLelland’s words all three “are diligent interpreters 
of what they see as hidden meanings, masked through falsehood either 
deliberate or unconscious. If the truth is to make us free, they feel called to 
make the truth free”423. 
 
3.6.1. Marx 
 
For a start, an important and unmasking reinterpretation of the myth is the 
socialist one, which will place it within a much more political context. The 
emphasis moves from the theme of creation more towards the Byronian and 
Shelleyan themes of rebellion, freedom and justice. In fact, both Byron and 
Shelley are very popular amongst the great social theorists Karl Marx (1818 – 
1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820 – 1895), as well as amongst the working 
class people themselves.  
Not only does Marx enjoy reading the rebellious Romantics, but he is 
classically educated and fascinated by Greek mythology. At a young age and 
probably before he had read any romantic work, he writes his dissertation, The 
Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature 
(1841). In his preface Marx quotes from the Prometheus Bound: 
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“Philosophy makes no secret of it. The confession of Prometheus: 
 
In simple words, I hate the pack of gods 
[Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound] 
 
is its own confession, its own aphorism against all heavenly and earthly gods who do 
not acknowledge human self-consciousness as the highest divinity. It will have none 
other beside”
424
. 
 
Marx cites Aeschylus’ play a second time, at the point where Prometheus says 
to Hermes: “Better to be the servant of this rock / Than to be faithful boy to 
Father Zeus”; and following that quote, he finishes his preface with a respectful 
phrase, stating that “Prometheus is the most eminent saint and martyr in the 
philosophical calendar”425. 
It is a section from a very early work, in which Marx’s main aim is 
practically to revive classical Epicurean atheism. He employs the Promethean 
image accordingly, namely to proclaim his resentment against divinity and its 
estranging quality, and to announce philosophy’s uprising against religion.426 
Furthermore, it already foreshadows the analogy between the Titan’s rebellion 
against his despot, and Marx’s future revolt against the tyranny of capitalism. 
Whatever it takes, all heavenly and earthly gods – later the bourgeoisie and 
capitalists – should be overcome, and the only authority exercised over the 
humans – later the labourers in particular – should be their own authority. 
In Marx’s Capital Prometheus emerges once more, this time indeed as 
representative of the proletariat: 
 
“in proportion as capital accumulates, the situation of the worker, be his payment high 
or low, must grow worse. Finally, the law which always holds the relative surplus 
population or industrial reserve army in equilibria with the extent and energy of 
accumulation rivets the worker to capital more firmly than the wedges of Hephaestus 
held Prometheus to the rock. It makes an accumulation of misery a necessary 
condition, corresponding with the accumulation of wealth.”
427
 
 
The two ways in which Marx employs the Titan combine the positive image of a 
rebellious hero with the negative image of the miserable, degraded creature that 
is caught in a stranglehold – as many times before, the ambiguity of the myth 
proves to be useful. In Marx’s dissertation, Prometheus represents the brave, 
defying human who refuses to obey the constraints imposed on him by the 
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(religious) authorities. Later this human becomes the proletarian, bounded to 
the alienating rock of capitalism and its mechanised factories. The labourer is 
“necessarily” downgraded by the class system based on the accumulation of 
wealth, which is an “accumulation of misery” on his side, and “moral 
degradation on the side of the class that produces its own product as capital”. 
However, although the Titan’s heroic capacities are not explicitly mentioned in 
Capital, they are also unequivocally present in this book. For despite – or 
actually, due to – their suffering, these workers are preparing themselves to 
fight for their freedom, to revolt against the bourgeoisie; against the abasing, 
impersonal laws and the anonymous institutions of capitalism; against that 
restraining system of wealth and its masters. The labourers’ misery is at the 
same time their strength, as it evokes a Promethean ambition. Their agony 
drives them to action; encourages them to appeal to their creative powers, and 
set in motion the revolutionary processes through which they will manage to 
cross the system’s boundaries and create a new future. 
Several theorists pick up this – perhaps at first sight seemingly 
insignificant – Promethean element. Quoting the Prometheus section from 
Marx’s dissertation, Joseph McLelland observes that the young “Left Hegelians 
have become a moving force in militant atheism, and soon Marx is at the cutting 
edge, Prometheus reincarnate”428. Loralea Michaelis underlines the modernity 
of Marx’s concept of history, characterised by “a kind of Promethean striving 
that tolerates no limits”429. Leszek Kolakowski even argues that besides the 
Romantic and the Enlightenment patterns, the ‘Promethean motif’ supplies one 
of the three principal motifs that are essential to Marx’s doctrine. With respect to 
the Enlightenment motif, Kolakowski states that the thinker borrows from its 
rationalist and deterministic ideas. As the least relevant one in this context, I will 
leave my discussion of the Enlightenment motif at this, but before I treat the 
Promethean motif, I’d like to take a closer look at the Romantic one. 
Kolakowski argues that Marx adopts the Romantics’ attack on the 
industrial society in which the community was based on self-interest and the 
individual was alienated, as he was cut loose from the collective life. Moreover, 
he borrowed their optimistic view of the future. Kolakowski underlines the 
influence of Marx’s favourite poets, such as Aeschylus and Goethe. To those, 
I’d like to add Shelley, for Marx was indeed a great admirer of the Romantics 
and of Shelley in particular, whom he considered an avant-garde socialist.430 
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Taking Marx’s fondness of Shelley together with his Promethean references 
does not make it unlikely that his ideas have been influenced by the 
Prometheus Unbound, for on top of these facts Marx’s picture of the future is 
indeed of a rather utopian character. Whatever happens, in Marx’s view the 
revolution will take place anyway. The individual will voluntarily unite with his 
fellows; there will be an uprising; the people will free themselves and no longer 
be enslaved to capitalist power. Interestingly, Shelley’s wife must also have left 
her impression. Marx criticises scientific ‘progress’ as it only improves 
machinery and enriches capital instead of the worker. He explains that the 
labourers are subordinate to “an alien will”, to “the objective unity of the 
machinery, of fixed capital, which, as the animated monster, objectifies the 
scientific idea”431. As Walt Sheasby observes, here Marx appropriates “Mary 
Shelley’s personification of science gone monstrously wrong through Victor’s 
experiment “bestowing animation upon lifeless matter””432. Science is only used 
to animate the machine, which subjugates, isolates, and alienates the worker. 
With respect to the third motif, Kolakowski argues that 
 
“[t]he Promethean idea which recurs constantly in Marx’s work is that of faith in man’s 
unlimited powers as self-creator, contempt for tradition and worship of the past, history 
is man’s self-realization through labour, and the belief that the man of tomorrow will 
derive his ‘poetry’ from the future”
433
. 
 
Although Marx might not have phrased it this way, Kolakowski identifies “the 
proletariat as the collective Prometheus” who would, “in the universal revolution, 
sweep away the age-long contradiction between the interest of the individual 
and that of the species”434. Whether Kolakowski goes one step too far by 
characterising Marx’s entire oeuvre in Promethean terms is a question that may 
be asked, but what is certain is that there are numerous Promethean concepts 
that keep on recurring in his books, which particularly match humankind’s 
emancipation through the proletarian revolution. Marx trusts humanity’s 
rebellious powers, infinite creativity, and future-oriented urge to transform the 
unjust, enchaining, capitalist system. People will overcome the tyrannical 
masters – whether heavenly or earthly. Marx has faith in humanity’s capacity to 
shape itself through work, and create another civilisation. This revolution, this 
fight for freedom, is even worth Promethean martyrdom, for it will liberate the 
species as a whole. When the time is right the unbound Prometheus of one 
Shelley will triumph over the other’s animated monster – as well as his creator.
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3.6.2. Nietzsche 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) also reworks the Promethean myth according 
to his own needs and theories. The Titan appears several times in his first book, 
The Birth of Tragedy (1872).435 In this work Nietzsche discusses Greek tragedy 
and establishes a connection between that ancient form of art and 
contemporary (German) art and human culture. He introduces a fundamental 
dichotomy between two aesthetic-metaphysical concepts, both carrying names 
derived from mythological gods: 
 
“We will have achieved much for scientific study of aesthetics when we come [...] to the 
certain and immediate apprehension of the fact that the further development of art is 
bound up with the duality of the Apollonian and the Dionysian”
436
. 
 
For Nietzsche mythological figures provide a means to observe, analyse and 
criticise modern culture and life. It is the “duality” cited which provides the basis 
for the connection between the ancient and the contemporary, for it 
characterises the “further development of art”, which is continuously evolving. 
Referring to Apollo – the god of calm, beauty, dreams and light – the concept of 
the Apollonian embodies order, clarity, beauty, but also the cosmetic in art, 
according to Nietzsche best expressed in pretty images and sculpture. 
Referring to Dionysius – the god of frenzy, intoxication and crossed boundaries 
– the Dionysian symbolises chaotic, amorphous and limitless art, as best 
expressed in music. It is exactly the tension between the opposed drives that is 
particularly productive and generates the most fruitful creations. The ancient 
tragedy is the sublime form of a fusion of the two impulses, which, according to 
Nietzsche, did not return ever since. Modern culture has become sterilised and 
inanimate and – understood as tragic work of art – so has modern life. Only a 
resurgence of the dynamic balance between these two aesthetic powers will 
save the contemporary society of lifelessness. A flawless harmony between the 
two tendencies should be the foremost objective of all human culture. 
 The frontispiece of The Birth of Tragedy was an image of the Titan. In 
section 9 Nietzsche discusses the hero most extensively, when demonstrating 
the character of Greek tragedies. Those works of art were of a light, beautiful, 
Apollonian, yet superficial and illusionary form, as essentially they were telling 
the most miserable, dark, Dionysian stories. The tragedy’s bright images of its 
hero, “briefly put, the Apollonian mask, are the [...] necessary creations of a 
glimpse into the inner terror of nature, bright spots, so to speak, to heal us from 
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the horrifying night of the crippled gaze”437. Nietzsche uses the figures of 
Oedipus and Prometheus in order to illustrate the dynamic nature of the ancient 
tragedy. He infers from the Oedipus myth (as related by Sophocles) that its core 
message is that “wisdom, and especially Dionysian wisdom, is an unnatural 
atrocity” – but the playwright managed to present this sad truth in the prettiest, 
most illuminating format.438 About the Prometheus Bound he writes that 
Aeschylus demonstrated the illuminating “glory of activity”, but Goethe truly 
knew how to express what the former “could only hint to us through a 
metaphorical picture”. Nietzsche quotes from Goethe’s passionate poem, citing 
the last verse in which Prometheus tells Zeus that each human will ignore the 
god – like him (“Wie Ich!”)! The aggressive, reckless words of the poem’s 
protagonist and its anti-divine flavour please the philosopher. Prometheus’ 
tirade shows the human’s autonomy, the power of his knowledge and the unity 
of the human and the divine world: the “Titanic” human “compels the gods to 
unite with him, because in his autonomous wisdom he holds their existence and 
the limits to their authority in his hand”. Yet although Goethe may have stated it 
more directly, Nietzsche admiringly declares that Aeschylus already claimed 
there was such a “oneness”, a reciprocal dependence of “both these worlds of 
suffering” (i.e. the human and divine world). The courageous playwright saw 
“Fate [Moira] enthroned over gods and men as eternal justice” – he called for 
such justice. Aeschylus’ Prometheus – the “Titanic artist” who fought the gods 
with his wisdom – symbolises the justice of this mutual dependency. Nietzsche 
compares the myth – “a primordial possession of the Aryan population” – with 
the story of the Fall, and suggests that the latter is probably of the same 
significance for “the Semitic peoples” as the former for the Aryan. The 
Prometheus myth, however, provides a much better view of the essence of 
human existence. 
 
“The best and loftiest thing which mankind can be blessed with men acquire through a 
crime, and now they must accept the further consequences, namely, the entire flood of 
suffering and troubles with which the offended divine presences must afflict the nobly 
ambitious human race: an austere notion which, through the value which it gives to the 
crime, stands in a curious contrast to the Semitic myth of the Fall”.
439
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Both tales focus on a fundamental crime against divinity (by, respectively, 
Prometheus and Eve); pose (thereby) an antithesis between human and god; 
and underline the terrible consequences of that act. Yet 
 
“[w]hat distinguishes the Aryan conception is the lofty view of the active transgression 
as the essentially Promethean virtue. With this, at the same time the ethical basis of 
pessimistic tragedy is established, together with the justification of human evils, that is, 
both of human guilt and of the forfeit of suffering caused by that guilt”. 
 
In contrast with the passive, weak Semite, who characterises the crime as 
(female) sin and calls for redemption, the thoughtful (male) Aryan recognises 
the world’s tragic, contradictory and impious essence and does not only accept 
but even value human crime and agony. The Promethean Aryan tries actively, 
heroically and in full awareness of the misery he will have to endure to cross the 
world’s boundaries, violate its laws and break the contradiction between the 
human and the divine world. The “innermost core of the Prometheus saga” is 
“the imperative requirement that the individual striving like a Titan has to fall into 
crime”. One should note, says Nietzsche, the “un-Apollonian quality of this 
pessimistic idea”. The Apollonian tendency emphasises rules and reason, 
establishes borders between individuals and demands moderation but – 
fortunately, Nietzsche seems to say – sometimes the reckless Dionysian energy 
manages to break through those suffocating limits and  
 
“[t]his Titanic impulse to become, as it were, the Atlas of all individuals and to bear 
them on one’s wide back, higher and higher, further and further, is the common link 
between the Promethean and the Dionysian. In this view, the Aeschylean Prometheus 
is a Dionysian mask”. 
 
Yet even as a “Dionysian mask”, in the end Aeschylus’ Titan has a 
“simultaneously Dionysian and Apollonian nature” and the play perfectly 
demonstrates how the two tendencies complement each other. It is a story 
about Dionysian suffering smartened with the Apollonian beauty and structure 
of Greek tragedy. It tells of an individual following Apollonian dreams, reaching 
for light – it is a courageous, yet reckless individual who is forced to atone for 
his Dionysian actions with perennial agony. Important is that the myth does not 
merely represent something aesthetic, but in fact the essentially tragic and 
ambiguous nature of human life. Its core philosophy entails both the atrocious 
nature of wisdom and the justification of human hubris – and of course, the 
miserable consequences. The Apollonian “will” and laws as well as the 
Dionysian crime that violates them can be justified as well as rejected. In 
Nietzsche’s words, Prometheus’ double nature reflects that “[e]verything 
present is just and unjust and equally justified in both”. The Apollonian-
Dionysian dynamic is not merely about theatre or art: it is about the tragedy of 
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the world as such, about the tragedy of humanity and their contradiction with 
God.440 
 In The Gay Science (1882), Nietzsche employs the Promethean figure 
again, this time to oppose the Greeks and Christians – analogous to the Aryan-
Semite opposition in The Birth of Tragedy. His perspective on the possibility to 
reintroduce the ancient Apollonian-Dionysian dynamic in modern art has 
become much more pessimistic. In a section called ‘Origin of sin’ (135) he sadly 
states that through the notion of sin, Christianity “judaized” the modern world 
and its morality. Despite all the hard work by Nietzsche and his contemporaries 
to access and integrate the ancient Greek culture – “a world without feelings of 
sin”441 – this world has become “alien” to modern Europe. Sin, which provides 
the foundation of Christian morality as such, is only about injury of the divine 
honour. “The Greeks, by contrast, were closer to the thought that even sacrilege 
can have dignity – even theft, as in the case of Prometheus”442. The Christian 
moral would have been ridiculous in the Hellenic view, in their tragic ethics of 
crime and misery and the dignity of the hubristic action – so well symbolised by 
the Promethean narrative. Other than in The Birth of Tragedy, for Nietzsche the 
Titan saga no longer embodies the roots of the Aryan population and the 
potential recovery of the sublime, hubris-acknowledging duality of the Greek 
tragedy in modern art. In The Gay Science, Prometheus symbolises the 
alienation of this ancient world, the miserable fact that it has become 
inaccessible to the contemporary artist – whether Semitic or Aryan. 
Prometheus also appears in a section entitled ‘Preludes to science’ 
(300).443 In order for the sciences to have emerged, they had to be preceded by 
the untrue claims and predictions of people such as magicians or alchemists so 
that a “thirst, hunger and taste for hidden and forbidden powers”444 be created. 
False promises and predictions were a prelude to science and created the very 
possibility of knowledge. Similarly, says Nietzsche, religion is likely to be such a 
prelude to humans, in order that some day they find their own powers and self-
sufficiency.  
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“Did Prometheus first have to imagine having stolen light and pay for it before he could 
finally discover that he had created light by desiring light, and that not only man but 
also god was the work of his own hands and clay in his hands? All mere images of the 
sculptor – no less than delusion, theft, the Caucasus, the vulture, and the whole tragic 
Prometheia of all those who know?”
445
. 
 
Whereas before Prometheus was each time celebrated as a hero, here 
Nietzsche downgrades the myth and even the Titan himself. The myth and its 
events were nothing but a delusion: Prometheus did not steal but create light; 
and although he did know he created humanity, the other actors and 
occurrences were just as much his own illusionary fabrications. Yet he did not 
realise what was his share in the tale’s figures and occurrences, which 
prevented him from assuming responsibility and honour for his 
accomplishments. Nietzsche’s point is that just as Prometheus, humans delude 
themselves by means of their own creations: mythical stories, legendary 
histories – and most of all the entire religious system. As he explains in Beyond 
Good and Evil (1886), 
 
“[R]eligion gives them an invaluable sense of contentment with their situation and type; 
it puts their hearts greatly at ease, it glorifies their obedience […], it transfigures and 
improves them, it provides something of a justification for everything commonplace, for 
all the lowliness, for the whole half-bestial poverty of their souls”
446
. 
 
Delusions such as religion give meaning and value to human life, they make 
suffering bearable because it is explained and justified. In a way, humans are 
indeed “half-bestial”, merely another type of animal who have their self-
constructed stories and beliefs as their means of survival. There are, however, 
two essential differences between human and animal. The first is humanity’s 
self-consciousness: the fact that humans are able to distinguish themselves 
from animals already makes a fundamental difference, whether this 
ability/difference is something good or not. Second, in Nietzsche’s words the 
human is “das noch nicht festgestellte Thier”447, that is, “the animal that is still 
not fixated” or “the yet unfinished”, “the not yet defined”, or “the not yet 
determined” animal448. Unlike all other animals the human being is a creature 
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whose nature is yet to be determined – reminiscent of the humans created by 
Epimetheus, who were “naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed”. This lack of 
fixation implies an immense source of possibilities. The human is alterable, “a 
being that changes and realizes himself by his own efforts”449. Unfortunately, up 
to now humans have been trying to compensate for their indeterminacy by 
means of “an illusory higher order of things”450 such as religion. This has only 
preserved the weak and suffering and restrained the higher and most promising 
types. It has kept “the type “man” on a lower level”451 and resulted in the 
‘breeding’ of “a stunted, almost ridiculous type, a herd animal”452. There is a 
possibility to change the situation, for the “basic flaw in man”453 simultaneously 
is exactly what constitutes his very worth, what makes him human. Yet then, 
according to Nietzsche, it is necessary to break free from our self-created 
constraints, our artificial truths and fight the bestialising tendencies that let us 
sink to the level of herd animals. Prometheus is then a means for the 
philosopher to urge humans to let go of their false tales, beliefs, and 
constructions, for only then can they take full credit for their own attainments – 
instead of ascribing these to some divine power.454 Just as the Titan should 
have, humans should recognise God to be nothing but an illusion, produced by 
their very own imagination. The Almighty should be eradicated, for his downfall 
– His death – will release humanity from its celestial restraints. 
As to many authors before, it is again the ambiguous character of the 
Prometheus myth which makes it particularly useful to Nietzsche. Its flexible 
format is practical: from a tragic yet highly estimated hero the Titan easily 
downgrades to a self-deluding Christian. Content-wise it is just as practical: 
beneficence and criminality, victory and punishment, creativity and rebellion, 
justice and injustice – it is these contrasting qualities and most of all their 
dynamic, that make the myth so effective. It makes it a perfect means to outline, 
or better, unveil the world’s tragedy. For each time Nietzsche brings 
Prometheus into play, the figure operates as a means to unveil “hidden and 
forbidden” significations about the human and his place in civilisation. As a 
Master of Suspicion, in McLelland’s words Nietzsche’s aim is indeed to disclose 
“hidden meanings, masked through falsehood” and try “to make the truth free”. 
Nietzsche employs the Promethean saga to remove humans’ “Apollonian mask” 
and heal their “crippled gaze”, so that they acknowledge the fundamentally 
tragic, illusionary, undetermined and ambiguous nature of human life. Yet as 
sad as it sounds, of course these unmaskings are not all negative: like Marx, 
Nietzsche tells the myth to encourage humanity to realise a revolutionary, 
                                                                                                                                               
Practice: The Task of the Science of Man,” Social Research 44, no. 3 (Autumn 1977): 541.; and 
Rüdiger Safranski, How Much Globalization Can We Bear (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 2. 
449
 Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity, 128. 
450
 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. A Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, 55. 
451
 Ibid., 56. 
452
 Ibid., 57. 
453
 Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity, 130. 
454
 This is one of the first times where Nietzsche presents his famous idea of ‘the death of God’.  
Trijsje Franssen    Prometheus Through the Ages 
123 
 
emancipatory break with the past. Nietzsche’s Prometheus is there to teach 
humans that active Titanic ambition can free them from the traditional chains of 
degradation and oppression – and most of all, from their self-delusions. 
 
3.6.3. Freud 
 
What Marx seeks in the social-political and Nietzsche in culture and recognition 
of (religious) illusions, Sigmund Freud (1865-1935) seeks in the psyche. 
Originally a neurologist, the founding father of psychoanalysis discovers 
concealed meanings and sensations by exploring the human unconscious. 
Considering myth in general a useful tool to investigate, label and present the 
relevant issues and research results, apart from for Oedipus and other figures 
Freud also creates a place for Prometheus. 
Before examining that place, first it is useful to take a quick look at 
Freud’s use of the Oedipus myth, as this is an essential part of his theory as 
such. He bases his famous Oedipus complex on the myth about a boy who slew 
his father and married his mother, without knowing they were his parents. Freud 
employs the tale’s symbols to characterise the infantile psychosexual 
maturation, which includes sexual desire towards the parent of the opposite sex 
and feelings of envy and rivalry towards the other parent. A conflict takes place 
between the infant’s passionate ‘id’ and his ‘ego’ looking for mastery. These are 
two of the three components of Freud’s renowned model of the human psyche, 
which consists of the id, ego, and super-ego. Respectively, these can roughly 
be characterised as the instinctual (unconscious and hedonistic), the rational 
and the moral component of the psyche, which together in interplay determine a 
person’s thoughts, feelings and actions. The internal conflict between the id and 
ego forms an important part of Freud’s interpretation of the Promethean myth. 
In his paper The Acquisition and Control of Fire (1932) Freud discusses the 
primitive human’s relation to fire with the help of the story of the Titan. Motivated 
by “the Mongolian law against ‘pissing on ashes’”455, he focuses thereby on the 
connection between fire and urination: 
 
“I think my hypothesis – that, in order to gain control over fire, men had to renounce the 
homosexually-tinged desire to put it out with a stream of urine – can be confirmed by 
an interpretation of the Greek myth of Prometheus”
456
. 
 
Freud argues that the crucial elements of the myth are 1) the way in which the 
stolen good was transported; 2) the character of the hero’s action; and 3) the 
significance of his penalty. First, he says, the fennel stalk in which Prometheus 
hid the fire is a penis symbol. For if the confusing, dream-characteristic 
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“mechanism of reversal”457 – is taken into account, one realises that instead of 
fire, the hollow stick should be understood as containing water. That is, it 
represents a man’s penis-tube and his urine – “the means of quenching fire”458. 
Second, Freud accentuates that Prometheus’ undertaking was an act of 
thievery. And since in numerous myths from many other seriously distinct 
historical cultures the obtainment of (control over) fire is inherently related to 
crime, this must be an essential feature. His crime is a defiance of the gods, 
who “are granted the satisfaction of all the desires which human creatures have 
to renounce”459. This is why, 
 
 “[s]peaking in analytic terms, we should say that instinctual life – the id – is the god 
who is defrauded when the quenching of fire is renounced: in the legend, a human 
desire is transformed into a divine privilege”
460
. 
 
That is, Prometheus’ theft of fire – which symbolises water or urine – signifies 
that the human’s instinctual urge to quench fire has to be discarded. 
The third essential feature of the myth concerns Prometheus’ liver. When 
the Titan was tied to the rock, this organ was chosen to be the locus of his 
penalty – a vulture gnawing on it every day – and in old times the liver “was 
regarded as the seat of all passions and desires”461. A punishment like this, 
says Freud, seems rather peculiar for such a well-intentioned act, which was 
only beneficial to civilisation. However, as this ‘gain’ for humankind included 
instinctual abstinence, Prometheus the “culture-hero” aroused “resentment”. For 
“[w]e know that a demand for a renunciation of instinct [...] call[s] out hostility 
and aggressiveness, which is only transformed into a sense of guilt in a later 
phase of psychical development”462. Hence the myth treats the beneficent act 
simultaneously as a malfeasance, with Prometheus deserving an assault on his 
own core of passion and desire. 
Freud states that the myth is quite obscure, for apart from the reversal 
interpretation with fire representing water, it should be noted that due to its heat, 
shape and movements, fire was also regarded by primitive people as a symbol 
of passion – that is, of the libido. And so “[t]here can be no doubt about the 
mythological significance of flame as a phallus”, which is why “to primal man the 
attempt to quench fire with his own water had the meaning of a pleasurable 
struggle with another phallus”463. Although here he does not elaborate on the 
issue, it is probably based on this explanation that Freud at the beginning of his 
text characterised man’s quenching of fire as a “homosexually-tinged desire”.  
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Now if the liver was the locus of passion and desire, its symbolic 
meaning is likely to be identical to the meaning of fire (i.e. when representing 
libido), “and that, if this is so, its being daily consumed and renewed gives an 
apt picture of the behaviour of the erotic desires, which, though daily satisfied, 
are daily revived”464. The psychoanalyst concludes that in that case, the vulture 
must also have the significance of a penis as it feeds itself on Prometheus’ 
organ. He draws an analogy between the Titan’s liver and the figure (and tale) 
of the phoenix, for the two clearly share a particular significance and aim. “Each 
describes the revival of libidinal desires after they have been quenched through 
being sated. That is to say, each brings out the indestructibility of those 
desires”465. The stories’ accent on this indestructibility functions to comfort the 
human, or represents the positive reaction of the historical primal human who is 
hereby assured that though “the offender” (i.e. Prometheus) forced him to 
renounce his instinct “after all at bottom [the offender] has done no damage”466. 
Before I continue with the discussion of the last section I will take a first 
look at Freud’s analysis of the story, since it involves a complex system of 
meanings, symbols, allegories and reversals. The myth’s well-known feature of 
ambiguity appears to have reached a climax. Fire actually represents water, but 
together with the fennel stalk and the vulture it also symbolises a penis; the 
robbed god is the human’s defrauded instinct; and Prometheus’ liver is the 
allegory of passion and desire (thereby again, similar to one of fire’s 
significations). As to many authors before, to Freud it is also the ambivalence 
that makes the Titan and his story so useful. Prometheus’ act is evaluated and 
responded to in two antithetical ways. Though surely performing a beneficent 
act, the Titan’s well-meaning transactions are not appreciated – interestingly, 
not even by humanity. The latter is an important difference in Freud’s analysis: 
what in other interpretations humans virtually always welcome with open arms, 
here calls out resentment and aggression. Only “in a later phase of psychical 
development”, feelings of guilt will arise, as well as of relief, consolation and 
appreciation. Yet despite this peculiar aspect of the psychoanalyst’s 
interpretation, its emphasis on the virtuous side of the crime as well as the 
miserable consequences for humanity does make it reminiscent of Marx’s and 
Nietzsche’s. Like the other two, Freud seeks for human emancipation and 
liberation and tries to release suppressed meanings. And as a genuine Master, 
he has his very own technique: mining the unconscious and elucidating the 
human’s (sexual) desires, shortcomings and needs. 
To continue with the last section of the essay, here Freud comes back to 
the duality fire-water and explains that apart from an historical and symbolical 
element, it also has a physiological one. The two functions of the male sexual 
organ – “the evacuation of the bladder” and the satisfaction of the libido through 
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“the act of love” – are namely “as incompatible as fire and water”467. When the 
phallus is excited and has the accompanying warm sensations, it is unthinkable 
to urinate, while when it employs the function of urination, the genital faculties 
are entirely extinguished. 
 
“The antithesis between the two functions might lead us to say that man quenches his 
own fire with his own water. And primal man, who had to understand the external world 
by the help of his own bodily sensations and states, would surely not have failed to 
notice and utilize the analogies pointed out to him by the behaviour of fire”
468
. 
 
This section shows other characteristic aspects of Freudian reasoning, which 
help understand his interpretation of the Prometheus myth. What makes 
Freud’s analysis stand out from others are not only the elements of the physical, 
sexual and unconscious, but also his attention to the individual human and – 
though he is not the first – to the contemporary human. 
First, the Prometheus myth does not only represent the historical 
acquisition of fire of the species as a whole. Freud’s explanation of the story’s 
essential components – the ‘id’ which is defrauded, the libidinal passions, the 
aggressive reactions – in the end mainly exposes the individual’s experience of 
the events. Of course, Prometheus’ theft aroused a common reaction and all 
humans probably sensed something similar when suffering the “blow in his 
instinctual life”469. But eventually the myth’s symbols embody an individual’s 
internal struggle between his instincts and their tempering; his unconscious and 
its managing; his desires and their control – an instinctual renunciation each 
human had to go through by himself. 
Second, although Freud initially speaks of the overcoming of an archaic 
instinct, his physiological explanation of the fire-water dichotomy applies to each 
human with a male sexual organ, which means that the conflict between the 
phallus’ two functions must be experienced by every contemporary man just as 
much as the primal one. An historical habit may have been mastered, but the 
physical desires related to it will not disappear for as long as the human has a 
body; symbolically contemporary man still quenches fire. His passions, 
excitations and other physical demands are still the same as the primitive’s 
“bodily sensations and states” – and so is his strife when trying to learn how to 
cope with these. Note, however, that this is not only an individual process, for 
Freud draws a strong parallel between the maturing of each individual human 
and the evolutionary and cultural development of the human race. Volney P. 
Gay explains that this course of development is the role of myth. 
 
“Myth is an elaboration of the task of taming [human instincts] and putting them into 
service. In general, Freud holds that the attainment of culture requires just this kind of 
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individual restraint. Hence myths and ritual are repeated endlessly because each 
generation must learn anew the tasks of self-control and self-sacrifice”
470
. 
 
The Promethean myth may reflect the primal human’s struggle with fire many 
ages ago, but the tale’s allegorical elements – the phallus-stalk; the urine-fire; 
the defrauded id/god; the passion-liver – represent essential characteristics and 
difficulties that are far from unknown to the contemporary human and his 
society. In other words, the Titan’s story remains relevant for as long as humans 
have to tame the instincts they are burdened with. 
With respect to the connection between Prometheus and the individual-
species-cultural analogy, it is also worth to shortly consider McLelland’s 
analysis of Freud’s work. He assigns the Titan quite a different place than Freud 
himself; his Prometheus is the Great Rebel and Liberator instead of a symbol of 
humanity’s instinctual struggles. McLelland writes that he takes “Oedipus as 
Freud’s symbol for the Promethean will, which overcomes domination and 
establishes personal autonomy”471. The Oedipean revolt is “Promethean”, for 
“[h]ere is the familiar story of rebellion against minority status, external power 
and authority (heteronomy)”472. The myth’s Zeus, from this Oedipus 
perspective, represents the maturing child’s father; the Promethean hero is the 
child who defies his father and suffers. Further, the “Promethean will” is not only 
rebellion against paternal power or authority as such – it is the “constructor of 
atheistic autonomy”473. Prometheus becomes McLelland’s means to articulate 
Freud’s criticism of religion: the Titan represents the rebel against both the 
authority of the parent and the corresponding social authority of religion. 
Freud indeed compares the Almighty Father – God – to the human father 
and the associated Oedipus complex. Religion is created according to the 
“infantile prototype”, which makes Freud speak of the “childhood of the human 
race”474. 
  
“When the growing individual finds that he is destined to remain a child for ever, that he 
can never do without protection against strange superior powers, he lends those 
powers the features belonging to the figure of his father; he creates for himself the 
gods whom he dreads”
475
. 
 
Due to their essential imperfection and vulnerability, humans need some divine, 
paternal authority. Interestingly, Freud’s critical account of religion reminds us of 
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Nietzsche’s. Freud, too, emphasises the fundamental incompleteness and the 
infinite immaturity of the human – reminiscent of Nietzsche’s “noch nicht 
Festgestellte Thier” – and underlines the resulting need for some superior 
power. Like Nietzsche, he rejects the human’s worshipping of a non-existent 
God – of a figure which is nothing but an illusion, self-made to compensate for 
this incompleteness. And just as Nietzsche, Freud considers humanity’s 
illusionary fabrications as a major obstacle to civilisation: religion impedes 
cultural development. 
 
“Like the obsessional neurosis of children, [religion] arose out of the Oedipus complex, 
out of the relation to the father. If this view is right, it is to be supposed that a turning-
way from religion is bound to occur with the fatal inevitability of the process of growth, 
and that we find ourselves at this very juncture in the middle of that phase of 
development”
476
. 
 
Analogous to the maturing child who passes through a neurotic phase in which 
he turns away from his father, the (cultural) evolution of the human race 
involves a period in which it distances itself from religion. According to Freud 
this is all happening in his days. And like Nietzsche, he argues that the time has 
come to outgrow this phase – perhaps the human’s immaturity is not so infinite 
after all. Freud’s parallel Oedipean analysis of the individual and the human 
species thus makes McLelland conclude that Oedipus is the psychoanalyst’s 
“symbol for the Promethean will”, that is, for the urge to establish “atheistic 
autonomy”. Whether the elements of rebellion, suffering and (the possibility of) 
cultural evolution should directly lead to this conclusion may be questioned. 
However, whether Oedipus should be classified as Promethean or not, the 
Oedipean analysis of religion certainly reveals an analogy between Nietzsche’s 
and Freud’s theological accounts – and both in a mythological context. 
 
3.7. The Modern Prometheus 
 
Although Marx, Nietzsche and Freud – and many before them – each 
refashioned Prometheus’ tale in their own special and creative way, there is 
always the possibility of another and even more peculiar version. As time 
passes, the myth is modernised. Several authors let the Titan’s adventures take 
place in a contemporary context and his story is systematically transformed, 
desacralised, and satirised. 
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3.7.1. Gide 
 
On the cusp of the 20thcentury, André Gide (1869-1951) publishes an 
impressively innovative version of the myth: Prometheus Illbound (1899).477 The 
story starts off on a random afternoon – “May 189...” – in fin-de-siècle Paris. A 
heavy gentleman wanders on one of the city’s boulevards and drops his 
handkerchief, which is returned to him by a skinny man. The stout man hands 
the latter an envelope and asks him to write a name on it. He complies, but the 
corpulent man suddenly, without any reason, strikes him in the face and 
disappears. The fat man turns out to be Zeus – ‘the banker’, or ‘the Miglionaire’; 
the thin gentleman’s name is Cocles; and the address on the envelope is 
Damocles’. 
In the following chapter, suddenly the anonymous narrator addresses us: 
“I will not speak of public morals, for there are none, but this reminds me of an 
anecdote”478. He tells the reader about the enchained Prometheus, who when 
he “found that chains, clamps, strait-waistcoats, parapets, and other scruples, 
had on the whole a numbing effect on him, for a change he turned to the left, 
stretched his right arm”479 and walked down a Parisian boulevard. Prometheus 
settles in a restaurant and has a chat with the waiter, who enthusiastically talks 
to him about ‘the gratuitous act’ (l’acte gratuit): an act without aim, without any 
motive whatsoever. He thinks, he says, “that man is the only being incapable of 
acting gratuitously; – gratuitously!”480. A friend of his – a millionaire – wanted to 
perform such an act. He put 500 francs in an envelope, had a random 
gentleman write a random name on it, gave the person a blow and disappeared. 
Then, Prometheus is seated with Cocles and Damocles. The latter two tell the 
others a personal adventure and are astonished when they realise they all refer 
to the same event. Damocles is desperate to learn who has been his 
benefactor, for it truly changed his entire life: “Before, I was banal but free [...]. 
This adventure has decided me; I was nothing, now I am somebody”481. 
Prometheus is also asked to speak, but he is shy and insecure. “Oh, 
gentlemen”, he says, “anything that I can say has so little importance...”482. 
Earlier, when the waiter asked him for his occupation, he had also been very 
reluctant to answer. Yet as the former insisted, he had to: “[m]aking matches, 
murmured Prometheus, blushing”483. Again, his interlocutors keep insisting, until 
he calls his eagle. The bird bursts through the window and Prometheus 
immediately offers him his liver, although it is anything but a dangerous monster 
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– it is a pathetic, ugly and meagre birdie. “That ... an eagle! — Not much!! at the 
most, a conscience”484 Cocles exclaims. 
A couple of days later Prometheus finds himself imprisoned as he did not 
have a licence for making matches. His eagle is still miserable and unhealthy, 
but he feeds the bird, who the next day is embellished with three more feathers 
– Prometheus “sobbed with tenderness” and, “enamoured of the future beauty 
of his eagle, gave him each day more to eat”485. Prometheus’ feelings for his 
“sweet eagle” grow stronger and stronger, even though he himself becomes 
very thin and weak. Finally, the eagle becomes so powerful that he flies 
Prometheus out of prison. Prometheus gives a public lecture about his pretty 
eagle and Damocles and Cocles attend his speech. He states first, that 
everyone must have an eagle and second, that everyone has an eagle. 
Prometheus relates the audience his history. He used to be “unconscious and 
beautiful, happy and naked and unaware”486. But he pitied humans: “[t]hey lived 
in such darkness; I invented for them certain kinds of fire, and from that moment 
my eagle began. And it is since that day that I have become aware that I am 
naked”487. Prometheus tells the public that he has “passionately, wildly, and 
deplorably loved men — and I have done so much for them — one can almost 
say that I have made them; for before, what were they?”488. He made them 
conscious of existence and having made them in his own image, in every 
human there was some expectancy, “in each one was the eagle’s egg”489. 
However, he did not want to give them mere consciousness of existence, but 
also a reason for it. 
 
 “So I gave them Fire, flame and all the arts which a flame nourishes. By warming their 
minds, I brought forth the devouring faith in progress. […] No more belief in good, but 
the morbid hope for better. The belief in progress, gentlemen, that was their eagle. Our 
eagle is our reason for existence, gentlemen”
490
. 
 
Prometheus continues that when his eagle was born, he no longer loved 
humans. “I love that which devours them. — Now what devours man? — His 
eagle”491. He states that everybody should not only have an eagle but also love 
it and devote themselves to it, like he does. “But I tell you this: the eagle will 
devour us anyway — vice or virtue — duty or passion, — cease to be 
commonplace and you cannot escape it”492. 
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Then Damocles becomes very sick and so Prometheus and the waiter go 
and try to convince the Miglionaire to visit him and introduce himself to him, but 
he refuses. Zeus tells Prometheus about himself: he is very rich. “You belong to 
me; he belongs to me; everything belongs to me”493. Moreover, “[i]t is only I, [...] 
who can act with absolute disinterestedness; for man it is impossible”494. He 
admits that he loves gambling and tells them his most recent game – the one of 
Cocles and Damocles. Before they leave, the waiter tells the banker that people 
call him God. “— I let them say so”495, says the latter. Prometheus asks him 
whether he would be so kind as to show him his eagle, but Zeus responds he 
does not have one. 
 
“Eagles (and he laughed), eagles! It is I who give them. 
Prometheus was stupefied.”
496
 
 
Damocles’ situation grows worse and worse. The banknote has become a true 
torture and he dies. Prometheus feels guilty and is afraid that Damocles’ 
disease was evoked by his speech. He tells Cocles that it made him change his 
mind about his bird. At the funeral, people are astonished when they see him – 
“he was unrecognizable; he was fat, fresh, smiling”497. Prometheus starts 
another speech and tells them that it is because of Damocles, “or rather thanks 
to his death, that now I have killed my eagle…. — Killed his eagle!!! cried every 
one”498. 
After the funeral Prometheus invites Cocles and the waiter to go have lunch. 
Still astonished, Cocles asks Prometheus whether he truly killed his eagle, and 
whether they are about to eat him. “Do you doubt it? said Prometheus. Have 
you looked at me? […] — He fed on me long enough. I think now that it is my 
turn”499. The eagle tastes ambrosial – at the last course, they even consume his 
health. Cocles wonders: 
 
“— Of his past beauty, what is there left. 
 — I have kept all his feathers.  
 
It is with one of them that I write this little book. May you rare friend, not find it too 
foolish”
500
. 
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This last sentence of the book suggests that Gide himself realised quite well 
that the story is pretty intangible. It is then rather unsurprising that there are 
quite some different critical interpretations of the book. Trousson emphasises it 
must have been a sacrilege. Despite its obscure, satirical and playful character, 
the short tale challenges the time’s rigid religious ideas and practices and poses 
fundamental questions. Trousson speaks of Prometheus Illbound as “une 
“fable” de la destinée humaine” and Prometheus is wondering about nothing 
less than “le sens de l’existence”501 when he, just after he came down from the 
Caucasus, asks the waiter about the promenading Parisians: “[w]here are they 
going?” and “[w]hat are they looking for?”502. 
Pamela Genova reads the text from a different point of view and 
highlights its “veiled motif”503. The relation between the Titan and his beautiful, 
“sweet eagle”, references to Oscar Wilde’s work, Prometheus’ love for 
humanity, and many other things make her draw the conclusion that “[t]hat 
which is hidden beneath the formal complexity of Le Prométhée mal enchaîné is 
homosexuality”.504 
There are many other analyses but all interpreters will nevertheless 
agree on the fact that what is obvious about Prometheus Illbound is that it is 
radically deconstructed and transformed. Therefore, one should probably not 
aspire to find the ‘right’ interpretation or the ‘true’ meaning of the text. As far as 
there is one, it shall be the book’s very multidimensionality, irony, elusiveness 
and “foolishness”. The myth’s traditional storyline and symbols are reversed and 
ridiculed as much as possible. The eagle is a complicated figure who is rather 
some pitiful parrot than a frightening torturer. Zeus/God is merely a fat 
millionaire who entertains himself by playing games behind the scenes. He 
does some nasty gambling with people’s lives – “more like a regular in a casino 
than a sovereign god”505. Tortuous enchainment is changed into boring ease 
and boulevard strolling: Prometheus is just a bit done with all the braces and 
banisters – he stretches, frees himself and walks down the boulevard. Even one 
of the major events of the classical narrative, the theft of fire, is satirised – 
stealing a divine flame at the risk of one’s life is degraded to making matches. 
The most important subject of ridicule of course, is the heroic thief himself. 
Prometheus is parodied as a timid, insecure and hyper-emotional creature and 
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the only time he truly attempts to save a human – Damocles – this proves to be 
a plain failure. 
However, despite its satirical metamorphosis, Gide’s myth still 
encompasses many traditional elements and themes. For a start, there is 
Prometheus’ role of pitying creator: he “deplorably loved men” and made them 
in his own image. Further, his shameful job is making matches, but his gift of 
fire to humankind is nevertheless present and important. He “gave them Fire, 
flame and all the arts which a flame nourishes”: the seemingly usual hope and 
belief in progress. His gift’s value is, however, radically reversed, for it results in 
humanity’s “morbid hope” for and “devouring faith”506 in progress. 
Other essential and interrelated themes are religion, ethics and the 
human being. Through the figure of Zeus, Gide satirises the Christian God and 
the religious dogma’s, as well as the belief in human liberty. The Miglionaire is 
“acting gratuitously” at the expense of others, solely for fun, if not merely 
because of the fact that he can. He is the only one who knows full liberty, as he 
is the only one capable of acting amorally, disinterestedly and absurdly, without 
any reason or motive whatsoever. The human, however, as the waiter tells 
Prometheus, “is the only being incapable of acting gratuitously” and later he 
exclaims “[a] gratuitous act! There is nothing more demoralizing”507. The 
section’s essence is first, that God is not benevolent, but uncaring, amoral, 
irresponsible and unjust; and second, that in contrast, human nature is 
fundamentally moral. Whether doing right or wrong, the human always needs to 
act within an ethical framework. An arbitrary, if not absurd fate is imposed on 
him, one for which he cannot find any reason or purpose but is forced to deal 
with anyway since he is conscious of his existence. And this condition is the 
result of Prometheus’ gift. He illuminated the unconscious darkness of the 
human mind, but thereby limited the freedom of humans, who from then on 
need to have a motive, take responsibility and justify their actions. 
Clearly, the traditional gifts of fire and the arts are present, but again 
entirely inverted by Gide. The human’s unique qualities and characteristics are 
her reason for existence – even what makes her human, but instead of enabling 
her to infinitely evolve, they are swallowing her up completely. In other words, 
her consciousness is her eagle – or perhaps even better: her conscience is, like 
Cocles exclaimed when he met the bird. This eagle consists in the norms and 
laws that each conscious/conscientious human has somehow accepted to 
incarcerate herself in, in order to have a reason to live. Note that Gide does not 
merely criticise religious morals, but laws from any limiting moral system that 
comes to function in some quasi-godly way. Despite the fact that the rules and 
dogmas are enchaining and torturing, people endure them nevertheless. They 
even devote themselves to such laws, for they believe and hope that if one 
“nourishes” them well these can provide progress and become very beautiful. 
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Such devotion of the human to his restrictions is underlined when Prometheus’ 
says he does not love humans but “that which devours them”. For though being 
their alleged ‘benefactor’, Prometheus himself also represents the human. From 
the day of his gift of consciousness his “eagle began” – from that day, 
something has been limiting Prometheus, feeding on him, something he loves 
nevertheless. And “it is since that day that I have become aware that I am 
naked”: he/the human is an essentially incomplete and vulnerable being – 
interestingly, reminiscent of Nietzsche’s and Freud’s concept of humanity. 
However, the theme of rebellion is certainly not absent. As pathetic as 
Prometheus may be at the beginning, he is nevertheless an independent figure 
who easily frees himself from his chains and – through speeches and feasting – 
rebels against Zeus. In the end, the Titan liberates himself from the limits 
imposed on him by God – it was him who gave him his eagle – and finally 
manages to exert positive influence on human destiny. Prometheus destroys his 
limits, nourishes himself with them and takes control of his own life. Gide’s point 
is that people are not completely impotent with respect to their restrictions: they 
can decide to eat their eagle and free themselves from the set of rules imposed 
on them from outside. The author appeals to humans to emancipate themselves 
from whatever doctrine or ethical system is oppressing them in the name of 
some illusionary consciousness. According to Gide, says Trousson, humans will 
never reach some absolute liberty, for human action is indeed limited by their 
own responsibility. But this is not necessarily something bad: “Le Promethée 
gidien est responsable; il n’est pas coupable. Dans ce sens, il est un révolté, 
contre le dogme, la tradition, les classes sociales, les principes établis”508. The 
human’s freedom may still be limited, but this is by his individual responsibility, 
founded upon nothing but his personal autonomy and morality.  
A last and fundamental characteristic of the classical myth that cannot be 
missed is ambiguity. The ironical narration of the story already invites 
ambivalence, for obviously it does not need to be serious or logical – on the 
contrary. As said, Prometheus is shy yet independent, clumsy yet creative, 
loving humanity yet encouraging their misery. The eagle is both despotic and 
needed, cruel and loved. The relation between the two – whether homosexual 
or not – is sometimes encouraged, at other times rejected. In fact, the very text 
itself is one great ambiguous play. Intertextual and structural games confuse the 
reader as he is taken on the adventure of the author’s experiments. The story is 
seriously remoulded and the text is told in a plurality of styles: it starts with a 
parabolic, third person tale (Zeus meeting Cocles) but in the next section the 
anonymous narrator speaks in first person. The chapter headings are in general 
mere Roman numbers, yet the subtitles are often placed at random locations, 
such as in the middle of a conversation, or one encounters a curious heading 
such as “a chapter while waiting the next one”509. There are more of such 
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metafictional comments, such as the last sentence of the book when the reader 
– “you, rare friend” – is told it is written with one of the eagle’s feathers. In short, 
in Prometheus Illbound the radical transformation of the classical myth ends up 
in a disorienting collection of ambiguous images. Yet not merely this myth is 
ridiculed, but the storyline as such – any narrative in fact – is. Apart from an 
ironical subversion of the Prometheus myth, Gide’s book is one satirical 
deconstruction of a conventional textual structure as such: a mixture of 
parables, anecdotes, inverted symbols, abrupt interruptions and metafictional 
commentary. This is a level and a kind of ambiguity we did not see before in the 
many earlier versions of the myth. 
 
3.7.2. Kafka 
 
Though radically different from Gide’s, another strongly modified, ambiguous 
and even obscure version of the Promethean story was written by Franz Kafka 
(1883 – 1924). In fact, he presents four versions of the myth in a ‘short story’ or 
parable which is concise enough to quote in its entirety: 
 
 
“Prometheus 
There are four legends concerning Prometheus: 
According to the first he was clamped to a rock in the Caucasus for betraying 
the secrets of the gods to men, and the gods sent eagles to feed on his liver, which 
was perpetually renewed. 
According to the second Prometheus, goaded by the pain of the tearing beaks, 
pressed himself deeper and deeper into the rock until he became one with it. 
According to the third his treachery was forgotten in the course of thousands of 
years, forgotten by the gods, the eagles, forgotten by himself. 
According to the fourth everyone grew weary of the meaningless affair [des 
grundlos Gewordenen]. The gods grew weary, the eagles grew weary, the wound 
closed wearily. 
There remains the inexplicable mass of rock. The legend tries to explain the 
inexplicable [das Unerklärliche]. As it comes out of the substratum of truth [einem 
Wahrheitsgrund] it has in turn to end in the inexplicable”
510
. 
 
At first sight, Kafka’s Prometheus (1918) seems as inexplicable as the rock. The 
first version of the myth is still rather recognisable. But the second is one we 
have not seen before and with respect to the third and fourth – in particular in 
the light of the last two sentences – one wonders whether these are still about 
the Titan at all. Whatever the text’s central subject is, certain seems to be that, 
as we read in the fourth version, the Promethean “affair” somehow lost its 
meaningful foundation – as far as it has ever had one in the first place. It literally 
lost its ‘ground’, for “das grundlos Gewordene” could also be translated as “that 
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which has become groundless” or, again invoking different connotations, as 
“that which has come into existence without a reason”: there was no reason or 
ground for its becoming. What remains of the meaning-, ground-, or reasonless 
affair is “das Unerklärliche”, “the inexplicable”. Yet despite the text’s obscurity, 
re-reading it should enable us to reveal at least some of its hidden meaning – in 
fact, groundlessness or inexplicability seems to be Prometheus’ very point. 
According to Svetlana Boym the central theme of Prometheus is 
storytelling and contemporary oblivion: 
 
“there is no longer Prometheus bound or unbound but Prometheus forgotten. [...] We 
are in the modern era when [...] the common yardsticks of tradition can no longer be 
taken for granted. [...] Kafka blurs the boundaries between Greek myths [...] and the 
Jewish tradition of Midrash and Hassidic tales”
511
. 
 
Blending various narrative traditions, Kafka makes the story a “cross-cultural 
fable”512 and the “ground of truth” – Wahrheitsgrund – “a space of long-term 
cultural interpretations” 513. “The inexplicable”, or as Boym translates it, the 
“unelucidated”, or the “unenlightened” requires enlightenment. “[T]he parable 
urges us to confront our limits and understand what we don’t understand” 514. 
Complete possession of the truth is not possible, but this does not mean that 
there is none at all; we do have some freedom of interpretation. Boym quotes 
another aphorism from Kafka, in which he compares the truth with light that falls 
upon a theatrical mask. Boym explains that the mask “refracts the light of truth, 
casting short shadows. [...] What remains is the shadow play of agnostic 
truth”515. Yet the fragmented character of truth should not make one understand 
the parable in a circular sense – that is, from the inexplicable to the inexplicable 
– for reading it attentively reveals “a parabolic spiral in which every 
interpretation re-marks the previous one, foreshadows the next but also remains 
singular”516. In the end, by means of the multiplicity of interpretations and 
obscure, unerklärliche truths, according to Boym even in modern times Kafka 
furthers the parabolic and never-ending process of storytelling. 
 György Kálmán agrees that Prometheus is about myth, interpretation and 
truth. He observes that the text’s first sentence and the very fact that there are 
four versions of the myth already questions their truth. Yet “it is not the truth 
concerning Prometheus”517, the parable is rather an ironic subversion of 
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“the machinery of working of the mythology, by [...] deforming the conventional form of 
myths. His myths are, in fact, parodies of the myth itself, experimental transformations 
of mythical thinking, challenges of the traditional ways of telling stories”
518
. 
  
Actually, the assumption that it is a parable should even be reviewed – “it has 
the form of a parable, but one cannot infer to any deep or transcendent idea 
from it”519. Yet focusing on Kafka’s emphasis on the “inexplicable”, he does 
discover a fifth legend in Prometheus: 
 
“a legend on the useless or defected nature of legends. However we try, we cannot 
interpret the phenomena of the nature [sic], it implies; it is in vain that people invent 
explanations for strange or obtrusive objects. The legend, then, is about the 
hopelessness of the legends. The parable suggests that we cannot use parables”
520
. 
 
In the end, Prometheus is about explanation as such: legends are hopeless, 
parables are unusable and it is characteristic of myth is that it leaves much 
unexplained: the stories themselves require explanation. And texts about reality 
are indeed always interpretable, but the point is that reality itself is not. The rock 
as such cannot be explained, nor can the ground of truth. 
 
“It just exists. It is something given. An interpretation is always focused on texts, that is, 
it is always an interpretation of interpretations – ultimately, an interpretation of the 
interpretation of the world around us. [...] Reality or truth itself must remain and will 
remain inexplicable”
521
. 
 
Hans Blumenberg reads Prometheus’ in a similar yet even more radical way: 
Kafka’s parable tries to overcome myth as such. Interestingly, according to 
Blumenberg this puts his text on a par with Gide’s Prometheus Illbound. For 
both embody the attempt “to bring myth to an end”522 by means of grotesque 
modifications and fundamental reversals so that the classical myth can hardly 
be recognised. In the words of Blumenberg’s translator they end myth “by the 
indirect means of bringing one particular great myth to an end”523. The 
multiplicity of interpretations, says Blumenberg, is of an ironical nature; it “sets 
[...] relativism aside, overcomes it by means of the evidence of completeness: 
What could still be said in addition, what could be added to these ‘versions’?”524. 
The rock Prometheus becomes one with, the groundlessness, the forgetting 
and the weariness do no longer need clarification at all. “What remains [...] is 
the stone, because it is ground [Grund, “earth”] and therefore needs no ground 
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[Grund, “reason”]: not needing explanation is the ground of its 
incontestability”525. Kafka’s inexplicable rock should be read as a “metaphor of 
an original stratum underlying all events, which itself no longer requires 
justification”526. The point is that if there is no longer any need for explanation or 
clarification, there is no longer any need for myth as such. 
Now despite the differences between their interpretations, Boym, Kálmán 
and Blumenberg all share the conviction that Prometheus is about storytelling or 
mythology as such – an interesting and persuasive argument. However, another 
idea subscribed to by all three is not as convincing: the idea that the Titan’s 
story is nothing but a means – even an “indirect means” according to 
Blumenberg’s translator – to bring forward some transcending thought. The 
myth is barely paid any attention to in its individuality. But why, one could 
wonder, did Kafka choose this story in particular? Although Boym does focus on 
the metaphor of light, no connection is drawn with Promethean fire. And as she 
observes, Kafka “blurs boundaries” when merging Greek and Jewish 
storytelling, turning it into a “cross-cultural fable”. Yet what remains unnoticed is 
the Promethean character of this boundary crossing: Kafka himself takes a 
rebellious, Promethean position when radically deforming and even satirising 
the archaic myth. Further, although Kálmán’s statement is plausible that Kafka’s 
writing is not about “the truth concerning Prometheus”, Kálmán does not at any 
point consider the relation between “the inexplicable” and the Titan’s gift of 
knowledge. Prometheus’ overarching message may be about interpretation or 
legend per se, but it is not merely a means. An essential element of the myth is 
of course the Promethean fire, symbolising knowledge, wisdom and 
enlightenment. Even though fire or wisdom is not explicitly named in 
Prometheus, the fact that Kafka speaks of das Unerklärliche can hardly be a 
coincidence. For although it literally means the ‘inexplicable’ it nevertheless 
contains the word ‘klar’, which can mean ‘lucid’, ‘clear’, and ‘unobscured’, which 
is probably the reason why Boym chose to translate it as the “unelucidated”. By 
means of its multiplicity of interpretations, the parable does not only question or 
ridicule mythology as such, but in particular this specific myth which proudly 
presents the human capacity to enlighten himself, to know – that is, to acquire 
the truth. However, paradoxically Kafka states nevertheless that das 
Unerklärliche comes out of the Wahrheitsgrund, literally the ‘ground of truth’, 
which thus exists nonetheless. Confusingly, he combines an allegedly fatal 
rejection of the human possession of the Promethean gift of knowledge with the 
claim that the ‘inexplicable’ is rooted in truth after all. Kafka does thereby 
confirm that the human has the capacity to at least search for knowledge and 
truth. Interestingly, this disorientating combination gives the parable a high 
degree of ambiguity, an essential feature of the classical myth of Prometheus. 
In short, Prometheus may not reveal the truth about the Titan, but once again, it 
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is not a mere means or “one particular great myth” which also could have been 
about Oedipus or Herakles. The Promethean themes of rebellion, boundary 
crossing, enlightenment and knowledge are essential for Kafka’s parable. One 
could call his cynical deformation of the myth an act of Promethean courage, 
which turns him into a true benefactor of humanity. For Kafka uncovers the 
agnostic character of truth, the vainness of the legend, and the inscrutability of 
reality, thereby helping the human to face the rock of the inexplicable. On top of 
it all, not only do the contradictory messages about truth possess the 
characteristically Promethean quality of ambivalence, but so does the contrast 
between the parable’s content – its message about the incompleteness, futility, 
or even end of myth as such – and the parable itself. For even though it may not 
have been Kafka’s aim, instead of finishing myth as such he carries on the 
telling of a specific story which is hard, if not impossible, to end. 
 
3.7.3. Camus 
 
Someone who joins Gide and Kafka in their ironical and transformational 
approach to the Prometheus myth is Albert Camus (1913-1960). Like the other 
two, Camus uses traditional mythology to address modernity, yet focusing on 
more practical topics such as modern technology. And when it comes to 
bringing things to an end: not only God or myth is pictured as senseless; to 
Camus the entire world is. There is no divine order or destiny anymore today – 
at least not one of any use – only a terrestrial, a human one. God has become 
superfluous. As Camus explains in The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt 
(1951), the classical Prometheus has disappeared; he lost all of his 
metaphysical characteristics. 
 
“Prometheus alone has become god and reigns over the solitude of men. But from 
Zeus he has gained only solitude and cruelty; he is no longer Prometheus, he is 
Caesar. The real, the eternal Prometheus has now assumed the aspect of one of his 
victims”
527
. 
 
That is, in fact the Promethean ‘god’ has become human and his rebellion 
consists precisely in taking God’s place on earth. In an undeified world, 
meaning disappears: without a heaven and a determined destiny, life lacks 
significance and becomes absurd. Yet simultaneously that means that the 
human himself becomes God, now that the latter does not exist anymore. This 
results in an absurd form of freedom, for as Camus tells us in The Myth of 
Sisyphus (1942) “[t]o become god is merely to be free on this earth, not to serve 
an immortal being”528. In her section on Kafka, Boym states that “[h]is 
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Promethean storyteller and Camus’s Sisyphus are twin brothers”529. Kafka’s 
concept of the inexplicable, the “agnostic truth” and his never-ending – though 
positive – parabolic storytelling remind Boym of Camus’ concepts of the absurd 
and meaninglessness and their interminable – though positive – character. For 
in The Myth of Sisyphus, it is that hero’s never-ending destiny with which 
Camus characterises human fate: Sisyphus’ life is useless and meaningless, 
but it is nevertheless his lack of use and meaning and his senseless liberty, 
which, paradoxically, does create some absurd form of sense. 
 
“His fate belongs to him. His rock is his thing. [...] This universe henceforth without a 
master seems to him neither sterile nor futile. [...] The struggle itself toward the heights 
is enough to fill a man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy”
530
. 
 
In fact, not only God, but virtually all metaphysical ideals or whatever form of 
spiritual salvation are found to be useless – the modern human focuses on the 
practical, on technique, on the machine. Now that all power is in human hands, 
with respect to science and technology nothing seems unrealisable anymore. 
However, with civilisation’s entire focus on the practical, what happened to the 
ancient (humanist) ideals, values, and culture? Can today’s society in its 
allegedly ‘Promethean’ progress live without them, left with nothing but rather 
inhuman faculties such as developing atomic bombs? In Prometheus in the 
Underworld (1954) Camus addresses the issue: “What does Prometheus mean 
to man today?”531. The “God-defying rebel” could be considered to represent 
the modern human, says Camus, yet simultaneously “something suggests that 
this victim of persecution is still among us and that we are still deaf to the great 
cry of human revolt of which he gives the solitary signal”532. Prometheus was 
not just the great rebel, but also humankind’s benefactor. Not only did he give 
humanity technology, but also fire, liberty and art. Today, however, 
 
“mankind needs and cares only for technology. We rebel through our machines, 
holding art and what art implies as an obstacle and a symbol of slavery. But what 
characterises Prometheus is that he cannot separate machines from art. He believes 
that both souls and bodies can be freed at the same time. Man today believes that we 
must first of all free the body, even if the mind must suffer temporary death. But can the 
mind die temporarily?”
533
 
 
Instead of God, humans chose history to be their judge, yet without attention for 
art, beauty and the soul they do not master it but enslave themselves to it. 
Since the war began, all of Europe is in misery, in a (nonreligious) hell – and so 
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is Prometheus. Humanity betrays him and Camus calls passionately for a return 
to the Promethean spirit, liberty and enlightenment. Technology and art cannot 
be separated, nor can body and mind – and neither should they. The human’s 
suffering is a fact, and so is her blindness to beauty, freedom and the mind. 
However, in the end she does have the capacity, courage and strength to face 
her fate and reject history’s blind justice “in order to replace it as much as 
possible with the justice conceived by the mind. This is how Prometheus returns 
in our century”534. We can be our own saviours, but only if we release the Titan 
from the underworld and embrace him in all his qualities and gifts. Promethean 
life is a life lived in beauty and liberty, with a view to not only the body and 
technique, but also the mind and soul. For 
  
“one serves nothing in man if one does not serve the whole man. If he is hungry for 
bread and heather, and if it is true that bread is the more necessary, let us learn how to 
keep the memory of heather alive. In the thunder and lightning of the gods, the chained 
hero keeps his quiet faith in man. This is how he is harder than his rock and more 
patient than his vulture. His long stubbornness has more meaning for us than his revolt 
against the gods. Along with his admirable determination to separate and exclude 
nothing, which always has and always will reconcile mankind’s suffering with the 
springtimes of the world”
535
. 
 
Salvation lies in the Promethean patience to live the suffering and absurdity of 
life while stubbornly, based on our pretty memories, keeping faith in beauty and 
happiness. For even though the modern human lives under the illusion that art 
and technology can be parted, in the end beauty, happiness and the soul are 
inseparable from the machine. 
 
3.7.4. Anders 
 
Another serious commentary on modern technology is developed in the writings 
of the Jewish philosopher Günther Anders (1902-1992). His theory is concrete 
and explicit. Motivated by real, historical events such as the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki bombings, Anders strongly criticises the technology-driven society 
and its negative effects on humanity. In Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen 
(1956), he raises almost literally the same question as Camus: “Der heutige 
Prometheus fragt: Wer bin ich schon?”536. Just as Camus, he laments the 
modern human’s exclusive focus on technology and the resulting dangerous 
inventions and he investigates what happened to Prometheus’ magnificent and 
creative powers. Yet unlike Camus, Anders does not believe that now that it has 
come into force, the hazardous process can be reversed. He has a very 
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pessimistic image of the future: our ‘enlightenment’ and technological ‘progress’ 
have developed into a (potential) self-staged apocalypse, the symbol of which is 
the atomic bomb.  
Anders’ theory diverges in significant ways from the other 20th-century 
writers discussed above: in its pessimism and concreteness and most 
importantly in its concept of humankind. The other three call into question the 
classical idea of the human and so does he. However, even though in an ironic 
way, particularly Gide and Camus nevertheless develop their own idea of the 
human essence, somehow characterised by Promethean qualities. According to 
Gide, the Promethean gifts provide the human with a reason for existence. His 
qualities may be torturing, but they are special qualities and determine his 
fundamentally vulnerable, yet unique nature. Kafka’s Prometheus is perhaps 
too ambiguous to deduce a full account of human nature from it. But although in 
Camus’ theory meaning has disappeared and life has become absurd, the 
human essence is still explicitly defined, namely, as Promethean. Even though 
the modern human is fundamentally incomplete, he nevertheless has the 
potential to recover the essentially Promethean qualities – beauty, creativity, 
liberty – which are the unique characteristics of human nature. 
Fundamental for Anders’ theory, however, is that the human being lacks 
any form of essence. Anders’ anthropology can only have a negative form, 
according to which any attempt to define human nature is doomed to fail. 
Humanity’s very essence is not having any. Anders argues that the human, or 
actually the individual is unadapted to the world – a foreigner, an outsider, 
literally independent. As Paul van Dijk phrases it, he is 
 
“undeniably condemned to detachment from the world. Only later [...] does the person 
recover the world and come into relationship with it again. [...] The individual [...] must 
do so in fact, through the roundabout way of cultural mediation”
537
. 
 
The human’s essential ‘unworldliness’ creates independence and a strange 
form of liberty. Just as Gide, Kafka and Camus, Anders concludes that meaning 
has disappeared, which forces the human to shape her own world: “the 
unadjusted being must create a personal world, because no ready-made world 
is available. (...) Human beings are unattached not just to this specific world, but 
to any world at all”538. This results in humankind’s capacity to develop – and 
change – a large scope of possible creations and ways of living. Yet this 
structural changeability means that human nature is essentially characterised 
by instability. And whereas in particular Gide and Camus still have hope for 
humans to liberate themselves from their self-created laws and blindspots, 
according to Anders they experience their unstable abstraction as a 
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““shock of contingency.” The person’s self-experience is that of being contingent and 
arbitrary, (...) a human being who is who that person is (though I had wanted to be 
quite different), “coming from an origin which he can’t do anything with, but which he 
must identify himself with here and now””
539. 
 
Whereas Anders’ description of the human as essentially abstracted, 
independent and non-fixated still may sound somehow as a positive definition of 
human nature, van Dijk emphasises it should not be understood in that way. It 
does not matter what concepts he uses to characterise the person, 
 
“ – they may never be regarded as a determination of the human essence. [Anders] is 
firmly convinced that, after the “Hiroshima happening” of 1945, the changing of 
personal manifestations is henceforth without any permanent substance or essential 
core”
540
. 
 
As Anders already stated at a seminar in Los Angeles in 1942, “artificiality is the 
nature of the human being”; “the demand of the human being exceeds from the 
very start the supply of the world”. Therefore, “humanity must create for itself a 
world which satisfies its needs. [...] The artificiality of humankind increases as it 
becomes a product of its own products. Since humanity is incapable of meeting 
the requirements of its own products [...], a discrepancy arises between human 
beings and their products”.541 In his paper ‘Theses for the Atomic Age’ (1962) 
Anders will call this The Promethean Discrepancy (“das prometheische 
Gefälle”). The enlightened hero of creativity and technology has fallen. Human 
beings today have become “Inverted Utopians”: 
 
“The basic dilemma of our age is that “We are smaller than ourselves,” incapable of 
mentally realizing the realities which we ourselves have produced. Therefore we might 
call ourselves “inverted Utopians”: while ordinary Utopians are unable to actually 
produce what they are able to visualize, we are unable to visualize what we are 
actually producing”
542
. 
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Today’s dichotomy is thus no longer one such as between body and mind, but 
between our Herstellungs- and Vorstellungsleistung – our capacity to produce 
and imagine. We can no longer imagine the immense potential of the 
techniques we developed. We have been so successful in applying our 
technological capabilities that we lost our overview and our control of our 
artefacts. The title and subtitle of the first volume of Die Antiquiertheit des 
Menschen. Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution 
(‘The Antiquatedness of the Human Being. On the Soul in the Age of the 
Second Industrial Revolution’) reveal Anders’ idea of humanity in the modern 
world: human life has become antiquated, a form of life lagging behind the 
technological reality of the day. The subtitle of the work’s second volume, Über 
die Zerstörung des Lebens im Zeitalter der dritten industriellen Revolution (‘On 
the Destruction of Life in the Age of the Third Industrial Revolution’), reveals the 
dystopian character of Anders’ theory. In Endzeit und Zeitende. Gedanken über 
die atomare Situation (‘Final Time and the End of Time. Thoughts on the Atomic 
Situation’ (1972)), he phrases it in the following way: 
 
“What we constantly aim at is to bring about something that can function without us and 
our assistance, tools by which we make ourselves superfluous, by which we eliminate 
and ‘liquidate’ ourselves. It does not matter that this final goal has hardly been 
achieved yet. What matters is the trend. And its motto is: without us”
543
. 
 
Humanity’s creations have outgrown it. This, says Anders in Die Antiquiertheit 
(I), fills humanity with what he calls Prometheische Scham (Promethean 
shame): “Scham für der ‘beschämend’ hohen Qualität der selbgemachten 
Dinge”544. That is, the humans’ being-in-the-world today is characterised by 
shame for the “shamefully high quality” of the things they fabricated themselves. 
What Anders describes as “prometheischer Trotz” (Promethean stubbornness 
or defiance) consists in the refusal to owe anything and particularly oneself, to 
others; and “prometheischer Stolz” (Promethean pride), in owing everything, 
and particularly oneself, exclusively to oneself. Yet this attitude, characteristic of 
the 19th century, has nearly disappeared. Prometheus’ triumph has been too 
complete, so that now, facing his own handiwork, the Promethean pride is being 
replaced with a feeling of deficiency and distress. 
 
“Prometheus hat gewissermaßen zu triumphal gesiegt, so triumphal, daß er nun, 
konfrontiert mit seinem eigenen Werke, den Stolz [...] abzutun beginnt, um ihn durch 
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das Gefühl eigener Minderwertigkeit und Jämmerlichkeit zu ersetzen. Wer bin ich 
schon?” fragt der Prometheus von heute, der Hofzwerg seines eigenes 
Machinenparks, “wer bin ich schon?”
545
. 
 
“Who am I after all?”; “Who am I after all?”, today’s Prometheus asks 
desperately. In their daily confrontations with the perfection of their self-created 
technological equipment – its strength, reliability, accuracy and durability – 
humans are forced to face their own imperfection. The contemporary humans 
feel that artifices have taken over their position of the most perfect, unique and 
superior being. They are ashamed to not have been made themselves, but to 
have been born, to be the outcome of a blind, accidental, illogical and obviously 
highly antiquated process of birth. Their aim is to overcome their inferiority, their 
contingency, their nature, and attain the perfection of the artifice. 
When we look at his use of the myth, what is remarkable is that Anders, 
both when speaking of “Promethean discrepancy” and “Promethean shame” – 
and despite the fact that ‘discrepancy’ and ‘shame’ are negative concepts – 
employs only one image of Prometheus, namely the positive 19th century one 
of the creative, enlightened, progressive and boundary-crossing hero. It is this 
positive and proud self-image that fell and was brought to shame. At first sight, 
other typical pictures of the Titan such as the hubristic rebel or the thief that 
should be punished are not present. However, implicitly they are. That is, 
Anders explicitly emphasises that he does not want to make any moral 
judgement about the actions of humankind – even human ethics has lost its 
meaning. But it is a fact that humans, setting themselves hazardous (and thus 
perhaps hubristic) aims, have created their own punishment – or their own 
downfall, to use the image of Icarus Anders refers to below. Ashamed of their 
defects, humans are suffering just as Prometheus. They have enchained 
themselves to the rock of the modern tool – and for good. Actually, if we think of 
one of Kafka’s versions, the human even wishes to become one with the rock. 
For as Anders explains, today’s human has “das Begehren [...] ein self-made 
man, ein Produkt zu werden”546. He desires his own “Verdinglichung” – his own 
“reification”.547 The Promethean shame is not so much a feeling towards other 
people, but towards the thing, the product, the machine. Humans wants to 
conceal their flaws – and their shame itself – doing this paradoxically by making 
themselves visible. For, they reason, those who remain visible will not be 
suspected of shame. According to Anders, a simple example of this visible “self-
reification” (“Selbstverdinglichung”) is make-up: ‘naked’ nails, for instance, have 
become unthinkable. They have only become presentable once they have 
become equivalent to the “device” (“das Gerät”) the fingers equipped 
themselves with. The whole human body has become “naked” in a new sense, 
namely, as “unworked” (“unbearbeitet”) and has become shameful if it has not 
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been sufficiently reified. Quoting Nietzsche, Anders states that the human body 
is something “that must be overcome”548. In fact, it has already been overcome: 
being human is something of the past. It is a “faulty construction”549 – his 
thinking capacities, for instance, lag behind computers. By means of the words 
of an imagined Air Force Instructor, Anders argues that in fact, we could easily 
reach every planet if it were not for our weak bodies. If it would only have come 
down to our machines and devices, we could have flown that high. Today’s 
Icarus does not fall down because of his wax: “Nicht weil das Flügelwachs 
versagt, stürzt heute Ikarus, sondern weil Ikarus selbst versagt. Könnte er sich 
selbst als Ballast abwerfen, seine Flügel könnten den Himmel erobern”550 – if 
only he could throw off the ballast that he is himself! 
The humans’ shame even leads them to transform themselves. Once 
human beings wanted to be gods, now they want to be equal to machines. 
Anders observes that they already aim to improve themselves by means of 
Human Engineering. Humanity is trying to find weak spots or limits which are 
nevertheless changeable; boundaries that can potentially be crossed. 
Contemporary humans want to transcend themselves – not so much to reach 
some supernatural state but rather to the not-natural-anymore, the kingdom of 
the hybrid and the artificial. They leave their natural boundaries, the immature 
state of being human behind, and work on what one could call their 
dehumanization. 
 
“So “übermenschlich” diese Leistung, gemessen an dem, was dem Leibe eigentlich 
möglich ist, sein mag, das erhoffte Resultat besteht also in etwas Untermenschlichem, 
in einer reinen Gerätfunktion, in einer isolierten “Fertigkeit”, an der der “wirkliche 
Mensch” […] nur noch als in Kauf genommer Appendix hängt”
551
. 
 
Robots are no longer worthless or frightening figures, they are the embodiments 
of human wishes and dreams. To become dehumanized – under- instead of 
overhuman – will not be a problem and not even thought to be worth any 
attention, for this is what is demanded by the machine and thus what befits the 
human. Interestingly, it seems that Anders already saw, not only the digital 
revolution coming, but even the unimaginable potential of human enhancement 
today. Later, I will return to this fascinating topic. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I gave an historical outline of the myth of Prometheus and the 
many shapes it took in the hands of the many Western philosophers, authors 
and artists who made it their own. I chronologically treated the relevant texts or 
artifices and thereby a) established its meaning and role in each text or artifice; 
b) pointed out significant similarities, dissimilarities and patterns amongst the 
texts; and c) showed how the myth develops through the ages. From Antiquity a 
story emerges with a number of core elements, yet it remains very flexible. 
Some ancients trace the roots of their cultural practices back to this myth, 
whereas others employ the story to ridicule religion or even themselves. In the 
era of Augustus the creation theme has become truly popular, although this 
does not mean the result of the Titan’s creativity is always appreciated. When 
Christianity arises Prometheus the Creator first intermingles with and then is 
taken over by the Bible’s Creator. And more and more what used to be 
interpreted as religious truths by the classical people the Early Church Fathers 
explain in allegorical and euhemerist terms. The myth does maintain 
significance and the parallels between the mythological and biblical narratives 
are drawn, yet in a more descriptive encyclopaedia context. 
Moving towards the early Middle Ages the Prometheus myth slowly 
recovers its moralising function. In the Renaissance its theological meaning is 
again taken more seriously and the myth is used to present deep ontological 
and moral messages about the nature, aim and sense of human life. Human 
knowledge, cultivation and self-creation are major subjects of discussion when 
the myth is appealed to and they are explained in positive as well as negative 
terms. 
Towards the scientific revolution knowledge and rationality remain the 
main themes taken from the Titan’s story. Yet they are presented against many 
different backgrounds: the secularised and practical one of empirical science, 
the euhemerist framework and the background of the time’s social 
circumstances. Though being the personification of human reason, Prometheus 
does not become the hero of the Enlightenment. Mythology as such does not 
conform to the rational spirit of the age. Rousseau is the time’s only author who 
truly concerns himself with the myth but explains it in opposition to the strong 
Enlightenment spirit as an allegory of the soul-corrupting effect of science and 
civilisation.  
The myth regains its high esteem in the Sturm und Drang and Romantic 
period, this time based on a set of explanations that strongly contrasts with the 
Enlightenment ones, with artistic creativity, courage, suffering and rebellion as 
its central themes. In general Prometheus is celebrated in all his qualities, 
except by Mary Shelley. She does concentrate on the characteristic romantic 
themes, but approaches the myth from a more critical and questioning 
perspective. 
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Prometheus maintains his popularity in the second half of the 19th 
century and finds himself in more and more radical reinterpretations when the 
Masters of Suspicion take over. As time passes, the radical refashioning trend 
only expands and 20th century authors transform the myth up to the point where 
it is barely recognisable. Irony, abstraction, human nature and later 
contemporary technology become the main focus of those who tell the myth. 
Why and how the Prometheus myth never lost people’s interest throughout 
history will be examined in the next chapter. 
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4. Promethean Functions and Themes 
 
Now that I have investigated a large range of historical references to the 
Prometheus myth, I believe that I have gained a reliable and satisfying amount 
of information on the basis of which I can answer the question why especially 
this myth continued to intrigue philosophers, poets, ecclesiasts and many others 
throughout more than 2700 years – and still does today. What do these 
references to the Titan tell us about the myth itself? What do the myth’s 
characteristics tell us about the authors’ ideas and motivations? In order to 
answer these questions in this chapter I critically analyse my findings from the 
previous chapters and produce an overview of the myth’s exceptional array of 
functions and themes and demonstrate their significance in understanding an 
author’s argument and framework. In the first part I determine what are the most 
important functions of the Prometheus myth; in the second part I explore its 
specific characteristics and themes. As I will not be able to discuss each work 
separately, the appendix to this chapter contains two tables with a list of all 
authors (discussed in chapter 2 and 3) and the functions and themes relevant in 
their work. 
 
4.1. The Myth – its Nature and Functions 
 
First, we need to ask why it is useful to employ the Prometheus myth in the first 
place in order to make one’s point – what are the myth’s specific uses and 
functions? To answer this question, in the following I will have a look at more 
general functions of myth which are not necessarily exclusive but, as I will 
show, particularly relevant to the Prometheus myth. They are all inherently 
related, which makes it nearly impossible to study them one by one. However, I 
will nevertheless try to separately discuss the myth’s main functions, while 
keeping in mind their interconnectedness.552 Yet before I start treating its 
functions, I will discuss an attribute of the Prometheus myth that underlies and 
supports all of them. Something that strikes one immediately is the fact that it is 
told in times and by artists that diverge from one another to a considerable 
extent. The fact that we have also seen other ancient myths – such as ones 
about Herakles, Dionysius or Oedipus – recurring time and again shows that it 
is not only a Promethean characteristic. Rather, their survival is due to an 
essential quality of myth as such: malleability. The recurrence of the stories is 
only possible because they are conveniently adaptable to a wide range of 
societies with their specific historical circumstances, just as to many different 
personal characters and ideas, which opens up a myriad of conceivable 
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meanings and purposes. Prometheus provides Hesiod with a means to explain 
human misery, as well as to make his own voice heard. First, his Titan functions 
as a scapegoat, because of his tricky actions responsible for the harsh life of 
the people of Hesiod’s times. Second, the story enables the poet to lecture both 
his lazy brother Perses and an external audience on how to live the right life: 
“Work, you fool Perses. Work the work the gods laid out for men”. Many ages 
later, Boccaccio forms Prometheus into Christian shapes, so that he represents 
the almighty God-Creator: “both Ovid and Claudian know about him, although 
not in the religious sense in which Christians understand it”. The Titan neatly fits 
the author’s personal interests and ideas as well as his times: he embodies both 
Boccaccio’s concept of the author – Boccaccio considers his writing tasks of a 
Promethean difficulty, thereby implicitly calling himself a Promethean author – 
as well as the Christian Creator, perfectly matching the era’s beliefs. 450 years 
later, for Lord Byron the Titan’s tale serves as a Romantic ode to the human 
and his suffering. With the time’s despairing political situation in mind, he 
fashions his Prometheus in a completely distinct way, this time in order to 
celebrate brave rebellion and encourage the people of his age to resist their 
tyrants. 
Prometheus thus evolves easily from a trickster via the almighty God to a 
romantic rebel-hero, each time within a story with its own context, explanation 
and significance. Kafka seems to contradict this significance when he comes up 
with an obscure set of versions of the Prometheus myth, allegedly in order to 
demonstrate the essential inexplicability of myth. Yet at the same time he picks 
the story of the Titan, shapes it according to his personal ideas and thus 
necessarily assigns it his own meaning. This means that with his apparently 
incomprehensible set of interpretations Kafka only confirms the significance of 
the myth and the usefulness of its malleability. 
It is this innate flexibility that makes the myth of Prometheus survive all 
those different era’s, each with its own problems, fashions, concepts and 
beliefs. It can be told in many different ways and may have a social, 
explanatory, ontological and/or moral function – all essential functions of the 
Titan’s story, each of which I will discuss below. 
 
4.1.1. Myth’s Reciprocal Relation with Society  
 
The malleability of myth clearly shows that it is in considerable part dependent 
on the cultural and political conditions whether the stories are told in one way or 
another; they are moulded according to the circumstances and thereby reveal a 
significant bit about the social and historical situation in question. As Ziolkowski 
puts it, “[t]he modifications of the myth […] provide a key to the anxieties and 
hopes of the society that recognizes itself in the mythic model”553.  
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My research shows indeed that apart from the examples I mentioned 
above – Hesiod, Boccaccio and Byron – all of the other versions of the 
Prometheus myth each in its own way reveal significant information about the 
society’s happenings, aspirations and fears. Particularly because of his 
association with fire, technology and knowledge a genuine Promethean cult was 
practised in prosperous and science-focused fifth-century Athens (BC). 
Amongst other things the Titan was celebrated by means of torch races, which 
had also obtained a political significance due to the tyranny (of Peisistratus and 
sons) and political reforms in the late sixth century. It is then rather unlikely for it 
to be a coincidence that the conflict between Prometheus and Zeus in the 
Prometheus Bound changes from a mere competition of ingenuity into a political 
contest. More in general, the fact that Aeschylus’ Prometheus was entirely 
transformed from the Hesiodic trickster into the brave founder of civilisation is 
thus most probably due to Athens’ prosperity and the greatly increased interest 
in science. Similarly, it can hardly be coincidental that it is in early Christianity 
when Tertullian exclaims that “He [the Lord – TF] is your true Prometheus!” 
Furthermore, it is during the Industrial Revolution that the Titan comes to 
represent the proletariat. And Anders is motivated by the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki bombings when he sadly draws our attention to our Promethean 
Shame now that the technology-driven society shows us nothing but our 
imperfections. In other words, whether it concerns the celebration of progress, 
the desire to convert people to the right religion, the urge to rebel against the 
unjust socio-political system, or fear of the dangers of technology – on the basis 
of each Promethean reference one can sketch at least a crude image of the age 
in which the myth was told. 
Interestingly, myth’s flexibility works both ways: it is not only the historical 
and social situation that fashions myth along its lines, but it also works the other 
way around. As Ziolkowski observes, “our imagination is shaped by cultural 
images or, to put it more crudely, life imitates art”554. Dougherty agrees: 
“[m]yths”, she says, “take on the role of shaping a society’s imagination”555. 
Myth should be understood as “a vibrant system of communication”556, and its 
power lies in the capacity to  
 
“take all this pre-worked, culturally rich material – gods, goddesses, plots, and places – 
and work with it to create a narrative that is important and compelling to its audience. 
[...] Above all, [myths] help cultures accommodate and negotiate change in a 
productive way”
557
. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
– but throughout the book he underlines several times that it is the malleability of (classical) 
myths in general that makes them reappear so often. 
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Myths are not only there to relate to or think about, but also useful to think with. 
They provide the human with a means to reflect on essential issues of life such 
as misery, love and change. Blumenberg speaks of “work on myth”, which 
entails a whole process that is done by humanity in order to pursue the 
“reduction of the absolutism of reality”558. That is, the threat of reality, of 
conditions we do not control, is put at a distance by means of a story that 
rationalises this anxiety into mere fear of specific agencies that are given names 
and as such are made familiar, identifiable and ready to deal with. 
I agree with these scholars that mythological storylines, figures and 
symbols provide material to give shape to the problems, questions, concepts 
and novelties of the time and thereby influence a society’s imagery. It is 
certainly characteristic of the Prometheus myth. As we saw, for Hesiod the story 
was a convenient way to question as well as explain people’s social 
circumstances and human nature as such. His myth was not merely an example 
of a nice tale formed by the imaginary powers of one of the time’s great 
narrators. Conversely, through its pictures and tales, the myth also shaped the 
imagination of the era. Pandora’s jar, for instance, clarified the fact that 
humanity had to work so hard to survive, and deal with agonising issues such 
as disease and death. Together with the genealogical story about the human 
degradation from a Golden to an Iron Age, Hesiod’s Prometheus myth supplied 
the ancient Greeks with a comprehensible image of the human condition and a 
way to understand contemporary society, history and the world’s structure. 
In a different way, the mythological figures used by Bacon both reflect the 
historical changes and embody the serious influence of his new, modern 
thinking on those changes. He places the late-Renaissance ideals of freedom, 
rationality and progress within a radically new framework – yet by means of 
familiar images. Bacon pursues an ‘instauration’ of humankind, which should 
lead to significant scientific innovations and progress. He calls for empirical 
research, illustrated by the donkey in his version of the Prometheus myth. He 
calls for knowledge-as-power, which he supports with a picture of the 
Promethean torch games. One should fight for knowledge: “matters should 
receive success by combat and emulation” and it should be passed on just as 
the torches. Bacon characterises the human as a creature with Promethean, 
Epimethean, Heraklean, and Pandoran qualities. By means of his mythological 
images and arguments, Bacon seriously reforms the contemporary paradigm. It 
becomes one in which humanity assumes a central position in the universe; the 
concept of knowledge is secularised; and new – experimental and pragmatic – 
models, aims and rules regulate. The people of his time are offered an entirely 
new way to view that world and to deal with its changes and novelties – not only 
conceptually, but also in practice. 
In short, the relation between myth and society is reciprocal; it both 
mirrors and forms a society’s images, ideas and worldviews. The Prometheus 
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myth shows it is inevitably influenced by the historical and cultural 
circumstances, personal convictions and ideas, while simultaneously it also 
helps shape those ideas and imagery. It provides an important means to 
investigate and reflect on social, cultural, historical and even individual 
conditions, which in turn may very well also have practical consequences. 
 
4.1.2. Knowledge Formation 
 
With respect to the relation between myth and social imagery, what should not 
be overlooked is that knowledge plays an essential role. Myth’s imagination-
shaping function provides a way for people to assign things their place in the 
world, a framework through which to view that world and their own place in it. 
By means of its narratives and pictures, myth does not only create social 
imagination – but knowledge as well. It helps the human to understand a 
chaotic and inherently irrational universe. Myth offers answers to the essential 
questions the human poses about that universe – where does it start? where 
does it end? what is its form? what is its use? what is existence?559 This is a 
fundamental function of the Prometheus myth: it explains. 
As we saw, Hesiod’s and Bacon’s stories are more than some 
assemblage of images. Together these images form a framework of wisdom: 
reading Hesiod’s genealogical narrative, people learn about their history and 
condition – also if they realise it is mainly of a symbolic nature. Reading Bacon’s 
argument, they learn about their place in the world and their relation to 
knowledge. Similarly, Socrates’ myth about the soul’s final judgement in Plato’s 
Gorgias is not only about knowledge of death, but it also provides knowledge of 
death. For a start, death itself is defined: according to Socrates it is “simply the 
separation from one another of two things, the soul and the body”. Further, his 
myth explains humans what happens after death and why they do not know 
what day they will die. It also gives them an important reason why it would be 
good to lead a just and pious life: that would assure them an afterlife on the 
Island of the Blessed. Moreover, by means of the myth as a whole Socrates 
wants to convey an important message about the nature of truth. Contrary to 
what his interlocutors – the rhetoricians – think, truth is not manipulable. When 
Prometheus took away humanity’s foreknowledge of death, what was once 
accepted as truth was revealed to be mere appearance and manipulation. Truth 
is not about witnesses and persuasion, but completely independent and thus 
entirely unaffected by rhetoric practices. Socrates does not only choose to tell 
his story in order to sketch a particular image of death. As always in Plato’s 
writings, the myth supplies its readers with knowledge; here about life and death 
– and on a meta-level, about truth as such. 
One may think that to present wisdom by means of myth is a rather 
ancient practice, needed due to a lack of scientific knowledge. Yet this is 
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anything but true. Roughly 2300 years after Plato, the Masters of Suspicion still 
take full advantage of myth – surely in order to explore contemporary issues 
and to give vent to social anxieties and hopes, but also to transfer knowledge to 
their public. All three feel, as McLelland’s phrases it, “called to make the truth 
free”. Their aim is to disclose mistakes and suppressed meanings and most of 
all: to fight falsehoods, and tell people what they think – or actually know – to be 
true instead. 
Freud’s psychoanalytical explanations, for instance, are dotted with 
mythological figures and with respect to the Titan’s story Freud explicitly says “I 
think my hypothesis” – the one on control over fire by means of urine – “can be 
confirmed by an interpretation of the Greek myth of Prometheus”560. The myth 
does nothing less than present facts, “provided that we bear in mind the 
distortions which must be expected to occur in the transition from facts to the 
contents of a myth”561. When interpreted in the right (i.e. Freudian) way it 
uncovers first, historical facts about a) ancient human practices, in particular the 
process of humankind’s acquisition of fire; and b) more in general about 
evolution, the species’ cultural development. Second, it discloses facts about 
essential qualities of the human being: physical and cognitive proceedings 
which characterise contemporary humans just as much as their primitive 
double. A proper analysis of the myth’s storyline and symbols – fire, 
Prometheus’ theft, the vulture, the liver – reveals insights about the human’s 
conscious and unconscious: his instincts, (sexual) desires, behavioural 
practices and processes of development. It tells about the individual’s 
experience of these, such as feelings of passion, aggression, suffering and 
guilt; as well as his reaction to these, such as attempts to understand and 
master his instincts and feelings. 
Important to realise is that the knowledge Freud generates by means of 
his myths does not only consist in the results of his interpretations. If his 
analyses indeed unveil hidden meanings, processes or even facts, his myths 
also demonstrate the validity of his methods of analysis. Prometheus’ tale 
supports Freud’s method of interpretation based on what he terms “the 
mechanism of reversal”: fire is actually water, and vice versa. Further, the myth 
confirms several of Freud’s hypotheses – not only the one about the control of 
fire, but also his model of the human psyche. It does not take much effort to 
indicate elements in the Promethean myth that characterise the id – passionate 
desires, symbolised by (amongst other things) the fennel stalk and liver; the ego 
– the urge to control one’s instincts, symbolised by the Titan’s theft; and the 
super-ego – moral judgement reflected in the simultaneously beneficent and 
maleficent role of Prometheus. If it makes sense for the Promethean myth to 
represent the acquisition of fire, not only Freud’s hypothesis about that historical 
practice is accepted as knowledge, but then so are his assumptions, models 
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and methods. The methodical and conceptual wisdom brought to light by means 
of this and other myths can now be used to analyse and understand 
contemporary humans as well. And in the end, it can help them to cope with the 
instincts, feelings, behaviour and thoughts that primal humans had to handle 
just as much, that is, with the issues they tried to verbalise and give shape to in 
the stories that are still valuable today. 
Many theorists affirm the inherent connection between myth and the 
formation of knowledge and underline their continuing relevance today. Mary 
Midgley states that myth-making is a “vital human function”562: we both use and 
create myths today just as we always have. “We have a choice of what myths, 
what visions we will use to help us understand the physical world. We do not 
have a choice of understanding it without using any myths or visions at all”563. 
We cannot separate knowledge – or what we believe to be knowledge – from 
the imaginations, hopes and myths that characterise the way we see our lives. 
Today, according to Midgley it is mainly science that shapes our myths and our 
views of human life and the world. The relation, then, between myth and 
knowledge is also reciprocal. 
Nicolas Pethes also highlights the knowledge forming function of 
imagination and myth, with his main focus on science-fiction. He argues that 
“literary discourse can contribute to the future design of knowledge [...] in times 
when the classical forms of accounting for this knowledge are being 
reshaped”564. Similar to actual research, science fiction dealing with scientific 
experimentation is “fictional research”, based on discourse and narration and as 
such should be understood as a genuine mode of knowledge formation. Literary 
and mythological discourses contextualise and give meaning to science. This 
way, says Pethes, scientific facts obtain a cultural, popular meaning, which 
even overrules their ‘factual’ meaning; “the formation of knowledge generally 
depends on rhetorical and narrative, if not mythological, strategies”565. 
I think that Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein embodies a good example of 
such “fictional research”. Shelley writes her book in an age when science has 
made serious progress. The authority of knowledge has been largely withdrawn 
from the church and in society a rather optimistic view prevails on science’s new 
potentialities. The narrative is a clear reaction to the contemporary situation and 
one could indeed characterise it as well as fictional experimentation, instigated 
by social change and discussion. I have some doubts about whether the novel’s 
substance itself should be called ‘knowledge’. I would say it rather poses 
questions: about scientific potential and about the dangers of extreme scientific 
ambition. It aims to set its reader thinking about the boundaries of humanity’s 
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creative powers and about related issues such as responsibility for one’s 
creations. Simultaneously it sketches images of the future of science when 
some of its contemporary boundaries would actually be crossed. Shelley’s story 
thus surely contributes to knowledge in the sense that by means of its narrative 
it creates space for new ideas and debate about the possibilities of science. 
Perhaps it does not explain, but it does open up space for investigation and 
explanation. The tale’s fictional pictures and concepts stimulated real-life 
scientific imagery, discussion and research at the time – and interestingly, they 
still do. The idea of the self-created human seems more alive than ever with 
recent progress in practices such as molecular biology and nanotechnology. 
Consequently, the picture of Frankenstein’s monster still regularly appears in 
scientific debates and as we will see, so does Prometheus. Important to realise 
is that the monster and Titan are anything but mere illustrations, for what is 
studied, questioned and conceptualised in Frankenstein as well as the myth is 
nothing less than what it means to be human. This, of course, continues to be a 
central point of discussion today; a question to which both scientists and laymen 
want to know the answer. 
 
4.1.3. Myth’s Originary and Ontological Meaning 
 
Speaking of the question of what it means to be human, we arrive at what may 
very well be the most important about myth: its function as story of origin and 
ontology – its role in assigning the human her place in the world. The many 
retellings of the Genesis and the Prometheus myth provide countless examples 
that demonstrate the human quest for and generation of existential answers – 
interestingly, answers which are widely divergent. Plato’s sage Protagoras tells 
how one day the creation process was started – a mixture of earth and fire was 
taken up by Epimetheus to create all mortal races. It tells how we were formed 
and came to be what we are – that ‘afterthinking’ Epimetheus left the human 
“completely unequipped”; that his brother had to make up for this fault by 
stealing fire for humanity; and that Zeus needed to complement this with justice 
and shame. Protagoras’ tale fashions an idea of a common origin and gives 
ontological explanations. It clarifies our uniqueness and respectable capacities, 
due to our “share of the divine dispensation” and also explains the birth of 
culture, virtue, and politics. Because of his narrative about human history, 
Hesiod’s story is another case. 
After the emergence of Christianity, for many centuries it is very popular 
to draw a parallel between the Promethean story of creation and the Genesis. 
Each in his own way, many philosophers, theorists and clergymen – e.g. Isidore 
of Seville or Peter Comestor – try to bring the two narratives together, yet 
thereby virtually always with the aim to transfer the message that the true story 
of origin is told in the Scripture. In their fight against pagan religion, the Early 
Church Fathers state that Prometheus had simply been the first sculptor. 
According to Lactantius he was the one who “first originated the art of making 
Trijsje Franssen    Prometheus Through the Ages 
157 
 
statues and images [...]. But the making of the true and living man from clay is 
the work of God”.  
Ages later, Ficino (15th century) constructs an utterly new paradigm 
which is strongly inspired by Plato’s ideas and sometimes even has a secular 
flavour. Ficino places humanity in a unique metaphysical position: at the centre 
of the hierarchy of all creations. As he explains in Five Questions concerning 
the Mind, humanity’s one and universal aim is the highest good, that is, 
“boundless truth and goodness”. Unfortunately, due to its dual nature – irrational 
and physical as well as rational and spiritual – the soul will never be able to 
attain this summum bonum. Prometheus, then, represents humanity’s 
unfortunate condition very well. On the one hand, humans are uniquely 
equipped because of their reason and creativity, the “light” of which even 
establishes “a certain highest affinity” between their intellect and the highest 
good; on the other hand, however, they are fundamentally imperfect because of 
the inherent unattainability of the superior truth and perfection they search for all 
their life. The soul encounters itself as if chained to a rock, “most miserable of 
all, for he is made wretched by the continuous gnawing of the most ravenous of 
vultures, that is, by the torment of inquiry”. Prometheus embodies nothing less 
than human nature: the human’s rational, fantasising and creative skills and yet 
the inevitable agony his unique skills bring along. 
In the 19th century Percy Shelley has Prometheus’ wife Asia relate how 
human existence originates in a beautiful, happy age – reminiscent of Hesiod’s 
golden one – when there used to be nothing but “Light and Love”. Unfortunately 
Jupiter came to power, evil was created and misery fell upon the humans. 
Prometheus tried to alleviate this situation by giving them hope, wisdom and 
creativity. In short, in Shelley’s myth not only humans’ story of origin is unveiled, 
but also their natural condition, which is again characterised by the Titan: 
brilliantly creative but in agony at the same time. Finally, as a story of ancient 
practices, evolution and essential human characteristics, Freud’s Prometheus 
myth shows once more its originary and ontological meaning. In Freud’s hands 
Prometheus and his tale are not a mere illustration, but a way to define and 
explain the human’s very nature.566 
Several scholars accentuate the origin- and ontological function of myth. 
Anna Lydia Svalastog defines myth “as a narrative, a cultural construct that 
aims to describe the world, its origin and its constituent elements”567. According 
to Mircea Eliade myth is a representation of the truth about primordial time or 
the origin of the world: “myth, then, is always an account of a “creation””568. 
From a different than usual (that is, humanities) perspective, the evolutionary 
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biologist Robin Dunbar also underlines the fundamental connection between 
storytelling, origins and metaphysics. Dunbar argues that it is specifically the 
cognitive capacity to envisage parallel universes which enables the human to 
tell narratives and which forms the basis of literature as well as religion. 
“[S]tories [...] are often about group origins” and “play a prominent role because 
they remind us all who we are, and how we came to be here”569. They remind 
us of the fact that we have a shared ancestor – “whether that ancestor be real 
or entirely mythical” – which, in turn, arouses powerful and “evolutionary very 
ancient emotions” of loyalty to kin570. Further, “[b]eing able to tell a story 
depends on being able to call on a vast array of implicit shared knowledge 
among the listeners, so that the story-teller does not have to explain every last 
detail”571. To be able to fill in the gaps “stirs up” the emotions mentioned above 
and creates a sense of bonding. 
In his own way, Dunbar thus substantiates the functions of myth I outlined 
above: its reciprocal relationship with society, its function in shaping people’s 
imagination and wisdom and its inherent connection with knowledge. According 
to Dunbar himself it is even this very storytelling capacity that, bonding us into 
large social communities, makes us fundamentally different from monkeys and 
apes. The ability “to live in a virtual world”572 is what distinguishes our race from 
other species – in other words: what makes us human. 
It is interesting that there are thus also more biologically informed 
arguments which confirm myth’s ontological and originary character and explain 
their usefulness. Essential is indeed the human desire to find an answer to the 
questions of how we originated and what it means to be human. One thing, 
however, that seems self-evident but should still be noted is that this does not 
mean each story of origin has the prominent, ontological and emotion arousing 
role both Eliade and Dunbar seem to ascribe to it. The originary function of the 
Prometheus myth does not only concern the birth of humanity, but also much 
more practical issues, rituals and traditions. Pliny the Elder relates how the 
Titan encloses gold in the ring of iron which is supposed to be symbol of his 
chains and wears it on his finger: this is “how the use of precious stones first 
originated”. Hyginus narrates, like Hesiod, that the contemporary offering rituals 
have their roots in the Titan’s misleading portion of bones. Further, when 
bringing his gift of fire, the god “came joyfully, seeming to fly, not to run” and 
that is why since then, “men who bring good news usually come with speed”. 
Prometheus’ acrobatic way of transporting this gift gave birth to the torch races 
and finally the custom to wear rings and wreaths – “at times of great rejoicing 
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and victory” – are also rooted in the Titan’s exciting actions and experiences.573 
Of course the origins of ring wearing, speedy news bringing and torch racing 
are culturally significant and the stories are interesting because of (amongst 
other things) their society reflecting function. Yet it is also important to recognise 
that in these cases they do not carry the metaphysical gravity I discussed 
before.  
 
4.1.4. Myth’s Moral Function 
 
One more essential quality of a mythological story is its moral significance. 
Moulded according to social and personal interests, providing a framework 
through which to understand the world and often offering an account of the 
human’s creation, being and purpose, virtually all myths contain a strong ethical 
message. Many of the preceding examples confirm this is an essential function 
of the Prometheus myth: Hesiod tells his brother and readers how to live the 
good life; in the Gorgias Socrates also urges people to make and keep their 
soul healthy and just; and the Early Church Fathers aim to convince their 
audience that the Scripture tells the right story of creation. Another beautiful 
example of ethical encouragement is Erasmus’s, who in the light of Bible 
interpretation tells us literally that when it comes to knowledge “we ought to 
imitate Prometheus” and face the fact that we should work for our wisdom. 
Percy Shelley’s Titan also comes onto the scene in order to convey a serious 
moral message: he offers the author a way to criticise the contemporary political 
turbulence. Shelley expresses his regrets with respect to the French Revolution 
when Prometheus relates how many countries united and cried “[a]s with one 
voice, Truth, Liberty, and Love!” yet “[s]uddenly fierce confusion fell from 
heaven”. Everything slipped into fighting, cheating and anxiety, after which 
tyrants seized power by force. However, Shelley is optimistic about the future: 
the human has the ability to, in Promethean fashion, break the circle of violence 
and create a community which is governed by the power of equality and justice, 
in which he is “king over himself; just, gentle, wise: but man”. The human can, 
should and will manage. 
Apart from its function as originary narrative, Svalastog also accentuates 
the social and moral use of myth, which is “meant to generate meaning that 
entails socially structuring functions for individuals as well as for the group that 
embraces the reading. I understand myths to be a carrier of both constructive 
and destructive norms and values”574. 
John Maynard Smith emphasises the ethical significance of a mythological story 
as well. He argues that a major function of myths is to “give moral and 
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evaluative guidance” and to supply “a source and justification for values”575. 
Myths are reproduced by people “because they hope to persuade others to 
behave in certain ways”576. Interestingly, just as Dunbar, Maynard Smith is not a 
philosopher or social scientist but an evolutionary biologist and so another 
essential function of myth is confirmed by a scholar outside of the humanities. 
Looking at my research, both scholars’ statements are very convincing. 
One thing, however, which neither of them focuses on, but is essential 
nevertheless is that this moral significance is particularly relevant with respect to 
the ontological concept. Whether explicit or implicit, the accounts of human 
nature in the Prometheus myth are never ethically neutral. When Pico della 
Mirandola narrates how God told Adam “thou art confined by no bounds” this is 
anything but a mere description. Pico states that we humans have the 
Promethean capacity to fix our own limits, “by reason of our nature sloughing its 
skin and transforming itself”. This is not merely our nature, or what we can do, 
but also what we ought to do: we should make every effort to mould ourselves 
well, lest we “grow downward into the lower natures which are brutes”. 
Shelley’s political argument discussed earlier is also clearly based upon 
a morally charged image of humanity. The Titan of the Prometheus Unbound 
curses Jupiter but later recalls it and only pities him from now on; it is 
compassion, forgiveness and love on the basis of which he achieves victory. 
This Prometheus represents the suffering human who by nature has his flaws 
and can go awfully wrong, but nevertheless also has the intellectual, creative 
and moral powers to change his situation. It is not for nothing that “every heart 
contains perfection’s germ” – by means of hope, love and artistry humans can 
actually build a “new world”, a paradisiacal cosmos. 
Of course there are also several ontological (and mythologically 
informed) accounts in which human nature – or one of the human’s natural 
features – is judged negatively. When the human condition is characterised by 
Promethean or Icarian hubris, this is almost always judged to be wrong. Horace, 
for instance, condemns the fact that “[n]othing is too steep for man: we foolishly 
seek heaven itself”, all because Prometheus equipped humankind with fury, 
immorality and over-ambition. Gide criticises the human condition in an entirely 
different way. He pictures the human as a naked, insecure and sensitive 
Prometheus who lets himself be tortured by “his eagle”, that is, by some 
illusionary – for instance, religious – ‘consciousness’ without any attempt to stop 
him. Gide laments that the human condition will always be limited by the fact 
that the human cannot but act within an ethical system, and is thus always 
followed by the need for moral justification and feelings of responsibility. 
Fortunately, however, there is a way for humans to free themselves from the 
external rules and traditions (how exactly I will come back to in 4.2.), and Gide’s 
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moral message then indeed consists of an appeal to the human to liberate 
herself from her natural restrictions and take control of her life. 
 
4.2. The Promethean Themes 
 
The Prometheus myth is not about one central topic, nor does it carry one 
particular message, but it consists of a set of interconnected themes, such as 
fire, rebellion and creation. This multiplicity may not be so special – most myths 
have more than one subject – but what is special about this story, if not unique, 
is the many ways in which these themes can relate to one another. The tale’s 
topics are by themselves not sufficient to explain why specifically this myth is 
used: there are more myths and stories dealing with, for instance, hubris 
(Daedalus and Icarus) human knowledge (Plato’s myth of the cave) or endless 
punishment (Sisyphus). But a fundamental quality of the myth of Prometheus is 
its ambivalence – and that is related to more than general mythological 
malleability. Not only do the storylines in the classical versions of the myth 
already differ radically from chronicle to chronicle but also – and especially – the 
evaluation of Prometheus and his actions. From Hesiod via Aeschylus to Plato, 
Prometheus evolves from a trickster bringing nothing but misery to humanity, by 
way of a tragic hero who civilised humans but was severely punished, to the 
courageous (co-)creator of humankind. Essential is that there is not one 
canonical text, which makes the myth much more adaptable than not only a text 
such as Homer’s Odyssey, but also than already malleable tales such as 
Adam’s Fall and Faust. The Promethean plot is easily liberated from the original 
contexts, enabling each narrator to mould the myth into an immense variety of 
forms and directions, shape the story according to his wishes, adapt it to his 
time and topic and let it carry the meaning he prefers. As Percy Shelley states, 
already the ancient Greek playwrights “by no means conceived themselves 
bound to adhere to the common interpretation”. 
Furthermore, what is special about the myth’s ambivalence is that it does 
not limit itself to the flexibility of the story as a whole, the lack of a canonical text 
or the massive array of possible relations between its themes. Crucial is the fact 
that, as we will see, ambivalence as such is also an essential theme of the myth 
itself and each of its separate elements, including the figure of Prometheus. 
Therefore, in the end, with a larger quantity of discussed material at my 
disposal, I will come back to the myth’s ambivalence. 
In short, it is this thoroughly ambiguous nature that explains why the 
myth and its protagonist lend themselves to as many contexts and perspectives 
as the historical ones discussed; this explains why Prometheus can symbolise 
just as much humanity’s ill-fated urge to cross boundaries as the promise of 
human evolutionary progress. Yet despite all its transformations the myth 
nevertheless maintains some fundamental characteristics; and underneath the 
many different interpretations lie themes, questions and messages that keep on 
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coming back. In this section I will have a close look at these essential 
Promethean themes and study the differences, similarities and various 
significances in the many forms in which they arise. One of these themes is 
wisdom: in general represented by fire, which is often of such broad significance 
that it includes arts, skills, technology and science and is even the essence of 
human nature. Another fundamental matter is the ethical meaning underlying 
the myth; as I already argued when discussing myth’s moral function in 4.1, the 
Prometheus myth always carries an ethical message, which ranges from 
Alciati’s rejection of stealing divine wisdom to Marx’s promotion of Promethean 
rebellion. The point is that wisdom and morality are absorbed in virtually every 
theme and example. Because of these intertwinements I chose not to treat them 
as separate subjects, but each time within the context of the other 
interconnected, yet generally easier definable themes: fire, rebellion, creation 
and human nature. I will conclude with a section on ambiguity. 
 
4.2.1. Fire 
 
An essential, never missing theme is fire. Speaking of ambivalence, fire is 
something which is in itself – i.e. in ‘reality’ – already something highly double-
edged. On the one hand, fire lies at the origin of civilised life, while on the other 
hand, it has disastrous powers. With Prometheus’ gift of fire ambiguity is thus 
placed at the heart of the narrative, presenting both narrator and audience with 
a large range of possible and contradictory symbols, messages and 
interpretations. It is a gift as well as a stolen good, can represent progress as 
well as steady decline and can be a way to urge people to cross boundaries as 
well as to respect limits. 
 
4.2.1.1. Real-life Fire 
 
Before starting a thorough analysis of its many symbolic meanings, it is useful 
to cast an eye on the phenomenon of fire as such, on what it is, what it does, 
and what it is used for in the ‘real world’. Short and simple, fire is the oxidative 
process of combustion – burning – of a material, thereby releasing heat and 
light. It is ascribed its civilising role due to the fact that it thus enriches human 
life with warmth and light: indispensable in cold and darkness and of course the 
basis of many practices and techniques – from cooking and metal works to 
protection from animals and fighting. When speaking of its positive side, 
Dougherty characterises fire as 
 
“giving mankind freedom from the constraints of nature. […] Fire provides mankind with 
the means, both material and spiritual, to develop all those technologies and skills that 
mark his existence as superior to that of the beasts”577. 
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I think that to describe fire as giving humanity true freedom of nature and 
superiority to animals is quite excessive. The ability to make and use fire surely 
enables humans to develop themselves in many ways, bring them at least 
partially in control over nature and seriously distinguishes them from other 
animals, which is why it is often characterised as the fount of human civilisation. 
However, of course fire also has powers that can destroy virtually any kind of 
material or creature. It can be the source of complete demolition and 
annihilation – burning woods, houses, people – and bring humans nothing but 
suffering. This way, it is subjecting them to nature rather than liberating them 
from it. 
Fire’s double-edged nature has always fascinated people, which is why it 
has always and in most – if not all – cultures, had a larger role and significance 
than its practical one. Someone who already extensively investigates the 
functions, practices, rituals and meanings of fire in many different cultures – 
from the Mucelis of Angola to the American Indians or the Greeks – is Frazer in 
The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (1906-1915). A great 
example is his chapter ‘The Origin of Perpetual Fires’. That fire itself was useful 
for light, warmth and techniques is obvious, but here Frazer examines how and 
why throughout the ages peoples all over the world have or had the custom of 
maintaining a perpetual fire. Probably, he says, it “sprang from a simple 
consideration of practical convenience”578: some people did not know how to 
make fire – and if they did, making it by friction was not particularly easy, which 
is why virtually all people always kept a fire smouldering both at home and 
when travelling. Frazer describes ways in which different peoples maintain their 
fire and carry it about. On sea journeys New Guinea natives kept “glowing coals 
in a half-broken pot partly filled with earth”; tribes from Central Africa “keep the 
burning trunks of fallen trees in suitable spots and watch over their 
preservation”; natives of Materbert Island (New Britain) “place a red-hot ember 
in the middle of [a coco-nut shell]”579. Interestingly, Frazer writes subsequently 
how 
 
“Greek peasants used to convey fire from place to place in a stalk of giant fennel. [...] 
Thus when Prometheus, according to the legend, stole the first fire from heaven and 
brought it down to earth hidden in a stalk of giant fennel, he carried his fire just as 
every Greek peasant and mariner did on a journey”580. 
 
Prometheus’ journey with the fennel was thus originally nothing but a reflection 
from daily farming practices. Yet when people all over the world started 
travelling less and settled in villages, soon what used to be nothing but 
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convenience evolved into something more significant. For, says Frazer, a 
logical spot to keep fire where everyone could obtain it when needed, “would be 
the hearth of the head man of the village”581. Amongst the Ethiopian Gallas, for 
instance, such a fire is indeed “a favourite mode of asserting high rank”582. And 
 
“in ancient Greece the perpetual fire kept up in the Prytaneum, or town-hall, was at first 
apparently the fire on the king’s hearth. From this simple origin may have sprung the 
custom which in various parts of the world associates the maintenance of a perpetual 
fire with chiefly or royal dignity”583. 
 
Although Frazer himself does not explicitly highlight the commonalities between 
the Prometheus myth and other stories about how humanity obtained fire, the 
cultures he discusses often tell similar tales. He writes that in Uganda the king’s 
fire is lighted from “a perpetual sacred fire, supposed to have come down to 
earth with the first man Kintu”; and that “[b]efore the palace gate of the king of 
Siam there burns [...] a perpetual fire, which was said to have been lit from 
heaven with a fiery ball”584. The Natchez Indians maintained a fire “supposed to 
have been brought down from the sun”585 in a temple close to the head chief. 
Fascinating is that many of the cultural beliefs and rituals discussed by Frazer 
reflect the double-edged nature of fire: a good and a bad symbol at the same 
time. It is thus often obtained from some royal, celestial or divine source, which 
ascribes it a sacred value and worthy significance. Yet this also means that 
when it expires, that is a bad presage. If the Natchez’ sacred fire would be 
quenched this “would have been thought to put the whole nation in jeopardy”586 
and the ancient Scythians indeed believed there to be an essential relation 
between the king’s life and his hearth, “so that if the fire were put out the king 
would die”587.  
 To return to the role of fire in ancient Greece – there it has a function in 
roughly every religion-related place or act. The Greek temple always has a fire 
place as its heart. It may formerly have been nothing but convenience, but now 
this is the gods’ hearth and understandably the fire is absolutely not to be 
extinguished. The smoke and smell of fire – often incense wears such as myrrh 
are used – is considered to establish contact with the gods. Walter Burkert tells 
that “a sudden burst of flame from the altar fire is seen as a sign of the divine 
presence”588 and as said Dougherty’s terms it a “system of communication” 
between humans and gods. Apart from temples, it also lights nocturnal festivals 
and travelling ships bring fire from one place to another. At a wedding a lit torch 
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is brought from the bride’s home to her new husband’s hearth, for she is about 
to illuminate her husband’s life; in Argos after someone’s death his hearth will 
be extinguished and after some mourning time rekindled with a sacrificial act – 
in both cases the practice symbolises a new start. 
Not only fire’s more positive sides of light and warmth are used, for burning 
obviously plays a significant part in sacrifice. Some festivals are entirely focused 
on the destructive potential of fire. At a festival called Laphria at Patrai the 
people throw all kinds of living animals – birds, gazelles, wolves – as well as 
fruit and trees onto the altar’s fire, drive back any creature trying to escape and 
let it all dissolve in smoke and ashes. 
Prosperous fifth-century Athens (BC) is particularly interesting. As said, 
the city has experienced the devastating potential of fire when after the first 
Persian war much of the city and its flourishing civilisation is burned. Yet the 
Athenians manage to recreate their home from the ashes left by the warriors 
which is something to which Aeschylus may have given a good contribution and 
if so, that provides another good example of the myth’s society-shaping 
function. For with his positive adaptations of the Prometheus myth and the satyr 
play Prometheus Fire-Kindler Aeschylus gives the Athenians, in Dougherty’s 
words, a chance “to transform their recent memories of fire’s destructive 
capabilities into a city rebuilt and renewed” by means of their impressive 
Promethean capacities. In Athens fire is then celebrated even more than 
elsewhere and so are the gods associated with it. As said before, the Titan has 
an altar in the Academy and later even his own festival, the Prometheia. At this 
festival the civilians glorify the Titan and his flames, amongst other things with 
the torch races described in detail by Pausanias. 
 
4.2.1.2. Symbols and Meanings 
 
In Hesiod’s story celestial fire does have ‘weariless’ powers, but in compliance 
with its ambiguous nature it nevertheless mainly symbolises the origin of human 
decline. This is not only because of Pandora’s box and its “Evil in exchange for 
fire”, but also because as a reaction to Prometheus’ first sacrificial trick Zeus 
decided to hide fire from the mortals, which means that before they must have 
disposed of the same fire as the gods. If Vernant is right in his argument that 
the ‘stolen’ fire in the fennel stalk is a mere flame which “must be continually 
fed”, then humans are already separated from the gods before the miseries 
scattered by Pandora because they are downgraded due to their second-class 
fire. 
Yet Aeschylus substantially refashions the Promethean story. 
Accordingly, the role and meaning of fire change significantly. Fire is beneficent 
for the humans and it is not Prometheus’ fault that they lacked it, for he did not 
do any earlier trick and they never had it before. Fire’s area of meaning is 
widely expanded: the Titan’s gift covers an immense range of knowledge, 
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technologies and arts. It elevates the humans from their former, outspokenly 
“babyish” state and literally enlightens their life: 
 
“[t]hey swarmed like bitty ants in dugouts, in sunless caves [...]. All their work was work 
without thought, until I taught them to see what had been hard to see: where and when 
the stars rise and set”.589 
 
Aeschylus’ interpretation and presentation of Prometheus’ fire is almost 
exclusively positive. Fire stands for illumination in both senses: it provides sight 
and simultaneously symbolises all kinds of understanding and wisdom. Fire’s 
warmth is also celebrated, as it is needed for all kinds of crafts that Prometheus 
enriches humanity with, such as medical care and metal works. He also teaches 
the human sacrificing and related prediction techniques: 
 
“thigh bones wrapped in fat, and long backbones I burned, I showed humans the 
pathway into an art hard to figure. I gave the fire eyes, so that its signs shone through 
where before they were filmed over”590. 
  
Fire’s enlightening and heating qualities do not only make humans see and 
understand; although of course never up to Prometheus’ level, it can also give 
them some form of foresight. All in all, it gives them the ability to continuously 
develop and improve their new skills: Prometheus “made them masters of their 
own thought”. 
However, the negative side of fire is not absent. The play ends with a 
great tempest brought about by Zeus: “Rolling thunder hollowing up bangs at 
rock. Lightning coils gutter and flash”591. As Prometheus already foresaw, this 
will throw him “utterly down the black pit of Tartaros”. In the hands of the 
tyrannical Zeus fire becomes lightning and in this context thus a symbol of 
devastation. 
So despite all its positive associations, fire nevertheless maintains its 
double-edged nature. One more thing that adds to this ambivalence is 
Prometheus’ other gift to humans. He took away their ability to foresee their 
own death, and gave them “blind hopes” for this “disease”. Foresight is of 
course not the same as fire, but as we saw it is related to it. The fact that the 
hopes are blind implies that humanity receives obscurity in return for foreseeing 
and thus characterises foresight as a form of light. So Prometheus’ two gifts 
strongly contrast with one another: the light of fire versus the darkness of 
blindness. And in both cases it does not merely concern light, but the light of 
knowledge: the progress-generating practical knowledge versus the knowledge 
of death. Not only Aeschylus’ fire, but also his light of knowledge, is then of an 
ambiguous character. It can lead to progress and continuous development, but 
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also to the miserable situation of having to face one’s inescapable fate. 
Sometimes it is good to turn off the lights, for ignorance can bring humans hope 
and creativity. 
In Plato’s Protagoras fire is purely beneficent and it is even unclear 
whether Prometheus will be punished for his theft or not. In this story, fire does 
not merely improve the human species, it is essential for its creation. In fact, it 
saves humans’ very existence: it is the indispensable extension of them being 
left “unequipped” by Epimetheus. “Prometheus, desperate to find some means 
of survival for the human race, stole […] wisdom in the practical arts together 
with fire (without which this kind of wisdom is effectively useless)”592. Fire is 
fundamental for the human to stay alive: in combination with – and apparently 
crucial for – the practical arts it gives her the ability to build houses, develop 
language and nourish herself. Just as the gift of fire from the Prometheus 
Bound, the Protagoras’ fire does not only represent theoretical knowledge but 
also many forms of technology and culture. Here it even provides the human 
with “a kind of kinship” with the gods – the flames are nothing but good. 
Throughout all of history, the Promethean fire will keep on covering a 
myriad of significations and symbolic associations. The majority of authors and 
artists present fire as some form of wisdom or knowledge. Boccaccio calls fire 
“the clarity of truth”; Bovelles speaks of “le feu très clair de la sagesse”; Bacon 
describes fire as “the succour of succours” which “affords aid and assistance to 
all labours and mechanical arts, and to the sciences themselves”; and Byron 
calls the human mind and intelligence “the Promethean spark”. However, one 
should realise two things: first, that it is not always the case that fire’s symbolic 
meaning includes wisdom or knowledge; and second, that also when it does 
receive the at first sight positive label ‘wisdom’, it is judged in many different 
ways, positively as well as negatively. 
Let us take a quick look at the first question. From Early Christianity to 
the Early Middle Ages the pagan story is theologised, it is fused with the biblical 
narrative. In the Ovide Moralisé Prometheus creates the human: “Une ymagete 
a la semblance/Des dieus”. He takes fire – that is, he does not steal it. He takes 
it from the sun – “du chars du Solail ravie” – instead of from the Olympian gods. 
And he animates the human with the flame of his torch: “Une luisante faille 
enflammee/Dont il ot l’image animee”. Prometheus prefigures, joins or even 
embodies the Christian God. And rather than knowledge, fire then is a means to 
bring the human to life, to enrich him with a (good) soul. Perhaps the most 
fascinating and extreme non-wisdom explanation of fire is Freud’s in The 
Acquisition and Control of Fire. First, in Prometheus’ tale fire is to be 
understood as water, or better: masculine urine. Second, it represents passion, 
the libido, or the male sexual organ: “[t]here can be no doubt about the 
mythological significance of flame as a phallus”. Therefore, “to primal man the 
attempt to quench fire with his own water had the meaning of a pleasurable 
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struggle with another phallus”. Interestingly, once again fire is of a very 
ambivalent – if not contradictory – character. It represents the humidity of water 
and urine as well as the heat of passion and sex – according to Freud the two 
antithetical functions of the male genitals. The psychoanalyst’s fire clearly has a 
set of strong allegorical meanings, but these do not include wisdom or 
knowledge. 
The second question to discuss is the variation in the evaluation of fire. 
Even though it may appear to be different, when fire represents ‘knowledge’ or 
‘wisdom’ this does not automatically imply it is judged to be good. Many of the 
discussed authors do underline the positive side of fire, or even present it as 
nothing but valuable – Plato, Bacon, Percy Shelley, to name a few. However, 
there are also various authors who focus on the danger of fire. Hesiod is one of 
the most obvious examples, highlighting the miserable consequences for 
Prometheus as well as humanity. In the form of lightning fire is virtually always 
pictured as perilous and evil, by authors from Aeschylus to Camus. The 12th 
century overview of mythological interpretations, the Mythographus Tertius, 
presents completely opposite judgements. At one point Prometheus’ theft is 
praised for its enlivening powers: “Prometheus rightly kindled his torch from the 
sun because [...] we receive life from the sun” 593. However, in the next 
paragraph we are told that the Titan’s flames only “benefited mortal man while 
they used it well. Later, through the wicked use of mankind, it was turned to 
their destruction”594. Fire itself is not disapproved of, but humanity’s “wicked” 
use is seriously rejected, because this is why it becomes dangerous and 
destructive. An author who strongly condemns fire is Rousseau. “Prometheus’s 
torch is the torch of the Sciences”, but he passionately argues against its 
flames. The Titan’s intentions may have been good, but the author relates how 
a satyr “wanted to kiss and embrace fire [...] but Prometheus cried out to him: 
‘Satyr, you will weep the loss of the beard on your chin, for it burns when you 
touch it.’” Rousseau’s message is that the sciences, arts and ‘civilisation’ of the 
contemporary society have demolished the purity of humanity’s natural being. 
Humans will or actually already have burnt themselves on the apparent 
radiance of wisdom, for the accompanying urge for power and control will only 
lead to deplorable qualities such as greed, superstition and decadence. 
Humans should let go of the heat and the alleged illumination of knowledge and 
return to the serenity of their original ignorance, innocence and happy virtuosity. 
 
4.2.2. Rebellion 
 
Never absent from the Promethean reference are the themes of trickery, theft 
and rebellion. Humankind’s benefactor is simultaneously a trickster and a thief, 
who rebels in different ways against the powers of Zeus. In general the 
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retellings of the story do not elaborate much on the tricks and theft as such – 
regularly all that is said is ‘Prometheus stole fire from heaven’. Therefore, and 
because it is not just his trickery and thievery but often also his creativity which 
is found to be recalcitrant, in this section I will focus on the rebellious nature of 
his acts rather than the acts themselves. As with virtually any aspect of the 
myth, his riotous characteristics and actions are interpreted in a myriad of ways 
and evoke completely opposite judgements. One should note that in principle, 
the concept of rebellion is neither positive nor negative. It is some form of 
resistance to an authority, tradition or moral code and whether it is judged as 
being good or bad largely depends upon the evaluator’s opinion of that 
authority. It goes without saying that the authorities revolted against over the 
centuries as well as people’s assessments of the authorities and revolutions are 
countless. Consequently, so are the interpretations and evaluations of 
Prometheus’ defiant activities, influenced by – and often applied to – the 
contemporary circumstances. His tricks and theft are pictured as heroic 
boundary-crossing and righteous revolt, but just as much as hubris, disrespect 
and sacrilege – and sometimes even as a mixture of both. In the following, first I 
will treat a classical example of both the positive and negative understanding; 
second, I will discuss some historical cases of the different meanings and 
assessments of the rebellious Titan. 
 
4.2.2.1. The Ancient Rebel 
 
Two of the most obvious and radically contrasting examples are of course the 
ones from Hesiod and Aeschylus. In Hesiod’s story Prometheus’ revolutionary 
actions are his cheating of Zeus with misleading sacrifice and his theft of fire – 
both strongly dismissed by the author. Humans used to live like gods, “not a 
care in their hearts”, but Zeus – the “high lord of Olympos” – “went and hid how 
to make a living, all because shifty Prometheus tricked him”. The Titan may 
have been benevolent, but Hesiod seriously condemns the trickery of that 
“shifty Prometheus”, or “that fine son of Iapetos” (‘fine’ most likely to be 
understood cynically), which – via Epimetheus and Pandora – is the very cause 
of humankind’s misery. If that know-it-all would not have bothered, things would 
have been much better, and then “you might get enough done in one day to 
keep you fixed for a year without working”. Hesiod’s myth is about hubris: it 
warns of the perils of unrealistic imagination, arrogance, over-ambition and 
overestimation of one’s own powers. 
As will be clear, Aeschylus shows nothing of the Hesiodic condemnation, 
on the contrary. Zeus is portrayed as a relentless despot and nearly all of 
Prometheus’ interlocutors sympathise with him. In the first lines, Hephaistos 
already strongly grumbles “I haven’t the heart to chain this god, this brother!”; 
Ocean’s daughters chant “[Y]ou’re brave, you won’t give in to pain”595; the 
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chorus sings “Prometheus, your savage fate has made me cry”596; and Io calls 
him “patron saint of the whole human race”597. The Titan’s person and rebellion 
are now of a fully heroic and altruistic character. Virtually everything he says 
sounds courageous, for instance “I knew what I was doing. Helping humankind I 
helped myself to misery” and “[c]ome what may: [Zeus] won’t put me to death”. 
Further, in the Prometheus Bound the sacrificial trick does not seem to have 
taken place, but apart from Prometheus’ theft his foreseeing abilities also 
enable him to dare Zeus by keeping a secret from him about his future. It gives 
the Titan the opportunity to take an even more courageous and admirable 
stand. He still may have to endure quite some agonising millennia, but this does 
not matter that much, for he foresaw that the marriage between Zeus and Thetis 
“will throw Him out of His throne and His tyranny”. And when Hermes pulls 
everything together in order to let Prometheus reveal the secret, he answers 
recalcitrantly: “Do I seem afraid? Do I cringe before the new Gods? Far from it. 
Not one bit. Now scurry on back the way you came. Whatever you ask, you’ll 
get nothing out of me”598. This will in the end force the latter to give in and thus 
result in the Titan’s salvation. Important is that it is then not only his actions 
which are brave and rebellious, but also his cognitive capacities. As Detienne 
and Vernant explain, Prometheus is “the only one who is equipped to duel in 
cunning with Zeus [...] and challenge the mētis [cunning, TF] of the king of the 
gods with his own”599.  
 
4.2.2.2. Heroic Boundary-Crossing 
 
From Aeschylus onwards the positive and heroic image of Prometheus will 
prevail for quite some time. His brave thievery and the rebellious nature of his 
actions are appreciated and admired, yet in general not the centre of attention. 
It is, however, the focus of Lucian of Samosata, who gladly identifies with the 
Titan and mainly because of the revolutionary character of the latter’s 
movements. Interestingly, it is not so much Prometheus’ theft but rather his 
revolutionary creations that interest the author most. The reason Lucian wishes 
to acquire creative abilities that are similar to the Titan’s is precisely because of 
their rebellious, novel and ‘remodelling’ nature – because of the critique of 
religion and established tradition that these abilities imply. 
In the next millennium the main focus is also on Prometheus’ creative 
activities but then again not their rebellious aspects. The appreciation of these 
aspects slightly returns in the Renaissance with authors such as Pico, but it only 
experiences a true revival with Goethe and his enthusiastic followers in the 
Romantic Age. Goethe’s Prometheus boldly tells Zeus to “cover his heavens” 
and to leave “his Earth” to him. The heroic Titan says he does not owe anything 
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to any god, nor does he identify with one – he radically states he is not a god 
but shares his world with humanity. No Olympian is almighty, so why honour 
them? “Ich dich ehren? Wofür?” Prometheus’ rebellion here is mainly this 
defiant attitude and his creativity. He shaped the human being all by himself, 
which provides him with a revolutionary autonomy that draws a sharp line 
between him and the Olympus. According to Kerényi, Goethe’s Titan is “the 
immortal prototype of man as the original rebel and affirmer of his fate: [...] seen 
as an antigod, as Lord of the Earth”. Goethe celebrates the independent, 
creative human who dares to ignore the limits imposed upon him, resist 
authority and take life in his own hands. He praises the recalcitrant individual, 
the artistic genius or, as we saw, even the confident Goethe himself. 
After Goethe, the Romantics bring Prometheus’ rebellious characteristics 
even more to the foreground. They assign them a more practical significance, 
for often the Promethean reference is politically charged. As we saw, for Percy 
Shelley the revolutionary protagonist of the Prometheus Unbound is a serious 
way to express his antagonising attitude towards the contemporary political 
world. Byron’s Prometheus has a similar role. The Titan bravely opposes and 
frustrates Zeus by carrying his torture in indifferent silence, refusing to admit his 
defeat. Zeus represents the time’s totalitarian regime; and through Prometheus’ 
courageous resistance Byron means to highlight the revolutionary force of 
humankind and in particular the powers of the human mind. For even while in 
misery, the human can still fight the contemporary tyrants with “a firm will, and a 
deep sense [...] Triumphant where it dares defy/And making Death a Victory”. 
Both Shelley and Byron glorify Prometheus’ revolt and thereby celebrate and 
encourage humanity’s resistance against all forms of suppressive authorities – 
including the religious ones where they have assumed a tyrannical format. Note 
however, that in both cases Prometheus’ revolt is explicitly non-violent: his 
rebellious means are love and silence respectively. 
The most practical interpretation – perhaps I should say application – of 
Prometheus’ revolt is Marx’s. First, he calls on the hero’s rebellious attitude to 
express his resentment against religion. In his dissertation Marx explains that 
the Titan’s confession “I hate the pack of gods” (from the Prometheus Bound) is 
philosophy’s “aphorism against all heavenly and earthly gods”. Marx quotes this 
statement to praise and promote social opposition against religion. Whether it 
concerns its celestial or terrestrial components, religion is oppressive and 
alienating. Second, in the Capital Marx draws an analogy between Prometheus 
and the proletarian; in fact, the latter is even in a worse position since capitalism 
“rivets the worker to capital more firmly than the wedges of Hephaistos held 
Prometheus to the rock. It makes an accumulation of misery a necessary 
condition, corresponding with the accumulation of wealth”. Even though it 
remains rather implicit, by means of this comparison Marx brings in 
Prometheus’ turbulent qualities to call for an all-encompassing revolution 
against capitalism. Explicitly or not, again the Titan’s rebellion is presented as 
respect-invoking heroism, a strife to cross the boundaries of the restraining 
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status quo. One should note that Marx’s image is a very optimistic one. The 
parallel between Titan and worker is about their common agony, but at the 
same time it implies a strong belief in the Promethean ambition of that worker; a 
belief in the fact that the proletariat’s suffering will evoke a revolutionary power 
to fight for freedom and justice. Enforced by their very misery, in their 
Promethean striving the labourers shall be successful and will break free from 
the alienating rock of the industrial society. 
There are innumerable other cases after Marx in which Prometheus is 
lauded for his rebellion, which each time consists of a brave transgression of 
some authoritarian limit – whether that limit be social, political and/or religious. 
He may start off as a pathetic little figure, but in the end Gide’s Titan is also a 
rebel. When Prometheus eats his eagle, he emancipates himself from various 
external restrictions; not only religious ones, but a broad range nicely listed by 
Trousson who explains that he is “un révolté, contre le dogme, la tradition, les 
classes sociales, les principes établis”. Gide’s rebellious Prometheus is 
representative of the human in general, but one should note that the author 
himself also identifies with the Titan as an individual. The same holds for Kafka 
– and in both cases this is particularly because of Prometheus’ recalcitrance. 
Both authors ridicule, manipulate and remodel the myth in such a radical way 
that it acquires rebel forms; according to Blumenberg their versions are even 
“an attempt to bring myth to an end” – and in particular this myth of course. The 
authors have the courage to not only transform the story but also its format, so 
that it becomes even more unrecognisable and intangible. Kafka’s emphasis on 
“the inexplicable” and his blending of Greek and Jewish storytelling is his way to 
challenge customs and cross traditional boundaries. Trousson underlines that 
because of its critique on religion Gide’s version must have been experienced 
as a sacrilege; and if Genova is right about its “veiled motif” being 
homosexuality, that too (at Gide’s time) does not make his work very compliant. 
Interestingly, where other authors identify with Prometheus mainly because of 
his creative capacities, Gide and Kafka thus consciously choose to put 
themselves in the Titan’s place precisely because of his rebellious character. 
Not only do they celebrate Prometheus’ defiance by telling a tale, but also by 
taking his role as rebel. 
Speaking of which, Camus wrote a book called The Rebel. Here, the 
Titan’s revolutionary action resides in him taking God’s place on earth. This 
means that the “God-defying rebel” has become human and so in other words 
the human himself has taken that formerly divine position. Such an undeified 
world does lead to the absurdity of life, but it is nevertheless favourable 
because it creates freedom and independence: from now on, all power is in 
human hands. Modern humans particularly employ this newly gained force in 
science and technology: “[w]e rebel through our machines”. According to 
Camus, this may be something good, but modern humans have not yet 
completely taken over all positive characteristics of Prometheus’ rebellion and 
therefore they keep on suffering. For Prometheus’ revolt also consists in his 
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gifts of art, cheerfulness and the mind and these are just as essential as 
technology. Camus calls passionately for his contemporaries to embrace the 
Titan in all his qualities and revolutionary elements. If with Promethean 
stubbornness, they keep their faith in beauty, happiness and the soul, they can 
be their own saviours. 
As with each theme or sub-theme, the positive interpretations of 
Prometheus’ rebellion are very diverse. It may stand for a critique of pantheism, 
Christianity, capitalism or a traditional culture. But it is always a call for change: 
each time the author’s reference to the Titan’s defiant acts is a means to 
encourage a rebellious attitude towards some authority. It is always a call for at 
least verbal resistance; sometimes it even becomes an outspoken call for a 
real-life revolution; and sometimes it is taken up by the individual author and put 
into practice on paper. 
 
4.2.2.3. Reckless Insurgency and Hubris 
 
Of course there are also many negative evaluations of Prometheus’ rebellion 
and these are often formulated in terms of hubris. Of the authors I discussed, 
the first after Hesiod to explicitly warn about hubris is Horace and his worries do 
not concern Prometheus’ over-ambition but explicitly humanity’s. It is 
nevertheless the Titan’s responsibility since it was he who endowed us humans 
with – apart from many enriching capacities – an inherently hubristic nature, 
which makes us “foolishly seek heaven”. As with Lucian, Prometheus’ riotous 
action is not so much his trick or theft, but his creation. However, contrary to 
Lucian, Horace obviously dismisses it as wrong. 
In the early Christian centuries the myth is criticised as well, and again 
this is about the Titan’s fashioning qualities. In fact, it is not Prometheus who is 
criticised, but rather people’s defiant and impious idea that he has been the real 
Creator, which is dismissed as blasphemy by Christian clergymen. As we saw, 
ages later a similar critique comes from Alciati. He also rejects Prometheus’ 
rebellious acts, which here symbolise the pretentious attitude of the educated of 
his era. While on the picture his liver is feasted on by an eagle, the Titan 
“curses the torch lit from the stolen fire” and laments his human-creating 
operations. Alciati’s message is that this is what happens when the scholars he 
disapproves of try to grab hold of divine wisdom, thereby crossing holy limits. As 
the motto above the image reads “we should not be concerned with things 
above us” – such striving is all silly hubris and sacrilege. 
In De Cive Hobbes also uses the image of the Promethean rebel to 
criticise humans for their overconfidence and recklessness, but this time in a 
socio-political context. Motivated by his repulsion of the Puritans’ uprising 
against the English monarchy, Hobbes employs the allegory to argue against 
such hubristic audacity and in favour of royal authority. The torture Prometheus 
had to endure shows that the sovereign’s control should not be challenged; the 
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ancients already knew that monarchs should rule “and the People, least of all”. 
According to Hobbes, the myth illustrates that 
 
“by human invention, which is signified by Prometheus, laws and justice were by 
imitation taken from monarchy; by virtue thereof, as by fire removed from its orb, the 
multitude, as the dirt and dregs of men, was as it were quickened and formed into a 
civil person”. 
 
Prometheus’ creation of humankind stands for the presumptuous human desire 
to “invent”; his theft stands for recalcitrant urges such as what one, in the light of 
the myth, could call the urge to steal the flame of power; and his creativity and 
thievery represent the people’s attempt to “imitate” the rules and control of 
those in charge – all in order to empower the ‘dirty’ mass. The Titan’s story 
demonstrates what agonising consequences such acts may have; and this is 
confirmed by the Puritans’ revolt against what Hobbes considers to be a 
completely legitimate and justified authority. Against an entirely different 
background than for instance Hesiod or Alciati, Hobbes thus also strongly 
dismisses Prometheus’ rebellious actions as misery-evoking hubris.600 
 Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is another work in which rebellion, trickery 
and theft play a central role. Though in a more indirect way, Prometheus’ 
defiance is present in both the person of Frankenstein and the monster. To start 
with the latter, he revolts against his tormentor in various ways, mainly by killing 
his loved ones and finally Frankenstein himself. One of these murders has 
particularly Promethean trick-characteristics as it is based on a secret about a 
marriage: the monster knows where to find Frankenstein’s bride and strangles 
her, thereby already virtually overthrowing his master. Although the creature’s 
actions are obviously wiley and rebellious, they are not so much of a hubristic 
kind; they are rather produced by sadness and frustration than arrogance or 
overconfidence. 
Frankenstein’s insurgence quietly resides in his passionate aspiration to 
shape a living being. This desire – and of course its exercise – is of a 
characteristically hubristic nature, for it implies a recalcitrant and disrespectful 
attitude towards God and nature. Frankenstein crosses sacred boundaries and 
rebels against the Creator when he, as Dougherty puts it, “metaphorically steals 
fire” from heaven and, one could say, robs the deity of the power to create life. 
The scientist’s project is overambitious; he overestimates his capacities and 
finds out that the results of his work are radically different from what he had 
imagined: very disappointing, painful and even lethal. Shelley does not wish to 
universally dismiss creative ambitions, but does express a serious warning for 
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Promethean hubris, this time with respect to the scientific dreams of her 
contemporaries and in particular the dangers of playing around with life.601 
As with the positive interpretations, there is a wide divergence of 
negative interpretations of the Titan’s revolutionary actions. Yet the 
interpretation always implies a warning for the perils of rebellion against an 
authority that should be honoured. Whether it concerns the attempt to seize 
divine knowledge or a revolt against the monarch in power, boundaries are 
crossed that should have been respected – and the problem is almost always 
hubris. Here, the mythological allegory is a means to fight over-ambition and 
plead for caution, obedience and/or piety. Just as for those encouraging 
Promethean insurgency, for the above authors the allegory is also always a call 
for change. Yet here it is a call for withdrawal; sometimes for careful 
consideration of the possibly dangerous consequences of one’s aspirations, 
sometimes for an immediate and complete reversal of opinion and activities. 
 
4.2.2.4. Hubristic Heroism 
 
Interestingly, where one should think that the concepts of ‘crime’ and ‘hubris’ 
necessarily involve a negative assessment, this turns out to not always be the 
case. As said, the myth as such is characterised by ambiguity and that includes 
Prometheus’ defiance. This means that the interpretation of his revolutionary 
actions are not necessarily positive or negative, but may also be something in 
between. A fascinating example is Nietzsche’s interpretation of the myth in The 
Birth of Tragedy: he praises the Titan’s rebellion despite the fact that he 
recognises them to be criminal and hubristic. The story should be understood in 
the cultural context of “the duality of the Apollonian and the Dionysian” – in 
short, of the dynamic between on the one hand reason, order and beauty and 
on the other hand energy, chaos and transgression of limits. The philosopher 
argues that this aesthetic – and as it turns out also metaphysical – dynamic 
creates a “tragic” world, for the Apollonian force turns out to be superficial and 
illusionary and the Dionysian force reveals the miserable truths underneath. The 
duality as well as the forces each have both positive and negative 
characteristics and it is due to this ambiguity that according to Nietzsche 
Prometheus’ tale represents the essence not only of culture, but also of the 
human’s very existence. The myth acknowledges its inherently ambivalent and 
tragic – that is, Apollonian as well as Dionysian – nature. Just as Prometheus, 
humans look for the light of knowledge. But they should recognise that their 
knowledge is per definition an “unnatural atrocity”, because their Titanic urge to 
acquire independent wisdom necessarily results in crime and agony. For, says 
Nietzsche, it is always an offense against the sacred, to which the deities react 
by engulfing “the nobly ambitious human race” with misery. However, 
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knowledge is nevertheless of great value because it provides humans with 
autonomy and thereby enables them to confine the divine powers: the human 
and the divine world become mutually dependent. Praising Prometheus’ 
rebellion, Nietzsche attacks Christianity and its limiting authority. In that light, he 
also underlines that the myth provides a much better view of human existence 
than the story of the Fall, precisely because of the worth it assigns to the Titan’s 
violation, for “[t]he best and loftiest thing which mankind can be blessed with 
men acquire through a crime”. Other than the Christians, who merely focus on 
‘sin’, the ancients knew “that even sacrilege can have dignity – even theft, as in 
the case of Prometheus”.  
 Obviously, just as the opponents I discussed above, Nietzsche views 
Prometheus’ actions as criminal. However, this does not mean they are not 
valuable. Just as the other admirers of the Titan, Nietzsche lauds his 
insurgence. Whereas most interpreters try to make a clear choice and label 
Prometheus’ rebellion as either – or at least, mainly – right or wrong, Nietzsche 
does not. What distinguishes his interpretation is that he acknowledges – or 
better, highlights – that somehow the Titan’s actions are truly bad. Most of all, 
contrary to both opponents and advocates, he underlines that it is this very 
badness that makes Prometheus’ revolt so worthy. Nietzsche emphasises that 
one should recognise “the active transgression as the essentially Promethean 
virtue”602 – it is the activity with which the Titan breaks the laws that makes his 
boundary-crossing virtuous. It is the consciousness with which he establishes 
“the justification of human evils, that is, both of human guilt and of the forfeit of 
suffering caused by that guilt”. Clearly, other than the opponents, Nietzsche 
does not reject Prometheus’ defiance because of its badness; yet neither does 
he, like the advocates, honour it because of its pure righteousness. In his 
intriguing combination of the two interpretations and judgements, Nietzsche 
celebrates the Titan because of the evil nature of his rebellion. 
 
4.2.3. Creation 
 
After describing the brilliant list of his gifts to humanity, Aeschylus’ Titan 
exclaims that “[a]ll human culture comes from Prometheus”; Plato relates how 
he partakes in the creation of the human species; and Marx believes in 
Promethean self-creation through labour. Clearly, the Titan’s wisdom is not only 
of a rational, theoretical, analytical and logical nature. It is just as much of a 
more intuitive character, defined by imagination, artistry and creativity. From 
now on I will refer to this type of Promethean ‘wisdom’ as Promethean creation 
or creativity.  
Creation/creativity is a very broad – and again, ambiguous – concept. It 
encompasses a wide range of significations, yet always refers to the ability to 
somehow create, shape, or produce and is generally inspired by an imaginative 
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– if not forethinking – motivation. Aiming for more clarity and transparency, I 
have subdivided the great historical diversity of interpretations and explanations 
of the Promethean creativity into three forms of creation: the creation of art, the 
creation of life and human self-creation. 
 
4.2.3.1. Creation of Art 
 
Just as the concept of creation/creativity, the concept of art is not a very clear-
cut one. The Greek technē covers skills, techniques and arts, and in the ancient 
versions of the myth it is indeed technai that humanity receives from 
Prometheus. Art and technology are hard to disentangle and not only in the 
ancient context. Against a contemporary background Camus also emphasises 
that “what characterises Prometheus is that he cannot separate machines from 
art” and argues that neither he nor the modern human should try to. Yet aware 
of their intrinsic relatedness for practical reasons I will nevertheless attempt to 
separate the two concepts. Art I understand to be something – a product, object, 
or idea; material or immaterial – created according to aesthetic principles and 
(mainly) with aesthetic objectives and purposes. Technology I understand to be 
a craft, method, or process which concerns itself with material objects and 
(mainly) has a practical and/or scientific purpose. In this section I will focus on 
Prometheus’ role as an artist. 
Now the artistic interpretation of Prometheus’ creativity again presents 
itself in many forms. First of all, there is the realistic-historical interpretation: 
Prometheus has been a human artist. Pliny tells us Prometheus was the first 
one to make jewellery and Hyginus adds he was an acrobatic athlete. Another 
interesting case is the Christians’ euhemerist explanation, according to which 
the alleged Titan had been nothing but a historical – that is, a human – figure. 
Just as Lactantius, Isidore explains that Prometheus’ creation ‘from clay’ should 
be taken literally: 
 
“Prometheus first made a likeness of humans from clay and [...] from him the art of 
making likenesses and statues was born. Whence also the poets supposed that human 
beings were first created by him – figuratively, because of these effigies”. 
 
The Titan had only been the inventor of sculpture, but he was idealised; the 
‘figurative’ interpretation slowly disappeared and he was ultimately deified by his 
admirers.  
 Whether the Christian fathers are correct about him having been a 
human or not, they are right about Prometheus’ role as idol: for many poets and 
other artists he is the ideal model – for them and/or humanity in general. One of 
these artists is Percy Shelley. His Prometheus Unbound lauds and encourages 
humanity’s creative abilities in many areas – intellectual, social and political. But 
the human’s aesthetic and imaginative creativity is perhaps the most important, 
for this – together with love – is what sets the other forms of creation in motion. 
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The human mind can produce “harmonies divine, yet ever new” and “arts, tho’ 
unimagined, yet to be”. Shelley believes in the massive creative potential of 
each human, but poets deserve some extra attention. One of the spirits in the 
play says about the poet that  
 
“Of shapes that haunt thought’s wildernesses.  
[...] from these create he can 
Forms more real than living man, 
Nurslings of immortality!” 
 
Of the wild chaos of images and ideas, poets thus have the ability to shape 
some supernatural, yet extra-real creation; and elsewhere Shelley also states 
that “poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world”. Poets then even 
seem to have more creative abilities than Prometheus, for they have the 
capacity to produce immortal forms and on top of that to legislate the world – 
two things the Titan never managed to do. Yet it is not very likely that the poetic 
artist has the capacity to somehow transcend Prometheus. The immortal and 
legislative creations Shelley refers to are conceptual: by means of their ideas 
and initiatives people can improve their situation or society and in that creative 
approach Prometheus should always be their model. For Shelley art and life are 
fundamentally united and if humans let themselves indeed be driven by the 
power of their imagery, their “work shall be called the Promethean”. The more 
creativity, the better, which is why Shelley assigns poets – including himself – a 
special status. 
The comparison between Prometheus and artists goes even deeper 
when an individual artist personally identifies with him, which throughout history 
a number of poets, playwrights and other kinds of authors do – whether 
seriously or cynically. Even though it is not his own initiative, an early example 
of such identification is Lucian. His account is a rather complex and ambiguous 
one, for he wrote a comical dialogue in which the myth is entirely satirised, but 
despite his ironical approach, he must have admired the Titan. For when in his 
speech Prometheus Es in Verbis his interlocutor names him “a literary 
Prometheus”, Lucian certainly sees that as a compliment and replies that “[i]f 
your meaning is, my good sir, that my works, like his, are of clay, I accept the 
comparison and hail my prototype”. As a strong critic of religion, just as 
Prometheus he aims to remodel the raw material of the established traditions by 
means of his creative proficiency. Yet even though Lucian initially seems to 
accept the comparison, a bit later he rejects it. He would gladly identify with the 
divine artist and compare the latter’s creative – and, not unimportant, rebellious 
– capacities to his own. However, he seems to be rather insecure about the 
quality of his creations, he fears it is superficial, unoriginal and mere imitation. 
His own clay, he says, is “poor common stuff, trampled by common feet till it is 
little better than mud. [...] [T]here is no motion, as with [Prometheus], not a sign 
of life; entertainment and pastime is the beginning and the end of my work”. Yet 
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at the end of his speech he denies that he would, just as Prometheus, be a 
thief: “I defy you there; that is the one fault you cannot find with me: from whom 
should I have stolen?” Nor does he consider himself as much a trickster as the 
Titan, for he wonders “have I [...] cheated my hearers by serving them up bones 
wrapped in fat, comic laughter in philosophic solemnity?” Apparently, Lucian 
has recovered some self-confidence. Perhaps his own creations will never 
acquire the amazing quality of those of Prometheus. But muddy or not, there 
may well be some novelty and motion in them after all – for I am sure Lucian will 
at least activate his hearers’ mouths and cheeks. 
Another uncertain – but this time more serious – analogy is drawn by 
Boccaccio between himself and Prometheus. He doubts his capacity to 
accomplish the mythographical task he is to do at the King’s request. In the 
preface of the Genealogy he writes “I dread undertaking such a large task, and 
if another Prometheus or even Prometheus himself [...] were to rise up and 
present himself, I scarcely believe that he, much more than I, would have the 
skills for this work”. Boccaccio humbly presents himself as incapable to 
accomplish such a Titanic task, but as he nevertheless gives it a try and finishes 
the book, he does implicitly call himself a Promethean kind of author. 
A more self-confident example of Promethean identification can be found in 
a letter by Ficino, who writes to Pico della Mirandola: “we are imitating 
Prometheus. We are making man, you the soul and I the body. [...] How 
beautifully, by our joint effort, we are now putting together our man, the 
observer of the universe!” Apparently, Ficino thinks very highly of their literary 
creativity, although his sense of humour and self-mockery suggests that 
perhaps we should not take this identification too seriously. 
Goethe also establishes an explicit parallel between his aesthetic abilities 
and those of Prometheus. In his autonomous, defiant creativity the Titan of 
Goethe’s Prometheus is a perfect representation of the characteristic Sturm und 
Drang- artistic genius. Prometheus expresses a distinct artistic identity and the 
poem’s content as well as its form603 suggest that it concerns Goethe’s identity 
in particular. This is indeed literally confirmed in his autobiography. There, he 
writes that while he is thinking about his own “productive talent”, he realises that 
this “natural gift” is entirely his – everything he fashions is no one’s work but his 
own. In this thinking process, he says, an image comes to him of “die alte 
mythologische Figur des Prometheus”, the genius who populated the world with 
what he created in complete solitude. Goethe evidently identifies with 
Prometheus: just as the Titan, he is independent from anything outside himself; 
he employs his internal powers to animate his inventions; and these can only be 
meaningful when created in isolation. Goethe feels the fable “come alive” in him 
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(“ward in mir lebendig”) and declares he can shape das Titanengewand – the 
“Titanic garment” – according to his wishes. In other words, the poet is so 
inspired by Prometheus’ artistic autonomy that he believes to have the capacity 
to even model his idol according to his personal aesthetic wishes. 
In conclusion, whether as a historical sculptor, a symbol for artistic creativity 
as such, or a figure a particular poet identifies with, Prometheus has always 
played an important role as artist; and even though his aesthetic capacities 
were not always appreciated, admired they always were. 
 
4.2.3.2. Creation of Life 
 
Prometheus’ creation of life may very well be the most important form of his 
creativity. Several times I discussed the Protagoras, in which we witness 
Prometheus’ participation in the creation of humankind for the first time. Ovid 
describes in detail and full of admiration how, this time on his own, the Titan 
fashioned humanity from “[new-made] earth [...] mixed with water/In likeness of 
the gods that govern the world”. In the first Christian centuries the myth is slowly 
absorbed by the story of Creation. And before the Early Church Fathers start to 
emphatically deny Prometheus’ life creation capacities, God and the Titan are 
basically one; some Bible illustrations showing many similarities with the 
iconographical tradition of Prometheus. In any case, Prometheus’ creation of life 
has become an essential element – if not the basis – of the myth. Explicit or not, 
this element is virtually always present in the scores of references to the story. 
We have already seen dozens of cases in which the Titan’s creation of 
humanity is passionately celebrated – Boccaccio, Bacon and Goethe, for 
example. But not everyone is that impressed. Horace deplores the 
fundamentally negative qualities with which Prometheus equipped his creation, 
such as sinfulness and anger; Propertius calls the result of the Titan’s 
fashioning “a botch” because he gave its mind so little control over its actions. 
Alciati sees it as a foolish aberration. Under one of his Emblemata, the picture 
of the suffering Titan, it says that he “could well wish he had not made man” and 
that he hates “moulders of clay”. Alciati does not seem to pity him – it is due to 
Prometheus’ own arrogance he is in such agony; he should have known better 
and not have created humankind. 
The most fascinating work that questions the Promethean creation of life 
is probably Frankenstein. Mary Shelley does not mean to immediately reject the 
Promethean ambitions, but rather aims to carefully study humanity’s creative 
and scientific capacities in order to investigate their boundaries and dangers. 
The results are far from positive. Frankenstein, the enthusiastic scientist, tells 
us how he has always been “longing to penetrate the secrets of nature” and 
how he “entered with the greatest diligence into the search of the philosopher’s 
stone and the elixir of life”. His dream is to “banish disease from the human 
frame, and render man invulnerable to any but a violent death!” Yet the 
outcome of Frankenstein’s ardent creating urge is tragic and brings to life a 
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creature who, in his own words, is “a poor, helpless, miserable wretch; [who] 
knew, and could distinguish, nothing”. Shelley also presents fire as an in 
essence positive symbol of life, yet in a very negative context, when 
Frankenstein’s monster exclaims “Cursed, cursed creator! Why did I live? Why, 
in that instant, did I not extinguish the spark of existence which you had so 
wantonly bestowed?”604 
By means of the sad narrative Shelley calls attention to several points 
regarding creation: a) the sacrilegious aspects of creating life; b) the flexible but 
therefore simultaneously very vulnerable character of (the development of) 
human life; and c) more in general, the perils of radical creative ambition and of 
the unimaginable possibilities of science. 
Frankenstein never explicitly criticises God, but in his aim to improve the 
human he judges God’s creation to be flawed. His operation is never literally 
labelled a sacrilege. But the monster calls him “that enemy of God and man” 
and the fact that Frankenstein’s creation is anything but an improvement of the 
human, his regrets and his many references to sin do present it as sacrilegious. 
Moreover, the scientist compares himself to a guilty Adam when he bitterly 
declares that “the apple was already eaten”, as well as when he tells Walton 
that he hopes that the captain’s search for knowledge “may not be a serpent to 
sting you, as mine has been”. Formulated in his own way Frankenstein admits 
that he committed a dreadful sin by cutting into the Tree of Knowledge, as well 
as into the Tree of Life. Regularly, the monster also draws a parallel between 
his creation and the Genesis. However, the former is in all ways a shadowed 
reflection of the latter: Adam was beautiful, had skills and company and his 
creator did not abandon him from the start, whereas the monster “was 
wretched, helpless, and alone” and said that “[m]any times I considered Satan 
as the fitter emblem of my condition”605. 
Frankenstein transgressed sacred limits in his impious attempt to 
appropriate what up to then had been exclusively divine capacities; and both he 
and the monster become ‘fallen angels’ – later, in fact, even worse than that. 
Important is here the word ‘become’: neither Frankenstein nor the monster start 
off with negative objectives or bad qualities. On the contrary: driven by nothing 
but positive Promethean motivations Frankenstein dedicates himself to creation, 
in order to benefit humankind. Similarly, the monster begins as an innocent, 
ignorant and sensitive if not virtuous being. He admires the moonlight and 
enjoys the songs of birds, he empathises with the family and wishes to socialise 
with them. However, he is turned down by his creator as well as by other people 
and therefore, he says, “the fallen angel becomes a malignant devil”606. 
Frankenstein, too, is not just an angel who failed in his benevolent work and fell 
down – because of his cold rejection of the creature and denying him a 
companion the scientist also becomes a merciless tyrant. 
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Shelley’s point is that human life is subject to change, unpredictable and 
therefore vulnerable; and she accentuates that consequently good intentions 
and potentialities can never ensure a positive outcome. This is something which 
applies to all forms of creation. Even if one would manage to create life, this 
would not immediately result in something good. As said, Shelley questions the 
time’s strong optimism with respect to science. People should seriously 
consider the limits of scientific knowledge and creation and make sure they take 
their responsibilities, for the unpredictability of their development makes them 
dangerous. What if her husband’s (and Byron’s) fantasies would come true – 
fantasies about reanimating a corpse and manufacturing “the component parts 
of a creature”, bringing them together and endue them “with vital warmth”? It 
does not matter how benevolent and enthusiastic a creative ambition is – it is 
perilous. The Promethean dream to “pour a torrent of light into our dark world” 
and “bestow animation upon lifeless matter” may turn out to be something more 
obscure and less alive than could have ever been imagined beforehand. 
 
4.2.3.3. Human Self-Creation 
 
If we understand the concept broadly, in each version of the myth the element 
of self-creation is present somehow. The Promethean gift is never some ready-
made form of wisdom, but – as in, for instance, the Prometheus Bound – often 
consists of practical skills, techniques, arts, or at least the capacity to acquire 
knowledge. Promethean wisdom is a means for progress: humans can learn, 
practice and develop knowledge – in fact, they will have to before being able to 
benefit from it. That is, humans take part in their own creation in the sense that 
they proceed, cultivate, improve themselves. They evolve – and not just as 
individuals, but also on the level of society and the species. 
Rather than an individual or evolution-related form of creativity, Marx’s 
version is a social – or better, a socialist – one. He places humanity’s self-
creating capacities in a socio-political context. Kolakowski understands Marx’s 
entire opus in terms of the myth and states that “[t]he Promethean idea which 
recurs constantly in Marx’s work is that of faith in man’s unlimited powers as 
self-creator [...], history is man’s self-realization through labour”607. That is, 
Prometheus embodies the oppressed proletarian who nevertheless has a 
natural capacity to shape himself – this time through work. United with their 
fellows, the proletarians – or what Kolakowski calls the “collective Prometheus” 
– will call upon their infinite laborious creativity and be able to fashion not only 
themselves, but an entirely new civilisation. 
Apart from Prometheus’ gifts there are of course his human-moulding 
activities, upon which other authors focus when it comes to self-creation. As we 
saw, Pico for instance, takes our clay basis quite literally and concludes that this 
makes the human intrinsically pliable. ‘Self-creation’ should then also be taken 
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to the letter: we don’t have limits, which means that we can – and should – take 
our creation in our own hands. As Pico phrases it, it is our very nature to 
“slough” our skins and “transform” ourselves. 
The idea of human nature as lacking bounds and being inherently 
malleable reoccurs many times, in positive as well as negative explanations. 
Therefore, I will discuss this ontological question further in the next section. 
 
4.2.4. Human Nature 
 
In 4.1 I examined the originary-ontological function of myth and gave some 
examples of Prometheus’ story. The human condition is a very – if not the most 
– important theme of the Prometheus myth, because in all the versions written 
throughout all those different times, somehow there is always an essential 
connection between the Titan and the human being – one which, as we will see, 
is virtually always morally loaded. For some authors the myth is there to explain 
and/or condemn the characteristic agony of human life. For many others 
Prometheus has been the one who set human progress in motion and thereby 
established the superiority of the human species. And whatever the point of 
view of the author, in line with Promethean forethinking the myth is virtually 
always a means to speculate about the human future. 
In any case, essential is again the myth’s malleability, which also has its 
impact on the accounts of human nature. To picture the human, some of the 
authors choose the positive image of the courageous, wise, creative and 
progressing Prometheus; others choose the other side and emphasise the 
dangers of abusing knowledge and warn for the human’s hubristic refusal to 
respect essential limits. Most, however, take a less black-and-white point of 
view and choose the myth precisely because of the characteristic ambivalence 
of the story as well as its protagonist. In the following I will treat positive, 
negative and ambiguous pictures of human nature. As we have already seen 
many human conditions coming by I will not pay as much attention to one as to 
the other. I will concentrate on the relation between Prometheus and the human 
– is he to be interpreted as archetype for the human as such? – and on the 
image of the human as essentially incomplete. 
 
4.2.4.1. The Promethean Human 
 
The classic image of the creative and infinitely evolving Promethean human has 
come by several times; and once again, due to Prometheus’ trickery the 
condition of Hesiod’s human is essentially miserable. Yet most accounts of the 
human condition are not outspokenly positive or negative but more complex, 
ambivalent – and the same goes for the figure of Prometheus himself and the 
myth as such. When it comes to the Prometheus Bound, for instance, one 
should note that other than in Plato’s myth, Aeschylus’ Titan is not only the 
benefactor of the humans, but simultaneously their archetype as well, for they 
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share many qualities. Prometheus is an ambiguous figure with divine as well as 
human characteristics; he is full of wisdom, immortal, has foresight and many 
other powers; yet he also suffers, is unsteady, emotional and several times he 
even wishes to die. The thousands of years on the rock – interestingly, 
dismissed by Hephaistos as “this inhuman cliff”608 – the Titan is in a lower 
position than the other gods. He is still divine but thwarted from any action 
whatsoever, whereas the humans may be another step down in the world’s 
hierarchy but are able to act. In a way, despite their differences this balances 
their two positions: the one strong and immortal but powerless nevertheless, the 
other vulnerable and mortal but free to move. The human started off as an 
immature being but, thanks to Prometheus’ gifts, evolved into a rational, skilled 
and creative one. Moreover, as a species – biologically as well as culturally – 
humans are as immortal as Prometheus. And although they do not foresee their 
own death, their continuous cultural development implies a form of foreseeing 
which enables them to think and act creatively, invent and evolve. In short, 
Prometheus and the human share a combination of divine/superior and 
terrestrial/inferior characteristics; on the one hand wisdom, foresight, creativity 
and somehow even immortality; on the other hand vulnerability, emotionality, 
restriction and dependence. Prometheus is then a complex figure: apart from 
humanity’s benefactor or the embodiment of intelligence as such, he is also an 
archetype of the human, something which is confirmed by other elements of the 
story (such as the similarity between the Titan’s tale and Io’s – the human 
princess – or the historical context of the play). A fascinating consequence of 
Prometheus standing for humankind itself would be that his gifts would be the 
human’s gifts to herself. In addition to creativity and forethinking, the autonomy 
and independence of humans would be emphasised, as well as their self-
creation capacities. They would not only be able to evolve on the basis of 
practical as well as intellectual but given skills; they would be able to give 
themselves new skills and abilities, take control over their own nature and 
improve their very being. In conclusion, Aeschylus pictures a Prometheus who 
is ambiguous in his role as well as his character; and the author’s human also 
embodies an ambivalent combination of the terrestrial imperfect being needing 
help, and the autonomous one endowed with divine and self-creative powers. 
To quickly name a couple of essentially positive accounts of the human 
condition: Plato’s humans, one more time, have a “share of the divine 
dispensation” and creative, technological, social and political capacities after 
Prometheus and Zeus enriched them with their gifts. Ovid proudly describes the 
human’s likeness to the gods and his uniqueness, for “while the other creatures 
on all fours/Look downwards, man was made to hold his head/Erect in majesty 
and see the sky”. However, someone who does not think too highly of humans 
is Horace, who characterises them by their “urge of the ravening lion” and 
hubristic nature. 
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In early Christianity not so much is explicitly said about human nature 
when Prometheus is discussed; the authors who mention him aim to correct the 
story of Creation rather than examine the results of that process. Of course, in 
general the story underwrites the Christian image of the sinful human. Yet some 
authors of the era do speak of the Titan as the personification of human 
rationality – “Prometheus, or, in other words, the power to think and reason” 
(Plutarch); or of his liver as a symbol of the human heart where the wisdom is 
located which ‘feeds’ and ‘sustains’ Divine Providence (Fulgentius). Although 
neither case is a full account of the human condition, of course they imply a 
positive image of the human as a being who is endowed with special intellectual 
and spiritual powers. 
Boccaccio is the first one for centuries to present a more extensive image 
of human nature. According to him, Prometheus is nothing less than the ancient 
image of the Christian God and so it was he who created the human. The Titan 
breathed life and rational powers into humans, but he sinned and as a 
consequence degenerated into what Boccaccio names a “twofold” being: the 
human’s physical spirits became defective, whereas otherwise these “would 
have been eternal just as is the rational spirit, the nature of which is divine”. The 
latter spirit, however, should certainly not be taken for granted, for “those who 
are produced by nature arrive coarse and ignorant, nay, unless they are 
instructed, filthy, savage, and beastly”. Fortunately, Prometheus instructed and 
cultivated them; and as if he were “creating them anew” this resulted in humans 
“so distinguished in their knowledge of customs and in their virtues that it is very 
clear that nature produced some and teaching had reformed others”. 
Boccaccio’s point is that natural humans are still ignorant, imperfect, if not 
beastly creatures, but through education these creatures can truly transform: 
they can be moulded into civilised humans, unique in their wisdom, capacities 
and virtues. In fact, it is not so much the case that they can ‘be’ moulded. They 
themselves, in solitude, should make a strong effort to search for the light of the 
divine truth in order to enliven, to “complete” their being. For “the bodily mass 
[...] weakens the powers of the mind so much that unless they are aided and 
inspired by knowledge, they become so benumbed that men seem more like 
brutish than rational animals”. It will indeed take some hard work to achieve the 
enlightening salvation, for as if tearing our livers, deep thoughts and anxieties 
will trouble us and so will “corporeal labors”, “the ardors of desire” and the 
woman “her disobedience”. In summary, just as Aeschylus’ image of the 
human, Boccaccio’s is again an ambivalent one, but this time not only based 
upon the terrestrial-divine, but, importantly, also upon the body-mind dichotomy. 
Moreover, it is a much more active process: in order to overcome the physical 
shortcomings, the by nature brutish beings have to search for and work with the 
divine powers of their rational potentialities. Yet, like Aeschylus, Boccaccio is 
certainly not pessimistic: if enough effort is made, the by nature twofold 
creatures will be able to make up for their sinfulness, conquer their original 
imperfection and civilise up to the point that they leave their savageness behind. 
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Thus the ambiguity in Boccaccio’s concept is found at two levels. First, the 
human is an essentially dualistic organism, with on the one hand the terrestrial, 
beastly and bodily characteristics, and on the other hand the rational and 
animating powers which underline his divine kinship. Second, what should 
finally be understood to be the true human condition is unclear: as said, it is 
literally characterised as the natural “twofold” condition, whereas something 
rather different follows from the fact that “unless they are instructed”609, “those 
who are produced by nature” will stay “coarse and ignorant, nay, [...] filthy, 
savage, and beastly”. According to Boccaccio it is only by means of education 
and solitary studying that humans can surmount their naturally numb and 
brutish character and genuinely become human. That is, a real transformation 
can take place, but it is not until one found truth and civilisation. Boccaccio’s 
account is an ambiguous one, but in the end, it seems that even though the 
original humans may be natural, it is only the cultivated and virtuous condition 
the author will characterise as truly human – and this is of course the way they 
should be. 
Ficino also presents a “twofold” image of the human condition. The 
human’s unique nature is inherently dichotomous: she is superior in her 
rationality and creativity but simultaneously inferior because of her physical and 
irrational imperfections. Ficino’s account is, however, much more pessimistic 
than Boccaccio’s. Just like Prometheus, humans got hold of a ray of light of the 
celestial knowledge, but instead of happiness this brought them nothing but the 
vulture-like gnawing of the “torment of inquiry”. Now, due to their intellect’s 
kinship with “the highest form of perfection”, it is humans’ natural aim to acquire 
that highest form – the ultimate truth and goodness – in its entirety. However, 
dual in nature, they will always be distracted by the body and senses so that the 
highest good is essentially beyond reach – at least, while they are alive. The 
human is then not Boccaccio’s civilised being who after serious studying 
reaches the right human level. The natural condition of Ficino’s human is one 
like Prometheus’s, miserably chained to the unique qualities of her reason; 
physically and intellectually tortured.610 The soul of the living human is 
unsatisfiable by nature, infinitely tormented by both her body’s and ratio’s 
desires; wretched by the insurmountability of her imperfection and the 
fundamental unattainability of the summum bonum. This does not mean, 
however, that humans should let go of their ambitions, for once the soul is 
liberated from its body it will be able to reach what it has been striving for all its 
life. 
It may not be a complete account of human nature, but as I showed 
when discussing rebellion, Hobbes’ account and Prometheus’ role in it in De 
Cive is surely negative: the Titan’s creativity embodies the overconfident human 
                                                 
609
 My emphasis. 
610
 In Ficino’s Summary of Protagoras, the dual nature of the human condition is characterised 
by both Prometheus and Epimetheus, the former representing rationality and creativity, the 
latter irrationality and physicality. 
Trijsje Franssen    Prometheus Through the Ages 
187 
 
desire to “invent” and “imitate” – a natural craving to resist and copy legitimate 
authorities. Other than his Renaissance predecessors, Hobbes then does not 
stimulate the human to extend the borders of his Promethean capacities. Quite 
the contrary: he encourages humans to recognise their limits and fight the 
unfortunate hubristic urge that nature endowed them with, for otherwise misery 
will be theirs. Interestingly, in his Leviathan Hobbes’ presentation of 
Prometheus changes and so does his image of the human. The rebellious Titan 
has been replaced by “the prudent man”, who is “gnawed on by feare of death” 
and other worries when he tries to foresee the future and finds no social rule or 
structure. He represents the distressing, natural condition of humanity before 
their need for order has been fulfilled. Apart from their native anxiety, humans 
do however still possess their inventive capabilities and here, instead of 
something to be rejected, it is the potential way out of the anxious state. When 
used correctly, by means of these capabilities humans can – and should – 
“invent” the right form of civilisation and create the necessary authority. The 
human’s Promethean creativity is no longer dismissed as hubris or pride; it 
provides the solution to that other natural characteristic: his fundamental fear. 
In the 18th-19th century, forthright celebrations of the human condition 
are Goethe’s and Percy Shelley’s, who both, with Prometheus as ideal, praise 
human courage, independence and creativity. Mary Shelley’s account of the 
human is a more complicated one. It has been studied before, but I would like to 
view her story one more time and bring together the many elements and 
questions it contains when it comes to the human. The main question 
Frankenstein poses is: ‘what does it mean to be human’? And so it investigates 
related questions such as ‘what are the boundaries of human nature’?, ‘can 
these be moved’? and ‘if so, should these be moved (by means of, for instance, 
science)?’ 
Shelley’s husband writes in the preface that the aim is “to preserve the 
truth of the elementary principles of human nature”, but this should not be 
understood as a clear list of factual principles on the basis of which one can 
classify someone as human or not. Inspired by the ambiguity of the Promethean 
character, Mary Shelley sketches a fascinating but complex picture of humanity. 
She introduces an artificially created ‘monster’, a human being, a (potentially 
well-realised) virtual post-human and indirectly even God. They may be different 
personages, but their boundaries are blurred: the monster also has ‘human’ 
characteristics and Frankenstein ‘monstrous’ as well as divine ones. Shelley’s 
point is that what are commonly considered to be ‘human’ characteristics do not 
exclusively belong to the human; just as the human does not exclusively 
possess these ‘human’ qualities. 
Essential with respect to these qualities is the influence of the material 
and social circumstances. By describing the slow degradation of the two 
protagonists’ lives – the process of their ‘falling’ – Shelley wishes to accentuate 
this influence and the resulting contingency of human life. In his own way, 
Frankenstein’s creation represents the human, that is, what Shelley considers 
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to be the actual human condition. Reminiscent of Aeschylus’ primitive human 
and Epimetheus’ creature, the monster begins his life in a babyish state – 
unknowing and innocent; literally and metaphorically “nude”, while it does have 
impressive innate potentialities of a rational, emotional, social and moral 
character. These potentialities need to be developed in interaction with the 
environment. Although the creature starts off well, developing ideas, feelings, 
capacities and even morals, as the circumstances turn out poor he becomes a 
brute. By means of the monster’s story Shelley points out that social contact 
and experience determine the way that the human personality evolves, which 
means that the human, somehow, is also artificial. The resulting capacities, 
qualities and traits can turn out in many ways – cultivated or underdeveloped, 
right or wrong, good or bad. Due to this contingency, the human is then most 
prone to end up with a complex combination of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ qualities and 
Shelley indeed equips her protagonists with widely divergent characteristics. 
Both Frankenstein and his creature are figures of a Promethean ambiguity, 
possessing qualities such as creativity, foresight, ambition and social empathy; 
but just as much hubris, rebelliousness, vulnerability and (Zeusian) cruelty. 
They enjoy and suffer, succeed and fail. Even God Almighty has a complex 
character: the figure who is commonly the embodiment of the Good could 
nevertheless be said to have been hubristic since he failed when creating 
humankind. The same goes for the virtual post-human, whether it is 
Frankenstein’s monster before it is finished, the latter’s potential (female) mate 
or another artificially created being. The outcome could be positive or negative, 
better or worse than the original human being: beautiful, affectionate and 
immortal, or ugly, harmful and susceptible. It is, however, most feasible for it to 
possess and develop a personality including qualities of all forms – ‘good’ and 
‘bad’. 
The boundaries, between the alleged ‘human being’, monster, post-
human and God are blurred, for it turns out that it is precisely the combination of 
the classical ‘human’, ‘monstrous’, divine and artificial qualities and the 
continuous dynamic between being and environment out of which emerges the 
‘real’ human condition. The question of what it means to be human is hard to 
answer, for the human condition is an essentially ambivalent one, characterised 
by flexibility, vulnerability and contingency. This evokes the urge of the human 
to turn things around, try to “penetrate” nature’s secrets and grab hold of life. 
However, according to Shelley we should keep on asking ourselves whether to 
touch the limits of our being and carefully consider the possible consequences 
(and the resulting responsibilities) which are probably as unpredictable as the 
current course of life. The boundaries of human nature may be unclear, but this 
does not provide carte blanche for moving or crossing them. On the glacier the 
monster tells his creator “I was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend. 
Make me happy, and I shall again be virtuous”. Frankenstein goes through his 
own troubling circumstances; he becomes miserable and then develops 
tyrannical traits. Both their lives do not only demonstrate the social and 
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environmental influence on more practical characteristics, but also on their 
emotional and moral being. Shelley shows that human sensations are inherently 
connected to virtue – and it is the human’s very happiness which is at stake. 
 
4.2.4.2. The Limits of Nakedness and the Power of Incompleteness 
 
Like Mary Shelley, many authors referring to Prometheus focus on malleability 
and incompleteness when describing the human condition. They characterise 
the human being as essentially missing or lacking something, as fundamentally 
incomplete. Yet in line with the myth even this ontology itself is of a malleable 
nature and can be explained in a positive or negative way – and whether good 
or not, it is always a unique quality of the human species. In the following I will 
treat the different versions of the human being and her inherent shortcomings. 
Even though it has been discussed several times, I should like to have 
one more look at the human from the Protagoras. When Plato describes the 
human state after he was created by Epimetheus – I shall repeat once more: 
“completely unequipped” and “naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed” – those 
wants are obviously unacceptable and even species threatening. Initially, 
humans were naked; they practically lacked any nature whatsoever. 
Prometheus and Zeus had to save the human beings by fulfilling their wants 
with (divine) fire and justice (and everything these stand for), for without these 
they would have been incapable of anything. Remarkably, however, 
Prometheus’ role in the Gorgias is not one of giving but consists in depriving 
humans of something: their foreknowledge of death. Here, this ‘lack’ is 
nevertheless a positive thing, something to be praised. For despite the fact that 
their loss of foresight results in ignorance and the unpredictability of death, in 
return the mortals are now ensured by absolute justice when their soul will 
undergo its final judgement. For from now on, “stripped” of its misleading 
“clothing” of “fine bodies, good family, and wealth”, the human soul can be 
immediately evaluated; while the judges cannot be deceived anymore, because 
unlike before they are no longer alive and so their souls are no longer “cloaked 
by [...] their whole body”. An interesting remark on the side is that another 
translation writes that the people 
 
“must all be judged in nakedness, for judgement must not be passed till they are dead. 
The judge also must be naked and dead in order that the judgement shall be just, his 
very soul contemplating the naked soul of each man who has died without warning”611. 
 
This makes it even clearer that in this myth, in contrast with the Protagoras 
story, ‘nakedness’ is thus positively valued. In any case, the judges have finally 
become truly righteous; and the human, having lost his foreknowledge of death 
and thereby the (partial) control over his fate, has become keener to lead a just 
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and more authentic life. Similarly, the Prometheus Bound pictures a Titan who 
is extremely generous and makes sure he fills a myriad human wants, but 
nevertheless also takes the human’s foresight of his death. He sends them 
“blind hopes to settle their hearts”. Again, this lack is something beneficial – in 
the words of Ocean’s daughters even a “cure” for a “disease”. For both 
Aeschylus and Plato, then, an essential shortcoming is possibly, but not 
necessarily something negative. 
Nor is it for Propertius. He may seem to dismiss Prometheus’ deficient 
creation when he exclaims “[w]hat a botch Prometheus made when he 
fashioned men out of clay and left so little space for the governing mind”. The 
mind’s lack of control produces chaos for everybody, rich or poor: “[w]hen you 
cross that ferry into the world below, you go aboard as naked as when you were 
born”. However, at the same time it is precisely that condition which allows 
humans to let themselves be led by that boundlessness – actually, again 
nakedness – and follow the unbinding “bondage of Love”. In the end, it is the 
inadequate, non-governing nature of the mind which enables humanity to enjoy 
the pleasures of a licentious, Love-regulated life. 
For more than a millennium after Propertius the essentially lacking 
human being stays in the background. She does return in the Renaissance, and 
then for a few centuries there are quite some instances where the human’s 
inherent shortcoming is presented as something of great worth. In general, this 
shortcoming is not as clearly defined as the one in Gorgias or the Prometheus 
Bound. In fact, many authors seem to build forth upon the Protagorean image of 
a ‘naked’ human being without any clearly defined abilities. Yet they interpret it 
in a positive way: the human’s incompleteness is her very power, for this 
enables her to evolve and shape herself the way she wants. For Bovelles, for 
instance – as for Pico – “the famous Prometheus” represents the human who, 
contrary to all other beings, came into being without a predetermined form. 
Humans do, however, carry in themselves “the nature of all things” and 
therefore are endowed with the ability to determine their own shape. They can – 
and should, for Bovelles’ account is ethically charged – follow Prometheus and 
remould the deity’s creation. Bovelles explains that the Promethean human will 
have to move through several stages in this process of becoming and self-
creation, but with the flame of wisdom humans can “enliven”, “reheat” and 
“animate” the sheer terrestrial being they are at the start; they can design their 
own shape and ascend to celestial levels of consciousness and perfection. 
Bacon has another positive concept of the wanting human – a rather 
ambiguous concept, but full of faith nevertheless. Bacon settles upon four main 
characters of the Prometheus myth who, together, personify the human 
condition. We humans have a unique, namely central position in the world, and 
are “endued and furnished with most admirable virtues and faculties”. We enjoy 
Promethean foresight, wisdom and a strong urge for research – also, or 
especially, pragmatic research and invention; and nothing less than Providence 
– again symbolised by Prometheus – is located in the human’s rational mind. 
Trijsje Franssen    Prometheus Through the Ages 
191 
 
However, we also have our imperfections, such as disproportionate self-
indulgence, embodied by Pandora. She stands for “pleasure and 
voluptuousness” and when in line with these characteristics “the civil life is 
pampered with too much art and culture and superfluity”, this produces not only 
individual misery, but also war and tyranny. Bacon sees Epimetheus and 
Prometheus each providing a great example of a specific kind of human being 
with his own flaws. Typically Epimethean humans are un-foreseeing, 
irresponsible ones, who always live their life in the moment and its delights, but 
thereby also “almost in perpetual affliction”. However, thanks to their ignorance 
and carelessness, they do have their hopes and enjoy themselves, which the 
second type does not. According to Bacon Promethean humans are thus 
characterised by brightness and foresight, but also by caution. This comfortably 
enables them to avoid many disasters, yet also makes them “deprive 
themselves and defraud their genius of many lawful pleasures and diverse 
recreations”. It are exactly these rational, prudent and forethinking humans who 
continuously bother themselves with fears and worries: “they are afflicted with 
innumerable cogitations [...], as it were, gnawing and devouring the liver”. 
Bacon says we will never be able to both benefit from the faculties Providence 
enriched us with and evade anguish without the aid of Herakles, “that is, 
fortitude and constancy of mind [...], foreseeing without fear, enjoying without 
loathing, and suffering without impatience”. The solution lies in acknowledging 
our deficiencies; in keeping our faith in the possibility to advance by means of 
knowledge, (empirical) research and Heraklean courage and perseverance, for 
then we will evolve and improve ourselves. 
In short: humans suffer from excessive Pandoran self-pampering, 
Epimethean carelessness and/or Promethean self-generated eagle-like 
gnawing, that is, worrying. Yet according to Bacon this is nothing bad. In fact, it 
is a good thing: the story teaches us to be grateful for our limits, for those will 
only awaken the Heraklean potential in us and stimulate us to explore those 
limits and life and continue our search for (scientific) knowledge and 
improvement. Actually, our shortcomings are even preconditions for progress 
and so, paradoxically, our flaws make our condition flawless: as with Pico and 
Bovelles, the frailty of the human being is her strength. Moreover, again one 
should note that Bacon’s account of human nature is not a mere description. 
The human condition as such already incorporates, first, a moral evaluation: this 
condition is good; and, second, a moral encouragement: humans should 
employ this nature – their capabilities as well as their deficiencies. This will 
enable them to always keep on growing, expand their wisdom and capacities 
and perhaps even prolong their life, so that they may end up in a paradisiacal 
situation such as that of New Atlantis. 
The image of the fundamentally wanting human will keep on appearing 
throughout the centuries. Rousseau’s account of the human is another positive 
interpretation of the fundamentally wanting human. According to him, the 
original ignorance and primitivity of humanity is good; the human’s natural lack 
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of knowledge and civilisation is the precondition for her serenity, innocence and 
happiness – the human will only burn himself on the Promethean torch of 
science. 
In a quite different form, the idea of the lacking human returns with 
Nietzsche and Freud. This time the human condition is not so much 
straightforwardly celebrated or lamented, but rather stated as a fact, although 
the consequences are certainly discussed and criticised. Each in their own way, 
the scholars highlight humankind’s fundamental incompleteness and relate this 
to religion. Nietzsche characterises the human as “das noch nicht Festgestellte 
Thier” – reminiscent of the Epimethean creation – and Freud underlines 
humanity’s infinite immaturity. Humans need dreams, fantasies and illusions to 
compensate for the indeterminacy of their condition; and as Nietzsche argues in 
The Gay Science it is precisely these self-deceiving constructions which make 
the human strongly resemble Prometheus and his illusionary fabrications. Both 
Nietzsche and Freud point out that God is nothing but such a delusion, created 
by humans to close their inherent gaps. The human urge to complete may be 
not a bad thing in itself, but up to now the effects are: we took the wrong step 
when “finishing” or “maturing” ourselves by means of religion, for the 
worshipping of a non-existent deity only impedes the process of civilisation. 
Nietzsche may be more pessimistic than Freud, but neither is without hope for 
the future. Both push us to acknowledge our essential indeterminacy and the 
illusionary – according to Nietzsche even bestialising – nature of our tales and 
beliefs. Nietzsche states that we should recognise the fact that we ourselves, in 
Promethean fashion, created the myths we believe to be true, for if we do, we 
can free ourselves from those self-constructed restraints, proceed and explore 
the unlimited possibilities of our indefinite nature. 
Freud’s argument with respect to our self-deception is that it is time to outgrow 
our infantile state and its gods, self-made out of a need for paternal authority. 
And we will, for Freud believes that the evolution of the human species will 
proceed in accordance with the human’s individual, physical process of growth, 
which means that humans will no longer need an external authority to 
compensate for their ‘infinite’ immaturity: the gaps seem to have lost their 
inevitability. There is thus an important difference between Nietzsche and 
Freud: the latter states that “we find ourselves [...] in the middle of that phase of 
development” – in the end we will reach personal and cultural maturity. The 
human is endowed with what McLelland calls “the Promethean will” and by 
means of this rebellious opposition against authority we will establish personal 
and “atheistic autonomy”. For Nietzsche, however, we will always remain 
undetermined; there is nothing necessarily wrong with that, as long as we do 
not fix ourselves with something as deceiving as Christianity. 
Each in their own way, all the 20th century authors I treated picture the 
human as an inherently incomplete being and do this by means of the 
Prometheus myth. Gide’s Prometheus relates how he used to be an 
“unconscious and beautiful, happy and naked and unaware” being, but as soon 
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as he concerned himself with the humans the eagle appeared, took advantage 
of his exposedness and started feasting on him. Prometheus thus starts off as a 
Rousseau-like natural being, but his pleasant state of nudity is severely 
disturbed by the eagle, that is, by consciousness. The Titan makes the human 
in his own image, that is, conscious of existence, but thereby also essentially 
vulnerable. For with consciousness of existence also comes conscience and 
responsibility, as well as the need for a reason for existence. The reason 
Prometheus endows humans with is faith in progress, but this faith is 
“devouring”, a “morbid hope for better”. At first sight Prometheus may be 
humanity’s giver, but he embodies the inherently fragile human: everyone has 
an eagle, and “[t]he belief in progress, gentlemen, that was their eagle”. The 
human needs a reason to live and is forced to fulfil this with a moral system, 
which is as illusionary as the ones envisioned by Nietzsche and Freud. Humans 
devote themselves to its set of principles and laws as Prometheus to his eagle, 
hoping and believing this will make them advance. However, this allegedly 
need-satisfying system is only imprisoning, liberty-constraining, devouring them; 
only amplifying the human lack. Yet despite the misery of this image, again just 
as Nietzsche and Freud, Gide has faith in the human capacity to deal with their 
want. This want is inevitable, but, like Prometheus, humans can ‘eat’ their 
eagle: they can at least create their own, private morality and let their freedom 
be restricted by their own sense of responsibility instead of by some religious or 
other traditional ethics from the outside. According to Gide, humans can – and 
should – take life in their own hands and decide for themselves with what rules 
and laws they will close the moral gap of their existence. 
As I said when discussing rebellion, Camus’ Titan represents the human 
being in an undeified world. This modern, suddenly independent human has 
surely made progress, but Camus tells us “we are still deaf to the great cry of 
human revolt of which [Prometheus] gives the solitary signal”. The loss of God 
made life absurd: human existence lacks meaning and with our exclusive focus 
on science and the physical we ignore essential Promethean gifts such as art, 
liberty, happiness and the soul. We may be successful with technology, but 
“one serves nothing in man if one does not serve the whole man”. However, as 
the other 20th century thinkers just discussed, Camus believes we have the 
ability to fulfil our wants: we can – and again, we should – serve our whole 
selves, body and soul, if, like Prometheus, we “separate and exclude nothing”, 
because that “always has and always will reconcile mankind’s suffering with the 
springtimes of the world”. If we open our ears to the vibrations of freedom, 
enchantment, the aesthetic and the spiritual we can compensate for our lives’ 
absurd lack of significance. 
Finally, Anders emphasises the human’s lack of origin. He is another 
author who employs the Prometheus myth to reveal what humanity is missing. 
According to him, human nature is not having any nature at all and that is why 
humans shape their own world and being. At first sight, Anders’ idea may 
appear to fall under the same heading as Pico’s and Bovelles’ cheerful concept 
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of the naturally undetermined, self-transforming human. However, Anders’ 
account is dark and troubling: the human’s lack of essence makes him 
inherently detached from the world and then, rather than a Titanic talent, self-
creation is her duty, a pre-requisite. “[T]he unadjusted being must create a 
personal world, because no ready-made world is available” – nor is there any 
ready-made form of significance. Humans’ fundamental ‘unworldliness’ forces 
them to create their own universe and way of being out of an unfathomable 
amount of possible worlds. The non-existence of some inherent meaning and 
the structural artificiality and changeability of his nature makes the human 
essentially unstable. He experiences himself as contingent and arbitrary; 
“coming from an origin which he can’t do anything with, but which he must 
identify himself with here and now”. Driven by their Promethean pride and 
creativity humans used to keep on making progress, the quality of their products 
growing and growing. However, says Anders, Promethean pride is history – it 
has been replaced by Promethean shame. Nowadays, no one succeeds any 
more in satisfyingly employing their mythological moulding abilities. 
Paradoxically, this is all due to humankind’s immense technological progress, 
for it has been overhauled by its own creations. The “shamefully high quality” of 
their fabrications confronts humans with their own imperfections and the 
severely antiquated character of the accidental, contingent and illogical nature 
of their coming-into and being-in-the-world. The human body is naked in the 
sense that it is “unworked”, insufficiently reified, a “faulty construction” which 
invokes the severe Promethean shame humanity feels towards the artifice. 
Confronted with their own weaknesses, contemporary humans desire to 
become a product themselves, they crave their own reification. People wish to 
mould themselves into something mechanical, leaving behind all that is natural 
about them. Like thinkers such as Nietzsche and Gide, Anders pictures the 
human as fundamentally undefined. However, he certainly sketches the most 
pessimistic image and pictures a human who has become something of the 
past, who continuously fails to shape himself. This human lost the capacity to 
fulfil his inherent ontological emptiness and the only solution is to denaturalise; 
his only aim is dehumanization. 
 
4.2.5. Ambiguity 
 
As I said at the beginning, an essential quality of the Prometheus myth is its 
ambiguity. It is something that keeps on coming back and plays a fundamental 
role at various levels and layers of the story and its interpretations. First of all, 
the classical myth itself is ambiguous. Second, several of the myth’s themes, 
happenings, figures and objects are ambiguous by definition. Third, the 
narrators’ mouldings and interpretations of the story as well as the characters 
and themes within one narration are often ambiguous. Fourth, regularly the 
function and message of one particular version of (or reference to) the 
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Promethean story is ambiguous – sometimes because of several antagonistic 
references in different contexts – and so is the narrator’s point of view. 
To start with the first point: the ambivalence of the Prometheus myth 
itself – that is, its storyline – must be more than obvious. There is not one 
canonical text and so the different classical versions each include elements the 
others do not have – in short: Hesiod’s the sacrificial trick; Aeschylus’ the many 
details and Plato’s the creation. This already makes sure ‘the’ myth consists of 
a set of themes, occurrences, personages and objects, which together create 
complex network of potential connections, agreements, unities and 
contradictions and thus a world of possible forms, interpretations, employments 
and applications of the story. 
Second, various of the myth’s characteristic themes, concepts, figures 
and objects are ambivalent in themselves. Evidently, they are different from 
version to version, but even when taken out of the context of the Prometheus 
myth, they are not unequivocal. As said, fire is one of these elements. In 
‘reality’, apart from whatever storyline, the phenomenon as such is double-
edged: a source of light, warmth, technological practices and civilisation, while 
just as much one of death and destruction – one of the reasons why it plays not 
only an important practical role but also a symbolic and spiritual one in many 
different existent cultures. 
Hope is another example of such inherent ambiguity. As Dougherty says, 
“it can encourage a man to work hard [...] in anticipation of a prosperous future 
or it can delude an idle man into an unrealistic expectation of a life of ease”. It 
can take away fears – like the gift of “blind hopes” from Aeschylus’ Prometheus 
– and motivate humans to develop plans and undertake action. Yet its ‘blinding’ 
tendency may also disturb a sensible worldview and lead to nothing but 
unforeseen misfortunes. 
Related to hope is the ambiguity of knowledge. It is the birthplace of 
understanding, control, progress and perhaps even truth; but is simultaneously 
restrictive and it excludes possibilities. Whether on purpose or not, ‘wisdom’ can 
be used for inappropriate, immoral or dangerous objectives and contain 
confrontational and frightening facts one should rather not have known. The 
emptiness of ignorance may be preferable, for that can still be filled in many 
ways, with an innumerable amount of possible facts and understandings, which 
means there is much space for surprising and beautiful outcomes – and 
therefore also for much hope. 
There are several other cases of such intrinsic ambivalence (used in the 
myth). The figure of the Greek god, for instance: whatever myth it concerns, it is 
an equivocal figure – each possesses divine as well as human qualities, good 
as well as bad and controlling as well as chaotic ones. Typically Promethean 
character traits such as ambition, creativity and courage are ambiguous anyway 
– as they produce (respectively) progress as well as overconfidence; invention 
as well as failure; victory as well as suffering. Freedom is ambivalent – it places 
life in one’s own hands and thus opens up an immense realm of possibilities. 
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This free state of being, however, implies no guidance or structure so that there 
is a serious threat of getting lost in that very same realm. 
The above examples can be extended with a number of other ones. But 
the discussed cases should have made clear that several of the double-edged 
themes and concepts present in the Prometheus myth are ambiguous by 
definition, independent of the myth’s framework. Their use is unlikely to be a 
coincidence; the classical writers must have consciously chosen particular 
concepts to set their audience thinking. The ambivalence of hope, for instance, 
is probably why Hesiod keeps it in Pandora’s box – leaving it to the reader to 
decide whether it is the human’s last means of survival or something evoking 
such a terrible kind of badness that it should remain in the jar of evil. The 
ambiguity of knowledge is another main focus of the ancients. The gains of 
wisdom – technological progress, cultural civilisation etc – are obvious, but 
those of ignorance are not neglected. The benefit of not having knowledge of 
future misery is the main reason why Aeschylus’ and Plato’s Prometheus takes 
away the human’s foreknowledge of death. They have the reader reflect on the 
conviction that wisdom is not always for the better. 
The already independently ambiguous themes – together, of course, with 
the differences between the classical versions of the myth – produce a broad 
range of potential storylines, explanations and interpretations and thus food for 
thought. This is why throughout history many authors enthusiastically grab hold 
of the myth; its flexibility makes it easy for them to mould it according to their 
own wishes and use it to their benefit. However, this does not mean that within 
one particular version of the myth a figure or occurrence does not often still 
have different characteristics and can be interpreted in several ways. In fact, it 
is often not only the malleability of the myth as such but precisely the ambiguity 
of its figures and themes why narrators choose this story in particular to make 
their point. So to continue with the third field of ambiguity: the Promethean 
characters, themes and concepts employed are regularly still ambivalent within 
one narration since – thus often on purpose – different and even contradictory 
elements of the tale are combined. 
Evidently, Prometheus himself is the main case of such an ambiguous 
figure. From one tale to another we have seen a myriad of types with an 
immense variety of characteristics, from a nasty deceiver to an outright 
champion, from an anxious defaulter to a divine creator. But although usually 
there is a greater focus on some features than others, also within one narrative 
the Titan virtually always possesses a combination of different and even 
antithetical qualities. The same goes for his operations: perhaps an author 
focuses on one rather than the other, but often conflicting actions take place – 
though not always as explicit, his stealing as well as giving are for instance 
consistently included in each version. Hesiod rejects him as a trickster, 
Aeschylus and Plato present him as a hero, but in all three separate stories he 
is a thief as well as a benefactor. The appreciation of Prometheus’ character 
and actions and the author’s final judgement may be of an obviously positive or 
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negative nature. Yet whether he embodies “the power to think and reason” 
(Plutarch) or the miserable hubris of “human invention” (Hobbes), he has 
always done something good and bad, so that according to Ficino’s 
interpretation, the Titan may simultaneously represent “the highest level of 
daemons” and the “ruler of the rational soul”. 
Many other examples of ambiguous characters could be given which are 
obviously radically different from story to story, but also within one and the 
same: Pandora, for instance, is literally defined by Hesiod as a “lovely evil”612 – 
a contradictio in terminis, I would say. Another fascinating case is Gide’s 
extraordinarily refashioned eagle: a) a pitiable, meagre bird, yet nevertheless 
still a torturing, liver-devouring creature; b) first the “sweet eagle” loved tenderly 
by an anxious Prometheus, yet happily eaten by an advanced Titan at the end. 
The bird’s symbolic significance turns out to be the ambivalent human 
conscience, which devours humans by means of its restricting ethical rules, yet 
at the same time provides them with an identity. Clearly, Gide selected this 
particular story because of its malleability and rich supply of ambiguous and 
contradictory elements. 
In addition, not only the myth’s characters, but also the (classical) actions 
and themes are often equivocal within one version of the story. With respect to 
actions, Prometheus’ theft is always of an ambiguous nature. This is beautifully 
put to use by Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy when he characterises the theft 
– that is, the acquirement of knowledge – as a valuable crime, paradoxically 
worthy because of its evil nature. Further, the Titan’s act of creation is very 
often explained in the most ambivalent ways. Anders, for instance, shows how 
that same Promethean creative power which made humanity continuously 
evolve and proceed, simultaneously is the source of its current inferior and 
shameful condition. One could call it a self-destructive power – again, a 
contradiction in terms. 
When it comes to themes, as said, some are ambiguous by themselves, 
but clearly they are as well within the context of one particular narration, such 
as the examples given above: hope, for instance, in Hesiod’s version and 
knowledge in Aeschylus’ and Plato’s. Again, these could be extended with 
many more examples of ambivalence – such as science in Frankenstein, or fire 
in Freud’s explanation of the converse functions of the male genitals. Yet the 
most crucial ambiguity inspired by the myth is the concept of human nature – 
Plato’s semi-divine human, Boccaccio’s “twofold” one and many more. Indeed, 
all the accounts of an essentially incomplete, malleable human condition 
discussed above are fundamentally ambivalent, whether it is Bacon’s human 
with his fruitful flaws or Nietzsche’s undetermined, self-deceiving human animal. 
In fact, for Nietzsche the myth as a whole symbolises the inherent ambiguity of 
human existence as such, which is Apollonian as well as Dionysian, orderly as 
well as chaotic, victorious as well as tortured, human as well as bestial. 
                                                 
612
 My emphasis. 
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Fourth, the function of the Promethean reference in a text and the 
author’s message and viewpoint underneath are often ambivalent as well. 
Lucian’s perspective, for instance, is rather ambiguous in different ways. First, 
as said, he completely ridicules the myth in his dialogue, but Prometheus 
remains its hero nevertheless. Second, Lucian celebrates the vitality and 
flexibility of humans – that is, Prometheus’ creations – yet at the same time he 
states that humankind is nothing but a product to please the gods, for “[w]hat is 
great, you know, can only seem great if it is gauged by something small”. 
Moreover, he often speaks of himself – as a human – in a belittling way, just as 
of the people who enjoy his work, for they are nothing but a cheap, spectacle-
eager crowd. Third, when called “a literary Prometheus” because of his creative 
and innovative capacities, Lucian is flattered, but later he emphasises that 
contrary to the Titan he is no thief – “from whom should I have stolen?” – or 
trickster – “have I [...] cheated my hearers by serving them up bones wrapped in 
fat?” In all three cases, it is unclear whether Lucian’s final assessment of 
Prometheus is entirely cynical or serious at the core, whether it is positive or 
negative. Actually, what is clear is that his assessment cannot be characterised 
in either way. Lucian is a great example of a narrator who chooses this myth in 
particular precisely because of its ambivalence, because it provides him with a 
rich source of antithetical elements with which he can expose his complex 
ideas. 
Propertius’ idea is another equivocal one. He calls the creation of 
Prometheus a “botch”, which was made without forethought. The human being 
is ill-fashioned because of the mind’s unbound, ungoverned character – “the 
slightest wind is enough to blow us far off course” and this leads to awful things 
such as warfare. Yet at the same time Propertius deeply cherishes that 
nakedness, that lack of control and restriction and he openly admits to 
thoroughly revel in a free life of dancing, drinking and loving. Instead of telling 
people to let their minds be governed by rules, Propertius stimulates them to 
“bind” those minds to freedom and most of all, to love, for that is not only 
pleasing but also generates peace. However, once he has become older and 
his Love-filled days are over, that “will be time enough for my mind to turn to 
nature to consider the ways of the gods”. 
In short, the narrator’s statements are contradictory: Prometheus has made a 
blunder which is nevertheless happily enjoyed; the unbound mind is celebrated 
and stimulated, but in the end intellectual investigation and control are surely 
important. So when it comes to the crunch, does Propertius appreciate the 
Titan’s failure or not? Does he mean to encourage people to unbind their minds 
or not? His message is double and it seems to be so on purpose: enjoy your 
unbounded mind when young and bind it to serious rationality when older, when 
love life has become less interesting. In fact, it seems to be precisely the 
ambiguous, half-bound nature of the mind which pleases Propertius, so that in 
the end Prometheus has not done such a bad job after all. 
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Once more, there are many other occasions on which the narrator’s idea 
or opinion is ambivalent. If we lay an author’s reference to the myth side-by-side 
with another in a different text of his, often his final judgement is opaque by all 
means. Ficino’s Prometheus is a miserable chained martyr (Five Questions), 
whose creative capacities are nevertheless appreciated when Ficino compares 
himself to the Titan (Letter to Pico); Hobbes’ Prometheus who was earlier 
dismissed as a hubristic “imitating” rebel (De Cive), becomes “the prudent man” 
(Leviathan); and Nietzsche’s dignified criminal (The Birth of Tragedy) degrades 
to a pathetic, self-deluding human (The Gay Science). Of course the 
ambivalence of these cases could simply be due to the fact that the narrator’s 
view radically changed over time. 
The last text I’d like to address is Kafka’s Prometheus, which may be the 
most ambiguous of them all. One can endlessly speculate about its literal 
meaning and profound message: is it about storytelling, or about truth? Is it 
about the end of mythology as suggested by Blumenberg? Does it still have 
anything to do with Prometheus? Kafka’s writing covers the Promethean 
ambiguity in all four layers discussed above. First, by presenting four versions 
of the myth it makes use of its classical ambiguity due to the differences 
between the archaic versions. Second, two themes which are of central 
importance are the inherently ambiguous ones of truth and reality. Third, within 
the text as a whole the figure of Prometheus himself is ambiguous: a betrayer, a 
martyr and at some point even a rock. Fourth, together with cryptic phrasings 
this produces a text of which the meaning and purpose as well as the author’s 
viewpoint are thoroughly ambiguous. Kafka’s radical remodelling of what he 
names “the meaningless affair” is paradoxically nevertheless an attempt to 
assign meaning to that affair – in fact, it cannot but assign it some meaning, 
even if it is virtually incomprehensible. Perhaps his reshaping of “the legend” 
which “tries to explain the inexplicable” – again, a contradiction in terms – is 
about something one could call the inherent inexplicability of life? Whatever the 
answer, Kafka’s writing shows the myth’s ambivalence at its best.  
 
Conclusion 
 
By means of an analysis of the historical data from the former chapters in this 
chapter I have tried to show how the whole of interconnected characteristics, 
functions and themes explains why especially the Prometheus myth has always 
kept on intriguing people throughout all these centuries. Not only did I show 
what the historical references to the myth tell us about the myth itself, but also 
what they tell us about the ideas of the author and his times.  
I started by pointing out the myth’s extraordinary malleability, which is an 
essential quality that provides a firm basis for its functions. It produces an 
infinite potential of storylines and interpretations and therefore makes it 
adaptable to all the different eras and hands it passed through, all with their own 
aims, problems and paradigms. This is why it has always continued to spark all 
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kinds of authors to take hold of the fruitful story and shape their own version, 
moulded according to their own wishes, aims and philosophical convictions. 
First, I discussed the myth’s functional values. It has a society-related 
function: it is both influenced by the time’s social circumstances and individual 
beliefs, while its rich content also helps shape and reflect on those 
circumstances and beliefs. Related to this is the myth’s knowledge forming 
function: it offers a flexible assemblage of images and meanings which can be 
formed into frameworks that help humankind understand and investigate the 
world. As a story of the human’s origin and nature it particularly helps assign the 
human a place in that world and answer existential questions: what it means to 
be human. This brings us to the myth’s moral function. Apart from more specific 
ethical messages and normative recommendations, the ontology it presents by 
definition carries a moral meaning. The human condition represented by the 
Titan or his story always implies an idea of the ‘right’ or ‘just’ condition. 
Second, I investigated the myth’s themes. Whereas individually the 
treated functions are not exclusive to the myth of Prometheus, the combination 
of its malleability, functions and themes is. Its malleability is not only an 
essential feature of its form or storyline, but imbues all of its elements because 
the myth’s content is substantially ambiguous. Fire, rebellion, creativity and 
human nature – all of its characteristic themes are of an ambivalent nature. I 
discovered that the seemingly contradictory interpretations of the myth’s themes 
are never waterproof. One (e.g. positive) interpretation can never completely 
exclude the (e.g. negative) other. Prometheus’ beneficent gift is stolen; hubris is 
courageous nevertheless. The creation of humanity demands artistry; poetry 
involves self-creation. The Promethean human is infinitely self-improving, but 
therefore necessarily incomplete. This is what distinguishes the Prometheus 
myth from other stories: its ambiguity is impossible to escape, for it is inherent 
to its form, functions, themes, characters and (individual) interpretation. 
Moreover, it is not merely an ambiguous story but poses that ambiguity as its 
central question. The all-encompassing theme of the complicated double-edged 
nature of vital elements of the human and her life is the very question or 
problem that those employing the Prometheus myth – whether on purpose or 
not, implicitly or explicitly – raise, study and/or try to answer or solve. The 
myth’s ambivalence only strengthens its malleability, so that, as noted, the 
author is free to examine the innumerable quantity of possible interpretations, 
shape the story according to his own time, taste and philosophy, and create his 
own way to deal with the issue of ambivalence. 
However, the author’s ‘freedom’ of choice is simultaneously a restriction, 
since he is forced to limit his choice to only a few possibilities out of the infinite 
amount at his disposal. This means that the chapter’s analysis unveils 
significant information on two sides of a reference to the Prometheus myth: first, 
about the myth as such; second, about the author referring to the myth. While 
the references, shapes and choices of the many authors studied have taught us 
much about the nature, functions and themes of the Prometheus myth, at the 
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same time with this information at hand we gain access to the – often at first 
sight not that obvious – essential concepts, beliefs and judgements of the 
authors in question. Whether their emphasis lies on thievery or giving, whether 
the human’s Promethean nature is condemned or praised – it all allows us a 
look into something as paramount as their worldview. And so my findings have 
an explanatory as well as practical value. They explain its continuous 
recurrence in history: thanks to its complex, flexible whole of characteristics, 
functions and themes, the Prometheus myth has a particular usefulness and 
kept on inspiring philosophers, authors and artists throughout all these 
centuries. The practical value of my findings lies in their function as a means to 
disclose the fundamental views of the author who chose to appeal to the 
thought-provoking potentialities of this myth in order to make her point. 
Therefore I claim first, that in line with its malleability and continuous popularity 
the myth must still be of significant relevance in philosophy today; and second, 
that an analysis of contemporary references to the myth with my research as 
point of departure would thus provide access to the author’s vital concepts and 
convictions. In the next chapter I examine the contemporary debate on human 
enhancement in order to demonstrate the validity of these two claims. 
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5. The Enhancement Debate 
 
Introduction 
 
There is one more step to take in order to complete the discussion of the 
Prometheus myth: exploring the debate on ‘human enhancement’. Provoked by 
the blistering pace at which technology is advancing, it has made philosophers, 
scientists and many others wonder whether – and if so, how – emerging 
technologies such as IVF, cloning, artificial intelligence, genetic engineering and 
nanotechnology could be used to ‘enhance’ humans by fundamentally 
improving their characteristics. What would such profound changes mean for us 
as human beings? Would we actually remain human or become posthuman 
beings? Would such changes be improving us at all? Should we then be trying 
to ‘enhance’ the human with those new technologies or not? These are some of 
the main questions driving the ‘Enhancement Debate’. 
Both proponents and adversaries of human enhancement often refer to 
Prometheus. The former may warn us to “[b]eware the day when we betray our 
Promethean heritage”613. The latter may hold that “[i]n his moment of triumph, 
Promethean man will […] become a contented cow”614. In what follows, I will 
examine how both camps in the debate make use of the myth. I will start by 
giving a brief overview of the arguments and Prometheus references of Gregory 
Stock, Ronald Dworkin, Donrich Jordaan and Simon Young (advocates) and 
Michael Sandel, Leon Kass and Mike McNamee (opponents). I will go on to 
analyse the references encountered with my findings from the previous 
chapters as point of departure. My aims are to, first, demonstrate the 
continuous relevance and inspirational value of the Prometheus myth in 
philosophical arguments today; and second, uncover fundamental 
conceptualisations, beliefs and judgements of the participants of the debate. 
Thereby, I wish to a) clarify the arguments, ethics and ontological framework of 
the debaters and b) demonstrate the usefulness of my earlier findings as a 
means to gain access to vital concepts and convictions of an author referring to 
the myth. 
 
5.1. The Advocates 
 
The theorists in the pro-enhancement camp argue that human enhancement 
should be pursued: because it is a logical step in humanity’s evolution, because 
it is inevitable, or because it is a moral imperative. It will cure disease, reduce 
inequality, make us physically and mentally stronger, make us happier. 
                                                 
613
 D. Jordaan, “Antipromethean Fallacies: A Critique of Fukuyama’s Bioethics,” Biotechnology 
Law Report 28, no. 5 (2009): 590. 
614
 Leon Kass, Life, Liberty, and the Defence of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics (San 
Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002), 48. 
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According to some scholars, this will culminate in generating a new and better 
species. Many of those endorsing the latter idea call themselves 
‘transhumanists’. The term ‘transhumanism’ was coined by biologist Julian 
Huxley in 1957, who spoke of a belief in “man remaining man, but transcending 
himself, by realizing new possibilities of and for his human nature”615. 
Transhumanists believe in a future posthuman race which, in the words of 
leading transhumanist Nick Bostrom, will have physical and mental capacities 
“greatly exceeding the maximum attainable by any current human being”616. 
Today’s transhumanists promote this transcendence towards a posthuman 
existence and show strong commitments to science, technology, reason and 
progress. 
When they refer to Prometheus, they opt for the most positive and 
optimistic versions of the myth, dominated by themes of fire, courage, wisdom, 
control and progress. Their Titan is one who is shaped along Aeschylean lines 
and further possesses the creative powers Plato bestowed him with. He is the 
heroic benefactor of humanity who does not fear to face dangers and cross 
boundaries, not even if they lead to realms which are completely impossible to 
visualise. The pro-enhancement Prometheus is the one who fashioned humans 
out of clay and endowed them with the capacity to take over his shaping 
activities and fashion themselves. He is the one who gave them wisdom, arts 
and technology through which they can infinitely proceed and evolve, or better: 
enhance themselves. 
 
5.1.1. Gregory Stock 
 
The biophysicist Gregory Stock, a major figure among the advocates, is one of 
the promoters of the Promethean urge to improve. In his book Redesigning 
Humans (2003), he confidently announces that we are “on the cusp of profound 
biological change”617. Given emerging technologies such as cloning and human 
genetic modification it is only a matter of time before “these developments will 
write a new page in the history of life, allowing us to seize control of our 
evolutionary future”618. Whether we like it or not, he argues, the trend has been 
set and further developments are inevitable. In fact, some of us are already 
enhancing themselves by means of, for instance, performance enhancement in 
sports – doping – or aesthetic surgery. If people believe manipulating 
themselves by means of genetic engineering is to their advantage, as soon as 
they think it is safe enough, they shall be willing to use these new technologies. 
                                                 
615
 Julian Huxley, “Transhumanism,” in New Bottles for New Wine (London: Chatto & Windus, 
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616
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Quoting James Watson, co-discoverer of the structure of DNA, Stock 
asks us: “[i]f we could make better humans … why shouldn’t we?”619. Yes, there 
will be anxiety, mistakes and even abuse, but that could be said about any 
radical new development or technology. And of course we should be careful 
with the application of the technologies, but no serious scientist will start 
engineering human genes until such operations can be safely carried out. So 
“[w]hy all the fuss, then?”620. To try to stop the developments is unrealistic and 
impossible. We will be facing daunting choices, “but putting our heads in the 
sand is not the solution”621. Rather we should think about how to minimise the 
risks and maximise the benefits.  
 
“Humanity is moving out of its childhood and into a gawky, stumbling adolescence in 
which it must learn not only to acknowledge its immense new powers, but to figure out 
how to use them wisely.”
622
 
 
Instead, we should be brave and face the unknown dangers:  
 
“[S]ome imagine we will see the perils, come to our senses, and turn away from such 
possibilities. But when we imagine Prometheus stealing fire from the gods, we are not 
incredulous or shocked by his act. It is too characteristically human. To forego the 
powerful [enhancement] technologies […] would be as out of character for humanity as 
it would be to use them without concern for the dangers they pose”
623
. 
 
In short: the Promethean urge is only human. 
 
5.1.2. Ronald Dworkin 
 
A similar point is made by philosopher of law Ronald Dworkin in his book 
Sovereign Virtue (2000). In the chapter “Playing God: Genes, Clones, and Luck” 
he argues that the revulsion many people feel against cloning and genetic 
engineering is based not so much on fear of the potential dangers, concern 
about social injustice or loss of human diversity, but on an aversion to “playing 
God”. However, 
 
 “it is deeply unclear what the injunction [not to play God] really means—unclear what 
playing God is, and what, exactly, is wrong with it. It can’t mean that it is always wrong 
for human beings to attempt to resist natural catastrophes, or to improve upon the hand 
that nature has dealt them. People do that—always have done that—all the time”
624
. 
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The problem rather seems to be that genetic science presents the possibility of 
an enormous dislocation in the very structure of our moral and ethical 
framework. People dread genetic engineering not so much because of a fear of 
what is wrong, “it is rather a fear of losing our grip on what is wrong”, of a “moral 
free-fall” 625. However, this does not mean that the emotional responses to 
genetic manipulations are justified. It only means that we may have to revise 
some of our most basic moral presuppositions, but we should rise to the 
challenge: 
 
“Playing God is indeed playing with fire. But that is what we mortals have done since 
Prometheus, the patron saint of dangerous discoveries. We play with fire and take the 
consequences, because the alternative is cowardice in the face of the unknown”
626
. 
 
Again: the Promethean ambition is something inherently human. 
 
5.1.3. Donrich Jordaan 
 
Dworkin’s idea of the “Promethean courage” is strongly upheld by the 
biotechnology entrepreneur Donrich Jordaan, in his article “Antipromethean 
Fallacies: A Critique of Fukuyama’s Bioethics” (2009). Jordaan challenges the 
views of “bioconservative” Francis Fukuyama of (amongst other things) 
“resurrecting” the naturalistic fallacy. In Our Posthuman Future (2003), 
Fukuyama rejects genetic engineering on the grounds that it would harm human 
dignity, be unnatural, and dehumanize us. He argues that human dignity is 
based on what he calls “Factor X”, which 
 
“cannot be reduced to the possession of moral choice, or reason, or language, or 
sociability, or sentience, or emotions, or consciousness, or any other quality that has 
been put forth as a ground for human dignity. It is all these qualities coming together in 
a human whole that make up Factor X”
627
. 
 
Fukuyama holds that enhancement would mean an invasion of this “human 
whole” and as such harm human dignity. Jordaan argues that this human whole 
or Factor X is nothing but human nature. And to derive values such as human 
dignity exclusively from human nature is invalid because human nature, in itself, 
has no (or limited) moral relevance. Fukuyama’s argument, in other words, is a 
case of naturalistic fallacy. 
 Another claim from Fukuyama argued against by Jordaan is that pain 
and suffering are essential for humanity because they form the basis for 
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fundamental and valuable qualities such as compassion, heroism and “depth”. 
Since enhancement will relieve suffering, these qualities will be lost and such a 
loss will dehumanize us. In Jordaan’s view, this argument is “thoroughly 
unconvincing and unabashedly technophobic”628. In the absence of human 
suffering, nothing prevents us from still being compassionate or heroic – even if 
one insists on interpreting the latter narrowly as “bravery under difficult or even 
life-threatening circumstances”629, for there will still be extreme situations, such 
as accidents or natural disasters. Nor will it withhold us from deep reflection. 
Jordaan criticises Fukuyama for a “disappointing lack of intellectual 
courage”630 and for assuming that any change in human nature is automatically 
bad. But human nature could just as much “be changed for the better, 
promoting human dignity rather than undermining it”631. In Jordaan’s eyes, we 
should follow the example of Dworkin, who does have the “Promethean 
courage” to play with fire – to face the moral challenges of the new 
technologies, that is. It is thanks to this courage, this “cultural catalyst”, that we 
live in such a modern, civilised and technologically advanced society right now; 
that we have made such “awesome improvements to the human condition”632. 
And so Jordaan concludes the article with the following: 
 
“At the onset of modernity, only 500 years ago, nearly all Westerners lived in servitude, 
almost unimaginable poverty, ignorance, and superstition and toiled their short, 
disease-ridden lives away with hard physical labor. Beware the day when we betray 
our promethean heritage. Beware the antipromethean heresy of Fukuyama”
633
. 
 
The Promethean courage is our heritage, a fundamental element of our cultural 
essence. 
 
5.1.4. Simon Young 
 
Simon Young, author of Designer Evolution: A Transhumanist Manifesto (2006), 
refuses to accept the greatest “tragedies” of human life – biological limitations 
and death – and puts his trust in the power and possibilities of science to 
eventually conquer those. The overcoming of these limitations is not a mere 
wish, but understood to be our natural destiny: “the goal of human life is survival 
– we are programmed that way”634. We have always been engaged in the 
ongoing process of evolution and now the time has come to liberate ourselves – 
and here Young uses a metaphor nicely fitting the Promethean image – from 
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our “biological chains”. “Humanity will take evolution out of the hands of 
butterfingered nature into its own transhuman hands”635. This is not merely 
desirable – “Designer Evolution” is the inevitable next step in the human history 
of self-improvement. Young holds that we are standing at the “Dawn of a New 
Age – the DNAge” which will be characterised by our new ability to manipulate 
and enhance the human body by means of “Superbiology”636. 
At the DNAge, we require a new ethics. Secularisation and 
postmodernism, Young claims, have left us with a society devoid of shared 
meaning, values and beliefs. We need a new philosophy to provide us with 
answers to fundamental questions on metaphysics, human nature and ethics, 
and, from there, with shared values and a universal purpose. These answers, of 
course, are to be delivered by transhumanism. For Young, the world is “a 
process of evolutionary complexification toward evermore complex structures, 
forms, and operations”637. Human nature is defined by the “Will to Evolve”: “the 
instinctive drive of a conscious entity to expand its abilities in pursuit of ever-
increasing survivability and well-being”, “even at the expense of present 
pains”638. Prometheus symbolises this “Will”, which Young therefore entitles the 
“Prometheus Drive”639 and which his transhumanist ethics urges us to “foster” 
so that 
 
“by acting in harmony with the essential nature of the evolutionary process – 
complexification – we may discover a new sense of purpose […] and come to feel 
ourselves at home in the world once more”
640
. 
 
This new sense of purpose will be provided by “[t]he prospect of Designer 
Evolution […]: the continual improvement in the quality of life through the 
eradication of disease and enhancement of abilities”641. Young recognizes that a 
future of self-enhancement is not without risks. But to neglect the “innate” 
Prometheus Drive to progress, improve and enhance, will lead to stagnation or 
decline. It would mean to forever remain in the power of our limitations and 
keep on suffering from disease and death. Hence, Young pleads:  
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“Let us be the New Prometheans. Let us unite in our commitment to boldly go where 
none have gone before in search of the knowledge by which to transcend the 
limitations of the human condition. 
Let us cast aside cowardice and seize the torch of Prometheus with both hands”
642
. 
 
We should foster what is our innate, evolutionary, Promethean drive. 
 
5.2. The Opponents 
 
The debaters in the other camp, baptised ‘bioconservatives’ by their 
adversaries, are sceptical of the wonderful effects novel technologies such as 
bioengineering will bring about. They oppose human enhancement with 
arguments ranging from practical doubts with regard to its feasibility to 
passionate condemnation of any possible application of the allegedly enhancing 
techniques to humans. The new crafts will not make us happier, stronger, or 
equalise us, on the contrary: they threaten our dignity, will destroy our 
autonomy, promote injustice or, as Anders warned us earlier, even dehumanize 
us – and this would be anything but positive. 
It should then be no surprise that when Prometheus enters the scene in this 
context, he does not appear in his benefactor costume. The contra-
enhancement Titan is not shaped along Aeschylean but rather Hesiodic lines: 
the emphasis is on thievery, hubris, danger, misery and punishment. 
 
5.2.1. Michael Sandel 
 
The political philosopher Michael Sandel is a prominent opponent of 
enhancement who, in his book The Case against Perfection: Ethics in the Age 
of Genetic Engineering (2007), carefully studies many of the moral questions 
raised by enhancement. Sandel observes that violating the right to autonomy or 
exacerbating inequalities are often considered to be the main problems of 
enhancement – if, for instance, parents could choose a child’s genetic makeup 
or if access to the new technologies is unequal. Although Sandel recognises 
that these are serious issues, he locates the real problem in the moral status of 
enhancement and genetic engineering itself: 
 
“The deeper danger is that they represent a kind of hyperagency, a Promethean 
aspiration to remake nature, including human nature, to serve our purposes and satisfy 
our desires. The problem is not the drift to mechanism but the drive to mastery”
643. 
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Sandel argues that such a drive to mastery will destroy our appreciation of what 
he calls the “giftedness of life”644: in short, our natural talents and gifts. 
Appreciating the gifted quality of life is fundamental, for it “constrains the 
Promethean project and conduces to certain humility. It is in part a religious 
sensibility. But its resonance reaches beyond religion”645. This appreciation 
creates a kind of balance, a harmony between our different tendencies. If we 
would lose our reverence for life’s giftedness, this would transform three 
essential moral elements – humility, responsibility and solidarity – in a most 
negative way. 
 
“The awareness that our talents and abilities are not wholly our own doing restrains our 
tendency toward hubris. If bioengineering made the myth of the “self-made man” come 
true, it would be difficult to view our talents as gifts for which we are indebted rather 
than achievements for which we are responsible”
646
. 
 
The increasing (and possibility for complete) mastery would demolish the 
humility with regard to what we, so far, did not control – the world would 
become “inhospitable to the unbidden”647, until nothing would be left but our 
wish and desire. To be self-made would mean to be responsible for everything 
we are – athletes for their ‘talents’, parents for their children. 
 
“The Promethean impulse […] unsettles and erodes the gifted dimension of human 
experience. When performance-enhancing drugs become common-place, unenhanced 
ballplayers find themselves “playing naked.” When genetic screening becomes a 
routine part of pregnancy, parents who eschew it are regarded as “flying blind” and are 
held responsible for whatever genetic defect befalls their child”
648
. 
 
We would become the only ones liable for the entirety of our characteristics and 
functioning and such responsibility would undermine our solidarity with those 
who are less fortunate. If people’s genetic endowments would become 
achievements or choices rather than gifts or fortune, the “disadvantaged” at the 
bottom of society “would be viewed not as disadvantaged, and thus worthy of a 
measure of compensation, but as simply unfit, and thus worthy of eugenic 
repair”649. They would be considered to be lacking through a fault of their own, 
they – or their parents – could have chosen to be different. Therefore, it would 
eliminate the reason for others – the healthy or well-off – to share their ‘fate’ by, 
for instance, paying a greater share for insurance or taxes. “Perfect genetic 
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control would erode the actual solidarity that arises when men and women 
reflect on the contingency of their talents and fortunes”650. 
Sandel admits that the prospect of mastery by means of bioengineering – 
enhancement, design, perfection of life – is somehow attractive and may seem 
to provide us with the most pleasant kind of freedom, but forewarns us that in 
reality it is deeply disempowering: 
 
“changing our nature to fit the world, rather than the other way around, is actually the 
deepest form of disempowerment. It distracts us from reflecting critically on the world, 
and deadens the impulse to social and political improvement” [...]. “It threatens to 
banish our appreciation of life as a gift, and to leave us with nothing to affirm or behold 
outside our own will”
651
. 
  
Instead of feeding our “Promethean impulse” and following it in full power, we 
should realise the importance of the contingency of life. We should free 
ourselves from “the heady, Promethean self-image of the age”652, and cherish 
life’s giftedness, for the Titanic urge to master our nature seriously jeopardises 
the good of our limits and imperfection. 
 
5.2.2. Leon Kass 
 
In his book Life, Liberty and the Defence of Dignity (2002), the scientist and 
medical ethicist Leon Kass argues against what he calls the “disposition to 
rational mastery”653 – a concept similar to Sandel’s mastery. He writes that in 
their search for progress – and indeed achieving new technological successes 
each day – people in contemporary society lose sight of the most important 
human and moral concerns. Especially in biotechnology, “the evils we face are 
intertwined with the goods we so keenly seek”654. While serving noble goals 
such as relieving suffering and saving lives, the “burgeoning technological 
powers to intervene in the human body and mind [...] are also available for uses 
that could slide us down to the dehumanizing path toward what C. S. Lewis 
called [...] the abolition of man”655. Now that the medical possibilities are moving 
beyond the traditional aims of curing disease and fighting death, “[h]uman 
nature itself lies on the operating table, ready for [...] “enhancement”, for 
wholesale redesign”656. Kass considers Huxley’s Brave New World the worst 
case scenario for such a dehumanized future: its citizens do not pursue 
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anything “humanly richer or higher”657 than health, amusement and pleasure. 
Everything they aspire to is of a superficial, mediocre and trivial nature and they 
do not even recognise what they have lost. What is most concerning today is 
that because the striving for enhancement originates in a well-meant aiming for 
human welfare, we are heading towards such dehumanization voluntarily if 
nothing will stop us. We are well aware of the dangers of inequality, physical 
harm or the potential abuse of the emerging technologies. “But we are slow to 
recognize threats to human dignity, to the ways of doing and feeling and being 
in the world that make human life rich, deep and fulfilling”658. Hence, it is our 
task “to find ways to preserve [the human future] from the soft dehumanization 
of well-meaning but hubristic biotechnical “re-creationism”659. 
Kass uses the myth of Prometheus in order to clarify today’s discussion 
about technology and the mastery of nature and sketches the age-old dispute in 
which it is originated. He places “those who hold that the biggest obstacles to 
human happiness are material” against those who hold that these “are psychic 
and spiritual, and arise from the turbulences of the human soul itself”660. He 
notes that the first employ a concept of the human as a weak, wanting creature: 
it is need and anxiety that evoke the human quest for control. The world is seen 
as a hostile place; nature is the enemy which has to be conquered by 
technology and rationality and so for them Prometheus is the great benefactor 
as “bringer of fire, with its warming and transforming power, and through fire, all 
the other arts”661. In contrast, in the second view legislators, politicians and 
prophets are humanity’s benefactors – “not Prometheus but Lycurgus” – there 
to tame the “self-destroying passions of men”662. In this view, “the arts are 
suspect precisely because they serve comfort and safety, because they 
stimulate unnecessary desires”663. In order to illustrate the problem Kass recalls 
Plato’s allegory of the cave, in which 
 
“it is the Promethean gift of fire and the enchantment of the arts that hold men 
unwittingly enchained, warm and comfortable yet blind to the world beyond the city. 
Mistaking their crafted world for the whole, men live ignorant of their true standing in 
the world and their absolute dependence on powers not of their own making and 
beyond their control”
664
. 
 
Because of its misleading and perilous potential, art can only be beneficent to 
humans when ruled by (political) law, and then only when this is based on 
proper insight in the human soul and their “true standing in the world”. Kass’ 
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own view is rooted in the second, spiritualist, approach: contemporary arts such 
as biotechnology and other forms of alleged enhancement should thus “be 
restricted and brought under intellectual, spiritual, moral and political rule”, or 
“human debasement” will be our fate665. Euthanasia and embryonic stem cell 
research already show how the body is unjustly being “commodified”. More and 
more people are willing to accept the scientific, reductionist view of the human 
as “just a collection of molecules”666 and subject even the human soul, psyche 
and happiness to the indifferent, arbitrary standards of science.  
Kass respectfully quotes Rousseau, who centuries before had already 
seen the evils of technological success: the consequences of what Kass calls 
the “indefinitely inflatable”667 desires of the human. Rousseau writes that the 
many commodities humanity had developed 
 
“to soften body and mind [...] lost almost all their pleasantness through habit, and as 
they had at the same time degenerated into true needs, being deprived of them 
became much more cruel than possessing them was sweet”
668
.  
 
Full satisfaction of all our needs and desires by means of new technologies may 
seem unlikely, but if we became able to master the human soul, the result 
would indeed be outright Brave New World dehumanization: 
 
“Homogenisation, mediocrity, pacification, drug-induced contentment, debasement of 
taste, souls without loves and longings – these are the inevitable results of making the 
essence of human nature the last project for technical mastery. In his moment of 
triumph, Promethean man will become also a contented cow”
669
. 
 
The Promethean disposition to mastery will only lead to a “disconnected 
existence”, for “[p]erfected bodies are achieved at the price of flattened 
souls”670. What is needed is a richer anthropology, a new bioethics and a new 
biology: “an ethical account of human flourishing based on a biological account 
of human life as lived, not just physically, but psychically, socially and 
spiritually”671. Non-scientific wisdom about the human soul and place is 
fundamental to keep the technological enthusiasm within limits; and it is not per 
definition the more scientific knowledge, the better. “Foreknowledge”, says 
Kass, about your “possible medical future”672, will surely be gladly received 
when it enables healing or preventing of disease. But it will not always be 
welcome – genetic profiling of individuals could be damaging – not only for 
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one’s chances to get a job or health insurance, but also for oneself: to know that 
you carry a predisposition for some dreadful disorder could severely diminish 
the quality of your life. Hence, Kass quotes the Prometheus Bound and reminds 
us of the fact that apart from being the god who brought fire and technology, 
Prometheus also gave humankind 
 
“the greater gift of “blind hopes” – “to cease seeing doom before their eyes” – precisely 
because he knew that ignorance of one’s own future fate was indispensable to 
aspiration and achievement”
673
. 
 
Promethean foreknowledge and, more generally, infinite Promethean 
improvement and satisfaction are not necessarily something good. On the 
contrary, they threaten our humanness, for a human life is by definition a life 
that is lived: it is the human’s social, spiritual and embodied life, with all his 
wishes, pains and pleasures – and ignorance of his fate. And mortality is just as 
essential. Opposing proponents’ striving for immortality, Kass states that “[t]his 
is a question in which our very humanity is at stake [...]. For to argue that 
human life would be better without death is, I submit, to argue that human life 
would be better being something other than human”674. To be mortal is to have 
“loves and longings”, is to have a life of meaning, is to be human.  
 
5.2.3. Mike McNamee 
 
Although he does not use the term as such, a similar fear of dehumanization 
seems to drive the philosopher of applied ethics Mike McNamee in “Whose 
Prometheus? Transhumanism, Biotechnology and the Moral Topography of 
Sports Medicine” (2007). In this article, McNamee “problematise[s] the 
unfettered application of science and technology to the sphere of sports 
medicine”675. More broadly, he challenges medicine wherever it is guided by the 
“vertical ambition in transforming our very nature as humans”676, as in a pro-
enhancement ideology such as transhumanism. McNamee argues that an 
ethical framework is needed to evaluate the enhancement project. Therefore, 
he will present two versions of the Prometheus myth – Hesiod’s and Aeschylus’ 
– “which can help frame the moral limits of sports medicine”677. 
McNamee notes that there are “elements of science derived from […] Sir 
Francis Bacon [...] which survive and in some sense shape the hubris of 
modern biomedical science”678. Just like Kass, he thus observes how the 
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contemporary issues find their roots in age-old moral debates. The problems as 
well as the possible solutions do, for on the opposite side there is also “no need 
for the generation of a new ethics; rather […] the moral sources for such 
evaluations as the proper ends of medicine and sports medicine themselves go 
back at least as far as Plato”679. After treating doping, McNamee broadens his 
criticism to human enhancement in general and discusses transhumanism. He 
dismisses it as “undesirable utopianism”680 and sums up several points of 
critique. First, it could easily lead to social inequality – not everyone could 
equally afford enhancement. Second, some transhumanists wrongly equate ‘the 
good’ with personal choice and others assume they defend something like 
“objective goods”, whereas the idea to improve humanity’s quality of life 
presumes a specific concept of the good. Finally, McNamee writes that to 
interfere in human constitution would deprive the human of his “naturalness”, 
and change his “normative self-understanding”681. “At TH’s (sic) heart, it seems 
to me, is a view of technology at the mercy of scientists generally [...] which is 
simply a case of Prometheanism”682.  
McNamee thinks that the charge of Prometheanism is often made in the 
debate on human enhancement but not properly explained and so he decides to 
turn back to the myth’s origins and examine the two contrasting versions of 
Hesiod and Aeschylus. On the former’s account, he says, Prometheus is a 
rather faulty character. He is “a cheat and a thief”683 who acts against his fellow 
Titans, misleads Zeus and steals fire, and whose hubris leads to punishment for 
himself and humankind. Prometheus’ sacrifice is one of “foolhardy thieves, 
stealers of the divinity round about them – for the world of nature that surrounds 
them is divine”684. In contrast, in Aeschylus’ interpretation the Titan is the great 
benefactor, a courageous figure who brings humanity civilisation. “The Hesiodic 
Prometheus is thus the indirect cause of all man’s woes, while the Aeschylean 
Prometheus is the saviour of mankind”685. 
Although McNamee does not draw any explicit parallel between the two 
interpretations of the myth and transhumanism (or contemporary 
biotechnology), he does imply that it is Hesiod’s Prometheus who represents 
the transhumanist agenda. The warning of what will happen if enhancement is 
given free sway is thus clear.  
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McNamee urges for a dialogue between different groups so that the 
“moral topography”686 of the enhancement project in the context of sports can 
be established. Essential questions include where to draw the line between 
therapy and enhancement, between the natural and artificial, how much control 
over our bodies should be allowed and what other (physical) boundaries should 
be observed. Just as Sandel and Kass, McNamee emphasises the importance 
of human imperfection. “[W]e are mortal beings. Our vulnerability to disease and 
death, far from something we can overcome or eliminate, represents natural 
limits both for morality and medicine generally and sports medicine in 
particular”687. However, especially elite athletes, their coaches and sports 
institutions 
 
“all have an interest in surpassing limits. [...] This denial of the necessity of limits in 
nature by some, the desire [...] to control these human-limiting factors by the unfettered 
use of biotechnology is something that should concern us all in sports. I submit that 
philosophers of both sport and medicine begin to press such questions home […] so 
that sports do not become the vanguard of Hesiod’s Promethean project”
688
. 
 
In other words, the athlete should beware in his enhancement enthusiasm not 
to follow the wrong Promethean urges, steal “the divinity” of “the world of 
nature” and become “the indirect cause of all man’s woes”.  
 
5.3. Analysis 
 
The texts just discussed show that the myth of Prometheus is remarkably fitting 
with contemporary ideas. Once again, the myth demonstrates its malleability: its 
capacities to accompany a variety of socio-cultural developments, while never 
losing its strong rootedness in Antiquity. The very fact that the Titan is present 
in such a lively debate confirms my claim that the myth is still relevant and 
significant in philosophy today. The mentions of Prometheus are not rare and 
participants in the debate treat one Promethean issue after another. Both 
advocates and opponents bring up the classical storytellers and in addition to 
that other historical authors, some of whom I discussed in earlier chapters. This 
shows that today’s debaters are still dealing with age-old dilemmas and 
continue a discussion held for at least three millennia. And while it may seem 
that Prometheus references are mere illustrations, they enable us to uncover 
essential elements of the authors’ positions. The myth clearly has a powerful 
illustrative function and flexible format, which make it so widely used. But as we 
have seen in chapter 4, it has a broader function and works amongst other 
things also as an ontology and/or a story of origin. This is a fact which 
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commentators and the authors themselves, often fail to notice. If we have a 
closer look at the Prometheus references, we will always find the idea of what it 
means to be human – and never without its moral charge. 
With my findings from the previous chapters as point of departure, in the 
following section I will examine the references to the myth, indicate historical 
links between texts and explore how the Promethean themes which I previously 
identified fit in the debaters’ arguments. The analysis led by these themes – 
whether present on an explicit or implicit level – will help us understand the 
debaters’ thinking. I aim to clarify their arguments and frameworks and disclose 
moral, ontological and other vital conceptualisations in their employment of the 
Prometheus myth and themes. I will treat advocates and opponents respectively 
and conclude with an examination of the ambiguity theme in both camps. 
 
5.3.1. A Closer Look: the Advocates 
 
All four advocates of enhancement employ the most positive form of the myth 
and its protagonist. The format is modern, but ancient symbols and 
characteristic themes are consistently used. Below, I will start by treating the 
Promethean themes of fire, rebellion and creation; and after that the theme of 
human nature and the myth’s ontological and moral function. Throughout, I will 
point out the other functions discussed in chapter 4. 
 
5.3.1.1. Fire, Rebellion and Creation 
 
Fire is the most obvious classical symbol in pro-enhancement thinking. For the 
advocates, just as for the positive-thinking historical authors, the Titan’s flames 
stand for (scientific) knowledge, artistry, technology and progress. The theft of 
fire, along with the creation of humanity, functions as a general symbol for the 
development of science and creation of technology, as well as a particular 
symbol for the manipulation and creation of the human by means of technology. 
For Stock, the fire which Prometheus steals represents “the powerful 
[enhancement] technologies”. For Young, “the torch” is “the knowledge by which 
to transcend the limitations of the human condition”. For Jordaan, the 
“metaphorical fire” is the very basis of our highly developed civilisation: 
 
“the Promethean metaphor has been a defining paradigm in classical times, as well as 
in modernity – it was the cultural catalyst for creating the free and technologically 
advanced contemporary society of the West”689. 
 
Reading these phrases, in the background one sees a fire burning such as 
Bacon’s proud “succour of succours” which “affords aid and assistance to all 
labours and mechanical arts, and to the sciences themselves”. And when 
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looking carefully, one can even see the faces of his New Atlantis “perfect 
creatures” warming themselves at that fire. 
The proponents do not see the alleged dangers of the symbolic fire as an 
obstacle, but rather as a challenge: each radical new development inevitably 
brings along risks, but it is worth taking those risks. This will eventually bring us 
progress, transcendence and enhancement. Interestingly, Stock combines the 
image of such progress with another mythical image that persists throughout 
history – that of human infancy: “Humanity is moving out of its childhood and 
into a gawky, stumbling adolescence”. We may not have arrived at adulthood 
yet, but we are on our way, discovering our “immense new powers”. Today, 
Stock witnesses the same process Aeschylus described when Prometheus’ 
gifts elevated humans from their “babyish” state. Freud refers to a similar 
process in asserting that we are “in the middle of that phase” to be leaving the 
“childhood of the human race” behind. McLelland calls the drive to evolve 
discussed by Freud “the Promethean will”, in a striking similarity of contents and 
naming – in fact, almost a literal mergence of words – to that of Young’s 
“Prometheus Drive” and “Will to Evolve”. Stock and Young are not the only pro-
enhancement debaters thinking in such terms: Bostrom, for instance, in “Why I 
Want to Be a Posthuman When I Grow up”, suggests that “we are all currently 
in the situation of children relative to the emotion, passion, and mental states 
that posthuman beings could experience”690.  
The idea of growth may have remained largely neutral were the flame of 
progress presented rather than stolen. Yet it was acquired through theft and 
there are thus themes of rebellion, courage and overcoming of limits underlying 
the idea of growth. All four pro-enhancement thinkers acknowledge that 
Prometheus was a trickster and thief, but do not consider that as necessarily 
bad. On the contrary: it is inevitable to run risks when trying to cross established 
boundaries in order to improve one’s situation. The Titan’s thievery is an 
admirable form of such brave boundary-crossing; and it is something to follow, 
for it will enrich us with wisdom and control. Dworkin recognizes that “Playing 
God is indeed playing with fire”, but he does not see why this should hold us 
back. He encourages us to take the position of the audacious anti-god; “to play 
with fire and take the consequences, because the alternative is cowardice in the 
face of the unknown” – and such cowardice and the resulting lack of knowledge 
is unacceptable. Building on Dworkin’s statement, Jordaan urges everyone to 
have the “Promethean courage” to play with the “metaphorical fire” that 
Fukuyama fears so much and to “explore a radically new value paradigm”691. 
The advocacy of the Promethean attitude is often combined with some kind of 
risk rhetoric: enhancement technologies might be dangerous, but to remain 
what we are – non-enhanced, limited, defective beings – also contains risks, 
possibly even worse ones. In essence, Jordaan says that to forsake our 
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Promethean legacy could take us back centuries, to pre-modern circumstances 
– “poverty, ignorance, [...] superstition and [...] disease-ridden lives”. Young also 
emphasises the awful consequences if we do not cherish the Prometheus 
Drive, for “without the instinct to progress, humankind is doomed to remain 
forever at the mercy of disease, decay, and the limitations of the human body 
and mind”692. 
The enhancement advocates fight established principles with a Sturm 
und Drang temperament – moral, social, conceptual, material, physical, natural 
principles and regularly, also religious ones. Like Goethe’s Prometheus – “Ich 
dich ehren? Wofür?” – they wonder why they should honour any god or alleged 
‘naturalness’. The radical transhumanist (or ‘extropian’) Max More writes “[n]o 
more gods, no more faith, no more timid holding back. Let us blast out of our old 
forms, our ignorance, our weakness, and our mortality”693. They announce that 
the time has come for God/Nature to leave the earth to humanity and for the 
latter to “take evolution [...] into its own transhuman hands” (Young). The quotes 
show how the advocates aim to persuade others to follow the Promethean 
defiance, but that is not all: whether consciously or not, in their fight against the 
common paradigm, with a Goethean passion they themselves have set the 
example and taken the Titan’s rebel stance. 
The torch of knowledge and the rebellious attitude come together in the 
most controversial Promethean theme of the debate: creation. The advocates 
encourage creation in all forms discussed in 4.2.: the creation of technē, the 
creation of life and self-creation, all motivated by a characteristically 
Promethean, forethinking kind of creativity. First, they aim to stimulate what one 
could call humanity’s Aeschylean creativity in the technē realm, that is, the 
scientific and technological realm. They encourage a creative, forward-looking 
approach in the development of our “immense new [technological] powers” 
(Stock) such as “Superbiology” so that we can “boldly go where none have 
gone before” (Young). 
The technologically enhanced future visualised by the advocates often 
shows utopian characteristics. They foresee a Hesiodic Golden Age; seem to 
quote from Prometheus Unbound  in which Prometheus’ gifts made “[s]cience 
struck the thrones of earth and heaven”; they imagine a paradisiacal era like the 
“DNAge” (Young), which is ruled by yet to be developed knowledge and 
reminiscent of the world Shelley’s spirits have in mind: 
 
“A world for the Spirit of Wisdom to wield; 
We will take our plan 
From the new world of man, 
And our work shall be called the Promethean.” 
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It is this kind of Promethean work Young refers to when he asks us to be “the 
New Prometheans” and design our own human. For the aim of the techno-
scientific artistry is the second form of creativity: the manipulation, 
transformation and indeed the creation of human, transhuman or posthuman 
life. The creative means of the pro-enhancement Titan may be different than his 
nineteenth-century doppelganger, but he is a Shelleyan figure with rather similar 
capacities. When Bostrom envisions the living outcome of future enhancement 
activities – “lives wonderful beyond imagination” and creatures “greatly 
exceeding the maximum attainable by any current human being” – it is as if he 
describes the work of Shelley’s protagonists. As if he pictures them feed 
“all/That tempers or improves man’s life, now free”; how they make the human 
grow “wise and kind/And, veil by veil, evil and error fall”. It is as if Prometheus 
has been there to “create […] [f]orms more real than living man,/Nurslings of 
immortality!” In fact, even the last phrase can be taken to the letter and the 
Prometheus Unbound–pro-enhancement comparison holds. For those 
“nurslings of immortality” or, better, immortal nurslings are “no longer just a 
dream” to the enhancement advocates. Raymond Kurzweil speaks of the 
“Fantastic Voyage” through which life extension can be achieved and makes 
“the scientific case that immortality is within our grasp”694. 
The third type of creation is already an essential element of the other 
two: both technological creativity and the creation of life are a form of self-
creation. The development of a new technique makes the human – whether on 
a physical/material or more theoretical level – take part in his own improvement. 
Obviously, the creation of human, trans- and posthuman life is also self-
creation. In Young’s phrase, it is “Designer Evolution”: literally taking evolution 
into our own hands. In general, it is in his self-creating role that Prometheus is 
used by the pro-enhancement debaters. As will become clear shortly, they also 
take Prometheus to be the archetypal human being, the embodiment of human 
nature. In the following section, I will treat the themes of self-creation and 
human nature simultaneously. 
 
5.3.1.2. Human Nature: a Moral Imperative 
 
In all its versions throughout history the Prometheus myth has had a powerful, 
ethically charged ontological function and I will show that it does as well in the 
pro-enhancement writings. The mythological reference is not a mere illustration 
– analysis reveals that it includes a fundamental idea of what it means to be 
human. The Promethean self-creating urge is what characterises us as 
humans. The Titan is the prototype of the human being, that is, the Aeschylean 
prototype, who stands for the human who in his autonomy and independence 
gives himself his own gifts. We have always been enhancing our lives in the 
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course of history, whether by the invention of fire, the steam engine or plastic 
surgery. It is “what we mortals have done since Prometheus” (Dworkin). 
Similarly, Young states that all forms of human improvement are motivated by 
the same self-enhancing Prometheus Drive, which is “instinctive”, “innate” – that 
is, something essentially human. He explains that “[e]ach era of cultural 
evolution has been defined by the nature of its production processes”695: the 
Agricultural Age by the manipulation of plants and animals, the Industrial Age by 
the manipulation of metals in order to make machines, and just like that the 
DNAge will be defined by the manipulation of human life. Bioenhancement is 
just a new way of exercising that innate Prometheus Drive: it “will come to be 
welcomed as the next step in self-improvement after education, exercise, diet, 
and aesthetic surgery”696. 
By presenting the Titan as the archetype of the human being, the 
defenders of enhancement aim to convince the reader that self-creation is not 
unnatural, like many of its critics claim. On the contrary: it is simply what we, as 
members of the human species, do. As Stock says: to steal fire from the gods is 
“too characteristically human”. It is our nature to confront the new and 
dangerous in search of wisdom and improvement, to transform ourselves and 
conquer our limitations, even if this means taking part in our own physical 
creation. A typical human dares to take a rebel stance against today’s version of 
the gods – our “biological chains” – and put herself at risk for the better of 
humankind. To turn away from the possibly perilous challenges, to dismiss the 
new technologies would not simply mean to be unrealistic or cowardly. One 
would be refraining from acting “in harmony with the essential nature of the 
evolutionary process” (Young697). It would be “out of character for humanity” 
(Stock), unnatural. A true human being enhances herself. 
Jordaan’s argument takes a cultural turn: our self-improving bravery is a 
fundamental element of our cultural and spiritual constitution – of our legacy as 
a species. But the message of self-creation being characteristically human and 
remarkably beneficial remains the same. It is thanks to our Promethean 
courage and technological ingenuity that we live in such a modern, civilised and 
advanced society today, whereas before all was misery, ignorance and disaster. 
Sadly, as demonstrated by Fukuyama, not every human is as fortunate to have 
this Promethean courage – it is thus anything but a natural quality in the 
Fukuyama sense. However, our self-improving bravery certainly is a 
fundamental element of our cultural and spiritual constitution and by calling 
Fukuyama guilty of “antipromethean heresy” Jordaan even insinuates it has a 
religious sanctity. 
In adhering to a Promethean concept of human nature, pro-enhancement 
thinkers have predecessors with impressively similar ideas. Once again, I cite 
Pico’s words in which God tells Adam he has “no fixed seat, no form of thy very 
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own [...], thou art confined by no bounds; and thou wilt fix limits of nature for 
thyself”. Humans, continues Pico, are “symbolised by Prometheus in the secret 
rites, by reason of our nature sloughing its skin and transforming itself”. Michael 
Hauskeller argues that “Pico was the first transhumanist [...] by describing man 
as an animal whose nature it is not to have a nature”698. I think the same could 
be said of Bovelles – perhaps he was the second transhumanist. He states that, 
in essence, nothing is inherent to humanity, or actually, everything is. And this is 
the human’s strength: he who carries “the nature of all things” within him 
“reproduces nature in its entirety”. 
Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion 
about the pro-enhancement view of what it means to be human. First of all, 
human nature is fundamentally characterised by incompleteness and 
malleability. And as much as it may strike us as paradoxical, this is the same as 
saying that human nature is essentially self-enhancing: to be possible to 
complete, evolve and/or enhance oneself, there must be something lacking or 
imperfect. Intentionally or not, the proponents of enhancement define the 
human as a self-improving being and, by virtue of this, as fundamentally flawed.  
Second, as in the case of Pico, Bovelles, Bacon and others (e.g. 
Boccaccio and Gide), in pro-enhancement thinking humanity’s malleability and 
imperfection are understood as some of its greatest powers – in my words, ‘the 
power of incompleteness’. Humans’ essential flexibility enables them to shape 
themselves, up to the point where the outcome can even be a posthuman 
being, who/which is regularly envisioned as a hybrid that possesses 
characteristics of both human and machine. The posthuman is by definition a 
superior being: a creature improved to such a degree that it is no longer human 
– that is, deficient by nature – but member of a new species.699 
Third, the pro-enhancement argument has a strong ethical charge: to 
enhance ourselves is the right thing to do: “Beware the day when we betray our 
promethean heritage”; “Let us be the New Prometheans” (Jordaan; Young700). 
And while Jordaan bases his moral message on our cultural heritage, Stock, 
Dworkin and Young infer their normative claim from human nature. It is highly 
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unlikely they would recognise this – after all, Nature is their fiend. Nature, 
including human nature, is not good enough as it is. It is “butterfingered” and we 
are condemned to “remain forever at the mercy of disease” and other physical 
restrictions (Young) – that is, the mercy of Nature –, if we do not “improve upon 
the hand that nature has dealt [us]” (Dworkin). However, as Hauskeller 
observes, “[t]ranshumanism [...] rests on certain value assumptions that are tied 
to a particular conception of human nature that is just as normative as the one 
that transhumanists so eloquently attack”701. Proponents may, like Jordaan, 
accuse “bio-conservatives” such as Fukuyama of committing the naturalistic 
fallacy, but are likely to do the same. Just as Fukuyama invokes Factor X, they 
invoke the flexibility, courage and creativity fundamental for us as humans to 
justify their argument: since it is our nature to discover, face danger, create and 
improve, we should. We have always stolen and played with fire (Stock; 
Dworkin), so why stop now? If human nature is self-moulding we ought to mould 
ourselves – lest we “grow downward into the lower natures which are brutes” 
(Pico). In other words, the three pro-enhancement thinkers use the myth of 
Prometheus to (explicitly or implicitly) present their idea of what it means to be 
human, which consequently provides the basis for a moral imperative: we 
should improve ourselves, because otherwise we would be acting “out of 
character” (Stock) with our nature. I would say this comes down to an is/ought 
argument which is not unlike the naturalistic fallacy: we are creative, daring, 
knowledge-seeking beings and therefore we ought to enhance. 
Fourth, this ethically charged ontological concept has a significant 
implication for the contemporary human. As we saw, the advocates show a 
certain disdain for the non-enhanced human or for those who choose not to 
“recognise” their Promethean nature, culture or drive and at least try to promote 
enhancement. The metaphor of infancy and accusation of cowardice is used 
more than once. But there is more than disdain. The proponents’ claim that 
human nature is essentially Promethean implies that those who do not enhance 
themselves, or do not do everything that lies in their power to promote 
enhancement, are in some sense abnormal or dysfunctional. Pro-enhancement 
theorist John Harris argues that we have a moral obligation to develop or use 
enhancement and he would probably even label the non-enhanced human as 
disabled. For in his eyes, disability should be defined relative to “possible 
functioning”702, that is, to the possible alternative conditions at a certain point. I 
think this entails that as soon as we have the opportunity to enhance ourselves, 
we become practically disabled.703 But the consequences could become still 
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more puzzling: we could become unhuman. Stock says literally that it would be 
incompatible with our humanness not to welcome enhancement technologies; 
and by means of their conception of human nature the other advocates agree. If 
to be what we really are we need to show our Promethean qualities, if 
enhancement is what makes us ‘truly’ human, the non-enhancing or the non-
enhanced human becomes a subhuman being. This is a rather confusing 
outcome, intensely fought by other thinkers. 
 
5.3.2. A Closer Look: the Opponents 
 
As outlined above, the opponents of enhancement tend to concentrate on the 
negative storyline of the myth of Prometheus – Hesiod’s rather than Aeschylus’ 
– and on negative aspects of the symbols associated with it. As in the pro-
enhancement case it is a story in modern form, but still firmly rooted in the 
ancient themes and dilemmas. Analogous to 5.3.1., in the following section I will 
discuss the role of the Promethean themes and functions in their thinking. 
 
5.3.2.1. Fire, Rebellion and Creation 
 
Fire is again an indispensable symbol of knowledge, technology, creativity and 
civilisation, but one should note that in the opponent’s camp its double-edged 
nature is highly pronounced. The image of Prometheus’ flames is used, for 
instance, when Kass discusses the classical dispute about technology. Because 
of its widely divergent characteristics, the Titan’s fire has a meaningful place in 
both the materialist and spiritualist approach. It has “warming and transforming 
power” and promises control. But it is simultaneously “suspect”: it stimulates 
“unnecessary desires”, or worse, “self-destroying passions”; it holds the human 
“unwittingly enchained, warm and comfortable yet blind to the world beyond the 
city”. While in the pro-enhancement context all focus is on the positive powers 
of the metaphorical fire, the opponents bring its dangers to the fore: heat is 
destructive and light is blinding. Knowledge and technology can be damaging 
and make one lose, amongst other things, humility, sensitivity and spiritual 
wisdom. Ignorance of the human soul and its worth is seriously harmful, but lack 
of knowledge is not necessarily bad. Sandel and Kass accentuate the threats of 
an overload of information, interestingly both using an allegory of blindness. 
Sandel writes that “[w]hen genetic screening becomes a routine part of 
pregnancy, parents who eschew it are regarded as “flying blind” and are held 
responsible for whatever genetic defect befalls their child”. Similarly, when 
discussing genetic profiling, Kass reminds us of Prometheus’ gift of “blind 
hopes”. Both thinkers point out the value of ignorance in these kinds of 
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situations: knowing less of your (child’s) medical future can make a great 
positive difference in your (child’s) quality of life. 
Apart from evoking the “blind hopes” metaphor, Sandel’s and Kass’ 
argumentation is also reminiscent of the Gorgias’ message about knowledge 
and ignorance, in their various forms – intellectual, visual and even physical. In 
this work Prometheus deprives humans of their foreknowledge of death. But this 
is not only to “to cease seeing doom before their eyes”704. Now that death has 
become unpredictable, humans can no longer manipulate the judgement about 
their afterlife and are thus stimulated to lead a more just and authentic life. And 
as the judges are no longer alive, their assessments are truly just. Although the 
opponents make no explicit reference to the Gorgias, to take a moment to 
consider the correspondence between their thinking and the Prometheus story 
from that work brings to the fore two of their core views. First, as in the Gorgias 
tale, the opponents emphasise the fact that ignorance of our fate endows us 
with humility, solidarity, righteousness and suchlike virtues, rather than that it 
spares us fear or “doom”. Second, they highlight a motif from the myth of a 
strong connection between, on the one hand, humans’ knowledge of their future 
and the accompanying loss of spirit (authenticity, righteousness, etc.) and on 
the other hand, an undue focus on the body and appearance. When in the story 
the humans still had their foreknowledge, they tried to mislead the judges with 
the “fine bodies” they could arrange beforehand. The judges themselves used 
to have “their own soul cloaked by eyes and ears and their whole body”. 
Authenticity and righteousness do not exist until humans lose their 
foreknowledge and body and they are “judged in nakedness” by judges who are 
also “naked and dead” – who, one could say, lost their ‘physical knowledge’. 
One should note that the adversaries of enhancement employ a similar 
approach: one of their main arguments is based upon the (potential) 
despiritualisation and injustice (e.g. unequal access to new technologies) of the 
proponents’ often exclusive and glorifying focus on the physical and external. 
Kass nicely phrases it in Gorgias-like terms when he states that “[p]erfected 
bodies are achieved at the price of flattened souls”. For both Gorgias’ Zeus and 
the contra-enhancement camp ignorance, care for the spiritual (instead of 
exclusive care for the physical) and authenticity are inherently connected.705 
Fire, its light and the knowledge and arts it represents are remarkably 
ambiguous. Of course, to gain knowledge can be truly worthy, but so can it be 
to lack knowledge. With respect to the fire of techno-scientific knowledge, the 
enhancement adversaries try to draw all attention to its damaging perils. It 
should then be no surprise that Kass cites Rousseau when he discusses the 
soul-flattening evils of scientific success. For all three adversaries could have 
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phrased their fears like this French philosopher, who warns that the fire of 
Prometheus’ torch “burns when you touch it” – not despite, but because of the 
fact that it is “the torch of the Sciences”. 
With respect to the themes of rebellion, courage and boundary-crossing, 
what may be Promethean courage to the proponents of enhancement is 
Promethean hubris to the opponents. Sandel laments “our tendency toward 
hubris”; Kass warns about “hubristic biotechnical “re-creationism””; and 
McNamee rejects “the hubris of modern biomedical science” and its underlying 
Baconian roots. In their view, the conceptual, natural and scientific boundaries 
the advocates wish to overcome should be respected, at least to some extent.  
Of all forms of hubris, the one implied in the wish for creation is the most 
loathsome. As in the pro-enhancement argument, in the opponents’ reaction 
one can find the Promethean theme in its three different forms. First, creation in 
the technē sense: the boundless technological inventiveness symbolised by the 
Titan and his fire is virtually present at any place at any time – but the 
opponents discourage it just as passionately as it is stimulated by the 
proponents. The promising possibilities of the new techniques will be of a 
misleading, Pandoran kind of beauty. They will open the jar and scatter what 
Hesiod called “the miseries that spell sorrow for men”: the technologies will 
‘blind’ us (Sandel, Kass), be ‘self-destructive’ (Kass), produce inequality and 
injustice, and threaten our dignity and autonomy. Consequently, the ‘improved’ 
future takes on dystopian qualities for contra-enhancement thinkers. This is 
something they freely admit and regularly highlight. We are reminded of horrific 
events in history and rather often of the frightening Nazi ambitions. Sandel, for 
instance, writes that “[t]he shadow of eugenics hangs over today’s debates 
about genetic engineering and enhancement”706. There is also a myriad of 
references to miserable scenarios in novels and other writings, from the Original 
Sin to, as we saw, Brave New World. This last work and eugenics lead us to the 
second form of Promethean creativity, which is probably by far what concerns 
the opponents the most: not the creation of the technologies themselves, but 
overconfident “re-creation” (Kass), that is, the actual manipulation, 
transformation and creation of human, transhuman, or posthuman life. It is 
ironic that when it comes to picturing this form of (future) creation, just like their 
adversaries, the contra-enhancement thinkers seem inspired by a Shelleyan 
image of Promethean work – with that difference that they call upon another 
Shelley. Often, when the opponents envision a future where “Promethean 
mastery” has triumphed, the first image that arises is Frankenstein’s self-made 
creation: their Titan is not Percy’s brilliant inventor but Mary’s crazy scientist. 
For instance, when in 1976 Harvard planned to open a new laboratory to do 
recombinant DNA research, a concerned Mayor Alfred Vellucci (of Cambridge, 
Massachusetts) exclaimed: 
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“we want to be damned sure the people of Cambridge won’t be affected by anything 
that could crawl out of that laboratory. . . . They may come up with a disease that can’t 
be cured, even a monster. Is this the answer to Dr. Frankenstein’s dream?”707. 
 
More recently, as ‘bioconservative’ George Annas discusses the risks of genetic 
engineering (and screening, cloning, etc.), he tells us what we can – and should 
– learn from an old science fiction novel such as Mary Shelley’s. Her story, he 
says, “teaches us a lesson that we find hard to deal with seriously: as difficult as 
it is to create a monster, it is even more difficult to control it or to restore order 
after the creation has spawned chaos”708. Annas worries about the fact that 
scientists today working on the Human Genome Project are unstoppable in their 
research, motivated by ‘the more knowledge, the better’. They do not concern 
themselves with the impact of the new knowledge on our thoughts, society and 
species: 
 
“[i]f we take the scientists at face value, they have given no more thought to the 
potential social applications of genome mapping and sequencing than Victor 
Frankenstein had given to the consequences of creating his monster”
709
. 
 
Hauskeller also compares Harris, Bostrom and More with Frankenstein, 
because of their focus on the prolongation of life and even immortality: they 
share the idea with the scientist “that death is the greatest of all evils and that 
nothing could be more important than getting rid of it”710 – something strongly 
questioned by Hauskeller himself. 
Another example is the parallel drawn by Kass; he expresses his revulsion at 
cloning by calling it “the Frankensteinian hubris to create a human life and 
increasingly to control its destiny: men playing at being God”711. 
The Frankenstein metaphor makes explicit what the authors’ reasons are 
to oppose human enhancement and creation of life. Kass’ statement above 
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covers all points. To start with the last part, to create life is ‘Frankensteinian’ 
because it is sinful, sacrilegious. As Mary Shelley’s monster said, the scientist 
becomes an “enemy of God and man”. Further, it is hubristic: like Frankenstein, 
those aiming to create life do not recognise the (natural) boundaries that should 
limit our aspirations and actions. The problem is that wish for control: the 
opponents compare the pro-enhancement disposition to mastery – what Sandel 
calls the “Promethean impulse” – with Frankenstein’s desire to, as Mary Shelley 
phrased it, “penetrate the secrets of nature”. Like her, the opponents question 
the optimistic faith in the infinite possibilities of science. They foresee failure and 
misery for both creator and creature if humanity will try to take the divine 
position of the Designing Master. As Annas says, instead of control, the results 
of such creation activities may very well produce nothing but chaos – whether 
on an individual or social level: “[i]n seeking to control our world, we may in fact 
lessen our control over it”712. As Sandel emphasises, it will be crucial to take 
responsibility for our live fabrications, but we may as well run away from it like 
Frankenstein.713 Yet finally, what evokes most disgust is not sacrilege, hubris, 
chaos or lack of responsibility, but the creatures themselves: the adversaries 
fear these will be anything but what Mary’s husband called “forms more real 
than living man” – and even if they will be the “nurslings of immortality” he 
imagined, this is certainly not necessarily something good. In the end, the main 
message of all references to Frankenstein – ‘or the Modern Prometheus’ – is 
that as praiseworthy our intentions and motivations may be, the outcome of our 
creative ambitions may be as wretched as the scientist’s monster. 
Finally, both technological creativity and the creation of life underpin the 
third kind of Promethean creativity, self-(re-)creation: they enable us to change, 
manipulate or re-generate our physical and/or mental state. But that is not all – 
these self-creating crafts may change our very nature. For the opponents of 
enhancement, “Prometheanism” is such a dark term not just because of the 
practical dangers of enhancement technologies. It has its most negative flavour 
because it threatens nothing less than what it means to be human. 
 
5.3.2.2. Human Nature: a Moral Imperative 
 
The opponents of enhancement openly defend their concept of humanity and 
emphasise the value they attach to its naturalness. The moral load of their 
human concept is clear and so is the ethical message of their argument as a 
whole, which is visible in their references to Prometheus. The “Promethean 
impulse […] unsettles and erodes...” (Sandel); “the Promethean gift[s] [...] hold 
men unwittingly enchained”, (Kass); and McNamee prays that “sports do not 
become the vanguard of Hesiod’s Promethean project” 714. In all cases the 
allusions to the myth are charged with a heavy load of negative associations 
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and the main message is that it is ethically wrong to act in a Promethean way – 
or even to be Promethean. Therefore, at first sight an analysis of the moral-
ontological significance of the Promethean references and themes in the 
opponents’ writings may not appear that useful. However, it is, in two ways. 
First, an examination of the references to the myth clarifies what the 
adversaries of enhancement believe the threat to human nature consists of. The 
adversaries need to explain that threat, which is complicated because of its 
immaterial, spiritual nature. They find that the Promethean reference is useful to 
this task – that is, if recognised by the reader. Let us have another look at 
Sandel’s statement: 
 
“The deeper danger is that [enhancement technologies] represent a kind of 
hyperagency, a Promethean aspiration to remake nature, including human nature, to 
serve our purposes and satisfy our desires”. 
 
With my earlier analysis of the Promethean history, themes and functions, we 
understand Sandel’s image of the threat of enhancement much easier than 
without. Knowing the symbolic meaning of fire and the Titan’s creation of 
humankind we understand the radical character of the enhancement 
technologies. Knowing the hubris of Prometheus’ actions, as well as their 
miserable consequences, we understand the fear which speaks from Sandel’s 
quote: why the threat to human nature is a form of “hyperagency” and why 
enhancement could end up in a mere wish for satisfaction of human desires. 
We immediately understand why, in Sandel’s view, enhancement is not a mere 
change but an alarming, immoral danger to humanity which must be prevented 
at all costs. In short, our knowledge of the Titan and his story accelerates our 
understanding of the danger of enhancement. Moreover, it enriches our 
understanding, for the little phrase of the “Promethean aspiration” opens up a 
unique, historical background of meaning and associations which is impossible 
to invoke in another (just as short) way. If Sandel’s reference is interpreted 
through the frame of Promethean themes I outlined above, the threat of 
enhancement to human nature can be understood in a most profound way, for it 
offers an immediate context of science, hubris, self-creation, misery and more.  
The same goes for our understanding of the threat as envisioned by the 
other adversaries of enhancement. We retrospectively comprehend the implicit 
background of Kass’ urge to protect ourselves from “the soft dehumanization of 
well-meaning but hubristic biotechnical “re-creationism””, while he has not yet 
mentioned Prometheus. McNamee is more explicit about why the “vertical 
ambition in transforming our very nature as humans” is “a case of 
Prometheanism”. However, our historical and thematic knowledge still enriches 
our understanding of the nature of that threatening ambition, since we recognise 
the implicit connection between the Prometheus myth and McNamee’s 
reference to Bacon. I speculate that McNamee himself may not have been 
aware of the fact that, this way, he included the gift of perpetual youth from 
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Bacon’s Prometheus in the threat of the transhumanists’ “undesirable 
utopianism”. 
In our interpretation of the opponents’ references to the Prometheus 
myth our knowledge of him and his tale thus accelerates and enriches our 
understanding of enhancement’s threat to human nature. However, what 
exactly does that human nature, soul or naturalness consist of? Is it indeed 
Fukuyama’s Factor X, “the species-typical characteristics shared by all human 
beings qua human beings”715? This is the second issue which can be clarified 
by the Promethean references and themes in the adversaries’ thinking. With our 
background knowledge of the Titan as symbol of a hubristic urge for crossing of 
limits, control, endless progress and perfection, we understand what they 
consider the valuable essence of human nature: limitations, lack of control and 
imperfection. 
If we compare the opponents’ idea of the human to the advocates’, at 
first sight the former is completely opposite to the latter: the human is not 
essentially Promethean, self-creation is anything but characteristically human 
and enhancement only destroys our nature. However, if we take a closer look, it 
is not that simple. As mentioned before, the basis upon which the advocates 
identify humanity as Promethean and self-designing is a conception of human 
nature as incomplete, that is, as essentially lacking, imperfect. Now we should 
note that so do the opponents. Both camps attach great value to that natural 
lack: somehow our frailty is our strength. The important difference is that their 
reasons for that high evaluation are widely divergent and lead to antithetical 
judgements and conclusions. The proponents of enhancement argue that our 
many deficiencies – ignorance, disease, mortality and other limits – are a 
precondition for improvement: the more improvement, the better, and so natural 
imperfection is good. For the adversaries human imperfection is also ineffably 
worthy, but for very different reasons. Humankind is at its best being flawed, 
because of the flaws as such. One step from the proponents’ argument is 
absent from the adversaries’. They miss out the part on improvement: 
imperfection leads directly to the better, for the imperfect condition is good as 
such. 
Prometheus is useful to the opponents to outline an ontology which is 
difficult to describe. Sandel calls upon the myth to express what it is that 
enhancement would destroy in human nature: “The Promethean impulse […] 
unsettles and erodes the gifted dimension of human experience”. He rejects this 
impulse because it does not acknowledge “the giftedness of life”, which is 
valuable precisely because of the human’s lack of control over life that it 
implies. This giftedness – fate, fortune, contingency – and, most of all, the 
human’s appreciation of this giftedness, is essential. For “[a]ppreciating the 
gifted quality of life constrains the Promethean project”: to be aware that “our 
talents and abilities are not wholly our doing” and that our deficiencies are 
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largely fate, is crucial for feelings of humility, solidarity and responsibility. If 
bioengineering would provide us with control over what used to be gifts and 
fortune, we would lose the first two sensitivities and dangerously expand the 
last one. Life’s contingency makes us humble and social towards other humans 
and critical towards the world, whereas, if the Promethean “drive to mastery” 
would turn us into “self-made” humans, we would lose these sensibilities and 
become responsible for our whole being. It would lead to the “one-sided triumph 
of willfulness over giftedness, of dominion over reverence, of molding over 
beholding”716. The world would become “inhospitable to the unbidden”; 
ballplayers would “find themselves “playing naked”; and parents would be 
“regarded as “flying blind””.717 I suspect that Sandel did not intentionally mean to 
draw this link, but here our knowledge of the Promethean history adds to our 
understanding of his ontology. For if we remember the correspondence I 
outlined above between Sandel’s view and the Gorgias moral, this gives us a 
more profound idea of why it is precisely this ‘unbiddenness’, ‘nakedness’ and 
‘blindness’ which is most precious about human nature. 
Kass’ passionate argument against dehumanization – and thus in favour 
of human nature as it is – also finds its ground in the value of human 
imperfection and he also calls upon Prometheus to explain what he believes 
that natural human state is. The Titan’s fire and chains make the people in 
Plato’s cave blind to “their true standing in the world and their absolute 
dependence on powers not of their own making and beyond their control”. Like 
Sandel, Kass appreciates the human’s “true standing” precisely because of this 
dependence, this lack of control – hence the Promethean reference. If we will 
take complete control over our “minds and hearts” and satisfy all our desires, 
we will lose “the essence of human nature”. In an article entitled “Ageless 
Bodies, Happy Souls” (2003) Kass further investigates what exactly makes 
human nature worth defending – a mere appeal to ‘the natural’ does not suffice. 
Humans have always been creatures that naturally look for ways to improve 
their lives, so what could be wrong with enhancement, with perfection? First, 
Kass argues, unpleasant memories or feelings are helpful for future responses 
and make up someone’s identity. Second, humans satisfy their longings not by 
the mere feeling of satisfaction but by desiring, working to fulfil that desire and 
in the end achieving it. The inherent worth of the natural lies in the fact that our 
activities aimed at self-improvement involve effort, choice, work and therefore 
meaning. If some form of enhancement would attain a specific goal – fulfil a 
wish or heal a wound – without us playing any role in achieving it, it will lose all 
significance. “Biotechnical (especially mental) “improvers”” will disrupt “the 
normal character of human being-at-work-in-the-world [...], which when fine and 
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full constitutes human flourishing”718. Human life is lived; and it is precisely this 
way of being in the world, including all performing and struggling, loving and 
howling “that make human life rich, deep and fulfilling” – “Promethean man will 
become also a contented cow”. Even finitude is essential: to be immortal would 
mean to be “something other than human”. We are mortal, have needs and 
desires, we are imperfect by nature. But that does not mean we are weak: it 
makes our lives meaningful, it makes us human.  
In his plea for human nature McNamee also appeals to imperfection and 
finitude and “Prometheanism” characterises the unnatural. As he says, “we are 
mortal beings. Our vulnerability to disease and death, far from something we 
can overcome or eliminate, represents natural limits both for morality and 
medicine generally”. Our mortality and vulnerability are not only invaluable, they 
are indispensable: McNamee dismisses “Hesiod’s Promethean project” 
because it implies the “denial of the necessity of limits in nature” 719. The human 
is imperfect by nature and as for Fukuyama, Sandel and Kass, this imperfect 
condition – endangered by the Promethean urge for infinite, boundary-crossing 
improvement – is of inestimable worth. 
To summarise, in an ontologically motivated interpretation of the 
opponents’ references to the Prometheus myth, my earlier research to the 
history, functions and themes of the myth accelerates and intensifies an 
understanding of something as difficult to phrase and understand as first, an 
immaterial threat to human nature and second, that concept of human nature 
itself. Our knowledge provides a background of relevant meanings and 
connotations and adds significance to the opponents’ conceptualisations and 
arguments by means of, for instance, implicit and perhaps even unintended 
links with particular historical versions of the myth. 
 
5.3.3. Ambiguity 
 
The idea of the incompleteness of the human as such and the fact that both 
advocates and opponents of enhancement attach such strong value to this 
natural lack, brings us to the last Promethean theme: ambiguity. Ambiguity is a 
defining feature of the debate, an examination of which will once more 
demonstrate the relevance, usefulness and clarifying nature of the myth of 
Prometheus. 
 A certain level of ambiguity is probably characteristic of any debate – if 
something was not ambiguous, would it generate a debate? However, 
ambiguity is the central issue the Enhancement Debate is concerned with – and 
this is not universal. Due to recent technological developments and the potential 
consequences for human enhancement, distinctions formerly considered as 
easily determinable have lost all clarity: the difference between human and 
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machine, the natural and artificial, progress and decline, therapy and 
enhancement, life and death, etc. In essence, what the debate’s participants 
mean to do is free themselves from the discomfort of the ambivalence in all 
these questions and establish certainty of meaning. They refuse to remain in 
vagueness; they take a particular stance and try to motivate their opponents to 
move over to their side. 
The character of the discussion thus very well accounts for the regular 
use of the Prometheus myth. As always, the broad range of faces of the myth’s 
protagonist, of his theft and creations allows the debater to shape it according to 
his own understanding and aims and so the same story is found useful by 
groups as antithetical as transhumanists and bioconservatives. The fact that 
they pick this tale to make their point makes it plausible that they are well aware 
of its ambiguous nature and it may even be the very reason why they choose it. 
In fact, as earlier in history, every time the myth appears at least one figure or 
theme has contrasting characteristics, meanings and values. 
The theme of knowledge, for instance, clearly outlines how ambiguity 
commands the attention of participants of the debate: how they strive to resolve 
that ambiguity; how they choose a position which, at first sight, allows them to 
achieve such a resolution; and how they employ the Prometheus myth in this 
process. All the participants I discussed appear to recognise (what I argued in 
4.2. is) the inherent ambivalence of knowledge and its value. This is 
demonstrated by their use of the myth: Promethean knowledge is depicted as 
the result of thievery, yet heroic and successful; as a partially beneficent gift, yet 
hubristic and dangerous. However, one camp accepts the insecurities and risks 
associated with gaining knowledge that is vastly superior to that which we 
currently have, and decides to defy the dangers. The other camp rejects these, 
although they do value and encourage the pursuit of vastly superior knowledge 
in particular areas, such as the human soul. The different debaters do then not 
recognise the ambivalence of knowledge in the sense that they accept it, but 
rather wish to prove that its nature is either unproblematically or seemingly 
ambivalent. For their aim is what I wish to call de-ambiguation: establish clarity 
in the chaotic assemblage of understandings and evaluations of wisdom, 
science, technology, etc. and convince their opponents of the validity of their 
stance. The proponents’ account is roughly that whatever the perils may be, the 
more knowledge, the better. There is nothing ambiguous about that. They do 
acknowledge the comparatively more dangerous and ethically confusing 
character of many new knowledge developments, but “why all the fuss?” 
(Stock). We simply have “to figure out how to use [our powers] wisely” (Stock) 
and see our alleged “moral free-fall” as a challenge rather than a threat 
(Dworkin) – just like Prometheus did and we have always done. They are 
convinced we will succeed in this, so, in the end, the ambivalent character of 
knowledge is no problem. In contrast, the bioconservatives hold that there 
certainly are limits to true and ethically valuable knowledge: thorough 
examination and reflection can clear up the observed ambiguity. Because of 
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such thorough examinations, they tend to offer more extensive discussion of the 
issue than the proponents do. I will thus address their ideas in greater detail. 
Kass highlights the ambivalent character of knowledge by characterising 
technology as tragedy: tragedy is “the poignantly human adventure of living in 
grand self-contradiction. In tragedy the failure is embedded in the hero’s 
success”720. And it is in this context that he juxtaposes the warming powers of 
Prometheus’ flames of knowledge and its destructive ones. Further, both Kass 
and Sandel simultaneously dismiss and encourage ignorance, something 
clearly visible in their use of the metaphor of ‘blindness’. Kass criticises the 
blinded ones in Plato’s cave since they miss essential knowledge, whereas 
Aeschylus’ blinding hopes are very valuable. Sandel rejects ‘unawareness’ of 
the giftedness of life, yet encourages parents to ‘fly blind’ and remain ignorant of 
their child’s genetics. Both debaters see the problem of ambiguity but try to 
separate the positive form of knowledge/ignorance from the negative one. And 
as we saw, the Prometheus figure provides a great means in the drawing of 
these boundaries: it is a way to place the hubristic, ever expanding knowledge 
opposite the more humble, non-commodifying, gift- and soul appreciating 
knowledge, which sometimes amounts to the wisdom of ignorance. 
McNamee’s paper in its entirety provides the most explicit example of the 
de-ambiguation process. He writes that in the face of the enhancement 
ambitions of (for instance) transhumanists, he will structure an ethical 
framework around Hesiod’s and Aeschylus’ interpretations of the Prometheus 
myth, for these “can help frame the moral limits of sports medicine”. Later, he 
charges his adversaries with ‘Prometheanism’ and says that 
 
“[i]n order to understand the charge [...] one might begin by asking ‘What is the myth of 
Prometheus?’ I think the better question is ‘whose myth of Prometheus should we 
concern ourselves with?’ [...] I merely use [Conacher’s and Kerényi’s accounts] for my 
own purpose of providing lenses to view the unrestrained enhancement ideology of 
TH”721. 
 
The above two quotations reflect – or, better, describe, almost word for word – 
the several steps of the process of de-ambiguation: a) McNamee observes the 
ambiguity of the novel knowledge and its moral worth, as well as of the different 
views on it; b) he sets himself the objective to examine that ambiguity and find a 
reference framework for the evaluation of the new sciences; c) he encourages 
dialogue d) he makes an effort to establish clarity; and e) he consciously 
chooses to hereby employ the myth of Prometheus, precisely because of its 
ambiguous nature. For in McNamee’s eyes, the fact that there is more than one 
interpretation of the tale mirrors the uncertainty with respect to the new 
technologies and the “unrestrained” enhancement ideas; and simultaneously 
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 Kass, Life, Liberty, and the Defence of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics, 48–49. 
721
 McNamee, “Whose Prometheus? Transhumanism, Biotechnology and the Moral Topography 
of Sports Medicine,” 189. My emphasis. 
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offers different “lenses” through which to look at these. It provides a convenient 
means to cope with the equivocality and “the unfettered use” of science and 
technology, because the process of figuring out what interpretation to focus on 
– or, better, focus with – will create transparency in what questions we should 
concern ourselves with and what we should guard against. McNamee tries to 
undo the myth of its ambiguity by placing the two interpretations side-by-side, 
separating hubris from daring and the “cause of all man’s woes” from the 
“saviour of mankind”. Thereby, he clarifies the meaning of Prometheanism: this 
should be understood as Hesiodic hubris – and Hesiodic hubris is what we 
should beware of in our dealing with and evaluation of the new sciences. By 
means of his analysis McNamee creates a framework which is demarcated by 
the metaphorical boundaries of “Hesiod’s Promethean project”. Although they 
do not yet have a tangible form, now that the boundaries have been labelled, 
the dialogue between the disputants can be started; and thereby the process is 
set in motion to find answers to the pressing questions, fill the boundaries with 
concrete content and “frame the moral limits” so that a “moral topography” may 
be established. 
In short, to both advocates and opponents of enhancement the 
Promethean story with its inexhaustible realm of possibilities is a useful 
instrument to handle the ambiguity of knowledge: they either choose the 
courageous stance and accept the potential perils and uncertainty; or they 
dismiss the hubristic stance and create a framework within which these 
possibilities can be investigated and their limits established. Of course, it is not 
just the ambiguity of knowledge with respect to which the myth plays its role. 
Ambiguity is interwoven with all themes addressed above, especially with 
human nature. As we saw, both advocates and opponents – intentionally or not 
– employ the myth to characterise their philosophical concepts of human nature. 
There turns out to be a striking overlap between their concepts, but a great 
difference in their evaluation. With respect to ambiguity this fact may be 
interpreted in two ways. First, it could be seen as another way in which the 
exceptional malleability of the Prometheus myth is useful to the debaters to 
mould it to fit their argument and resolve the ambiguity of the concept of 
humanity. Second, however, it could evoke the question whether they do not, 
on the contrary, just strengthen the ambiguity of that concept and undermine 
their own argument. The resulting definition of the human in both camps comes 
down to the naturally imperfect being, infinitely self-enhancing (advocates) or 
“being-at-work-in-the-world” (opponents). Whether this is appreciated or not, 
both subscribe to the fact that the human can change, evolve or transform in 
whatever way. This is however, a very undefined, ambiguous concept of the 
human, reminiscent of Anders’ statement that there exists no human nature, 
that the human is the continuously, ever-changing creation of his own world. Do 
the debaters not, by means of this ambivalent concept and in contrast to their 
aim, bring forward an idea of the impossibility to answer the question of the true 
nature of the human? Unanswerable not only for them, but for anyone 
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concerned with it? And as their moral stances are largely derived from their 
concept of human nature: do they then anything more than underline the 
impossibility to answer the question of what is the right step to take with respect 
to human enhancement? As McNamee says, the new technologies “need not 
require us to think a new ethics ab initio”722: the sources for their evaluation can 
already be found in Antiquity. However, the fact that we still look for our 
answers in sources that old; or that for as long as we know there has never 
been found an exhaustive definition of humanity or a moral agreed-upon by all 
humans – does that not prove exactly the opposite? Has the Prometheus myth 
not been so useful and clarifying after all? Perhaps, with its infinite amount of 
potential variations, the myth reveals nothing less than that until the day that the 
posthuman takes over, our philosophical concepts of the human will always 
remain ambivalent – and if the debaters are right, so will our ‘real’ being-in-the-
world. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By means of my analysis of the Prometheus references in the Enhancement 
Debate, in this chapter I tried to demonstrate first, the relevance of the myth in 
contemporary philosophy and second, the usefulness of my findings in 
disclosing essential concepts and convictions of the author referring to the 
myth. 
First, an extensive argument to support the claim that the Prometheus 
myth is still relevant in philosophy today is hardly needed. The regular 
occurrence of the myth in the Enhancement Debate and the serious context of 
passionate arguments and existential questions in which the myth is brought up 
prove that it is relevant and significant. The similarities in form and content 
between various historical interpretations of the myth and the participants’ 
interpretations, as well as the latter’s literal references to storytellers and 
philosophers from centuries past confirm the age-old roots of both the pro- and 
contra-enhancement conceptualisations and argumentation. It proves that the 
classical Promethean issues are still alive today and that the myth is interesting, 
meaningful and useful to the contemporary thinker, as it has always been. 
Second, I claimed that examining the debaters’ employment of the 
Prometheus myth with my research as point of departure would provide access 
to vital conceptualisations and convictions of the participants of the debate – 
pro- as well as contra-enhancement. My analysis of the (role of the) 
Promethean themes and functions in their references and thinking confirms this 
claim. In the Promethean references from both camps the symbolic meanings of 
fire, rebellion and creation are only partially explicit, yet as I have shown, 
significant in the debaters’ argumentation. I believe it is unnecessary to repeat 
the details of these symbolic meanings. Yet I do wish to briefly reiterate the key 
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points of my analysis based on the myth’s moral-ontological function/theme as 
well as on the theme of ambiguity. 
The advocates of enhancement attack the meaning and value opponents 
ascribe to the ‘natural’. To the former, Nature is the fiend who needs to be 
overcome, ‘the natural’ has no worth, and so a Fukuyaman argument on the 
human Factor X is considered a naturalistic fallacy. However, I argue that the 
statement that “stealing fire from the gods [...] is too characteristically human” 
(Stock) and a phrase such as “Let us be the New Prometheans” (Young) call 
this position into question. I show that these phrases imply an advocate concept 
of human nature, which teaches us an important point about their thinking. 
Nature does not per definition have no value, for in the context of human nature 
it does. The advocates’ concept of human nature has a strong ethical charge: to 
enhance ourselves is naturally human and therefore, this is what we ought to 
do.  
The adversaries of enhancement openly present their concept of human 
nature and emphasise the moral worth of its naturalness. Yet an analysis of the 
moral-ontological significance of their Promethean references clarifies two less 
explicit things. In the context of my research on the myth’s historical 
interpretations and themes, opponent phrases such as “a case of 
Prometheanism” (McNamee) or the Promethean “drive to mastery” (Sandel) 
accelerate and enrich our understanding of first, the threat of enhancement to 
human nature and second, what that human nature, soul or naturalness 
consists of. These phrases invoke characteristically Promethean meanings and 
associations. Although the concepts of the threat and the human are hard to 
explain and therefore much remains implicit in the debater’s text, against the 
background of these meanings they can nevertheless be understood more 
easily and in a most profound way. Prometheus’ hubris and punishment clarify 
the radical, “hyperagent” and frightening character of enhancement technology; 
and his creative, boundary-crossing urges explain the concept of the imperfect 
human. 
The above analysis of the references to Prometheus in both camps show 
that by employing my findings about the myth I have uncovered previously 
unclear yet essential, morally charged, ontological conceptualisations of the 
pro- as well as contra-enhancement debaters. Moreover, what I could call my 
‘Promethean knowledge’ can even add to the meaning of the debaters’ 
references, as I find (possibly unintended) links with specific historical variations 
on the story. 
I finished the chapter with a discussion of the theme of ambiguity. This 
once more confirmed the usefulness and revealing nature of (my findings on) 
the myth of Prometheus. The myth’s ambiguity is useful to the debaters 
because, as always throughout history, it enables them to mould the story to fit 
their argument. It enables them to (try to) resolve what is the central issue of the 
debate: the ambiguity evoked by contemporary technological developments, 
which are blurring boundaries of formerly clear dichotomies such as between 
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human and machine. The myth provides them with a means to de-ambiguate 
concepts and boundaries: they observe an ambiguous concept such as 
knowledge or human nature and use the story to either justify this ambiguity 
(advocates) or draw the boundaries they are missing (opponents), in order to 
support their argument with respect to the enhancement question. 
The myth’s ambiguity is revealing to us as it highlights the ambiguity of 
the main concepts of the debate – especially the one of human nature. What 
may at first sight appear useful malleability to the debaters to de-ambiguate the 
concept of the human may turn out to be the contrary. Both camps, using 
Prometheus’ tale, conclude with a definition of the imperfect, continuously 
evolving human, which fits what we know are the ancient, ever recurring and 
never resolved concepts of the essentially ambiguous human nature in 
Promethean history. 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
 
1. MYTHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS 
X Work has this function 
XX  Work’s function discussed in 4.1. 
 
AUTHOR/ 
WORK 
RELATION 
SOCIETY 
KNOWLEDGE 
FORMATION 
ONTOLOGICAL 
MEANING 
MORAL 
FUNCTION 
HESIOD: 
WORKS AND 
DAYS 
XX XX XX XX 
HESIOD: 
THEOGONY 
XX XX XX XX 
AESCHYLUS XX X X X 
PLATO: 
GORGIAS 
X XX X XX 
PLATO: 
PROTA-
GORAS 
X X XX X 
PLINY X X XX  
HYGINUS X X XX  
LUCIAN X X X X 
PAUSANIAS X X X  
OVID  X X  
HORACE  X XX XX 
PROPER-
TIUS 
 X X X 
TERTULLIAN XX X X X 
PLUTARCH   X  
EUHEME-
RUS 
X X X  
LACTAN-
TIUS 
 X XX X 
FULGEN-
TIUS 
 X X X 
ISIDORE X X X X 
COMESTOR X X X X 
NECKAM X X  X 
OVIDE 
MORALISÉ 
X X X X 
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AUTHOR/ 
WORK 
RELATION 
SOCIETY 
KNOWLEDGE 
FORMATION 
ONTOLOGICAL 
MEANING 
MORAL 
FUNCTION 
 
BOCCACCIO X X X X 
FICINO X X XX X 
PICO X X XX XX 
BOVELLES X X X X 
ERASMUS  X  XX 
ALCIATI X   X 
BACON XX XX X X 
HOBBES X X X X 
ROUSSEAU X X X X 
KANT X  X  
GOETHE X  X X 
BYRON X  X X 
P SHELLEY X  XX XX 
M SHELLEY X XX XX X 
MARX XX X X X 
NIETZSCHE X X X X 
FREUD X XX XX X 
GIDE X  XX XX 
KAFKA X X X X 
CAMUS X X X X 
ANDERS XX X X X 
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2. PROMETHEAN THEMES 
X Theme significant in this work 
XX Work’s theme discussed in 4.2. 
 
AUTHOR/ 
WORK 
FIRE REBELLION CREATION HUMAN 
NATURE 
AMBI-
GUITY 
 
HESIOD: 
WORKS AND 
DAYS 
XX XX X XX XX 
HESIOD: 
THEOGONY 
XX XX X XX XX 
AESCHYLUS XX XX XX XX XX 
PLATO: 
GORGIAS 
XX   XX XX 
PLATO: 
PROTA-
GORAS 
X  XX XX XX 
PLINY   XX   
HYGINUS X  XX   
LUCIAN X XX XX X XX 
PAUSANIAS X  X  X 
OVID   XX XX  
HORACE  XX XX XX X 
PROPERTIUS   XX XX XX 
TERTULLIAN   X   
PLUTARCH    XX  
EUHEMERUS   X   
LACTANTIUS   XX   
FULGENTIUS X   XX X 
ISIDORE   XX   
COMESTOR   X   
NECKAM XX  X  X 
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AUTHOR/ 
WORK 
FIRE REBELLION CREATION HUMAN 
NATURE 
AMBI-
GUITY 
 
OVIDE 
MORALISÉ 
XX  X   
BOCCACCIO XX  XX XX X 
FICINO X  XX XX XX 
PICO   XX XX  
BOVELLES XX  X XX X 
ERASMUS   X  X 
ALCIATI X XX XX   
BACON XX X X XX XX 
HOBBES X XX X XX XX 
ROUSSEAU  XX  X XX  
KANT   X X  
GOETHE  XX XX XX X 
BYRON XX XX X X X 
P. SHELLEY X XX XX XX X 
M. SHELLEY X XX XX XX X 
MARX  XX XX X X 
NIETZSCHE X XX X XX XX 
FREUD XX   XX X 
GIDE X XX X XX XX 
KAFKA X XX X X XX 
CAMUS X XX XX XX X 
ANDERS   X XX XX 
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